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"Af Hein Hayu Be-oto Ha-nes" (2)

Translated by David Silverberg 

B.  Minors

 

The Gemara says in Masekhet Pesachim (108b):

 

"Everyone is obligated in these four cups: men, women and children.  Rabbi Yehuda said: What purpose is served by having children drink wine?  Rather, we distribute to them roasted grains and nuts on Erev Pesach in order that they do not sleep, and they will ask [questions at the seder].  It is said of Rabbi Akiva that he would distribute roasted grains and nuts to the children on Erev Pesach in order that they would not sleep, and they would ask."

 

The Rashbam there explains the reason behind children's inclusion in the obligation of arba kosot: "For they, too, were redeemed."  This resembles the reason given by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi – "for they, too, were included in that miracle."  I might add that this applies even within the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who asks, "What purpose is served by having children drink wine?"  Even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that children must be included in the seder, only in his view, they must be included in a manner suitable to them.

 

     From arba kosot we come to Megilla reading.  The mishna comments in Masekhet Megilla (2:4): "Everyone is suitable to read the Megilla, except for the deaf-mute, the mentally disabled, and minors.  Rabbi Yehuda allows a minor [to read]."  The meaning of this mishna is subject to a debate among the Rishonim.  Tosefot explain that the two positions in the mishna argue with regard to a "katan she-higi'a le-chinukh" – a child who has already reached the age of education in mitzvot.  The dispute in the mishna surrounds the question as to whether a minor, who is obligated in mitzvot only mi-de'rabbanan (by force of the rabbinic obligation of chinukh), can read on behalf of adults, who are also obligated mi-de'rabbanan, and thereby fulfill their obligation on their behalf.  Tosefot describe the child's obligation as a "double de-rabbanan," in that the obligation of Megilla reading itself constitutes a rabbinic obligation, and minors' obligation in mitzvot in general exists only on the level of de-rabbanan.  The debate between the first view in the mishna and Rabbi Yehuda is thus whether a "double de-rabbanan" can fulfill the obligation on behalf of a "single de-rabbanan."[17] Other Rishonim, however, such as the Ravya and Rashba, explain, based on the sugya in the Yerushalmi, that Rabbi Yehuda's position evolves from his premise that children, too, may read the Megilla because "they, too, were included in that miracle."  The Yerushalmi, commenting on this mishna, records the following: "Bar Kapara says, one must read it before women and before children, for they, too, where included in the threat.  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did just that: he gathered his children and members of his household and read it before them."[18]

 

     On the basis of this passage in the Yerushalmi, the Ravya writes (569):

 

"However, it appears to me that since it attributed the reason to the fact that they were included in the threat, even a child who has not reached the age of education, but is capable of understanding, must hear Megilla reading, as it is said, 'since he is like women and ignoramuses,' and it concludes, 'Rather, pirsumei nisa' – meaning, that he knows how to ask and the miracle is publicized to them."

 

The Rashba, employing the Yerushalmi's terminology, writes: "Rabbi Yehuda, who here permits [a minor to read] – the reason is that minors, too, were included in the threat.  This is why we do not find that he argues concerning the reading of hallel or 'perisat shema'."[19]

 

     As opposed to Tosefot, who viewed the debate in the mishna as a general dispute regarding a minor's ability to fulfill an obligation on behalf of others, the Ravya and Rashba hold that Rabbi Yehuda's position applies strictly to Megilla reading, "because minors, too, were included in the threat."

 

     Regarding Chanuka candles, the Gemara states explicitly that children do not light Chanuka candles.  Just prior to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's ruling with regard to women's obligation, the Gemara says in Masekhet Shabbat (23a):

 

"Now that we have concluded that the lighting [rather than the placing of the candles] constitutes the fulfillment of the mitzva, if a deaf-mute, mentally disabled person, or minor lights – he has accomplished nothing.  A woman certainly lights, for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Women are obligated in Chanuka candles, for they, too, were included in that miracle."

 

The Gemara thus explicitly rules that we cannot apply Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's rule to minors, and we must draw a distinction between women and minors in this regard.

 

     The Ba'al Ha-ittur, however, qualifies this assertion: "It stands to reason that [this is true only] regarding [a child] who has not reached the age of education; when, however, he reaches the age of education, a custom exists, and we follow the custom – we learn in Megilla."[20]  The text of the Ba'al Ha-ittur seems to have been corrupted, so we cite here the Ran's paraphrase of his comments: "However, the Ba'al Ha-ittur z"l wrote that if he reached the age of education, he may [light Chanuka candles], but it all depends on the custom, as it says in the Yerushalmi in Megilla, 'From here on – they established that children may read on behalf of the congregation."[21]  The Ba'al Ha-ittur builds his theory on the basis of Rabbi Yehuda's view allowing a minor to read the Megilla.  His comments imply that in his view, we may compare the halakha of a minor in the context of Chanuka candles to his status with respect to Megilla.

 

     It thus emerges from a combination of various sources that we include minors in these three mitzvot because of the factor of "af hen hayu be-oto ha-nes."

 

C.  The Poor

 

The mishna states towards the beginning of the tenth chapter of Masekhet Pesachim: "Even the poor among Israel may not eat until he sits down [for the seder].  And they may not give him fewer than four cups of wine – even from the charity plate."  This halakha is codified by the Rambam in Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (7:7).  The Rambam does not, however, cite this halakha in the context of the laws of charity in Hilkhot Matenot Aniyim.  It appears that this halakha does not stem from the standard framework of the halakhot of tzedaka.  In the seventh chapter of Hilkhot Matenot Aniyim, the Rambam rules that all needs of the poor must be cared for.  All his examples, however, involve physical or material needs.  Seemingly, the laws of tzedaka do not include the obligation to provide the spiritual needs of a poor person.  It follows, then, that the obligation to provide the poor with four cups of wine for the seder is not included in the standard laws of tzedaka, but rather constitutes an independent obligation.  This emerges clearly from the Rambam's comments in Hilkhot Chanuka (4:12):

 

"The mitzva of Chanuka candles is a particularly beloved mitzva.  A person must be meticulous in regard to it in order to make known the miracle and add to the praise of God and thanksgiving to Him for the miracles He performed for us.  Even if one has nothing to eat, other than from charity, he must borrow or sell his clothing to purchase oil and candles and light."

 

The Maggid Mishneh there writes:

 

"It appears that he derived this from that which is explained in the seventh chapter of Hilkhot Chametz U-matza, that even the poor among Israel may not have fewer than four cups.  The reason is because of pirsumei nisa; all the more so regarding Chanuka candles, which takes precedence over kiddush."

 

It clearly emerges from these comments that a person who cannot afford food to eat is generally exempt from mitzvot on grounds of "oness" (extenuating circumstances).[22]  When it comes to mitzvot involving pisumei nisa, however, Halakha includes a poor person because of this factor of pirsumei nisa.[23]  I would add that regarding Purim, the obligation to include the poor is explicit already in Megillat Ester itself, within the framework of the mitzva of matenot aniyim (gifts to the poor – Ester 9:22).  We thus find that with regard to these three mitzvot, a poor person, too, must participate, because the standard exemption does not apply to the obligation of pirsumei nisa.

 

     We have seen, then, that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi's halakha obligating women in the mitzva of pirsumei nisa actually establishes a much broader halakha, that we cannot apply standard exemptions when dealing with the obligation to publicize a miracle that occurred for a person.  The regular framework of exemptions which absolves women, minors and those without sufficient means does not take effect with regard to the mitzva of pirsumei nisa.  The beneficiary of a miracle must acknowledge his miracle and publicize the Almighty's kindness towards him.

 

D.  "Pirsum" Characteristics of These Mitzvot

 

Towards the beginning of our discussion, I noted that the indicator that these three mitzvot are essentially mitzvot of pirsumei nisa is the berakha they all share – the berakha of "she-asa nisim."  In conclusion, I would like to point to other characteristics relating to "pirsum" (publicizing) shared by these mitzvot.

 

   "Pirsum," or "publicizing," means making known to others.  When we assess the characteristics of these three mitzvot, we detect that they all involve addressing other people, to whom we wish to publicize the miracle that occurred to us.

 

     Let us begin with the four cups of wine drunk at the seder.  It stands to reason that when Chazal spoke of four cups, they referred to the general context of the seder.  Given that we recite the Haggada within the framework of the four cups of wine, these cups symbolize the entire context of the evening, the focal point being the mitzva of "sippur Yetziat Mitzrayim" (telling the story of the Exodus).[24]  When the aforementioned mishna in Masekhet Pesachim established that a poor person must also drink four cups of wine, it presumably includes the poor in the obligation of sippur Yetziat Mitzrayim, as well.[25]  Clearly, this mitzva is entirely geared towards retelling the story to others – to one's children.  The entirety of this mitzva involves the transmission of the story of Exodus and our sense of identification with it to the next generation.  Therefore, the Torah consistently describes this mitzva in the form of a parent telling of the Exodus to his children, and this is true in our oral tradition, as well.  The beraita in Masekhet Pesachim (116a) states: 

 

"If one's son is intelligent – he asks him.  If he is not intelligent – his wife asks him.  Otherwise, he asks himself.  Even two Torah scholars who know the laws of Pesach – ask one another." 

 

The beraita describes the entire framework of this mitzva as one of questions and answers.  Even if a person conducts the seder alone, the beraita requires that he "ask himself."  He must act simultaneously as the questioner and the responder.

 

     Regarding Chanuka candles, the mitzva requires placing them outside the doorway of one's home.  The candles face the public domain and publicize the miracle to them.  Among the unique halakhot of Chanuka candles is the berakha recited when seeing them.[26]  This halakha expresses the "dialogue" between the one publicizing the miracle and the viewer who absorbs the message conveyed by the candles and recites a berakha over it.

 

     With regard to Megilla reading, too, it is worth noting the formulation of the aforementioned halakha in the Yerushalmi:

 

"Bar Kapara says, one must read it before women and before children, for they, too, where included in the threat.  Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did just that: he gathered his children and members of his household and read it before them."

 

     The Behag writes that a woman may not read the Megilla for men to fulfill their obligation on their behalf.[27]  The explanation of this ruling appears in the Ravya (569), who writes that women are obligated to hear the Megilla, not to read the Megilla.  This approach corresponds to the formulation in the Yerushalmi.  Some Acharonim explained on this basis that the mitzva of Megilla consists of two parts: reading and hearing.[28]  It turns out, then, that regarding Megilla reading, too, the dimension of "pirsum" directed towards others is manifest in this two-tiered obligation.

 

NOTES:

 

17. See Tosefot, Megilla 19b, s.v. ve-Rabbi Yehuda makhshir.

 

18. Yerushalmi, Megilla 2:5, 73b.

 

19. Rashba's chiddushim to Megilla, 19b, s.v. ha di-tenan chutz mei-cheresh shoteh ve-katan, C.Z. Dimitrovsky edition, p.120.

 

20. Sefer Ha-ittur, Rabbi Meir Yona edition, Tzilum Yerushalayim Publications, 5747, vol. 2, Aseret Ha-diberot, Laws of Chanuka, 115b.

 

21. Ran on the Rif, Shabbat 10a in the Rif, s.v. hai ner Chanuka.

 

22. Although this is undoubtedly correct based on the comments of the Maggid Mishneh, it gives rise to considerable difficulty.  Why should we not include a person's spiritual needs under the category of a poor person's needs that others are commanded to provide ("sufficient for whatever he needs" – Devarim 15:8)?  Why should we deem the purchase of mitzva objects that one lacks the financial wherewithal to acquire, any less important than the purchase of clothing or means of transportation?  This seems to demonstrate that mitzvot are not considered a person's personal needs, and thus do not fall under the category of "whatever he needs."  A similar outlook is reflected in the Rambam's explanation as to the origin of birkot ha-mitzva, in Hilkhot Berakhot (1:3): "Just as we recite a berakha over benefit [such as before eating and drinking], so do we recite berakhot over every mitzva, and only then perform it."  As I heard from my grandfather, Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik zt"l, this passage implies that birkot ha-mitzva, like birkot ha-nehenin, bear the status and quality of a "matir" – that they cause something to be permitted.  Meaning, one must approach mitzvot as belonging to the Almighty so long as he has not recited a berakha and received permission to fulfill the given mitzva.  This outlook is reflected in the obligation of tzedaka, too, which works on the assumption that mitzva objects are not classified as a person's needs.

 

23. An important distinction exists in the Rambam's writings between the four cups of Pesach and Chanuka.  Whereas with regard to the four cups he cites the mishna's formulation, "They may not give him fewer than four cups of wine," in discussing Chanuka candles he establishes that "he must borrow or sell his clothing to purchase oil and candles and light."  He thus distinguishes between the two mitzvot: whereas the obligation to pay for the four cups is cast upon others, regarding Chanuka candles the poor person himself bears the obligation.  The Rambam's formulation implies that a poor person cannot ask others to finance his purchase of oil and candles.  The explanation for this difference is simple.  Since we do not include the purchase of mitzva objects within the framework of the mitzva of tzedaka, we cannot ask others to pay for the poor person's Chanuka candles.  The unique obligation upon the poor person to light Chanuka candles, stemming from this mitzva's status as a mitzva of pirsumei nisa, casts upon him the responsibility to pay for the candles.  Fundamentally, this should be the case concerning the four cups of the seder, as well.  However, since this mitzva involves the poor person's menu of food and drink, consequently, once Halakha establishes the obligation to drink four cups of wine, we then see in this the poor person's menu for that night.  He may therefore collect the funding from charity.  We may prove this from the fact that the mishna speaks of the poor person's collection from the "tamchuy" – the public food charity, which provides specifically food and does not give money for the performance of mitzvot.  Clearly, then, the ability to collect from others for the four cups is based upon the year-round collection of food from charity.

 

24. The Tur writes in Orach Chayim (472): "Both men and women are obligated in them [the four cups], as well as in all mitzvot that apply that night, such as matza and marror."  And the Beit Yosef there writes: "Women are obligated in the four cups for they, too, were included in that miracle.  For this same reason we must conclude that they are obligated in all the mitzvot that apply that night, as our rabbi [the Tur] wrote."

 

25. This becomes all the more reasonable when we take into account a point made by Rav Chayim of Brisk.  He notes that Tosefot (Pesachim 99b, s.v. lo yifchatu lo) appear to wrestle with the question as to whether the obligation of four cups consists of drinking the wine, or the recitation associated with the four cups.  If this obligation involves the recitation of the Haggada, then clearly the mitzva of four cups refers to the content of the text recited at the night of the seder.  For further elaboration, see Chiddushei Maran Riz Halevi on the Rambam, Hilkhot Chametz U-matza 7:9.

 

26. For further clarification concerning the berakha recited over seeing Chanuka candles, see the article by my father and teacher, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, "Be-inyan Chiyuv Suma Be-ner Chanuka," in "Hadarom," vol. 50 (5740), pp.184-206.

 

27. See Halachot Gedolot, Hildesheimer edition, Jerusalem, 5732, p.406.

 

28. See "Harerei Kedem," 191, 193.

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