SALT | Bamidbar 5784 - 2024

MOTZAEI

A famous Midrash tells of the jealousy harbored by the other nations towards Benei Yisrael when the latter received the Torah.  Why, the nations wondered, did the Almighty choose to establish a unique relationship specifically with Benei Yisrael?  The Midrash tells that the Almighty replied, "Bring to me your family records just as My children do."  The Midrash cites the verse from Parashat Bamidbar, "they registered according to the clans of their ancestral houses" (1:18).  Somehow, it was this genealogical record-keeping that distinguished Benei Yisrael and rendered them uniquely deserving of the Torah. Why?

Rav Yisrael Yaakov Fischer zt"l (who passed away just several months ago) explains that the key to the Torah's perpetuation lay specifically in this quality of genealogy.  A nation can receive the Torah only if it makes a commitment to convey the Torah to the next generation, who will in turn pledge its commitment to passing the tradition along to their children.  Such a process, however, requires that the younger generation look to the older generation with respect and a sense of authority.  If children view their parents as archaic, unsophisticated and out-of-date, no transmission of Torah can possibly take place.  The response to the complaint of the other nations, therefore, was this quality of "they registered according to the clans of their ancestral houses."  The fact that Benei Yisrael proudly trace their family records back generations, that we take pride in our family origins, renders us reliable transmitters of the tradition of the Torah.

We might add that the Midrash in Vayikra Rabba (32) commends Benei Yisrael for using the same names as they had generations earlier.  The Midrash writes, "Reuven and Shimon went down [to Egypt] and Reuven and Shimon ascended [from Egypt]."  It is noteworthy that the Midrash emphasizes the maintenance of the names after the Exodus from Egypt.  One may have expected that upon emerging as free men from slavery and humiliation, Benei Yisrael would dissociate themselves from their past entirely and view themselves as beginning a brand new people and nationality.  They would eliminate any memory or vestige of their previous national existence and start completely anew.  But, as the Midrash admiringly observes, this is not what happened. The newly emancipated slaves made no attempt to forget Reuven and Shimon, they had no interest in establishing a new national identity.  They still saw themselves as the descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov, they retained their commitment to their heritage.

Such a nation was indeed worthy of receiving the Torah. 

SUNDAY 

Towards the beginning of Parashat Bamidbar, God orders Moshe to conduct a census of Benei Yisrael, and He names the twelve tribal leaders assigned to help oversee the process.  After the listing the twelve names, the Torah tells, "Moshe and Aharon took those men, who were designated by name" (1:17).  Rashi, commenting on the words, "asher nikevu" ("who were designated"), writes, "[who were designated] for him here by name." What commentary does Rashi seek to add to the verse?  What difficulty has he resolved for us with this brief, ambiguous remark?

The Maharal of Prague, in his "Gur Aryeh," suggests that the phrase, "asher nikevu be-sheimot" ("who were designated by name") could be taken to mean that these men had already been singled out previously for some role or distinction.  One might have thought, then, that Moshe appointed these men not because of God's command, but rather because of their preexisting stature.  Rashi therefore clarifies that Moshe chose these men solely on the basis of God's instruction, and not due to any previous position they held.

A particularly sharp explanation of Rashi's commentary is cited in the name of the "Divrei Chakhamim."  Rashi here seeks to resolve a much different difficulty, one which arises from the very first word of this verse: "Va-yikach" – Moshe and Aharon "took" these men.  In the very next verse, we read that "Ve-et kol ha-eida hikhilu" – Moshe and Aharon ASSEMBLED the entire nation.  This terminology of "hikhilu," assembling, is associated with the sounding of the chatzotzrot, the trumpets used for calling together the nation (see later, Bamidbar 10:1-10).  The verses here imply that for some reason, Moshe and Aharon gathered the nation for the census by sounding the chatzotzrot ("hikhilu"), whereas the tribal leaders were "taken," they were summoned by some other means.  Now in the section dealing with the chatzotzrot, we find that these trumpets were to be used for gathering together the tribal leaders, as well (see 10:4 – the sounding of a single trumpet served as a call to the tribal leaders).  Why, then, did Moshe and Aharon not sound the chatzotzrot to summon the nesi'im (tribal leaders) for duty with regard to the census?

It is this question that Rashi answers in this brief passage: "who were designated for him HERE by name."  This is the first time these men were assigned to the task of tribal leadership; they were designated and singled out only here, when God ordered the taking of a census.  Therefore, Moshe and Aharon had to summon these men personally (or through messengers), and not by sounding the trumpets.  Since these twelve men had never served as nesi'im in the past, they would not have known to come to Moshe when hearing the sounding of the trumpet. 

MONDAY 

The final verses of Parashat Bamidbar instruct the kohanim to carefully oversee the work of the Levite family of Kehat.  As described at length in this parasha, the tribe of Levi was assigned the task of transporting the Mishkan and its accessories during travel.  The different components of the Mishkan were distributed among the three Levite families – Gershon, Kehat and Merari, with Kehat being charged with the responsibility of carrying the most sacred items, including the aron.  Given the danger involved in dealing with such sacred items, God issues a specific warning to the kohanim to ensure that the Kehatites are properly arranged so that they will not come "li-r'ot ke-vala et ha-kodesh" (4:20).  This difficult phrase seems to denote the viewing of the sacred items in an inappropriate context or manner.  But what does this phrase means precisely?  The word "ke-vala" clearly evolves from the root "b.l.a.," which means swallowing, or devouring.  What does the term mean in this context?

Some commentators, including Rav Saadya Gaon, Rashi and Ibn Ezra, translate "ke-vala" as, "during the covering of… "  Meaning, the root "b.l.a." can also mean covering. The etymology of such a translation is clear.  When one swallows, he takes the food out of sight, he renders it no longer visible. This verse thus means that the kohanim are to ensure that the transporters from Kehat do not come to take the sacred items until they are covered and fully out of view.

Rashbam and Chizkuni, however, explain differently, citing several verses implying that "b.l.a." means "dismantle," or take apart. For example, the verse in Eikha (2:2) laments, "Bila Hashem… et kol ne'ot Yaakov" – "The Lord has laid waste… all the habitations of Yaakov."  This translation, too, can easily be traced to the original meaning of "b.l.a.," as the process of eating and swallowing involves essentially breaking up the food into small particles.  According to this approach, the verse means that the Kehatites may not witness the dismantling of the sacred items.

One question, however, arises from the explanation of Rashbam and Chizkuni.  Why does the Torah emphasize specifically the dismantling of the aron and other sacred items as the focus of our concern?  According to the first approach, we understand that the kohanim must make sure to have the keilim completely out of view before the workers from Kehat come to transport them.  But according to Rashbam and Chizkuni, why does the Torah stress that the Kehatites may not observe the dismantling process itself?

A beautiful explanation appears in the work "Tishbi" by Rav Shraga Pollack (Hungary, 1927).  The aron was a magnificent sight to behold, an accurate and worthy symbolic representation of the awe and grandeur we must associate with the Almighty's Sanctuary. But once even the most spectacular edifice become dismantled, allowing one to view the independent components from which it is made, much of the majesty and grandeur is lost.  The process of disassembly could potentially undermine the people's awe and respect for the given object, as it exposes the small, unimpressive pieces from which it is built.  This process was therefore not to be viewed by anyone other than the kohanim, who, given their unique stature and piety, could be trusted with disassembling the sacred keilim without losing sight of their exalted nature. The Torah therefore warns that the Kehatites may not approach the keilim until after the dismantling process is completed.

Rav Pollack concludes his discussion by extending this theory to our perspective on Kelal Yisrael.  If we look at only individual Jews or groups of Jews, we may feel disappointed and discouraged about our people.  These, we might ask, are the type of people of which our nation consists?  These people are entrusted with God's Torah? We must remember, however, that the true grandeur and greatness of our people can be seen only from a broader perspective, when considering the nation as a whole.  The final product is far greater than the sum total of all its parts, and when we consider all of Am Yisrael as a single body, we can, indeed, appreciate the greatness of our people. 

TUESDAY 

In Parashat Bamidbar, the Torah describes the function of the Levi'im, who were charged with the responsibility of transporting the Mishkan as Benei Yisrael traveled through the wilderness.  In this context, God issues a stern warning to the rest of the nation: "ha-zar ha-karev yumat" – a non-Levi who performs the task of the Levi'im will be put do death (1:51).  This warning is repeated later in Sefer Bamidbar, in Parashat Korach (18:7), regarding the functions served by the kohanim.  Anyone who attempts to usurp the roles of the kohanim or Levi'im was deserving of capital punishment (though only through God Himself, not through the Bet-Din).

This verse is cited in a famous story told in the Gemara (Shabbat 31a) about a certain gentile who sought to undergo conversion to Judaism for less than altruistic motives.  The Gemara tells that this man happened to walk outside a Jewish school as the teacher taught the students the verses in Sefer Shemot dealing with the bigdei kehuna, the glamorous garments worn by the kohanim in the Bet Ha-mikdash.  The gentile asked the teacher who it is that earns this great privilege of wearing the eight special garments described. The teacher informed him that these garments were worn only by the kohen gadol.  The gentile then decided that he wanted to convert so that he can become a kohen gadol and wear these lavish garments of glory.

He came before the great sage Shammai and said, "Convert me so that I can be kohen gadol."  Shammai angrily drove him away.  The gentile then came before Hillel and expressed his request.  Rather than reject him, Hillel agreed to accept him as a convert. (The Gemara says that at this point Hillel actually converted him.  As the Maharsha points out, however, halakha prohibits accepting converts who seek to join the Jewish people for ulterior motives – such as honor and prestige. The Maharsha therefore explains the Gemara to mean that Hillel accepted his "application" for conversion, though did not actually perform the conversion process until later.)  Hillel added, however, that he cannot earn the position of kohen gadol until he studies the guidelines and protocols involved. He therefore instructed the prospective convert to study the Torah.

The convert began his studies and ultimately arrived at our verse – "ha-zar ha-kareiv yumat" – "the foreigner who approaches shall die."  He suddenly realized that perhaps he, as a convert, a "foreigner," might very well be excluded from the priesthood.  This, of course, would undermine the very purpose behind his conversion.

He hurried back to Hillel and asked, "To whom does this verse refer?"

"Even to David, the King of Israel," Hillel replied.

As the Gemara describes, the gentile thought to himself, "If all of Israel, who are beloved to the Almighty, are barred from the sacred service with the exception of the single tribe specifically chosen for this distinction, then certainly I, a convert, cannot possibly assume this position."  He completed his conversion and later thanked Hillel for bringing him "under the wings of the Shekhina."

What about this verse, "the foreigner who approaches shall die," made such an impression upon this gentile?

Perhaps the underlying message encapsulated by these three words, "ha-zar ha-kareiv yumat," together with Hillel's observation that it applied to even King David, reshaped this gentile's entire orientation and outlook concerning the nature of religious service.  As demonstrated by his initial attraction, he viewed religion as a means to achieve prestige and grandeur.  The service of God was, in his mind, not a value unto itself, but rather a medium by which one can satisfy his longings for glory.  This remained his perspective until he learned that even David, the King of Israel, despite his piety and royal stature, was barred from performing the service of the Levi'im and kohanim.  Even the most beloved of God's subjects are not necessarily permitted to enter His chamber and ascend to the highest positions of prominence.  At this point, perhaps, the gentile understood that to be "beloved" to the Almighty does not mean earning honor and glory, but rather the opportunity to obey His commands.  The goal of the Jew is not to don the garments of the kohen gadol, but to act in a manner befitting a "kingdom of kohanim and sacred nation" (Shemot 19).  It was this message, perhaps, that brought this gentile, in his own words, "under the wings of the Shekhina," that taught him that seeking honor and prestige is a far less worthwhile pursuit than is living a life of devotion to God and His laws. 

WEDNESDAY

Parashat Bamidbar contains a brief reference to the death of Aharon's two eldest sons, Nadav and Avihu: "Nadav and Avihu died before the Lord when they offered alien fire before the Lord in the wilderness of Sinai, and they had no sons" (3:4).  This verse informs us of the transgression for which Nadav and Avihu met an early death – their offering of an "eish zara" (foreign fire) – and that they had no children.  From the juxtaposition of these two pieces of information, the Midrash (Tanchuma Yashan, Acharei Mot 7) concludes that Nadav and Avihu were punished, among other reasons, for refusing to marry and beget children.  For this reason, the Torah associates their death with the fact that they left no progeny.

On the basis of this Midrash, the Ketav Sofer suggests a homiletic reading of this verse, one which sheds light on the nature of the sin committed by Nadav and Avihu and its underlying significance (a topic discussed several times already in our "S.A.L.T." series).  The Ketav Sofer writes that we may read the verse as follows: "Nadav and Avihu died… when they offered an alien fire… - namely, that they had no sons."  Meaning, their decision to refrain from marital life itself constituted a "foreign fire."  Nadav and Avihu not only brought a physical offering for which they were punished, but they brought a figurative offering, as well, namely, a willed decision to never have a family.

What does this figurative offering mean?  How was their refusal to marry an "offering" to God?

The Ketav Sofer explains that Nadav and Avihu decided not to marry in order to more fully serve their Creator.  The burden of responsibility brought on by family life, they figured, would prevent them from reaching their fullest spiritual potential.  Their decision was thus driven by the sincerest of motives, the desire for closeness with God and a life of spirituality unencumbered by the pressures of family life. 

This, the Ketav Sofer writes, constitutes a "foreign fire," an unlawful offering to God.  One may not attempt to achieve closeness with the Creator by sidestepping His own rules, by seeking holiness in ways that contradict divine law.  Nadav and Avihu brought their offering as a sincere expression of love and desire for closeness with God, but it violated a law that God Himself legislated.  A violation of God's law cannot possibly enhance the relationship between Him and the violator, no matter how sincere the motives.  Similarly, Nadav and Avihu decided not to marry despite the mitzva to reproduce.  Once again, they made a misguided attempt at holiness through foreign means, in a manner that God Himself never sanctioned, let alone prescribe.

We might add that significantly, the Torah never alludes to this wrongdoing of Nadav and Avihu – their decision not to marry – earlier, in Sefer Vayikra. Whereas there the Torah speaks exclusively about the unlawful offering they brought, here, in Sefer Bamidbar, the Torah for the first time makes a subtle reference to their having intentionally remained unmarried.  The explanation seems to lie in the different points of focus in Vayikra and Bamidbar. In the first half of Vayikra, where we first read of the death of Nadav and Avihu (10:1-2, 16:1), the Torah deals almost exclusively with issues related to the Mishkan, sacrifices, and so on. Naturally, then, the violation of Nadav and Avihu is described as an infringement on the sanctity of the Mishkan. Here, however, in Parashat Bamidbar, amidst the Torah's discussion of the census and arrangement of the Israelite camp, the sages find a reference to a different misdeed of Nadav and Avihu – their infringement upon the camp, upon the nation.  If the "foreign fire" constituted a sin against God and His Sanctuary, their refusal to marry was a sin against Am Yisrael and their camp.  Nadav and Avihu saw their place in the Mishkan alone; they closed themselves off from the camp at large.  They were not prepared to leave the holiness of God's service for "normal" family life, for the building of a home among Benei Yisrael.  The lesson conveyed in the Chumash is that even within the sacred grounds of the Mishkan, one mustn't neglect his responsibilities towards the "machaneh," towards the nation as a whole. 

THURSDAY

The second section of Parashat Bamidbar discusses the various tasks assigned to the three families of Levi'im, specifically, which components of the Mishkan each family was responsible for transporting during travel.  The family of Kehat (as we discussed earlier this week) was assigned the most sacred items, namely, the ark, table, menora, and altars, as well as all their accessories.  The verse describing their duties adds one more item that they had to transport: the "masakh and all its work [accessories]" (3:31).  At first glance, this refers to the "masakh petach ha-ohel," the curtain at the entranceway of the Mishkan (see Shemot 26:36).  The problem, however, is that just several verses earlier (3:25), this curtain is listed among the items under the charge of the family of Gershon.  If Gershon bears responsibility for transporting the "masakh petach ha-ohel," then to what does the Torah refer when it assigns to Kehat the duty of carrying the "masakh"?

It was this question, presumably, that prompted Rashi to interpret "masakh" not as the curtain covering the Mishkan, but rather to mean the "parokhet," the curtain inside the Mishkan that divided between its two chambers (the "kodesh" and "kodesh ha-kodashim" – see Shemot 26:31-33).  Rashi cites proof to the fact that even the parokhet is sometimes called a "masakh" from a verse towards the end of Sefer Shemot (40:21).

Ibn Ezra, however, adopts a different approach, noting that "many were confused regarding the interpretation" of this phrase.  He writes, "But the truth is clear, that it refers to the masakh at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, 'and all its work' – [this refers to] its ropes [with which it was held in place]." Unfortunately, however, Ibn Ezra does not address the obvious difficulty latent within this interpretation, as noted earlier, that the masakh of the entranceway is explicitly listed as part of the charge of the family of Gershon.  How, then, can Ibn Ezra claim that transporting the masakh was the duty of Kehat?

Rav Meshulam Rath, in his work of responsa, "Kol Mevaser" (2:39), discusses this question and advances a bold theory to explain these otherwise problematic comments of Ibn Ezra.  He speculates that a printing error befell the text of Ibn Ezra's commentary, and that the original text included the letter "khof," which means "like," or "similar to," before the word "masakh." We should thus read Ibn Ezra's commentary as follows: "It is like the masakh at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting, and all its accessories – [this means] the ropes."  With this slight emendation, Rav Rath suggests, we may arrive at an entirely new understanding of what issue Ibn Ezra addresses here.  The problem he raises is not, as we have assumed, the appearance of the masakh in the charges to both Gershon and Kehat.  Ibn Ezra takes for granted Rashi's interpretation, that "masakh" here actually refers to the parokhet.  The problem in this verse has to do with the term, "ve-khol avodato" – and all its accessories.  Which accessories are these?  Instinctively, we might assume that this refers to the ropes (see 3:26). Seemingly, however, the parokhet did not have ropes.  The hangings in the courtyard (Rashi, 4:26) and the curtain in the entranceway to the courtyard (Rashi, end of Teruma) had ropes to hold them down in the wind. Presumably, the masakh at the entranceway to the Mishkan, which was also outdoors and thus exposed to the wind, also had ropes.  The parokhet, however, was situated inside the Mishkan, and thus, seemingly, there was no need for ropes to hold it down.  Ibn Ezra therefore observes that much confusion arose concerning the expression "ve-khol avodato," because commentators did not understand to what this refers.

He thus explains that this masakh, the parokhet, was "like the masakh to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting," meaning, it, too, had ropes to hold it down. Although no wind blew inside the Mishkan, it was nevertheless a demonstration of honor to the Mishkan for the parokhet to be tied down to the ground rather than hang freely.  The parokhet therefore had ropes just like the other curtains of the Mishkan, and to this the verse refers when it says, "le-khol avodato." 

FRIDAY

Parashat Bamidbar tells of the designation of the tribe of Levi as the tribe destined to serve in the Mishkan.  God tells Moshe that He has taken the Levi'im in place of the bekhorim, the firstborn, who were to have become God's servants in the Mishkan.  Chazal explain that the firstborn forfeited this privilege through their participation in the sin of the golden calf; the tribe of Levi, who did not take part in the worship (see Shemot 32:26-29, and Rashi), were granted this distinction in place of the bekhorim.  In order for this substitution to take effect, each firstborn had to be formally "exchanged," so-to-speak, with a member of the tribe of Levi.  There were, however, two hundred and seventy-three more bekhorim than there were Levi'im; they had no Levi to serve as their substitute.  God therefore ordered that each of these firstborns would give five coins as his "redemption money" to Moshe, who then gave the money to Aharon and his sons.  (See 3:40-51.)

Ibn Ezra, commenting on this section (3:45), cites the position of the "makchishim" – literally, "deniers") that "from here we deduce that the redemption of every firstborn is [the amount] of five coins."  Meaning, these people viewed this incident in Parashat Bamidbar as the source for the five shekels with which a firstborn is "redeemed" from the kohen. Though the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben ("redeeming" the firstborn) has already been introduced earlier in Chumash (Shemot 13:13), we have yet to read of the amount with which this ritual is performed.  According to these "makchishim," we derive from this narrative in Parashat Bamidbar that a father redeems his firstborn son with five shekels.

Ibn Ezra proceeds to express his disapproval of this approach: "This is not a proof, for this constitutes an independent mitzva; the truth is [that we derive the five-shekel amount from] tradition."  In other words, Ibn Ezra argues that we cannot extract any laws concerning the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben from this incident recorded here in Parashat Bamidbar.  The procedure outlined here was not intended to establish permanent norms regarding the redemption of bekhorim; it was rather a one-time event that occurred in the wilderness, with no bearing on the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben generally. Rather, Ibn Ezra claims, the five-shekel amount has come to us by tradition, rather than via an explicit Scriptural source.

There is much room for discussion regarding the theory espoused here by Ibn Ezra, that this ritual performed in the wilderness has nothing to do with the standard mitzva of pidyon ha-ben.  Many sources indicate otherwise.  For example, the Gemara (Menachot 37) appears to deduce from a verse in this section (the word "gulgolet" in 3:47) that if a bekhor is born with two heads, the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben requires the father to pay ten shekels.  The Rambam (Hilkhot Bekhorim 1:10) cites a verse from this context ("le-Aharon u-l'vanav" – 3:48) as the source for the halakha requiring that the pidyon ha-ben money be given specifically to a male kohen.  Additionally, several Acharonim (Panim Yafot, Malbim, and others) bring this incident as proof to the fact that pidyon ha-ben can be performed through a shaliach (agent); just as the firstborns gave their redemption money to Moshe, who then gave it to the kohanim, so may the father of a bekhor – according to some – give the money to an agent to bring to the kohen.  All these sources clearly indicate that, unlike Ibn Ezra's argument, the procedure described in Parashat Bamidbar did, indeed, have the status of a standard pidyon ha-ben ritual.

There is, however, a more troubling difficulty that arises from these comments of Ibn Ezra, namely, that he ignores an explicit Biblical source for the five-shekel amount of pidyon ha-ben.  The Torah mentions this amount outright when introducing the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben in Parashat Korach: "Take as their redemption price… the value of money of five shekels" (18:16).  Why, then, would the "makchishim" look elsewhere for a source, and why would Ibn Ezra himself find it necessary to resort to oral tradition as the basis for the five-shekel amount, if it appears explicitly in the Chumash itself?

This question formed the basis of a lengthy discussion in the journal "Edut," as brought in the "Pardes Yosef He-chadash."  We bring here just one of several explanations suggested as to why Ibn Ezra struggles for a source for the five-shekel amount.  This explanation is based on the word "be-erkekha," literally, "according to the value," in the aforementioned verse in Parashat Korach. This word refers to the laws of "arakhin," which the Torah discusses in last week's parasha, Parashat Bechukotai.  If a person takes a vow to donate to the Temple the representative monetary value of a certain person, then he must give the value specified by the Torah in the final chapter of Sefer Vayikra.  There we find that the "value" of an infant male between the age of one month and five years is five shekels (Vayikra 27:6).  Presumably, this is what the Torah means in Parashat Korach, that when redeeming a firstborn son, the father gives the "value" prescribed earlier in the Torah, namely, five shekels.  But what happens if, for whatever reason, a father did not perform pidyon ha-ben one month after the birth of his bekhor?  What if a bekhor realizes only when he is much older that he had never had a pidyon ha-ben?  How much does he give the kohen as an adult?  Obviously, he, too, gives only five shekels.  But from where do we know this?  Why does he not give the higher amount, as outlined in the laws of "arakhin"?  This, perhaps, is the point of contention between the "makchishin" and Ibn Ezra, whether or not we may derive this halakha from the ritual described in our parasha.  According to Ibn Ezra, the incident recorded here cannot shed light on the laws of pidyon ha-ben in general, and we must therefore resort to oral tradition to learn the halakha that even an adult bekhor is redeemed with just five shekels. 

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