Iyun Masechet Sota: 14a

 

The concluding lines of the perek emphasize the importance of gemilut chasadim as a cardinal value in Yahadut:

 

"R. Simlai stated: the Torah commences with gemilut chasadim and concludes with gemilut chasadim.  It commences with gemilut chasadim, "and God made for Adam/man and his wife leather garments and He dressed them;" and it ends with gemilut chasadim, "and He buried him in the ravine."

 

This serves as a source in the Torah for the ethical obligation.  In a famous passage, the sugya bases the moral imperative on the verse, "Achrei HaShem Elokeikhem telekhu" "Follow God." Since the path of the KBH cannot literally be followed, R. Chama bar Chanina interprets it to mean that man should emulate the KBH's attributes and practice gemilut chasadim like He does, by caring for the poor, sick, bereaved etc.  The fact that the gemara chose the KBH's ethical attributes as the vehicle for emulating God and following in His footsteps cannot be overemphasized as its religious, theological and educational implications impact upon the most basic elements of Judaism.  This sugya serves as the basis for the Rambam's subsequent focus upon the ethical element in our relationship to the KBH that expressed itself in his interpretation of the 13 attributes as the answer to Mosheh Rabeinu's request that God's ways be revealed to him (Guide 1:54), and the corollary claim that knowledge of God - the pinnacle of human achievement that serves as the conclusion of the Moreh Nevukhim - is the knowledge of the KBH as establishing chesed, tzedaka and mishpat in our world (3:54). 

 

     The basis of the ethical obligation and its source in the ways of God is addressed by Chazal in two other sugyot.  In the Talmud Bavli, there is a gemara in Shabbat (133b) that derives morality from the pasuk of "zeh keli veanvehu," that mandates man "to be like God; as He is merciful so, too, should you be merciful." In the Sifri (Devarim 11:22), this idea is learnt from the pasuk that describes our fulfilling all the mitzvot as "loving the KBH, following His ways and associating/communing with Him," interpreted as "just as He is merciful, so too you should be merciful; just as He is gracious, so too you should be gracious."

 

     Is there any significance to the differences between these sources or do they all arrive at the same conclusion although using different sources? A passage in the Ramban's comments on Sefer Hamitzvot may shed some light on this issue.  As part of the Rambam's systematic critique of the Halakhot Gedolot, the Rambam points out that the BHG (Ba'al Halakhot Gedolot) lists various acts of chesed (e.g. clothing the poor, condoling the bereaved etc.) as independent mitzvot, although they are all included under the general category of tzedaka or "veahavta lerei'akha kamokha"(Sefer Hamitzvot, first shoresh [pp. 22-3 in the standard Warsaw edition] and second shoresh [pp. 43-8]; see also Hilkhot Avel 14:1).  The Ramban's response (p.22) is that the BHG derived these actions from the mitzva of ve-halakhta bedrakhav, and in support of this claim, he quotes R. Chama bar Chanina's statement in our sugya.  He thereon notes the Rambam's inclusion of this very mitzva in his Sefer Hamitzvot (aseh 8), and wonders why the Rambam is so upset with the BHG; after all, the difference between them is no greater than the fact that the BHG chose to quote the gemara in Sota, while the Rambam preferred the Sifri's formulation.  In the Ramban's words: "Why should he [the Rambam] wonder at the BHG – he chose the text of the Sifri regarding this mitzva while the BHG chose the text of the gemara."

 

     Apparently, the Rambam DID see a significant difference between these texts that has crucial implications for the inclusion of these individual acts in the minyan ha-mitzvot as separate mitzvot.

 

     Unlike the gemara, the focus in the Sifri is not upon specific actions but upon the personality traits of the moral agent.  It is not instructing us to perform specific actions but to acquire certain character traits.  The mitzva of imitatio Dei is perceived as relating to the development of the moral personality.  It is not surprising that the Rambam adopted this approach in Sefer Ha-mitzvot, as he indeed viewed the perfection of the human soul and the realization of the human potential as a major focus of ethics.  In Shemoneh Perakim, the systematic presentation of the Rambam's ethical theory in the introduction to his commentary on Pirkei Avot, the basis of morality is rooted in an analysis of the first principles of human existence and the means for realizing the true telos of man without any reference to the idea of "ve-halakhta bedrakhav." The result of the inquiry is that human perfection is attainted by achieving wisdom, which is the expression of the highest form of man.  Ethics is the highest degree of practical wisdom, just as metaphysics is the ultimate form of intellectual knowledge.  Good acts are significant in that they enable us to cultivate good character traits.  The perfection of the soul is the ultimate ethical achievement.  Although the Rambam does rely upon the imitatio Dei concept of ve-halakhta bedrakhav in Hilkhot Deot, his treatment in Hilkhot Deot repeats much of the subject matter and themes of Shemoneh Perakim, thereby leading us to assume that the introduction of ve-halakhta bedrakhav in Mishneh Torah is the addition of a significant element lacking in Shemoneh Prakim but it is not a reversal of his basic position that the moral imperative is a mitzva to perfect the soul.  The ideal of ve-halakhta bedrakhav that adds the religious element to the ethical system is to "be rachum and chanun" (Hilkhot Deot 1:5-6).

 

     An additional instance in which the Rambam emphasizes the character traits of the agent rather than the beneficial results to the beneficiary of the chesed is his definition of the mitzvat lo ta'aseh of withholding tzedaka from the needy ("lo teametz et levavekha ve-lo tikfotz et yadkha meiachikha ha-evion").  After listing the mitzva in Sefer Ha-mitzvot (mitzvat lo ta'aseh 232), the Rambam comments that "this mitzva is a prohibition from acquiring the character traits of miserliness and cruelty;" i.e., the mitzva is not result-oriented but character focused.

 

     Thus, the Rambam's choice of the Sifri text and his attack upon the BHG for separately counting the individual acts may be a result of their differing understandings of the mitzva of ve-halakhta bedrakhav.  The BHG and the Ramban apparently understood the mitzva as mandating individual acts of chesed and, therefore, felt justified in counting each act as a separate mitzva, while the Rambam's concept of ve-halakhta bedrakhav relates to the development of the personality and dictates a single mitzva in the list of taryag, since the various acts of chesed are all a manifestation of the same personality.

 

     If we now take a close look at the texts to see which of the two approaches they support, we shall notice that the text of the gemara mentions specific acts of chesed, while the Sifri's formulation relates to the acquisition of character traits.  Therefore, unlike the Ramban's assumption that the two are interchangeable, the Rambam may have purposely preferred the Sifri over the gemara as it reflects his approach of a character based mitzva.

 

     The above analysis is based upon R. Aharon Soloveitchik's analysis of the machloket between the Rambam and the Ramban in his sefer on Sefer Madah, Parach Mateh Aharon (pp.  68-70) and Rabbi W. Wurzberger's treatment of the subject in his Ethics of Responsibility, pp.69-72.]

 

     Our discussion of the topic until now has focused upon the content of the mitzva of ve-halakhta bedrakhav.  It is now time to address the issue of the mitzva's goal.  This, too, can most easily be approached through the lenses of the pesukim.  Two pesukim in sefer Devarim that express the idea of imitatio Dei are quoted by Chazal and the Rambam.  1. "Acharei HaShem Elokeikhem telekhu" (11:22); 2. "Vehalakhta bedrakhav" (28:9).  The first is quoted in our sugya and is the pasuk that the Sifri discusses, while the Rambam in Mishneh Torah cites the latter as the source of the mitzva.  The question that concerns us in this regard is whether the two pesukim are similar in nature, the second simply repeating that which has already been established by the first, as often happens in sefer Devarim, or is there a subtle but significant difference between the two ideals.  On this score, I have heard from my father that in his opinion they do indeed have a different focus about the motivation of adopting God's merciful ways.  The first pasuk speaks of following God as a believer follows a leader or a lover pursues his beloved.  The idea of following the KBH is the expression of a relationship between man and God and the mitzva is an invitation for man to seek out the KBH and pursue Him.  It is this focus that leads the gemara and the Sifri to the query, "how can man follow He who is an all consuming fire".  The other pasuk, ve-halakhta bedrakhav, that the Rambam cites in Mishneh Torah is lacking this emphasis.  It relates only to the proper conduct expected and mandated by the Torah that is to be achieved by emulating Divine benevolence.  Imitatio Dei in this scheme brings about ethical behavior that is an end unto itself, rather than part of the relationship between man and God. 

 

     If we accept this line of reasoning, we should also question the significance of the derasha of "zeh keli veanvehu" that the gemara in Shabbat (133b) and the Mekhilta quote in the name of Abba Shaul as the source of imitatio Dei.  The answer to this would seem to be that Godlike behavior is a form of praise to the KBH.  The context of the pasuk is, of course, Shirat Hayam, and even if we interpret the word "veanvehu" as emulation ("hevi domeh lo"), the motivating factor is the desire to glorify the KBH, as is the idea of hiddur mitzva that is the alternative proposal that the gemara suggests for the meaning of "veanvehu." Either way, it is man initiating honor to God and not God mandating proper behavior.  In other words, the concept behind veanvehu is essentially kiddush HaShem, an idea famously expressed by Chazal who use the example of a person respected and admired by society for his good deeds that are perceived as a result of the personality that his relationship to Torah and the KBH have bestowed upon him.

 

     In summary, we have addressed two central issues regarding the mitzva of ve-halakhta bedrakhav; is it intended to mandate behavior or personality development and whether its goal is good conduct, a relationship with the KBH or a means of praising and glorifying the KBH.  Needless to say, these various concepts are not mutually exclusive and may all form a part of the mitzva of gemilut chasadim that is so basic to Yahadut.