Iyun Masechet Sota: 19a

 

"He [the kohen] would take the mincha out of the Egyptian basket, put it into a holy vessel (kli sharet), place it on her hands and the kohen would then place his hands beneath hers and raise them in the air.  He would raise the mincha ("tnufah"), deliver it to the mizbeiaich ("hagashah"), perform kemitza and burn it on the mizbeiaich" (Third Perek, Mishna 1).

 

The above quote from the opening mishna of the third perek presents us with a perplexing enigma.  It is not the text itself that is problematic; on the contrary, the mishna's presentation of the sequence of the minchat sota's stages is straightforward and without any controversial claims.  The vexing problem, though, is the fact that the mishna already dealt with the topic of minchat sota in the beginning of the second perek, so that the repetition of the topic in the third perek is problematic for two reasons.  First, some of the details that appear in our mishna were already mentioned previously in that mishna; moreover, comparing the two mishnayot reveals differences in the sequence of the actions.  The mishna in the second perek (14a) states: "He [the kohen] would bring her mincha in an Egyptian basket and place it on her hands to burden her," while the mishna in the third perek (19a) reads: "He [the kohen] would take the mincha out of the Egyptian basket, put it into a holy vessel (kli sharet), place it on her hands..."  Thus, we are dealing not only with a redundancy but with a discrepancy as well. 

 

Second, our mishna continues the sequence of the mincha to its conclusion beyond the initial stages mentioned in the second perek.  However, rather than continue the sequence in the second perek upon introduction of the mincha, the Mishnayot of the second perek deal with other issues relating to the sota ceremony and postpone the treatment of the mincha's later stage to a new perek.

 

Thus, the third perek returns us to the point that we were already at before – the kohen's placing of the mincha on the sota's hands – yet proceeds to describe a different continuation than that presented in the previous perek.

 

In attempting to answer these questions, let us suggest that the reason for the above changes is that the mincha, like many other elements that we have seen in the masekhet, serves a dual purpose:

 

1. It is part of the process of the kinui and stira that the husband initiates against his wife as part of the breakdown or restoration of the interpersonal relationship between them.
2. It is a minchat chota incumbent upon the sota as upon any other sinner. 

 

The division of labor between the two perakim is in accordance with this duality.  The second perek places the mincha within the context of the sota ceremony as part of the mechanism that is designed to clarify her status.  The reason given by the mishna for the placing of the mincha on her hands (to weary her) is a sota, and not a kodshim, rationale.  The continuation of this process is the preparation of the sota waters, the writing of the megilat sota etc. the presentation and placement of the mincha is in accord with this principle.  Only the initial stage which is part of the sota aspect is mentioned while the advanced stages of the mincha are dealt with in a different context.  Therefore, the mishna mentions the placing of the mincha on her hands as the step immediately following the bringing of the mincha and does not mention the placement in the kli sharet, since only the placing of the mincha on the woman's hand is part of the sota procedure.

 

In the third perek, the mishna returns to deal with the mincha from the kodshim perspective and opens its treatment of the topic with the placing of the mincha on the woman's hands as the first stage in the sequence of the korban.  The mincha is put in her hands as a fulfillment of the mitzva of tenufa and not as part of the sota ceremony.  Since the mincha must become kadosh by its placement in a kli sharet before the kohen begins performing the mitzvot of the mincha, the presence of the mincha in the kli sharet must be mentioned prior to its placement on the woman's hand.

 

With this logic let us examine the opening passage in the gemara.  The sugya looks for the Biblical source that minchat sota requires tenufa.  As the gemara immediately points out, the question seems ridiculous, since the Torah explicitly states that the kohen does tenufa.  The gemara's answer is that the question was asked regarding the need for the woman's participation in the tenufa as the person who brings the korban ("tenufa beba'alim").  This is not merely a technical issue relating to who is required to participate in the ceremony, but is a reflection of the basic kiyum of the mincha. 

 

Reading the pesukim, it is possible to get the impression that the mincha is not brought by the woman but is the culmination of the sota process that she is required to submit to.  After describing the drinking of the water, the Torah simply states that the kohen takes the mincha from her and proceeds with the process of hakrava.  The woman has drunk the water, undergone the judgment and the kohen continues with the ceremony.  If so, the function of the mincha is not to serve as kaparah for the sota but as part of the ceremony. 

 

Therefore, the mishna's ruling that the woman participates in the tenufa as the "ba'al ha-korban" introduces an entire new element into minchat sota – its function as a korban of the woman.  The korban is not only a korban FOR the sota but also OF the sota.  It is not only part of the sota ceremony, as its juxtaposition in the second perek would suggest, but is also a classic korban brought for kapara as the context of the third perek demonstrates.

 

The status of the woman regarding the minchat sota and its applicability to other korbanot surfaces again in the sugya 23a.  The mishna there rules that the minchat sota of a woman married to a kohen is burnt in its entirety (in accordance with the halakha that the mincha of a kohen is burned) since "all that are married to a kohen, their menachot are burnt."  Rashi (23a d"h minchoteihen) interprets this rule to apply to all cases in which a kohen's wife brings a mincha regardless of the husband's involvement.  Tosfot, though, quote from the Yerushalmi in the second perek that the case of sota is a unique case, since the mincha is considered the korban of the husband as well as the korban of the wife because of his involvement in the sota process which is at the root of the korban.  The Yerushalmi thus recognizes the dual nature of the minchat sota as a korban that serves both as a method of clarifying the marital situation that addresses the husband's concerns and as a kapara for the wife as well. 

 

Tosfot are bothered by the Yerushalmi's claim that the minchat sota is a joint korban in which both have a share since the rule is that menachot cannot brought in partnership ("shutfut").  Therefore, they claim that the mincha is primarily the sota's korban ("ikar kapara meshum dida") and is not equally the husband's offering, thereby giving priority to the kapara element over the sota aspect.

 

However, it seems likely that this should not be considered a joint korban, since they are not attempting to achieve the same result in tandem.  Unlike the classic case of korban hashutfin in which both join forces to arrive at the same result, the husband and wife are each pulling the minchat sota in a different direction, so that although both are bringing the same object as a mincha, each is attempting to independently utilize it for his/her own purposes.  This is not a joint korban but a composite korban that need not be submitted to the rule that joint menachot cannot be offered. 

 

Moreover, the husband's involvement in the mincha is not due to its essence as a korban but to its role within hilkhot sota.  In other words, the minchat sota is a "kiyum korban" for the woman but a kiyum sota for the man.  This duality proves that it is not a joint korban, since it isn't really functioning as a korban for one of the parties but as a sota component.  Tosfot's answer can also be interpreted along this line of thought; i.e., that the essence of the mincha as a korban is for the woman's kapara, because for the husband it is not a korban but part of a sota ceremony.

 

Be it as it may, the sugyot of the third perek make it clear that from the kodshim perspective, the minchat sota is brought as a kapara for the woman.  Therefore, the tenufa is done by her as the master of the korban and not by her husband.

 

II

 

The machloket in the mishna between R. Shimon and Rabbanan should also be understood along these lines.  The root of their machloket is the Torah's seemingly inexplicable repetition of the obligation the woman to drink the water.  The Torah twice states that the woman is made to drink the water, once after the stage of the oath and the dissolution of the megila and once after the description of the mincha.  In resolution of this contradiction, R. Shimon and Chakhamim's paths diverge.  While R. Shimon follows the phrase "and he shall AFTERWORDS administer the water to the woman" that is written after the mincha, Chakhamim rely upon the first pasuk that describes the drinking in the context of the oath.

 

Conceptually speaking, their machloket should be understood within the framework of our discussion.  R. Shimon's claim that the drinking of the water is postponed until after the offering of the korban is based upon the assumption that the mincha's focus is its integration into the sota ceremony as part of the unique mechanism that the Torah established for dealing with a sota.  The drinking of the water, the climax of the affair, must follow the mincha so that it too shall be integrated into the ceremony.  Chakhamim, on the other hand, view the kapara element that follows on the footsteps of the woman's trial as the primary aim of the mincha.  Therefore, the drinking is done immediately after the oath and the dissolution of the megila that is the conclusion of the sota ceremony, dictated by the husband and administered by the kohen, while the mincha is brought afterwards as the woman's korban that she brings for kapara.

 

Having interpreted the machloket of R. Shimon and Chakhamim regarding the sequence, let us now attempt to integrate it into the additional machloket mentioned by the gemara on 19b regarding the authority of the kohen to force the sota to drink the water.

 

The issue at stake in this machloket is whether the role of the water is to clarify the marital situation or to punish the woman for her sin of adultery as well.  If the purpose of the sota water is to uncover the faithfulness or unfaithfulness of the suspected wife, the waters have served their purpose if she admits that the husband's suspicions were true and there is no need to go through with the actual drinking of the water.  The goal has been achieved, so the case can rest.  As R. Akiva states: "all the water must do is investigate her – now that she has confessed, the results of the investigation are known!" R. Yehuda, though, considers the water as an agent of divine retribution whose role is to mete out capital punishment to the sota for her adultery; therefore, her confession cannot exempt her from the drinking of the water, just as a convicted murderer or mechalel Shabbat cannot absolve himself from punishment by confessing.

 

This same issue is argued in the next mishna(20a) as well.  The mishna states that if the sota has any special merits (zechut), they may protect her from the effects of the water, even if she is guilty.  The following mishna (22b) records a machloket on this issue.  While R. Yehuda Hanasi agrees with the previous mishna's claim that zechut can protect the sota, R. Shimon denies this and claims that such an option would undermine to the purpose of sota which is to clarify her status.  In other words, if the drinking is a divine punishment, we do not necessarily postulate a direct infallible one-to-one relationship between crime and punishment.  We are well aware that many sinners who are deserving of divine retribution thrive and are not smitten by God for whatever reason, despite the Torah's assertions that sin will be punished.  Sota is no different in this regard from other sins.  However, if the water must clear up the factual question relating to the marriage, there can not be any false negatives and we must assume that all women who survive the ceremony are indeed innocent.   

 

Let us now return to the sugya on 19b.  The gemara ties together the two issues that we have discussed: a. The timing of the water drinking and b. The purpose of the drinking.  The connection made by the gemara is a technical connection regarding the economy of the derashot employed by the various Tannaim and not a conceptual one.  Is there, though, any intrinsic connection between these issues?

 

A priori, it would have seemed reasonable to assume that R. Shimon denies the idea of punishment in toto and understands the water as solely a mechanism of clarification, as he clearly states in the mishna 22b.  The gemara, though, assumes as axiomatic that he agrees with the other Tannaim that there is also a punitive aspect to the drinking ceremony.  Nevertheless, his opinion differs from R. Akiva's regarding the cut off point for the sota to halt the process. 

 

R. Akiva is presented by the gemara as arguing against R. Yehuda that the purpose of the drinking is to investigate her status, thereby negating the need to drink if she confesses, yet R. Akiva nevertheless admits that once the mincha has begun to be brought she cannot prevent the drinking.  As the gemara points out, this seems to be inconsistent, since even after the kemitza of the mincha the purpose of the water has been achieved.  Therefore, the gemara postulates that R. Akiva's position is that she cannot be forced to drink the mincha if she sincerely confesses; however, if there is reason to assume that her confession is motivated by an anxiety that the water will be harmful to her regardless of her innocence, then she can opt out of the ceremony only prior to the stage of the megila's dissolution (according to one opinion) or to the bringing of the mincha (according to the other presentation of R. Akiva's position).

 

R. Shimon's basic position is that the water's function is to clarify the marital situation, as he explicitly states in the mishna 22b.  In addition, he places the mincha within this context.  Therefore, the essential drinking that dispels the doubts regarding her behavior is enacted after the bringing of the mincha.  The Torah's introduction of the drinking after the dissolution of the megila introduces the punitive element into the ceremony.  This, though, is contingent upon the megila stage and not the mincha.  Thus, the actual drinking that is primarily intended to establish her status is performed after the mincha but she cannot refuse the water from the megilla stage onwards, since from that point onwards there is also a judgment that is included in the ceremony.

 

R. Akiva's position is that the drinking addresses the marital element alone.  The two opinions regarding the option of retraction are contingent upon our previous discussion of the status of the mincha.  If the mincha is part of the sota procedure, then the woman may decide to forgo the drinking until the final stage of the process; i.e. until the bringing of the mincha.  If, though, the mincha is the woman's private korban and is essentially unrelated to the process of clarification, then the terminus point regarding the drinking is the dissolution of the megila into the water and not the stage of the mincha.  Therefore, from this point onwards, the woman may not change her mind.  [It should be mentioned that the inability to opt out after the megila can also be explained as our refusal to let the erasing of the Name to be in vain, regardless of the point at which the sota ceremony is completed.]

 

The gemara's discussion on 19b that we have analyzed is within the context of R. Akiva and R. Shimon's concept of the water as intended to establish the marital status.  What is the opinion of R. Yehuda HaNasi, who treats the water as a punishment, regarding these issues.  The gemara doesn't relate to this.  The most reasonable suggestion would seem to be that the punitive element is introduced from after the stage of the megila, since it the opposite side of the coin of the mincha.  The mincha is essentially the korban of the woman for kapara.  This, though, is contingent upon her innocence.  If she has not committed adultery, she nevertheless requires kapara for the setira and lack of trust.  If she is indeed guilty, it is not the korban that absolves her, but the water that punishes her.  Thus, according to Rebbe, the marital issue is resolved at the point of the megila and the conclusion of the ceremony addresses the woman's status either by issuing a guilty verdict and punishing her or by providing her with a mechanism of kapara and a new start.

 

This is how we should understand the redundancy of the drinking act as well.  The first signifies the treatment of the marital dilemma (though as a personal message from the husband to the wife and not as supernatural resolution of the doubts raised by her behavior) while the second relates to the punitive aspect of the water.

 

Thus, both R. Shimon and R. Yehuda HaNasi offer a similar explanation to the repetition, but in an opposite application.