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Iyun in Sota -
Lesson 23

Iyun Masechet Sota: 23a

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The final mishna of the third perek, after stumbling upon the topic of man vs.  woman via its treatment of minchat sota, discusses the halakhic differences between men and women.  The list presented by the mishna consists of two different cases: a. the halakhic status of a kohen – kohenet; b. the halakhic distinctions between men and women, generally speaking.  As the two issues are totally independent topics, we must divide our treatment of them into separate units. 

 

Let us begin with the former case.  The mishna rules that the mincha of a sota who is married to a kohen is burnt (and not eaten by kohanim), as are the menachot of kohanim, but the mincha of a kohenet (i.e. the daughter of a kohen) is eaten, in accordance with the rules that apply to the menachot of non-kohanim.  In other words, a woman married to a kohen is regulated by the rules of kohanim, while a woman born to a kohen is considered a non-kohen in this regard.  Thus, we are actually presented with two questions: a. the status of a kohenet and b. the status of a kohen's wife.

 

The ruling of our mishna regarding a kohenet's mincha is consistent with the mishna in Kiddushin (36a) that a kohenet cannot perform avoda in the Mikdash.  The source provided by the gemara in that sugya is that the Torah describes the kohanim who work in the Mikdash as "bnei Aharon," a phrase that is understood to exclude kohanot, since they are bnot Aharon and not bnei Aharon.  This halakha  served as the starting point of a discussion among Acharonim whether female kohanot are considered kohanim that were excluded from the performance of certain acts, analogously to their exemption from some of the mitzvot or not.  Thus, although a Jewish woman is certainly part of Am Yisrael, nevertheless, she is exempt from talmud Torah, so, too, a kohenet may be a kohen who has certain restrictions regarding her avoda.  Conversely, the gemara's drasha of Benei Aharon and not Bnot Aharon can be understood to establish the fact that only Benei Aharon are kohanim, while all others (male yisraelim and female kohanot) are not kohanim; the former since they are not from Aharon's lineage and the latter because they are not his male descendants.  Either way, only male descendants of Aharon are kohanim and all others are strangers ("zarim").  In halakhic terminology, the issue is whether the disqualification ("pasul") of a woman is an issur zarut or not. 

 

Although Achronim spilled a lot of ink on this topic and considered it an open question (see Parashat Derakhim, Derekh Mitzvotekha, ch. 3, d.h. od ani; Minchat Chinukh 390; Asvan De'oraitah 19 and many others), the Rambam's position is quite clear that a kohenet may not work in the Mikdash since she is not a kohen.  "Who is a stranger? Anyone who is not from the male descendants of Aharon." (Biat Mikdash 9:1).  Nevertheless, despite his clear and unequivocal formulation, the Rambam treats kohanot as bona fide kohanim in other contexts.  Thus, he rules that "a kohenet eats matanot (the grant of animal parts to a kohen from a slaughtered animal) even though she is married to a non-kohen since they lack kedusha; moreover, the husband eats them because of his wife.  However, a chalala (a desecrated/violated woman) does not eat them since challalim are not considered kohanim" (Bikkurim 9:20).

 

Actually, the Rambam's pesak is the subject of much debate in a gemara in Chullin.  The sugya there relates as follows: "Ula used to give matanot to a kohenet.  Rava responded to Ula that his position is contradicted by the mishna in Sota 23a (= our mishna) that rules that the mincha of a kohenet is eaten while the mincha of a kohen is burnt; however, if the term kohen includes a kohenet in the Torah, then her mincha should also be burnt, rather than eaten.  Ula, thereby replied: Rebbe/Rabbi, from your our words [you are refuted], it is written in the parasha of mincha, "Aharon and his sons."  Ula's answer is that there are two separate terms used by the Torah: 1. Kohen 2. son of Aharon that are indicative of two distinct categories that should not be confused.  A kohenet is included in the group of kohanim but excluded from Aharon's sons.  Therefore, wherever the Torah writes kohen she is included, as is the case in matanot, but not where the term Aharon's sons is used. 

 

The gemara concludes with a list of other Tana'aim and Amora'im who took positions on this issue:

 

"in R. Yishmael's Beit Midrash they stated, a kohen and not a kohenet, since the concept of kohen should be derived from the concept of Benei Aharon; in the Beit Midrash of R. Elazar ben Ya'akov they claimed a kohen and even a kohenet …Rav Kahana ate [matanot] due to his wife, Rav Papa ate [matanot] due to his wife, Rav Yeimar ate [matanot] due to his wife, R. Idi bar Avin ate [matanot] due to his wife…halakha is according to Ula."

 

Thus, the Rambam's psak reflects the majority opinion in the gemara that the sugyot in Sota and Kiddushin must be differentiated from that of Chullin.  Nevertheless, we must ask ourselves what is the nature of this distinction and what do these two categories signify that one includes women kohanot while the other excludes them.

 

The explanation for this duality in terminology is the corresponding dual role of the kohanim in the Mikdash.  The gemara queries in two places whether the kohanim perform their tasks in the Mikdash for man or for God, i.e. whether their avoda is done as surrogates acting in lieu of the yisrael who brings the korban ("shluchi didan") or as the KBH's representative who receive the korban from the yisrael and sacrifice it.  Rather than being our delegates to bring the korban to Him, they are His workers who form the staff of the Mikdash.  This latter position found an interesting expression in the Rambam's organization of the halakhot in Mishne Torah - the Rambam included the halakhot of kohanim in hilkhot kli ha-mikdash vehaovdim bah.  In other words, the Rambam classifies them as part of the apparatus of Mikdash. 

 

The two sugyot do not arrive at the same conclusion.  The sugya in Kiddushin (23b) states that kohanim are the KBH's representatives while the gemara in Nedarim (35b) does not resolve the dilemma.  Tosfot in Kiddushin suggest that there is no contradiction between these differing results, since the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, so that it is quite possible that the kohanim are the delegates of both man and God.  At any rate, the kohanim in the Mikdash are considered as the human tools of the Mikdash or in other words, they are the uniformed staff who work for the "management" in Mikdash. 

This is the logic behind the halakha that an un-uniformed kohen (i.e. without bigdei kehuna) is considered a non-kohen ("bizman she'bigdeihem aleihem – kehunatam aleihem, ein bigdeihem aleihem – ein kehunatam aleihem"); just like a policeman, soldier etc. must be in uniform to exercise their authority since they represent their office in such garb, so, too, the kohen is considered a kohen that is part of the Mikdash's system when he is in uniform.  Nevertheless, it is obvious that a non-uniformed kohen is subject to other halakhot of kohanim, e.g. he cannot be exposed to the tuma of a dead person and he is allowed to eat teruma.  Thus, although he is considered a non-kohen for purposes of avoda in Mikdash (and is penalized by mita biyidei shamayim as a zar if he does avoda without bigdei kehuna), he is a kohen outside of Mikdash.  The rationale is as follows: regarding Mikdash and avoda, his kedusha is due to his role in the service of the Mikdash and the KBH while outside of the Mikdash, his kedusha is a personal kedusha, an expression of a higher level of kedushat Yisrael.

 

This dual perspective is at the root of a famous and cryptic remark of R. Tam that is recorded in the Hagahot Mordechai (Gittin 461).  The Mordechai relates that R. Tam was once served by a kohen, an act that caused one of his talmidim to inquire how he could allow a kohen to serve him, inasmuch that the Yerushalmi states that whoever uses a kohen for his own needs is in violation of the issur of me'ila (since the kohen is kadosh).  R. Tam's response was that the kohen who waited upon him in 12th century France was without bigdei kehuna and, therefore, not a kohen.  The talmid persisted that if so, we shouldn't give a kohen without bigdei kehuna the first aliya etc. "veshatak R. Tam" – and R. Tam did not bother to answer.  R. Peter then suggested that a kohen can voluntarily forfeit the respect due to him as a kohen and, therefore, there was no problem with R. Tam's use of him.  Achronim subsequently explained the story as follows: there is a double kedusha of kehuna, as mentioned above.  The issur of me'ila mentioned in the Yerushalmi may indeed be absolute and not subject to forfeiture.  This, however, applies only to the kohen in his capacity as an employee of the Mikdash and requires bigdei kehuna.  Nevertheless, there is an additional kedusha that derives from his personal status.  This does not require begadim and, therefore, we treat kohanim with special respect even outside of Mikdash, unlike the assumption of the talmid that R. Tam did not bother to answer his question.  However, since this a function of his personal status and not an obligation to hekdesh, the kohen can forfeit the respect due him and allow himself to provide service to others.  [a summary of this issue and the literature in Achronim about it can be found in R. Binyaamin Tabory's article "binyan mitzvat aseh ve-kidashto" that appeared in the journal "Alon Shvut," no. 100.]

 

We now have the key to understand the status of women kohanot.  As individuals, they are kohanim and have the kedusha of the kohen that is the higher expression of kedushat Yisrael, since women equally participate in all facets of kedushat Yisrael.  Therefore, halakhot that are a function of this kedusha such as matanot can be given to them.  This kedusha is signified by the phrase kohen and is inclusive of a kohenet.  However, regarding the kedusha whose source is the kohen's function as an employee of the Mikdash, they are not considered kohanim, since they do not perform avoda in the Mikdash.  This role was given only to male kohanim and is expressed in the Torah as "Aharon and his sons."  Therefore, the Rambam states in hilkhot Biat Mikdash that women are strangers to the kehuna, while he rules, in accordance with the gemara in Chullin that they are kohanim regarding matanot.

 

One problem that remains regarding our proposal that women are kohanim regarding the intrinsic personal kedusha of kehuna, but they lack the kedusha deriving from the kohen's role in Mikdash, is the halakha of tuma that is mentioned in our mishna.  As the mishna makes clear, women are not prohibited from coming into contact with tuma from a dead person.  If our suggestion is correct, we must assume that the prohibition of tuma is due to the kohanim's role in the Mikdash and not because of their personal degree of added kedusha.  The location of the issur of tuma in the heart of sefer Vayikra, adjacent to the issur of ba'al mum in kehuna and korbanot certainly supports this idea, as does the Torah's explicit statement that the kohen must be kadosh since he serves in the Mikdash, which appears shortly after the parasha of tuma (between it and the issur of tuma, the Torah included the prohibition of defacing the face or the body).  Indeed, most of the commentators adopted this position – see Ibn Ezra, Chizkuni, sefer HaCinukh ad loc. and Ravad, hilkhot Nezirut, 5:15.

 

The Ramban, however, explicitly rejects this suggestion and explains that the Torah itself phrased the issur in such manner that we should not be misled into establishing a connection between Mikdash and issur tuma.  The root of the problem is that the Torah used a composite phrase in its discussion of tuma: "emor el hakohanim, bnei Aharon."  Ramban, with his usual textual sensitivity, was quick to point out the use of the phrase kohanim, while Chazal zeroed in on the usage of Benei Aharon. 

 

If we adopt the Ramban's position, an alternate suggestion that women are considered part of the shevet of kohanim (as is the context of the mitzva of matanot – see Devarim 18:1-5), but do not have any of the kedusha.  The main difficulty with this is the issue of a challal, who does not receive any matanot since his kedusha has been defiled, although he presumably remains a member of the shevet.  Apparently, if we adopt this position, we must posit that membership in the shevet of kohanim is not only a function of lineage but also of personal status.  (The organization of the census in Bemidbar 1-2 may lend credence to this suggestion).

 

Aside from tuma, the mishna mentions two other halakhot that do not apply to kohanot: burning of the mincha and the privilege of eating kodshei kodshim.  If our analysis is correct, these halakhot are considered a function of the kohen's role in Mikdash and, therefore, are not relevant to a kohenet. 

 

Regarding, the eating of kodshei kodshim, this is indeed so; eating kodshei kodshim is part of the process of avoda (see Yevamot 40a, Rambam, hilkhot Ma'aseh Hakorbanot, 10:1) and, therefore, requires a kohen ha-oved. 

 

The burning of the minchat kohen would also seem to conform to this model, since it should also be understood as resulting from his participation in the avoda.  This, however, is difficult to reconcile with the mishna's ruling that the mincha of the kohen's wife is also not eaten, even though she does not perform any avoda.  Since she is certainly not a kohen, we must explain that the halakha of burning a kohen's mincha is dependent upon the determination of the ownership of the mincha rather than the personal status of the person receiving kapara from the korban.  The reason for this is best explained by the rationale that the Rambam (Guide 3:46), the Ba'alei HaTosfot (Chizkuni Vayikra 6:16 and sources cited in footnote of MHK's edition), Ibn Ezra and many other commentators provided for this halakha, that there would be no significance to his bringing a mincha and no "sacrifice" involved if the kohen were allowed to eat his own mincha.  After all, he would eat the entire mincha and there would be nothing presented to Mikdash.  If this is the reason, it is evident why the monetary element is the determining factor.  In any case that the owner of the mincha would also be the beneficiary of it, there would be no significance to the sacrifice, so the Torah prohibited eating it.  Thus, it is contingent upon the the kohen's privilege of eating kodshim in the Mikdash, but its expression is regulated by ownership rather than personal kedusha.

 

However, the gemara quotes a Tosefta that in such a case, the mincha is not burnt in the manner that a minchat kohen is offered, but is treated as pesulei ha-mukdashim.  The meaning of this is that the gemara derives two separate halakhot from the prohibition of eating a minchat kohen.  The pasuk states: "the mincha of a kohen shall be wholly consumed, it shall not be eaten."  From this our sugya concludes that there is a halakha that it should be consumed upon the mizbeiach, in addition to the prohibition to eat it.  Moreover, the requirement to burn it is not a preventive measure or a kiyum of pesulei ha-mukdashim but a kiyum hakrava (or akhilat mizbeiach).  The burning of the entire offering is the proper form of hakrava of a kohen's mincha, in a similar manner to the act of burning an ola.  This, though, is understood to be a function of the kohen's kedusha as an oved in the Mikdash and not as the owner of the mincha.  Thus, the prohibition of eating is rooted in the monetary status of the korban and includes all menachot that the kohen owns, while the mitzva of kalil tehyeh applies only to the actual kohen who works in the Mikdash.  Therefore, the mincha of a kohen's wife is not eaten but is also not burnt as a korban.  (According to the Yerushalmi quoted by Tosfot, the mincha of a kohen's wife is treated as a normal mincha of a yisrael since she is not a kohen.  Our mishna's ruling that the mincha of a kohen's wife cannot be eaten is unique to minchat sota, for reasons explained in previous shiurim.)    

 

 [This discussion should be supplemented by a parallel treatment of the halakhot regulating the status of a kohen ba'al mum, but this is beyond the scope of this shiur.  The knowledgeable and interested reader is invited to do so.]

 

In contradistinction to the differences between male and female kohanim that reflect a basic difference in their status as kohanim, the list of halakhic changes that are enumerated in the mishna regarding men and women in other halakhot are more localized distinctions that are not indicative of a qualitative difference in their kedushat Yisrael, rather they are the result of more localized factors.  Essentially, we can categorize them under three main headings: a. tzniut b. lineage or generational continuity and c. the household.  In the first group, we can include the halakha that a metzorat does not undo her hair or tear her garments, the fact that a woman is not undressed if she is executed by stoning nor is her corpse hung until sunset and the fact that she is not sold into servitude if she cannot pay her thievery.  Under the second cause should be subsumed the halakhot relating to parent-child relationships that are mentioned in the mishna.  These include the authority to impose nezirut on his son, the ability to utilize his father's korbanot nazir while the third category is based upon the husband's/father's role as head of the household.  Halakha views the man as the head of the family unit that includes his wife and daughters.  This is the concept of "bayit" that has various halakhic implications (e.g.  nullification of nedarim, vidui of CG on Yom Kippur, eating teruma, etc.); the option of selling or betrothing his daughter is part of this system. 

 

[The past few lines are a schematic outline for purposes of generalization; each of these require a more thorough treatment.  Thus, for instance, the ability to make a son into a nazir is the subject of an entire sugya in Nazir (28b-30a) that includes a machloket between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish whether it is a unique halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai or a halakha midrabanan, while the claim that kiddushin of a daughter is the function of her living in his household is debated at length in the gemara in Ketuvot (46b).]

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