A Woman's Hair-covering in a "Chatzer"

 

Translated by David Silverberg 

I.      Introduction

 

     The purpose of this discussion is to give a new explanation of the sugya concerning the requirement of hair-covering for women in a "chatzer," or courtyard.  Many Rishonim explained this sugya one way, while the Arukh and Bach adopted a different approach.  We will briefly survey the views of the Rishonim and the Bach and then attempt to posit a different explanation of the gemara, one which differs from that of the Bach but supports his halakhic conclusion.[1]

 

     The mishna in Masekhet Ketubot (72a) considers the exposure of a woman's hair a violation of "dat yehudit" (literally, "Jewish creed"), as opposed to transgressing "dat Moshe" (literally, "the creed of Moshe").  This implies that failure to cover her hair constitutes a rabbinic - rather than Biblical - violation.  The gemara immediately questions this implication, noting that hair-covering for women is clearly required by Torah law.  The gemara answers by distinguishing between two levels of covering.  According to Torah law, holding her basket on her head ("kalta"), meaning, a partial hair-covering, suffices to fulfill this requirement.  Chazal however ordained a stricter standard of covering, to which the mishna referred.

 

     The gemara continues by citing Rabbi Yochanan as allowing women to wear only a partial covering.  Rabbi Zeira asks on this comment, where is it permissible to wear only a partial covering?  In public this is forbidden on the level of rabbinic ordinance, as we saw in the mishna.  If Rabbi Yochanan allowed a partial hair-covering in a woman's own courtyard, then this would imply that anything less would be prohibited even in her personal yard.  "If so," Rabbi Zeira claims, "you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham Avinu living with her husband."  Meaning, this conclusion is clearly impossible.  Abayei answers that Rabbi Yochanan spoke of the area "from one courtyard to another through an alley," or the alleyway connected two courtyards.

 

     Thus, halakha recognizes three distinct areas with respect to the obligation of hair-covering for women.  In public, even a partial covering does not suffice; "from one courtyard to another through an alley" requires the minimal standard of a partial covering, and in the courtyard itself not even a partial covering is necessary.  What, however, is necessary in the courtyard?  This the gemara does not clarify.

 

II.   The Position of Rashi and Tosafot

 

     Rashi interprets the gemara as denying the possibility of any requirement concerning hair-covering in a woman's courtyard.  The Ritva elaborates on Rashi's view:

 

"Since Rabbi Yochanan stated [according to this possibility] that wearing a partial covering does not involve [the prohibition of] exposure of hair in a courtyard, it seems that going without a partial covering does involve exposure of hair, even in a courtyard.  If so, then you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham Avinu living with her husband, for most of them walk in their courtyards with exposed hair, since nobody sees… There are three halakhot in this regard: in the courtyard - even going without a partial covering does not involve forbidden exposure of hair; in public - even wearing a partial covering violates 'dat yehudit' [a rabbinic prohibition]; in the alleyway - with a partial covering, she may [go], without a partial covering, she may not [go]."

 

     In other words, according to Rashi, a woman may go into her courtyard without covering her hair at all.[2]  Tosafot interpret the gemara in a similar manner: "Even without a partial covering, too, there is no issue of [prohibited] exposure of hair, for otherwise, 'you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham Avinu… '"  Meaning, the gemara's rejection of this option as putting women in an impossible situation indicates a greater level of leniency in a courtyard, which implies that they may go there without any hair-covering whatsoever.[3]

 

     It is worth mentioning parenthetically the question as to whether or not "dat yehudit" - the rabbinic requirement concerning hair-covering - may be subject to change.  This issue does not directly relate to the topic at hand, but we will briefly note that this gemara perhaps indicates that "dat yehudit" cannot take on a more lenient form, even with the onset of changing societal norms.  Recall that the gemara rejected the possibility of applying Rabbi Yochanan's leniency to a courtyard because "if so, you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham living with her husband."  The Ritva and other Rishonim explained this to mean that most women leave their hair uncovered in the courtyards (and thus requiring a partial covering in a courtyard would render them all violators).  If "dat yehudit" was subject to change, then the common practice of women should have rendered it permissible!  Apparently, "dat yehudit" does not depend on the accepted practice of women in a given time-period, and the original prohibition remains in effect despite the prevalent custom.  (A more thorough treatment of this topic lies beyond the scope of our discussion.)

 

III. The Position of the Meiri

 

     The Meiri writes (in our sugya), "In her courtyard, although this is improper, it does not involve even 'dat yehudit,' even with total exposure."  Although the Meiri maintains that total exposure of hair in a woman's courtyard violates no prohibition, he considers it improper.  According to his position, the sugya here speaks not on the level of "le-chatkhila" (preferable conduct), but rather of what constitutes an outright violation of halakha.

 

     Based on this premise, one may have claimed that the gemara's leniency allowing a partial covering through an alleyway also does not refer to the preferable mode of behavior.  Perhaps this, too, is improper though not strictly forbidden.  However, the Meiri himself explicitly permits walking through an alley with a partial covering.  It thus turns out that gemara's halakha concerning an alleyway applies on the optimum level of "le-chatkhila," while its leniency regarding a courtyard means only that it does not violate the prohibition, not that it is permitted.  Though at first this may strike us as a peculiar reading of the gemara, it becomes more reasonable once we realize that the gemara here addresses the rabbinic requirement of "dat yehudit."  In this context, it notes that wearing a partial covering in an alleyway or no covering at all in a courtyard does not violate this prohibition.  The gemara here does not concern itself at all with the level of "le-chatkhila" - preferable mode of conduct.  In this respect, a distinction may indeed exist between a partial covering in an alleyway and leaving hair entirely exposed in a courtyard.  (Needless to say, it is now possible to understand the position of other Rishonim in a similar vein.)[4]

 

IV. The Position of the Arukh and the Bach

 

     The Bach (E.H. 115) raises a novel approach to the sugya.  He suggests that in a courtyard a woman may go with a partial covering (even on the level of "le-chatkhila") but not with her hair entirely exposed.  As opposed to the Meiri, the Bach reads the gemara as speaking on the level of optimum behavior, rather than merely the violation of "dat yehudit."  Yet, a woman may not go into the courtyard without any hair-covering.  This position emerges quite clearly from the comments of the Arukh, who writes, "In the courtyard with a partial covering - this does not violate the prohibition of exposing hair."  Evidently, the Arukh maintains that without a partial covering, a woman violates the prohibition even in the courtyard.

 

     Such a contention, however, seems contradictory to the gemara's rejection of the notion that Rabbi Yochanan's leniency, allowing partial covering, applies in a courtyard, arguing that "if so, you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham Avinu… "  The gemara seems to explicitly deny any obligation of hair-covering in a woman's own courtyard.

 

     The Bach therefore offers the following interpretation of the sugya.  The gemara rejected the application of Rabbi Yochanan's leniency to a courtyard setting not because the requirement of a partial covering in a courtyard is untenable, but because in the courtyard this leniency is blatantly obvious.  Rabbi Yochanan could not have meant that a partial covering suffices in the courtyard, because we would never have entertained the possibility of requiring anything more in a courtyard.  If we did, then we would "not have allowed for a single daughter of Avraham Avinu living with her husband."  Therefore, Rabbi Yochanan would not have felt compelled to issue such an obvious ruling, that a complete covering is not required in a courtyard.  Abayei then answers that Rabbi Yochanan spoke of the less obvious situation of an alleyway connecting two courtyards.  While here one may have required a full hair-covering, Rabbi Yochanan teaches that the alleyway shares the same halakhic status as a courtyard, requiring only a partial covering.

    

V.   A Suggestion for a Different Approach

 

     The Taz raises an objection to this interpretation of the Bach.  If the gemara rejected the notion that Rabbi Yochanan spoke about a situation of a courtyard on the grounds that such a statement would be unnecessary, then it should have declared, "peshita" ("this is obvious"), as it normally does in such contexts. 

 

     We may arrive at the same conclusion as the Bach (and Arukh) while understanding the gemara differently.  Rashi and Tosafot understood the gemara as saying that Rabbi Yochanan could not have only allowed a partial covering in a courtyard, since women generally go without any hair-covering in their courtyards.  However, we may read the gemara as saying that Rabbi Yochanan could not have permitted a partial covering only in a courtyard, since women generally go even outside their courtyards - through alleyways - with partial hair-coverings.  According to this reading, the expression, "if so, you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham living with her husband" refers not to the situation of a courtyard, but to outside the courtyard, in the alley leading from one courtyard to the next.  The possibility that Rabbi Yochanan allowed a partial covering only in the courtyard would imply that in between courtyards women must cover all their hair.  This the gemara rejects on the basis of its observation of common practice to the contrary: women routinely wear only partial hair-coverings while walking in between courtyards.  Abayei therefore concludes that even in the alleyway a partial covering suffices.

 

     This reading yields the same halakhic conclusion as the Bach's interpretation while avoiding the difficulty raised by the Taz.  The gemara did not question Rabbi Yochanan's statement based on its being obvious, but rather based on the common practice to the contrary.

 

VI. Summary and Conclusion

 

     Rabbi Yochanan posited that a partial hair-covering does not violate the prohibition against a woman exposing her hair.  Rabbi Zeira commented that Rabbi Yochanan could not have referred to a public setting, where a complete covering is clearly required.  He likewise could not have referred to a woman's own courtyard, because "if so, then you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham living with her husband."  We can understand this passage in one of three ways:

 

1)     Most Rishonim: This sentence rejects the possibility of requiring even a partial hair-covering in a courtyard.  The gemara therefore concludes that Rabbi Yochanan referred to an alleyway, where he requires a partial but not complete covering.  It thus turns out that in a courtyard no covering is required whatsoever.

2)     The Bach: This sentence rejects the possibility of even entertaining the notion of requiring more than a partial covering in a woman's courtyard.  Rabbi Yochanan would not have had any reason to introduce such a self-evident halakha.  According to this approach, a partial covering is required in a courtyard.

3)     Third approach: This sentence means that Rabbi Yochanan could not have possibly referred to the setting of a courtyard, as this would suggest that an alleyway requires a stricter standard - a full covering, and common practice dictates otherwise.  This understanding, too, yields an obligation of a partial covering in a courtyard.

 

     We should note that this third approach does raise a certain difficulty.  According to the first two approaches, Rabbi Zeira, in attempting to understand Rabbi Yochanan's remark, spoke of two possible situations: in public and in the courtyard.  Rabbi Zeira then concluded that both are untenable.  (According to the first approach, Rabbi Yochanan's halakha cannot possibly apply in a courtyard; according to the second, this halakha in a courtyard is too obvious to require mentioning.)  Abayei then comes and introduces a third setting - the alleyway joining two courtyards, and regarding such a situation Rabbi Yochanan issued his statement.

 

     According to the third interpretation, however, Rabbi Zeira actually suggested all three settings.  His difficulty in applying Rabbi Yochanan's halakha to a courtyard setting is based on the implication of such that a stricter standard would be required in the alleyway.  If, indeed, Rabbi Zeira already considered this third setting, then what does Abayei introduce that Rabbi Zeira did not know beforehand?

 

     A look at the Rashba's comments on the sugya may allow for this interpretation and resolve the difficulty mentioned.  The Rashba claims that the correct text of the gemara has one letter less than the text appearing in the standard edition.  The standard text has Rabbi Zeira asking, "Ve-ela be-chatzer?!" - "Could it be [that Rabbi Yochanan's halakha refers to a situation] in the courtyard?!"  He immediately rejects such a possibility based on the common practice of women, as we discussed.  The Rashba's version, by contrast, reads, "Ela be-chatzer."  Though the Rashba proceeds to interpret the gemara in the same manner as Rashi, this version of the text lends itself to a much different reading, by which Rabbi Zeira here reaches a final conclusion: "Rather, [Rabbi Yochanan's halakha refers to a situation] in a courtyard."  The following clause, "If so, then you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham…," is the gemara's question on Rabbi Zeira's conclusion.  Due to this problem, Abayei rejects Rabbi Zeira's understanding of Rabbi Yochanan's comment, and explains it as referring to a situation of an alleyway.

 

     This reading very well accommodates our third approach.  Rabbi Zeira concluded that Rabbi Yochanan spoke of the courtyard setting, claiming a partial covering suffices.  The gemara then rejects this conclusion, which implies that in the alleyway a complete covering is required.  Abayei therefore suggests a different explanation of Rabbi Yochanan's remark, that it speaks of the alleyway setting, which, like the courtyard, requires only a partial hair-covering.[5]

 

FOOTNOTES:

 

[1] This presentation is based on shiurim delivered in the yeshiva on the general topic of hair-covering for women.  In the actual shiurim I dealt with other issues, as well, such as who must cover her hair, the level of covering required, the nature of the requirement, and the source of the obligation.  In this piece I will focus only on where a woman must cover her hair, and in the notes I will briefly address the issue of the nature of the obligation.

 

[2] The Ritva mentions the reason behind this leniency: "… since nobody sees."  Later in his comments, however, he cites the Yerushalmi's definition of a "chatzer": "an alley that does not have many people intruding through it is considered a 'chatzer.'"  This definition suggests that people do, in fact, look into the "chatzer," only not "many people."  Accordingly, we should perhaps reread the Ritva's earlier phrase as "since not many people see."  In any event the Ritva's citation of the Yerushalmi requires explanation, since, as we will see in a later footnote, the straightforward reading of the Yerushalmi implies that a woman must cover her hair even in the courtyard.  (The Ritva may have intended merely to explain why women generally leave their hair uncovered in the "chatzer.")

 

[3] A note concerning the nature of this obligation: The fact that most Rishonim allowed women to leave their hair entirely uncovered in the courtyard, even in the presence of men, may lead us to conclude that this covering serves only as a sign  of sorts or as a show of respect, rather than a measure of modesty.  However, this is certainly not the case, and this obligation undoubtedly involves an issue of modesty.  We will attempt to show how these basic principles emerge from our sugya, particularly from the comments of Rashi, who, as noted, allows exposing hair in the courtyard.  (A full analysis of this issue must also take into account the sugya in Masekhet Berakhot 24a, which considers a woman's hair "erva" - a part of the body that must be covered, but a comprehensive treatment of the relationship between that sugya and ours lies beyond the scope of this discussion.)

Firstly, the fact that this appears in the context of the obligation of "dat yehudit" shows that we deal here with an issue involving modesty.  Moreover, we see this issue clearly in Rashi's comments regarding the source of the obligation.  The gemara cited as the source of the hair-covering requirement the verse dealing with the "sota" (infidel woman), "He [the kohen] exposes the woman's head," indicating that normally a woman's hair is covered.  Rashi explains, "From the fact that we do this to her in order to put her to shame, measure for measure, as she acted to make herself appealing to her partner, we see that it is forbidden.  Alternatively, from the fact that is says, 'He exposes,' we see that at that moment it was not exposed; we thus derive from here that Jewish women do not normally go out with exposed hair.  This is the correct explanation."

According to the first explanation, hair is exposed only during moments of intimacy and the like, in order to make a woman attractive to her partner.  It is therefore considered immodest in other contexts, and hence forbidden in the presence of people other than her husband.  According to the second explanation, the fact that the infidel woman's hair-covering is removed shows that women generally cover their hair.

In other words, the first approach views the prohibition as founded upon the issue of beauty: a woman may not make herself attractive in this way before other men. According to the second approach, this was the reality, not necessarily related to the issue of beauty.

As the "Hafla'a" notes, an apparent difficulty arises concerning Rashi's second interpretation: why should the fact that women normally covered their hair indicate an obligation to do so?  The "Hafla'a" strengthens the question by noting a discussion in the gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin (46b), where the gemara looked for a Biblical source for the obligation to bury the dead.  The gemara suggested deriving this mitzva from the Biblical accounts of burials of righteous personalities, but rejects this proof based on the possibility of this having been common practice rather than obligatory.  If, indeed, we cannot derive halakhot from practices in Biblical times, how can the apparent custom of women covering their hair form the basis of this obligation?  The Hafla'a leaves this difficulty unresolved.

We may add to this question the verse regarding "chalitza," requiring a childless widow to "remove the shoe" of her brother-in-law who refuses to marry her (Devarim 25:9).  May we derive from here an obligation to wear shoes?  Rashi apparently understood that if women were accustomed to covering their hair, they presumably did so for purposes of modesty.  We may therefore derive an obligation from this practice.  It turns out, then, that both explanations of Rashi point to modesty as the basis of this requirement, particularly the first approach, which views the issue of attraction as the foundation of the prohibition of exposed hair.  (One may suggest that according to the second reason, hair-covering serves as a sign of the woman's being married, meant as a precaution against the prohibition of adultery.)

 

[4] We should note, however, that the expression, "If so, you have not allowed for a single daughter of Avraham Avinu… ," which indicates that women commonly left their hair uncovered in the courtyard, strongly suggests that it speaks on the level of "le-chatkhila."  (It is hard to imagine that this prevalent practice was improper and the gemara made no remark to that effect.)

 

[5] The Yerushalmi (Ketubot 7:6) likewise implies that (according to Rabbi Yochanan) a woman may not leave her hair entirely exposed in the courtyard.  Indeed, the Beit Shemuel (E.H. 115:9) cites the position of Rashi and Tosafot and then adds, "But the Semag cited the Yerushalmi that even in a courtyard leaving her hair completely exposed involves a prohibition; the Shiltei Gibborim writes so, as well… It may be that regarding the ketuba we accept the ruling of our sugya [in the Bavli, and a woman would not lose her ketuba payment upon divorce for leaving her hair exposed in the courtyard].  However, with regard to the prohibition [whether or not a woman may in fact conduct herself in this manner], we may suggest that even our sugya maintains that this is prohibited."  These comments are cited as well in the Be'eir Heiteiv (115:10).

We will now briefly review the conclusions of other Acharonim.  As we saw, the straightforward reading of the sugya, accepted by many Rishonim, yields a lenient ruling allowing for women to leave their hair uncovered in their courtyard.  The Bach and Arukh, however, disagree and require a partial covering.  The Darkhei Moshe (115:4) implies that strictly speaking this is permitted, but out of modesty concerns a woman should preferably cover her hair even in her home (in accordance with the well-known story of Kimchit).  The Magen Avraham (O.C. 75:4) likewise implies that strictly speaking a woman may leave her hair uncovered in her own property, but recommends, based on the Zohar, acting stringently in this regard.  The Beit Yosef in Hilkhot Shabbat (O.C. 303, in Bedek Ha-bayit) implies that although this is permissible, the accepted practice is to wear a covering.  The Beit Yosef there addresses the comment of the Kolbo, that "nowadays woman are accustomed to braid their hair [on Shabbat] and no one objects, for it is preferable for them to violate the prohibition inadvertently… for it is impossible to prevent them, so that they do not become unappealing to their husbands."  The Beit Yosef writes regarding these comments, "This is not a valid reason, for the hair is covered, so how could the concern arise of their becoming unappealing?"  Now if women would customarily go about with exposed hair (particularly when other people are present), then such a concern would, in fact, arise, and we would have good reason to allow women to braid their uncovered hair.  Apparently, the common practice was for women to cover their hair even in the home, and thus the Beit Yosef saw no reason to permit braiding their hair on Shabbat.

The Chatam Sofer (O.C. 36) took a very stringent position concerning hair-covering in the home, as did the Bei'ur Halakha (75:2; and in Geder Olam, chapter 2).  The Taz (115:5) allows uncovered hair in a courtyard, but restricts this ruling to situations when no other people are present.  In effect, then, his position does not involve any leniency.

Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, E.H 1:58) concludes that a women should not expose her hair in the courtyard or home in the presence of other people.  In the home when others are not present, he writes, there is basis to act leniently.