"You Shall Not Place a Stumbling Block Before the Blind" (1)

 

Translated by David Silverberg 

            The prohibition of "lifnei iver," or "placing a stumbling block before the blind" (Vayikra 19:14), is generally understood as forbidding one to assist another in the violation of halakha.  This raises many important questions, including:

 

·         May one give food to another Jew who clearly will not recite a berakha before eating?  (This question becomes particularly relevant for one serving in the Israeli army.)

·         May one sell food to Jews who do not recite berakhot?

·         May one invite to a bar-mitzva friends or relatives who will most likely come by car?

·         May a rabbi officiate at a wedding of a couple that will not observe the laws of family purity?

·         How should one answer a Jewish driver on Shabbat who stops and asks for directions?

·         May one cross the street on Shabbat if this causes Jewish drivers to stop (thereby violating Shabbat as a result of the brake lights, etc.)?

·         If a non-observant soldier in the army asks to borrow a radio from his religious comrade, may the latter lend it to him?

·         Is it permissible to organize a protest demonstration in Israel on Shabbat (e.g. against the opening of movie theaters on Shabbat), knowing that this will lead to additional Shabbat violation on the part of the Jewish police officers?

 

            In the coming shiurim we will explore the principles of this prohibition and, at the end of the series, return to these questions in an attempt to resolve them as well as other issues.

 

I.      BAD ADVICE OR A PHYSICAL STUMBLING BLOCK?

 

            The simple reading of the verse implies that it forbids the actual placement of a physical stumbling block before a blind person.  However, Chazal in Torat Kohanim understand it as a reference to offering bad advice.  Accordingly, the Rambam writes (Sefer Ha-mitzvot, Frankel edition, "lo ta'aseh" 299): 

 

"It warns against any of us leading anyone else to stumble through offering advice.  Meaning, if someone asks you for advice involving some matter, he can be persuaded in this regard.  The prohibition is issued against tricking him and leading him to stumble.  You should rather lead him straight to the matter as you feel is good and correct, and this is what is meant when He said, 'You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind'… They said that this prohibition includes also one who offers assistance in the committing of a sin or who brings it about… But the simple meaning of the verse is what we mentioned first."

 

            In other words, the Rambam understands the simple meaning of the verse as referring to bad advice, including assistance in transgressing the Torah.  This verse does not, however, speak of the actual placing of a stumbling block before a blind person.  (The Chinukh - mitzva 232 - explains in a similar vein.)

 

            Why is the simple, straightforward meaning of the verse not included under this prohibition?

 

            The Rambam maintains that this type of activity, causing others to fall and hurt themselves, falls under a different mitzva, that of "you shall make a parapet for your roof, so that you do not bring bloodguilt on your house if anyone should fall from it" (Devarim 22:8).  He writes in Sefer Ha-mitzvot ("lo ta'aseh" 298),

 

"He warned us against placing traps and stumbling blocks in our lands and homes… As the Sifrei writes, 'you shall make a parapet' - this constitutes a mitzvat asei ['positive commandment'] and 'so that you do not bring bloodguilt on your house' constitutes a lo ta'aseh ['negative commandment'].'"  The Rambam expresses this idea in mitzvat asei 184, as well.  (This is also the position taken by Rav Yerucham Perlow, in his commentary to Rav Sa'adya Gaon's Sefer Ha-mitzvot, lo ta'aseh 55.)  This also appears to be the simple meaning of the verse, "Cursed be he who misdirects a blind person on his way" (Devarim 27:18). 

 

            Another possible explanation may be suggested based on the straightforward reading of the verse.  The verse concludes, "and you shall fear your God; I am Hashem."  This clause generally refers to matters that no one other than the Almighty Himself can see.  When a person places a stone in the path of a blind pedestrian, any onlooker can easily take note.  By contrast, when it comes to offering unsound advice, only the individual himself knows whether he specifically intended to mislead or was himself misguided.  (Nechama Leibowitz)

 

            We should add that the gemara (Masekhet Nidda 57a) records the insistence of the Sadducees (a heretical sect that rejected Chazal's exegetical interpretations) to interpret the verse according to its simple meaning.  Furthermore, the Torah Temima maintains that this prohibition also includes the actual placement of a physical stumbling block before a blind person.  (Chazal merely claimed that the verse encompasses as well the additional issue of offering misleading counsel.)

           

II.   THE TALMUDIC SOURCE

 

            The gemara introduces this prohibition, against facilitating Torah violations, in Masekhet Avoda Zara 6a-6b.  The mishna there had forbade commerce with idolatrous gentiles three days before their festival, and the gemara adds that neither may one give his animal to a gentile during that three-day period.  The gemara then raises two possible reasons for this second prohibition.  First, the gentile will offer thanksgiving to his god as a result of his newfound profit, and the Jew will thus appear as having participated in the festival.  Alternatively, the gentile will use the animal for pagan sacrifice, rendering the Jew, who has effectively facilitated idol worship, in violation of "lifnei iver."  The gemara notes that a practical difference between these two approaches arises in a case where the gentile already owns other animals suitable for sacrifice.  The concern for the idolater's thanksgiving for his recent gain still applies.  If, however, the issue is one of "lifnei iver," then the previous availability of animals for sacrifice would render this transaction inconsequential, as the gentile could have easily offered sacrifices even before his dealing with the Jew.  The gemara then questions this reasoning in light of the halakha established by Rabbi Natan, prohibiting one from giving others forbidden foods to eat, despite the fact that they could presumably take it by themselves.  Apparently, argues the gemara, the prohibition of "lifnei iver" forbids assisting in the committing of a violation even if it could occur without the Jew's intervention! 

 

The gemara answers by introducing a fundamental distinction regarding "lifnei iver": Rabbi Natan stated his halakha only with regard to cases of "two sides of the river," meaning, that the potential transgressor could not have independently obtained access to the forbidden food.  Only in cases where the individual's assistance is indispensable for the violation does the prohibition apply.  By contrast, "on one side of the river," in instances where the violator could have committed the sin without any assistance, "lifnei iver" is inapplicable.

           

III. DEFINING "ONE SIDE" AND "TWO SIDES"

 

            Rashi, in his commentary on this gemara, explains this halakha as dependent entirely on the potential violator's ability to commit the sin without assistance (as discussed).  If he can commit the transgression without intervention, then assisting him does not violate the prohibition of "lifnei iver."  The Meiri, however, writes, "If he does not find [the forbidden food, object, etc.] without great effort, then it is forbidden to make it easily accessible to him."  Whereas Rashi would consider "lifnei iver" inapplicable in any situation where the transgressor could obtain the forbidden item independently, the Meiri extends the prohibition to instances of providing easier access to the object.

 

            The Ketav Sofer (Y.D. 83)[1] holds that only when the given object is near and accessible to the potential violator does "lifnei iver" not apply.  If he must exert himself even to a small extent, such as go to the market and purchase the item, then the prohibition against facilitating the violation applies.  The Ketav Sofer writes, "If he does not own it and must thus purchase it, then perhaps even if it is available for him to buy, 'lifnei iver' would apply."  However, the expression used in the gemara for this provision, "two sides of the river," clearly implies otherwise.

 

            We may formulate the dispute as follows: for "lifnei iver" not to apply, must the transgressor be able to actually violate the given prohibition independently with the same amount of effort (Meiri, Ketav Sofer), or must he merely have the potential to violate the prohibition (Rashi)?

 

            Said otherwise, according to Rashi, we must consider the level of difficulty required for the violator to commit the sin independently, whereas the Meiri and Ketav Sofer would have us examine the level of likelihood of this occurring.

 

THROUGH WHOM CAN THE VIOLATION BE OTHERWISE COMMITTED

 

            The mishna in Masekhet Bava Metzia (75a-75b) establishes that the prohibition against usury applies to both lender and borrower; the lender may not accept interest, and the borrower may not pay interest.  The gemara adds that both borrower and lender also violate the prohibition of "lifnei iver" when interest is paid, as codified by the Rambam (Malveh Ve-loveh 4:2).

 

            The Mishneh La-melekh there cites the Penei Moshe (Y.D. 108) who limits this provision: the borrower violates "lifnei iver" only if the lender cannot lend to anyone else.  If other profitable, lending opportunities exist, then this situation falls under the category of "one side of the river."  Since the lender could have transgressed the prohibition of usury without the participation of this specific borrower, "lifnei iver" cannot apply.

 

            The Mishneh La-melekh himself disagrees.  He argues that this situation would qualify as a case of "one side of the river," and hence render "lifnei iver" inapplicable, only if the sinner could achieve his goal either independently or through the assistance of a non-Jew.  If, however, the transgressor would require the assistance of another Jew to commit the given sin, such as in the case of usury, a prohibition applicable only when lending to Jews, then whoever assists him violates "lifnei iver."  The Mishneh La-melekh draws proof for his contention from Tosafot in Masekhet Chagiga (13a) in the context of the prohibition against teaching Torah to gentiles.  Tosafot there ask why the gemara does not consider this a violation of "lifnei iver," given the prohibition against a gentile studying Torah (see Sanhedrin 59a).  Tosafot answer that the gemara referred to instances where the gentile could have learned Torah from another non-Jew.  Since the gentile has other opportunities for a Torah education, his Jewish teacher does not violate "lifnei iver."  The gemara therefore sought a different source for the prohibition against teaching a gentile Torah.  The Mishneh La-melekh notes that Tosafot required specifically a case where another gentile could teach the prospective student.  Apparently, were the gentile to have had access only to other Jewish instructors, a Jewish teacher would, in fact, violate "lifnei iver."

 

            One could easily refute this proof by suggesting that Tosafot spoke realistically.  A gentile looking to study Torah would likely have difficulty finding a Jew to teach him, given the prohibition involved.  Tosafot therefore raised the more likely possibility of other gentiles ready to teach him.  In truth, however, "lifnei iver" would not apply in any situation where the gentile has access to Torah study, be it under the tutelage of Jews or gentiles.  Indeed, Tosafot in Masekhet Kiddushin (56a) appear to side with the Penei Moshe, as opposed to the view of the Mishneh La-melekh.

 

            How may we understand the underlying logic behind the Mishneh La-melekh's position?  If the sinner could achieve his goal with the help of another Jew, why should the Jew who assists him be in violation of "lifnei iver"?

 

            One could suggest that given our hope that Jews will not assist one another in the violation of the Torah, we may thus not assume that this will occur.  As such, so long as the sinner requires the help of other Jews, the assistance given to him is considered indispensable, thus in violation of "lifnei iver."[2]

 

            Alternatively, we may view the entire Jewish people as collectively responsible to help prevent the violation of the Torah.  Any Jew who assists another in the committing of a sin has thus violated this prohibition.  The availability of other Jews to help facilitate the given transgression is irrelevant, as all Jews share the responsibility of preventing the potential sinner from bringing his desires into fruition.

 

            This dispute between the Mishneh La-melekh and Penei Moshe yields many important ramifications.  For example, may a store-owner sell food to a non-observant Jew, who will eat without reciting berakhot, if the customer may just as well purchase from other stores in the area, themselves under Jewish ownership?  The Penei Moshe would consider "lifnei iver" inapplicable in such a case, since the violator can transgress the given prohibition without the assistance of the given store owner.  The Mishneh La-melekh, by contrast, would forbid the sale, since the customer could achieve his goal only with the help of other Jews.

 

            Another ramification involves an actual case brought to my attention by a student in the yeshiva who served as an officer in the Israeli army.  One Shabbat, when he was on-duty, he had to bring a telephone to the secular soldiers as part of his responsibilities.  If he refused, the regimental commander would have to bring the phone (and would be furious).  Since the soldiers could perform the forbidden activity (of using the telephone on Shabbat) with the help of the commander if the officer refused, the Penei Moshe would not apply "lifnei iver" to the case.  According to the Mishneh La-melekh, by contrast, "lifnei iver" would apply, since the soldiers require the help of a Jew to carry out this violation.  We should note, however, that we may perhaps rule leniently in this case nowadays with the growing popularity of cellular phones.  Since most soldiers have their own, private phones (but prefer to save money and call at the army's expense), providing them with the army's telephone would perhaps not constitute a violation of "lifnei iver."[3] Moreover, even the Mishneh La-melekh may rule leniently in such a situation.  Recall the first explanation mentioned above, that we assume other Jews to be unwilling to help facilitate a Torah violation.  If so, then when it is clear that another Jew will provide the means for the transgression, such as when the commander does not observe Shabbat, "lifnei iver" would not apply.

 

            Next week, God willing, we will examine the related issue of "mesayei'a," which would perhaps forbid facilitating a sin even when it can be committed regardless.  We will also consider the possibility of applying "lifnei iver" to cases involving rabbinic prohibitions.

 

 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] A similar position appears in Shut Chavot Yair, 185. 

[2] Such an approach emerges from the writings of the Chatam Sofer (Sha'ar Ha-mikneh Ve-kinyan, 176b; cited in Darkhei Teshuva, Y.D. 151:15), who explains that all other Jews are presumed not to violate "lifnei iver."  However, the Mishneh La-melekh appears to raise both possibilities mentioned here. 

[3] Several other Acharonim have adopted the view of the Mishneh La-melekh, including the Benei Chayi (C.M. 34, Hagahot Beit Yosef 7), the Chida (Darkhei Yosef, C.M. 9:3), and Minchat Chinukh (232:3).  Authorities adopting the Penei Moshe's position include the Kenesset Ha-gedola (Y.D. 159, Hagahat Ha-tur 11), Ketav Sofer (Y.D. 83), and Shut Machaneh Chayim (O.C., vol. 2, 18).  For further discussion of this debate, see Minchat Yitzchak, 3:79.