"Kalot and Chamurot" - Gradation of Sin in Repentance
The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash
"Kalot
and Chamurot":
Gradation
of Sin in Repentance
Based
on a lecture by Harav Aharon Lichtenstein
Adapted by Rav
Reuven Ziegler
Transcribed by
Myles Brody
DIFFERENTIATED
AND UNDIFFERENTIATED REPENTANCE
Many of our sources note the existence of different levels within the
world of mitzva observance. I wish
to examine the extent, if any, to which we are sensitive to these gradations
within the context of teshuva (repentance). Let me open by citing two classic texts
relating to teshuva. The
Rambam opens his Hilkhot Teshuva as follows:
With regard to
all the precepts in the Torah, positive commands or negative ones, whenever a
person transgresses one of them, either willfully or unknowingly, and
subsequently repents and turns away from his sin, it is his duty to confess
before God, blessed be He, as it is said, "When a man or woman shall commit any
sin that men commit, to do a trespass against the Lord, and that person be
guilty, then they shall confess their sin which they have done" (Bamidbar
5:6-7). This means to confess in
words, and this confession is an affirmative precept.
How does one
confess? One says, "I beseech You, O Lord, I have sinned, I have acted
perversely, I have transgressed before You, and have done thus and thus, and lo,
I repent and am ashamed of my deed and will never do this again." This constitutes the essence of
confession. The more one elaborates
and the more detailed the confession one makes, the more he is
praiseworthy.
The Rambam's presentation here is comprehensive and
undifferentiated. He makes a
sweeping statement about "all the precepts in the Torah, positive commands or
negative ones." There is no hint of
weighing the significance or substance of a particular sin. The process is more
or less uniform, the formulation identical, except for the fact that a person
must mention exactly what he has done slandered someone, shaved with a razor,
lent with interest, etc.
In contrast, the third section of Rabbeinu Yona's Sha'arei Teshuva
opens with an exhortation for penitents to distinguish between the various
levels of commandments and prohibitions:
The penitent is
exhorted to search his ways to discover how many transgressions and sins he is
guilty of; and after having performed a diligent examination, he is further
exhorted to determine the severity of each of his sins, as it said, "Let us
examine and scrutinize our ways" (Eikha 3:40). He must do this to appraise himself of
the degree of sin involved in every one of his misdeeds. There are cases of guilt so great that
they approach Heaven, and instances of evil that are as weighty as many great
sins. The magnitude of one's
repentance will be commensurate with the magnitude of his soul-searching. His spirit will be broken to the extent
of his awareness of the magnitude and gravity of his transgression and then
his uncircumcised heart will be humbled and he will requite his
transgression.
According to Rabbeinu Yona, it is important to distinguish between
gradations of sin for a number of reasons.
First, this is necessary in order that the requisite repentance be
commensurate with the misdeed.
Second, it is required so that the sense of guilt and shame - two
different yet interactive responses - be of the proper
dimensions.
Clearly, Rabbeinu Yona's presentation differs substantially from the
Rambam's. Although in Hilkhot
Teshuva 1:1, quoted above, the Rambam speaks not of the stages of
teshuva, but rather of the viddui (confession) that comes at its
end, his discussion of the stages of teshuva in chapter 2 does not
highlight the need for inquiry into the different levels or grades of sin. Rabbeinu Yona, on the other hand,
devotes the third section of his book to a very detailed catalogue of different
levels of sin, listed in ascending order.
In terms of our own experience, goals and directions, ought to assume,
like the Rambam, that there is a uniform sense of teshuva, or, like
Rabbeinu Yona, that differentiation is critical in order to undergo
teshuva properly? If the
latter, what kind of differentiation do we have in mind, and what kind of
categories can we think of?
SINS AGAINST
GOD AND AGAINST MAN
Let us start with the familiar distinction between aveirot bein adam
la-Makom and aveirot bein adam le-chavero, sins man commits against
God and sins against his fellow man.
The mishna at the end of Yoma (65b) speaks of the need to attain
forgiveness from one's fellow in order for Yom Kippur to atone for an
interpersonal sin, whereas with regard to aveirot bein adam la-Makom, it
is sufficient if someone makes his peace, as it were, with the Almighty. This distinction can be variously
understood.
(1) In a pragmatic sense, the Rosh (Yoma 8:17) and others say that
interpersonal sins undermine the solidarity of Klal Yisrael. If this is the case, then interpersonal
forgiveness is valuable in its own right, but is not directly related to the
quality of the teshuva involved.
Rather, in addition to the person repenting, something else can be
attained Jewish unity.
(2) The Gemara in Rosh Ha-shana (17b) suggests a different
explanation.
Beloria the
convert once asked Rabban Gamliel:
"It is written in your Torah [that God] 'does not show favor'
(Devarim 10:17). Yet it is
also written, 'May God show favor to you' (Bamidbar 6:26)!"
R. Yosi the
Kohen joined the conversation and said to her, "I will give you a parable which
will illustrate the matter. A man
lent his neighbor an amount of money and fixed a time for payment in the
presence of the king, while the other swore to pay him by the life of the
king. When the time arrived, he did
not pay him, and he went to excuse himself to the king. The king, however, said to him, 'The
wrong done to me I excuse you, but go and obtain forgiveness from you
neighbor.' So too here, one verse
speaks of offences committed by man against God, and the other of offences
committed by man against his fellow man."
With regard to
bein adam la-Makom, God is willing to shower His grace upon us. However, forgiveness for aveirot bein
adam le-chavero is not up to God.
The reason one must placate his fellow is that God is not the proper
address; you have to pay the person from whom you borrowed, or placate the
person against whom you transgressed.
(3) Perhaps the most obvious interpretation is that without placating
your fellow, there is a problem with the quality of your teshuva. The most basic premise of teshuva
is azivat ha-chet, abandoning the sin. If one does not do this, it is like
plunging into a mikveh while gripping a continuous source of
impurity. With regard to aveirot
she-bein adam la-Makom, one confesses to God, and that constitutes azivat
ha-chet. With regard to bein
adam le-chavero, if a person has offended someone and has not taken pains to
placate him, then the offense is continuing; it is a festering sore. That being the case, the teshuva
is inadequate to attain the communal atonement offered by Yom Kippur, because
one has not repented properly.
INTENTION AND
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Apart from classification of mitzvot, there are additional factors
that affect the quality of a transgression. The Gemara in Yoma (36b) speaks
about a multiple confession "Chatati, aviti, pashati"
which distinguishes between different levels of rebelliousness. Though Chakhamim and R. Meir disagree
regarding the sequence and the interpretation, they agree that one should
distinguish between sins committed rebelliously, sins committed willfully but
not out of a sense of rebellion, and sins performed out of carelessness.
Other contexts draw a contrast between transgressions done
le-hakhis, to spite God, and those done le-te'avon, to
quench a desire. If a person
commits a sin in order to anger God or rebel against Him, then, apart from the
particular sin, he also transgresses the prohibition of chillul ha-Shem,
desecration of God's name (see Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah
5:10). However, if person is impelled by appetite, not rebellion, then, although
his sin may be intentional, it is not committed out of a desire to fight God,
but rather out of weakness of the flesh.
In addition to these factors, there is the question of habituation. In certain contexts, if person commits a
sin repeatedly, the punishment is commensurate.
Then there is the matter of mitigating circumstances. Chazal, by and large, did not
take the view of many modern penologists, criminologists, sociologists, and
psychologists that somehow everything can be ascribed to nurture and nature, and
that, to a great extent, one can be divested of personal responsibility. The sense of personal responsibilities
and liabilities is central for us, and is related to our faith in humanity and
to our belief in free will, in the ability of a person to act if he so
desires. Nonetheless, there is some
recognition of circumstances which can either inhibit or mitigate certain
actions. The Gemara in
Berakhot (32a) speaks of a father grooming his son and leaving him with a
purse of money in front of a brothel.
In such circumstances, the sin is much harder to avoid than under normal
conditions.
SEVERITY OF THE
ACT
Beyond all
this, we have the distinction, addressed by Rabbeinu Yona, between different
levels of the severity of the act.
The differentiation between kalot and chamurot, less and
more severe infractions, is itself dual.
The Gemara in Yoma (83a) says that if a person is suddenly seized
on Yom Kippur with a consuming passion to eat, and otherwise his health will be
in danger, then you must feed him.
But what do you feed him if no kosher food is available? You feed him whatever constitutes a
lesser degree of aveira (transgression). For instance, if you have tevel
or neveila, untithed produce or an animal that died without proper
slaughtering, you feed him the latter, because eating it is a prohibition
punished by lashes, while the former entails death at the hands of Heaven. The sugya goes on to elaborate
what is more chamur and less chamur, and R. Yona expands upon
this.
This kind of kalot and chamurot refers to different
gradations along the same continuum.
Within the realm of prohibitions, there are those punished by lashes and
those punished by death. The Rambam
(Hilkhot Teshuva 1:2) describes the sin of taking a false oath as being
among the chamurot, even though it is only punished with lashes, because
it entails a desecration of God's name. Within positive precepts, too, there are
some that are singled out as being particularly weighty. "The mitzva of tzitzit is
equivalent to the entire Torah" (Nedarim 25a, Shevuot 29a). To take another example, the Rambam
(Hilkhot Matenot Aniyim 10:1) says that a person needs to observe the
mitzva of tzedaka, charity, more than any other positive commandment.
The Rambam (Hilkhot Matenot
Aniyim 8:10) also describes redemption of captives as a mitzva rabba,
a great mitzva.
Yet there is another kind of distinction between kalot and
chamurot. The Mishna in
Yoma (85b) teaches:
The
sin-offering and the guilt-offering [for the] undoubted commission of certain
offences procure atonement.
Death and the
Day of Atonement procure atonement together with penitence.
Penitence
[alone] procures atonement for lighter transgressions (kalot): [the transgressions of] positive
commandments and prohibitions.
In the case of
more severe transgressions (chamurot), penitence suspends [the Divine
punishment], until the Day of Atonement comes to procure
atonement.
The Gemara (Yoma 86a), the Mekhilta (Yitro,
Ba-Chodesh, 7) and the Yerushalmi (Yoma 8:7 and elsewhere)
cite the famous classification of chilukei kappara, levels of
atonement:
R. Mattia ben
Cheresh asked R. Eleazar ben Azaria in Rome: Have you heard about the four kinds of
sins, concerning which R. Yishmael has lectured?
He
answered: They are three, and
repentance is connected with each.
If one transgressed a positive commandment, and repented, then he is
forgiven on the spot...
If he has
transgressed a prohibition and repented, then repentance suspends [the
punishment] and the Day of Atonement procures atonement
If he has
committed [a sin to be punished with] excision or death at the hands of the
court, and repented, then repentance and the Day of Atonement suspend [the
punishment], and suffering finishes the atonement
But if he has
been guilty of the profanation of the Name, then penitence has no power to
suspend punishment, nor the Day of Atonement to procure atonement, nor suffering
to finish it, but all of them together suspend the punishment and only death
finishes it
The Rambam
(Hilkhot Teshuva 1:2) cites this Gemara, stating the se'ir
ha-mishtaleach (scapegoat) provides atonement for all sins accompanied by
repentance; but if one does not repent, the se'ir provides atonement only
for kalot. He then provides
a definition of kalot and chamurot:
Which are the
light sins, and which are the severe ones?
The severe sins are those for which one is liable for execution by the
court or for karet (excision).
False and unnecessary oaths are also considered severe sins, even though
they are not [punished by] karet.
[The violation of] the other prohibitions, and [the failure to perform]
positive commandments that are not punishable by karet, are considered
light [sins].
Rambam explains
that kalot are everything short of sins punished by karet or
death, as well as false oaths, which entail a chilul ha-Shem.
There is not a continuum of sin,
but rather two groups starkly separated in terms of atonement. The group of kalot achieves
atonement by means of the scapegoat alone, even without repentance; and where
there is repentance, kalot receive atonement immediately, while
chamurot must wait.
Are we to regard kalot and chamurot as fundamentally
different categories, as would seem implicit in the Mishna and the Rambam, or as
different points along a spectrum of severity, along the lines of the Gemara
(Yoma 83a) which distinguishes between the different foods to feed
someone on Yom Kippur? We can get
guidance on this from a striking statement of the Ramban.
RAMBAN: TWO
ELEMENTS OF ATONEMENT
Regarding a person who brings a korban ola, a freewill offering
wholly burnt on the altar, the verse (Vayikra 1:4) says, "Ve-nirtza lo
lechapper alav, It shall be favorably accepted, to atone for him." Chazal ask: we know what sins a
chatat (sin-offering) or asham (guilt-offering) atone for, but for
which sins does an ola atone?
Rashi (ad loc.) quotes the answer found in the Torat Kohanim
(4, 5):
For what kind
of sins does [the freewill burnt-offering] effect atonement? Should you say, for sins [where
punishment if willfully committed] is excision, or any of the [four] deaths
imposed by a court, or death by the hands of Heaven, or lashes - the punishment
for all these sins is already stated, [and atonement is effected by those
punishments, and not by this offering]!
You must conclude that [the freewill burnt-offering] effects atonement
only for transgressions of a positive commandment, and for the violation of a
negative commandment that is juxtaposed to a positive
commandment.
Ramban (ad loc.) explains why Chazal were motivated to give this
explanation. Regarding capital crimes and sins entailing karet, the Torah
specified the punishments for willful commission and the sacrifices brought for
unwillful commission. Regarding
sins punished by lashes or by death at the hands of Heaven (if committed
willfully), the Torah does not mention that any sacrifice needs to be brought
for unwillful commission. Since it
does not make sense for the Torah to mention the punishments for willful and
unwillful commission of some sins, and the punishment only for willful
commission of other sins, Ramban concludes that, regarding the latter category,
"there is no burden of sin at all if they are committed unwillfully, and they do
not need any atonement." We are
left with a third category - transgressions of a positive commandment and
violation of a negative commandment juxtaposed to a positive one for which the
Torah mentions no punishment even for willful commission. Since it is impossible that no atonement
is needed for willful commission of these sins, Chazal conclude that the
olat nedava, freewill burnt offering, atones for
these.
Ramban himself goes beyond this approach:
It is possible
to say that because, in the case of freewill offering, [God] did not use the
expression "to make atonement for him concerning the error which he committed"
(as He said with reference to the offering brought for other sins committed
unwillfully), and instead He said, "it shall be favorably accepted," it appeared
to our Rabbis that [the burnt-offering] effects atonement for those who
willfully commit certain sins, seeing that these persons are not [hitherto]
"favorably accepted" by Him. For
he who commits a sin unwillfully is yet, in spite of the sin, considered
"favorably accepted" by God.
If, then, [the burnt-offering procures atonement for willful sinners,] it
must refer to those who willfully transgress a positive commandment or a
negative commandment that is juxtaposed to a positive commandment. For regarding these transgressions, no
punishment is mentioned in the Torah; yet, [clearly,] those who violate them are
not pleasing to God, because they have violated His commandment. How, then, shall these people become
favorably accepted by their Master?
By bringing this gift [i.e., the olat nedava].
In other words,
if person sins in error (be-shogeg), he is nevertheless favored by God
(retzui Hashem); but if he sins intentionally (be-mezid), he is
not favored. Therefore, the verse
"ve-nirtza lo, it shall be favorably accepted" cannot refer to sin
committed be-shogeg, for such a person is retzui Hashem even
without bringing an offering. The
verse must, then, refer to one who sins intentionally. Since we already know the punishments
meted out to those who sin intentionally, it must be that the verse refers to an
intentional sinner who receives no punishment but is nevertheless not favored by
God, i.e., those who transgress a positive commandment or a negative commandment
that is juxtaposed to a positive commandment.
Ramban's comment is remarkable in two respects. First, it invites the obvious question
which R. Meir Arik asked: Are we to understand that someone who sins
be-shogeg is retzui Hashem, and that he does not require repentance
or atonement? Second, we know that
one must offer a chatat (sin-offering) if he unintentionally commits a
sin that would be punished with karet if it were performed
intentionally. But if we adopt what
seems to be the Ramban's assumption, that an unintentional sinner does
not require atonement because he is retzui Hashem, then why does someone
who unintentionally transgresses a sin punishable by karet have to bring
a sin-offering? Isn't he retzui
Hashem?
There are two possible explanations of Ramban's comment. One is that the second question answers
the first. The extent to which we
would say that negligence is culpable depends on how serious the infraction
is. If it is a relatively minor
matter, so that even if done willfully it isn't much of a sin, then it can be
overlooked if it is done through negligence. Yet a graver infraction entails a
greater degree of responsibility and culpability, and one would not be
considered a retzui Hashem if he committed these acts unwillfully.
I believe we can offer another explanation if we take into account a
different purpose of the sacrifice, apart from its function in regaining divine
favor for the sinner. Ramban draws
a sharp line between kalot and chamurot. When committed unwillfully, ordinary
prohibitions (chayvei lavin) do not require kappara. However, severe prohibitions (chayvei
kritut u-mita), which would require karet or death if committed
intentionally, require kappara even when committed unintentionally. This distinction has important
implications.
With regard to kalot, i.e. chayvei lavin, the
seriousness of the aveira has less to do with the nature of the deed than
with the character with person who is sinning. In his willful confrontation with the
Almighty, he chose to prioritize his own desire over God's. Leaving aside certain moral
considerations, it is not the deed that needs to be redeemed, but the
person. Consequently, if the person
has not been pervaded by sinful desire and instead committed the deed
be-shogeg, in error, he himself does not require redemption, and remains
a retzui Hashem. However,
with regard to chamurot, i.e. chayvei kritot, it is not only the
person who requires redemption; the event needs to be redeemed, and the world
within which that sin has been committed needs to be redeemed.
We need, therefore, to consider the nature of teshuva in two
separate contexts. There is the
teshuva of kalot, with regard to which what is critical and
central is the redemption and purgation of the self. With regard to chamurot, however,
it is not sufficient that a person repent and thereby regain the status of
retzui Hashem; rather, a korban is required to cleanse the social
and metaphysical orders of the consequences of that sin. The quality of an aveira
chamura is that it defiles, not only in the sense that every sin defiles
through the sinner's subjective disobedience, but it also defiles
objectively. Therefore, this
objective defilement needs to be confronted. The teshuva of chamurot
thus needs to be considered both in terms of one's personal redemption, and in
terms of righting that which a person has defiled.
NULLIFYING
MAN'S WILL BEFORE GOD'S
Coming back to our original question of Rambam's approach vs. R. Yona's,
are we to think of sin as a uniform phenomenon, or are we to differentiate and
classify both categories and circumstances of sin? This question applies to avodat
Hashem generally and teshuva particularly. I think the answer is clear: we need
both Rambam's formulation and R. Yona's.
On the one hand, there is a common denominator to all sins, and we need to confront this if we want to improve ourselves. Every time a person fails in the realm of Torah, Halakha and morality, he stands before the question of what kind of person he is and what kind of life he leads. Does he give preference to his own will or to God's? Does he think in egocentric terms or in theocentric terms? Every time a person is confronted by God's will, Prospero's question arises: "My foot, my tutor?" (The Tempest, Act 1, Scene 2) - will he be led by his head or by his foot?
At this plane, when one considers the question of nullifying his will
before God's (see Avot 2:4), the differentiations of kalot and
chamurot fall away. All
sins, in this sense, are severe. In
his Life of Solon (XVII, 4), Plutarch writes: "Draco himself, when asked
why he had decreed the death penalty for the great majority of offenses, replied
that he considered the minor ones deserved it, and for the major ones no heavier
punishment was left." There is
substance to this approach. The
Yerushalmi (Makkot 2:6) recounts, "Prophecy was asked: A sinner
what is his punishment? She
answered: 'The soul that sins shall die' (Yechezkel 18:4, 20)." No question is raised as to which sin it
was, whether major or minor, kalot or chamurot. If a person sheds the role of
metzuveh (one who commanded) and instead usurps the role of metzaveh
(commander), that is the ultimate rebellion! Though sometimes the severity is
mitigated by circumstances, and some sins are committed through weakness rather
than rebellion, nevertheless, the bottom line is one gave preference to his own
will over that of the Almighty.
In this sense, when a person confronts not just a particular
aveira but the critical existential question of whose will is to prevail,
his or God's, the proper confession is simply, "Chatati, aviti, pashati
lefanekha!" I stood before You,
I was at that juncture, and I took the wrong turn. This is one aspect of
teshuva.
DETAIL AND
RELATIONSHIP
But it is not the only one.
Teshuva entails a plethora of aspects because sin is
multifaceted. At least five
different aspects of sin that can be singled out. One is the wrong per se, the choice of
doing evil. Second is the fact that
the evil which a person has done transgresses the will of God; over and above
murder being murder, it is also something which God has proscribed. Third, one must consider the
ramifications of sin, the contamination of the self, the defilement and
impurity. Fourth, defying God's
will is a "personal" affront to Him; it is spitting in His face, so to
speak. That being the case, there
is a fifth result: one's relationship to God has been impaired. Sin opens a chasm or sets up a barrier
between oneself and the Almighty. "Your iniquities have separated between
you and your God" (Yeshayahu 59:2).
If a person wants to engage in teshuva, he needs to relate to all
these elements and effect a tikkun (repair) in each. There needs to be a tikkun
ha-chet (repair of the sin), a tikkun of one's relationship with
God, and a tikkun of the self.
Each of these three types of tikkun should be examined
independently, and in order to do so, we need to distinguish between two veins
of teshuva: teshuva from and teshuva to. The former is exemplified by the verses,
"Turn, turn from your evil ways" (Yechezkel 33:11), and "Let the wicked
forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts" (Yeshayahu
55:7). The latter is exemplified by
verses that discuss not what a person is leaving, but where he is headed:
"Return to Me, and I will return to You" (Hoshea 14:2), and "Israel,
return to the Lord Your God" (Malakhi 3:7).
Tikkun
ha-chet is a matter of
"turn[ing] from your evil ways." As
such, one must consider, along the lines of R. Yona, the gravity and specifics
of his sin, and, as Ramban implied, how to repair the damage which the sin
brought upon the world. This
requires great attention to detail.
There are religious traditions and schools of thought that not only
neglect attention to detail, but even scorn it. The Lutheran tradition, for example,
believes that one is so suffused with sin that the only thing to do is to try to
make peace with God, whether actively or passively, waiting for divine grace or
seeking it. But acting to fix minor
or major failings is not relevant.
Some call this a "religious," as opposed to a "moral," view of divine
service, where "religious" refers to focusing upon one's relationship with God,
and "moral" refers to the righting of wrongs. If one adopts this focus, then indeed he
does not need to differentiate.
Neither the quality nor the quantity of sin is as important as the
existence of barrier between God and oneself, and one must focus on transcending
that barrier, pleading for grace, throwing oneself at God's mercy.
There is something to be said for an approach that does not content
itself solely with picking up the pieces, with trying to adjust and repair, but
rather seeks rehabilitation by establishing anew a bridge to the Almighty a
bridge allowing one to find his way to God, and enabling God to come to
him. Yet, though we understand that
one cannot focus solely on detail in avodat Hashem
generally, and in teshuva particularly, surely we believe that there is a
"moral" element of teshuva and of avodat Hashem, a need to
right the wrong and terminate its perpetuation. Our whole conception of avodat
Hashem rests upon two pillars: an awareness of the overpowering importance
of our relationship with God - "But as for me, the nearness of God is my
good" (Tehillim 73:28); "As the hart yearns for water brooks, so
my soul yearns for You, O God" (Tehillim 42:2) and, at the same time,
attention to a disciplined life and its minute details, which suffuses the world
of Halakha.
We reject totally the view that when one pursues the overarching
relationship and the quest for intimacy and rehabilitation, all of the minutiae
simply disappear into insignificance.
On the other hand, we also reject the view that only the specific actions
and details - weighted, graded, comprehended properly - will suffice. We do not - we dare not - focus
exclusively on one of these two pillars.
Our world is built in a multi-faceted and multi-planed way by relating to
and integrating both aspects. The
ability to relate to God is the most fundamental and basic aspect of human
existence, and also its overarching, ultimate, beatific attainment. At the same
time, the attention to detail, to every se'if katan, and the ability to
integrate the poetry and the prose of avodat Hashem, is central to our
conception and our experience.
This dual focus is, consequently, central to our view of
teshuva. The teshuva
of chamurot, which concentrates on actions and the desire to right them,
requires that we weigh, grade, prioritize, and emphasize. The teshuva of kalot,
which concentrates not on what we have done but on trying to reestablish our
relationship with God, allows a focus on overarching goals, expressed in
universal categories and uniform viddui. (I refer to kalot and
chamurot not as types of sin, but rather as signifying different
approaches to teshuva.)
While tikkun ha-chet and tikkun of one's damaged
relationship with God are characterized by different approaches to
teshuva the chamurot mode and the kalot mode,
respectively - the two approaches interact and coalesce in the third element of
repair, namely, tikkun of the self which has been contaminated by
sin. To repair and purify oneself
means to reaffirm and reestablish one's relationship with God, as well as a
spiritual and moral purgation that takes into account actions and details.
TWO
CONFESSIONS
Historically, we encounter two types of confession. The Gemara in Yoma (87b) speaks
of various formulae of viddui stated by a number of Amoraim, and
then the Gemara adds,
Mar Zutra said:
[The preceding confessions are necessary] only when he did not say, "Aval
anachnu chatanu, But we have sinned."
But if he had said "Aval anachnu chatanu," no more is
necessary. For Bar
Hamdudi said, "Once I stood before Shemuel, who was sitting, and when the prayer
leader came up and said 'Aval anachnu chatanu,' he rose." We learn from here that those words are
the quintessential viddui.
Aval anachnu
chatanu: simple,
uniform, undifferentiated confession.
It is simply an acknowledgment, with bowed head, with shame and guilt,
that we have gone astray. Whether
our sin is minor or major, it is still a sin: "But we have sinned."
Today, however, we have expanded this simple confession into an entire
aleph-bet of sin:
Ashamnu, bagadnu, gazalnu, etc. The Geonim added even more: a
double aleph-bet of "Al chet," concluding with a list of sins
categorized according to the gravity of their punishment "sins punishable by
the court, sins punishable by karet, etc." And if that isn't enough, some people
have taken each line of Al Chet and elaborated much further. Rambam's viddui was enough for
the Gemara, but Rabbeinu Yona's viddui entered the mainstream of our life
and our experience on Yom Kippur.
Yet that experience on Yom Kippur is itself differentiated. Broadly speaking, we stand on Yom Kippur
with a dual sense and a dual charge.
We stand with the Rambam, trying to eradicate the roots of sin, to
eliminate the desire for sin, to uproot completely the inclination and tendency
for sin. Reciting the viddui
of Aval anachnu chatanu, we confront where we are and where the
Almighty is, and try to reach out to Him, hoping that He will reach out to
us. On the other hand, we stand
with Rabbeinu Yona in following the advice of Eikha (3:40), "Let us
search and examine our ways."
Detailing our sins one after another, we examine what we have done and
how we have done it, weighing its severity, so that we know not just whether we
are sinners, but exactly what kind of sinners we are. On Yom Kippur, we engage in a highly
religious enterprise and a highly moral enterprise; that is Yom Kippur as a
whole.
But at the end of the day, when we come to Ne'ila, we change our
tune a bit. Starting on Erev Yom
Kippur, through the first four prayer services, we say Aval anachnu
chatanu and then we go through the whole list of Al chet. However, as dusk approaches and night
begins to fall, when the conclusion of the day and its atonement is on the
horizon, we turn to God and say: Master of the Universe, we have been working on
ourselves all year, and especially since the beginning the Elul, weighing and
measuring our sins, and all of Yom Kippur we have been striving and groping and
hoping. But now, at the end of the
day, we have only one thing left, and that is to cast our hopes and prayers upon
You. We look to You after we have
gone the extra mile, and maybe it isn't enough. Now it is too late in the day, and we
cannot involve ourselves again in this calculus, identifying and grading sins,
pinning down each one. Now it is
our very selves encountering You, and we implore You, we beg for Your
forgiveness, for selicha, mechila, kappara!
At Ne'ila, we do not say Al chet, and content ourselves
with saying Aval anachnu chatanu.
We do so in the hope that what we have done over the course of the year,
what we have done during Elul, during Selichot, during Aseret Yemei
Teshuva, during the first four prayers of Yom Kippur - following Rabbeinu
Yona, trying to right wrongs as best as we could, trying to grope and to inquire
makes us worthy and deserving of forgiveness. But now we look for something more: for
tahara, purification "Lifnei Hashem titharu, Before God you
shall be purified" (Vayikra 16:30).
This purification has a dual character. When a person is purified in a mikveh,
each part of him is immersed in the mikveh, and the whole of him is in the
mikveh. Similarly, on Yom Kippur we
strive for tahara which comes from moral purgation, from the
confrontation with sin, from the attempt to eradicate and overcome it. This is an aspect of tikkun atzmi
and of tikkun ha-chet. We
also strive for the tahara of "Mikveh Yisrael Hashem"
(Yirmiyahu 17:13 translated homiletically as "God is the mikveh of
Israel"). This second type of
tahara refers to our rehabilitation, to the reestablishment of our
relationship with God, which springs not solely from below, but from above.
"Lifnei Hashem titharu," Rabbeinu Yona said, means that there is a
special mitzva to repent on Yom Kippur (Sha'arei Teshuva 4:17). Here we encounter purification as a
charge, a mandate, which entails "Nachpesa derakhenu ve-nachkora," the
specific, detailed, calculating aspect of teshuva. Yet "Lifnei Hashem titharu" is
also to be understood not as a charge or a mandate, but as a hope, aspiration
and promise, that if we have confronted "mi-kol chatoteichem," all our
sins, then God, for His part, will proclaim "Titharu" You
shall be purified!
(This Kinus
Teshuva lecture was delivered at the Gruss Kollel in Jerusalem in Tishrei
5762 [2001].)