Kotzer: Defining the Melakha
THE LAWS OF SHABBAT
By Rav Yosef Zvi Rimon
Shiur
#33:
Kotzer, Part I
Is taking flowers out of a vase filled with water
permissible? Is there a problem with
walking or sitting on grass? May one
sniff a fruit or plant which is still attached to the ground? Can one retrieve a ball which is
stuck in a tree or a bush?
I)
Defining the Melakha
The term ketzira (reaping; the melakha is
known as kotzer) refers
specifically to harvesting grain.
What about collecting other produce?
The Gemara (73b) says:
Reaping, vintaging,
date-gathering, olive-picking, and fig-plucking are all the
same melakha.
The
examples mentioned all involve removing giddulei karka (things which grow
in the ground) from the ground itself or a plant attached to it. Is the prohibition of
kotzer applicable also to plants which are not attached to the ground? Is one allowed to pluck a leaf from a
severed branch or from a flowerpot?
The rule in this follows the following statement from the Gemara (107b-108a),
which formulates the prohibition as oker davar mi-giddulo, uprooting
something from the place of its growth.
Abbayei said: One
who pulls fungus from the handle of a pitcher is liable on account of oker
davar mi-giddulo.
Rav Oshaya cited a
disproof: If one plucks from a perforated pot, one is liable, but if it is
unperforated, one is not liable!
There, that is not
its growth; but here, this is its growth.
In other
words, the prohibition of kotzer does
not relate specifically to telisha
(detachment) from the ground, but to uprooting something from the place of
its growth. A fungus grows on
the handle of a vessel, so its telisha
from that spot constitutes kotzer,
since this is the place of its growth.
On the other hand, if a plant grows in an unperforated pot,
telisha of its parts is not forbidden
by Torah law because of kotzer; the
pot is not considered its place of growth, as generally one does not sow seeds
in a pot such as this (Rashi).[1]
According to this, there is no prohibition of detaching fruits or leaves
from a severed branch, since the fruit and the leaves already have already been
uprooted from the place of their growth by the chopping off of the branch; and
indeed the Rema rules accordingly
(336:8).
Breaking
the Connection or Interrupting the Nourishment?
One may ask whether the prohibition is linked to the severing of the
physical connection of the produce to its place of growth or its being
detached from its point of sustenance.
The ramification would be, for example, for a plant which is attached
to the ground but no longer is being nourished by it. The Rishonim debated this
question, based on the Gemara in Chullin (127b). The Gemara there rules that fruit
which have dried-up while on the tree are still considered attached to it and
thereby to the ground, and the prohibition of
kotzer is applicable to them. However,
Rashi (ad loc., s.v. I
De-yaveshu) indicates that a fruit which is so desiccated that its stem has
dried-up is considered detached, and the prohibition of
kotzer does not apply to it. On the other hand, the
Rambam (8:4) writes that the
prohibition of kotzer applies to a
tree with dried-up fruits, and the Magen
Avraham (336:1) understands his view to be that even if the stem is
totally dried-up, one is liable for kotzer
if one picks the fruit.[2]
The dispute ostensibly depends on the question we have mentioned:
according to Rashi, the
prohibition of kotzer relates to
uprooting something from the point of its sustenance, and therefore if the
fruit does not draw nourishment from the ground, there is no prohibition in
detaching it; according to the Rambam,
on the other hand, the prohibition relates to severing the physical
connection of the plant to the ground, and there is no significance to the
question of whether the plant draws nourishment from the ground at all.[3]
II) The Prohibition of Kotzer
for Animals
We have
seen a debate regarding the applicability of kotzer to items which are
technically attached to their place of growth but not drawing sustenance from
it. What about the inverse case? What is the law regarding things
which draw nourishment from a certain place but are not attached to it? In this context, the
Yerushalmi (7:2) cites the following ruling on this matter:
The rabbis of Caesarea say:
One who fishes or removes anything from its sustenance is liable because of
kotzer.
In
other words, one who catches a fish and takes it out of the water has violated
the melakha of
kotzer because one has removed the fish from its place of sustenance.[4] According to the Yerushalmi,
removing something from the point of its growth is not limited to plants; it
applies to any living thing which is being removed from its point of sustenance.
The Bavli (107b) seems to dispute this:
Shmuel said: If one
removes a fish from the sea, as soon as the size of a sela thereof
becomes dry, he is liable.
In
other words, one is not liable immediately for removing a fish from the sea; one
is liable only once a portion of the fishs body, of the diameter of a shekel (sela
in Talmudic terminology), becomes dry.
Rashi (s.v. Chayav), Tosafot (Taanit 24a, s.v. Ha-sholeh), and most
Rishonim explain that the liability is for a different Shabbat prohibition,
taking a life (netilat neshama),
and the assumption is that after a spot on the fishs body of the diameter of a
sela dries up, it has no chance to live, even were it to be thrown back
into the water. From the Gemara, it
appears that if the fisherman catches and releases the fish back into the water
before it has dried out to this extent, he does not violate a Torah prohibition. This goes against the implication of
the Yerushalmi, that someone who takes a fish out of the water is liable
immediately because of kotzer, even if
one returns the fish to water later.[5]
What is the basis of the
dispute between the Bavli and Yerushalmi?
It is possible that the dispute depends on the question which we
discussed above. According to the
Bavli, the prohibition of kotzer
focuses on the severing of a physical connection, and since the fish is
not actually attached to the water, there is no prohibition to remove it from
the water because of kotzer. The
Yerushalmi, on the other hand,
believes that the prohibition is focused on separating something from its
point of sustenance, and naturally the prohibition is applicable also to the
removal of fish from water, as this is its point of sustenance.
On this understanding, the Bavli
concedes that the prohibition of
kotzer may apply to animals, as long as one is talking about the severing of
a physical connection. Indeed, the
Gemara states that someone who births an animal by manually entering the birth
canal and pulling out the fetus is liable.
The simple meaning of the Gemara is that one is liable for
kotzer, and this is how the
Meiri explains it. In this
case, there is the severing of an actual connection, not only a removal of a
living thing from its point of sustenance, and therefore the prohibition of
kotzer is applicable even according to
the Bavli, even though we are
talking about animals.
However, the Ramban and the
Rashba (ad loc., s.v. Ha de-amrinan) explain the dispute in a
different way. According to them,
the Bavli believes that the
prohibition of kotzer does not apply
to animals at all, even if one is severing an actual connection, as removing
hairs or cutting nails makes one liable for the
melakha of
gozez (shearing), not
kotzer.[6]
The
Ramban explains this as follows:
If one shears [an
animal] or plucks a birds wing while they are alive (74b), this does not render
one doubly liable, one count being for oker davar mi-giddulo. So too, if one cuts hair or nails or
one trims his mustache (94b), there is no law of oker davar mi-giddulo
rendering one doubly liable. Thus,
we see that there is no law of oker davar mi-giddulo as a subcategory of
kotzer except for giddulei karka
Furthermore, reaping
and threshing are certainly derived in the same way from the Mishkan
(Tabernacle); just as the rabbis (75a) rule that threshing applies only to
giddulei karka, so we should certainly say that ketzira applies only
to giddulei karka
As for what they
said in the Yerushalmi
this does
not accord with the view of our Gemara.
The
Ramban and the Rashba understand
the view of the Bavli in the
following way: just as there is no prohibition of threshing except as it applies
to giddulei karka, as it was in the
Mishkan, so too there is no prohibition of
kotzer except as it applies to
giddulei karka.[7] Based on
this understanding, the Ramban
and the Rashba explain the Gemara
that says that one who uproots a fetus is liable as referring to
netilat neshama, not to
kotzer, because
kotzer applies only to giddulei
karka.[8]
In other words, the view of the
Yerushalmi, that one who removes a fish from the water is liable for
kotzer, is based on two assumptions
about the prohibition of kotzer that it is a) based on severing
something from the point of its sustenance; b) not limited to
giddulei karka, but applicable to animals as well. In parallel, the view of the
Bavli is that one who removes the
fish from the water is liable because of
netilat neshama and not because of
kotzer, which may be understood in two ways:
a)
Meiri The Bavli disputes the first
assumption, and holds that the prohibition of
kotzer applies only to severing a physical connection.
b)
Ramban, Rashba The Bavli disputes the second assumption, and holds that
the prohibition of kotzer applies to
giddulei karka alone.
Summary
In conclusion, on Shabbat it is forbidden by Torah law to detach
produce, flowers, leaves and the like from a plant attached to the ground;
similarly, it is forbidden to detach plants or fungi from the place in which
they grow, even if they are not attached to the ground.
It is forbidden to detach produce or branches even from a desiccated
tree (OC 336:12). According to the
Rambam, it may be that there is a
Torah prohibition involved, while according to Rashi and Tosafot, this is forbidden rabbinically (Beiur Halakha ad loc., s.v.
Chayav).
It is forbidden to remove a fish from water; however there is a
dispute as to whether the prohibition is because of
kotzer (Yerushalmi) or
because of netilat neshama (simple
reading of the Bavli; Ramban and Rashba).
It is forbidden to detach anything from a plant growing in a pot.
Detaching anything
from a plant growing in a perforated pot is forbidden by Torah law, while
detaching from a plant growing in a unperforated pot is rabbinically prohibited
(OC 336:7).
It is permitted to detach fruit or leaves from a branch that was chopped
off before Shabbat (Rema 336:8).[9]
However, if it is an action which is
regularly performed in the field, one must be careful to avoid violating the
melakha of dash (see our
shiurim on that topic).
It is permissible to remove flowers or branches from a water-filled
vase, and there is no prohibition of
kotzer (Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhata, 3rd ed., Ch. 26, n.
96, in the name of Rav S.Z. Auerbach), as it is permissible to put them back in
the water; the prohibition of zoreia
does not apply to these actions (Rema
336:11), as we saw in our shiurim on that topic.
[1] However,
telisha of part of a plant growing in
an unperforated pot is forbidden rabbinically (OC 336:7). For additional details of
the laws of flowerpots on Shabbat, see our analysis of the
melakha of
zoreia.
[2] There are other
ramifications of this dispute pertaining to a tree which dries up. The Sages forbid the use of a tree on
Shabbat, lest one come to detach something from it, as we shall see below;
however in the Gemara (Eruvin 100b), it appears that one may use a dried-out
tree in the summer.
Rashi explains that a dried-out
tree is not considered attached to the ground, and the prohibition of
kotzer is not applicable to it;
therefore, there is no reason to prohibit its use. (Nevertheless, during the winter they
forbid it because of marit ayin, the appearance of impropriety, since
during this season it is difficult to determine whether a tree is dried-out or
not).
Rashi is consistent with the approach presented above, that the prohibition of
kotzer does not apply to a plant which
is totally dry. On the other hand,
the Rambam (21:6) rules that it
is forbidden to use a dried-out tree, and the
Magen Avraham (ibid.) explains
that the Rambam, consistent with his view cited above, believes that the prohibition of
kotzer applies to a dried-out tree as
well on a Torah level; therefore, one even using a tree of this type is
prohibited.
However there are those who dispute the
Magen Avrahams understanding of the Rambam. From the words of the
Maggid Mishneh (ibid.), it
appears that he believes that the Rambam
would concede that there is no prohibition of
kotzer from the Torah upon a dried-out tree, and in any case it is forbidden to
use a dried-out tree because of a precaution.
Similarly, there are those who understand that the Rambam concedes to
Rashi that there is no prohibition of
kotzer for picking desiccated fruit if the stem has dried out (see Beiur
Halakha 336:12, s.v. Chayav).
[3] Based on this
principle, one can explain another dispute between Rashi and the Rambam. The Gemara (81b) says that one who
raises a perforated pot from the ground and leaves it in the air (on top of
pegs) is liable because of kotzer. Rashi (s.v.
Chayav) and Tosafot (s.v.
Ve-hinnicho) explain that the Gemara should not be taken to mean that
actually liable (in violation of a Torah prohibition); rather, it is a rabbinic
prohibition, because the pot continues to draw sustenance when it is still in
the air, and thus its nourishment has not been interrupted. Opposing this, the Rambam (8:4)
writes that this is indeed a Torah prohibition and one is liable. The Rambam may concede that the pot
draws sustenance when it is still in the air, as appears from the Gemara in
Gittin 7b; however, his understanding is that the prohibition of
kotzer does not depend on drawing sustenance but on a physical connection, and
therefore one who picks the pot off of the ground is liable even though it
continues to draw sustenance (see Chiddushei Ha-Gram Ha-Levi of Rav Mosheh
Soloveitchik ztl on the Rambam ad loc.).
This dispute would have the opposite ramification of detaching leaves from a pot
suspended in the air: according to Rashi and Tosafot,
telisha such as this is forbidden by
the Torah, since the pot is considered to be attached to the ground, while
according to the Rambam, telisha such
as this is forbidden at most rabbinically, since this pot is considered
detached.
[4] We are speaking,
apparently, about fish that do not need to be caught per se i.e., in a small
pool, in which there is no difficulty to catch them; therefore, there is no
separate liability for the melakha of trapping.
[5] It makes sense that
the Yerushalmi would concede that if one
leaves the fish outside of the water until it can no longer be returned and
survive, one violates the prohibition of netilat neshama. The novelty of the Yerushalmi
is that even one who does not keep the fish out of the water to such an extent
is liable for kotzer immediately upon
removing the fish from the water.
[6] One should note that
the words of Yereim (Ch. 274, 135b) indicate that cutting fingernails, hair,
etc. is indeed forbidden because of kotzer
and not just because of gozez.
[7] Indeed, the category
of giddulei karka may include things
which are not attached to the ground and do not draw sustenance from it
directly, because the Gemara says that there is a prohibition of
kotzer also if one pulls fungus from the handle of a pitcher, as we saw above. It may be that fungi are considered,
for these purposes, like giddulei karka,
since they grow with a certain assistance of the ground, as arises from the
words of the Gemara in Berakhot 40b (They certainly grow from the ground) and
Rashi ad loc. (They grow from
the moisture of the ground).
[8] The Gemara equates
the detaching of the fetus to detaching dodder (hops) from thorny bushes. Dodder is a parasitic plant; it draws
its nourishment from the bushes and not from the ground. The Gemara sets out that just as one
who detaches dodder is liable for uprooting something from its place of growth,
even though the dodder is not attached to the ground, so too one who detaches
the fetus from the animal is liable because of uprooting something from where it
grows. The Gemara seems to say
explicitly that the liability is because of oker davar mi-giddulo, and
this is how the Meiri
understands it; however, the Ramban
and the Rashba explain that the
comparison the Gemara makes is not to be taken narrowly, and the intent is only
to compare different melakhot: there is a prohibition of
kotzer on dodder, even though it
cannot live on its own, but only by way of the bushes upon which it grows;
similarly, there is a prohibition of netilat neshama on the fetus,
even though it has no life of its own in utero, but survives only through its
mother.
[9] Indeed, the Shaarei
Teshuva (651:3) cites authorities who rule that one should not remove leaves
from the lulav on Yom Tov, even though it is detached, and therefore one
who wants to bind a lulav using some of its leaves must remove the leaves
from the lulav before the holiday (see Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhata,
3rd ed., Ch. 26, n. 38).
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