Development of Halakha - Part I - continued
RAV KOOKS LETTERS
By Rav Tamir Granot
Lecture #19b
Development of Halakha Part I (continued)
R. Yehuda Ha-Levis Approach
R. Yehuda Ha-Levi expressed in the clearest and most radical form the ideology
known today as ongoing revelation,[1]
describing Halakha as a developing and changing system including, lest there
be any misunderstanding in this regard, Halakha in its biblical dimension.
The context in which R. Yehuda Ha-Levi presents his position is of no less
importance than the content. In Part III of the Kuzari, he deals with the
Karaite philosophy, in a discussion which may provide us with an interesting
historical and philosophical perspective on the debates of our own times.
The King of Kuzar presents the Karaite philosophy: the law, as given on Sinai
and as expressed in the Written Law, is not subject to change, is not open to
interpretation, and is the only law; none other exists on any level. This
position is ultra-conservative in the sense that it denies any development, and
it is also fundamentalist in that it accepts the plainest meaning of the text as
a closed and absolute interpretation. R. Yehuda Ha-Levi, through the voice of
the Chaver, defends the rabbinical position, a developing,
non-conservative Halakha that wanders afield of the plain text through exegesis
and through the addition of laws, enactments, and rabbinical decrees.
Beyond the historical irony of the once progressive view having become the
Orthodox, conservative position of today, this discussion of R. Yehuda Ha-Levi
is of fundamental importance for his entire ideology. He explains at length that
the difference between Judaism and philosophy and, in some respects, between
Judaism and other religions is that Judaism is a religion of revelation a
revelation whose content is the commandments. The words of the angel to the King
of Kuzar at the beginning of the book Your intention is accepted before God,
but your actions are not accepted represent the books message: the source of
religious law is revelation, and it can have no other possible source (see the
metaphor of the medications in I:39). On the other hand, there is no meaning to
faith without action that is, the commandments.
It is specifically this fundamental principle of revelation that presents R.
Yehuda Ha-Levi with a real problem when he comes to address the tradition of the
Oral Law as it has been developed by Chazal and continued up until his
generation. After all, the great majority of Halakha as it is observed has its
source not in the original Divine revelation described in the Written Law, but
rather in the interpretations and additions woven around it by the Sages of all
generations. R. Yehuda ha-Levis answer to this problem is consistent with the
rest of his ideology:
The Chaver said: Our law is linked to the Halakha passed down to Moses
at Sinai, or emerges from the place which the Lord shall choose, For Torah
goes forth from Tzion, and the word of God from Jerusalem (Yishayahu
2:3), in the presence of the judges, overseers, kohanim, and Sanhedrin.
It is incumbent upon us to obey the Judge appointed in each generation, as it is
written: You shall come to the Kohanim, the Leviim, and to the
judge who will be in those days
and you shall inquire, and they shall tell you
the matter of the law. And you shall do whatever they tell you
from that place
which God chooses, and you shall take care to do all that they instruct you (Devarim
17). Thereafter [it says], The man who acts presumptuously in not obeying the
Kohen
that man shall die,
and you shall remove the evil from your midst (ibid.). By means of the words,
you shall remove the evil from your midst, the Torah renders rebellion against
the Kohen or the judge equivalent to the gravest of sins. Immediately
thereafter it says, And all the people shall hear and fear, and they shall not
act presumptuously anymore. All this refers to the time when the order of the
Temple service, and the Sanhedrin, and all the watches [groups of Leviim]
who took care of the integrity of the nations way of life were still intact,
and the Divine consciousness was unquestionably part of them whether through
prophecy or through Divine aid and inspiration from on High, as we find during
the Second Temple period. It is unthinkable that such people would have engaged
in collaboration or arrived on their own at agreement on all of this. Thus, we
became obligated concerning the commandment of the Megilla on Purim, and
the commandment of Chanuka, and we are able to recite the blessing, Who has
commanded us concerning the reading of the Megilla and concerning the
lighting of the Chanuka lights and to complete Hallel or to recite
Hallel, or concerning the washing of the hands and concerning the
commandment of eruv and the suchlike. Because had these customs arisen
only after the exile, we would not have called them mitzvot, and they would
not require the recitation of a blessing. Rather, we would have referred to them
as takkanot, or as customs. (Sefer Ha-Kuzari III:39)
In other words, the distinction between the Revelation at Sinai and the
revelation that continues in later generations has literary and declarative
significance, but not formal legal significance. Halakha is continuously being
renewed because revelation is always continuing. There is revelation through
real prophets, and there is revelation through the Kohanim in Gods
House, or through the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem, or through Gods spirit. In each
case, it is revelation, and therefore it has the status of conveying
commandments for all intents and purposes. According to R. Yehuda Ha-Levi, the
authority of the Sages to introduce laws (such as the washing of hands in the
morning, eruv, Chanuka, Purim) is not vested in them by virtue of the
verse, And you shall take care to do all that they instruct you, as the Rambam
maintains, but rather by virtue of themselves because they themselves are
Gods word, which comes about through revelation. It is therefore appropriate to
recite the blessing over them, Who has sanctified us with His commandments
literally, it is from Him; it is He Who is commanding.
This is also the source of the great controversy between R. Yehuda Ha-Levi and
the Rambam concerning the interpretation of the prohibition against adding to
it [the Torah] or detracting from it. We recall that according to the Rambam,
the essence of this prohibition is a limitation on legislation. In R. Yehuda
ha-Levis view, that idea is absurd. Ideally, the Sages should also convey Gods
word, and their words themselves are sections of Torah, which should have
nothing added to or detracted from them. To whom, then, does the prohibition
apply? To those who have not merited revelation (an individual, a beit din in
exile, etc.):
The Chaver said: This [prohibition, You shall not add, nor shall you
detract
(Devarim 4:2)] was meant for the
masses, lest they invent laws of the their own conjuring, and lest they set them
down as Torah, based only on their own deduction as the Karaites do.
Therefore, the Torah warned them that they should accept instruction only from
the prophets who would arise after Moshe, and from the Kohanim and the
judges, as it is written, I will raise them up a prophet from amongst their
brethren, like you
and he shall speak to them all that I command him (Devarim
18:18); Concerning the Kohanim and the judges, He commanded that we
should observe and act in accordance with their instructions. The words, You shall not add to the
thing which I command you, nor shall you detract from it
therefore mean: You
shall not add to the thing which I have commanded you through Moshe, or through
a prophet from amongst you, one of your brethren, in accordance with the
conditions set down for prophecy. Or: You shall not add to the thing agreed upon
by the Kohanim and the judges, from the place which God will choose
because they receive Divine assistance, and since there are so many of them, it
is impossible that they could concur amongst themselves on something which
contradicts the Torah. (ibid. 41)
R. Yehuda ha-Levi and the Rambam agree, then, when it comes to the philosophical
justification for development. The difference between them and it is a
profound one is to be found on the normative level and in the perception of
revelation. According to the Rambam, only the Revelation to Moshe can be a
source of legislation, and whatever is created from that point onwards can only
be exegesis, or secondary legislation. According to R. Yehuda Ha-Levi, on the
other hand, revelation is an ongoing, historical phenomenon, and therefore the
Torah is continually being created in each and every generation.
Presentation of the Question in the Modern Era
R. Nachman Krochmal addressed the problem of development in modern Jewish
thought. In his book Moreh Nevukhei Ha-Zeman, he argues that religious
ideas are developing all the time. Admittedly, he did not extend this theory
into the realm of Halakha, which he left within the boundaries of tradition.
In general, discussion of the development of Halakha arose from reformist or
semi-reformist movements, and therefore it is almost automatically associated
with rebellion against the authority of Halakha in general, and faith in the
eternity and divinity of the Torah in particular. Even the school of historical
positivism (which ended up being the source for the Conservative movement),
which argued for necessary change to
take place within the framework of the halakhic system and in accordance with
its principles, was ultimately active outside of traditional circles. Orthodox
Judaism hardened its stance, sometimes even relinquishing the use of permissible
legal devices. This is reflected in the phrase coined, with a new twist, by the
Chatam Sofer: Chadash (literally referring to the wheat harvest, but
homiletically referring to any new teaching) is prohibited by the Torah. The
familiar association of the qualities of change, temporality, and human source,
with which we began this shiur, was realized over the course of the 19th
century in processes that consolidated the Reform stream and led to the
phenomenon of assimilation.
In light of the above, it is quite easy to understand Rav Kooks alarm at the
very idea that his position involved any sort of acquiescence to the idea of
development, and his insistence that the idea is indeed foreign. However, a
reading of the continuation of his response, and a review of previous sections
of this letter and of Letter 89, show that the picture is more complex, and that
what Rav Kook is expressing is far from being a declaration of identification
with the position of the Chatam Sofer.
What, then, did Rav Kook think? To which view was he closer that of Rav Yehuda
Ha-Levi or that of the Rambam? What are the theoretical foundations of his view
on Halakha and on its dimension of development? We shall attempt to answer these
questions in the next shiur.
Translated by Kaeren Fish
[1]
To the best of my knowledge, the term was coined by Prof. Shalom Rosenberg in
his article, "Ongoing Revelation: Three Directions, in "Hitgalut, Emuna,
Tevuna: Kovetz Hartza'ot (Ramat-Gan, Bar-Ilan University, 5736), pp.
131-143, and thereafter in his book, Lo Ba-Shamayim Hi, (Alon Shevut,
Herzog College, 5757).
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