Lecture #2: On Tolerance - Letter 20
RAV KOOK’S
LETTERS
By Rav
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Mazal tov to Rav Tamir
and Avivit Granot on the birth of a daughter, Chana Simcha.
She-tizku
le-gadla le-Torah, le-chuppa, u-le-ma'asim tovim!
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Lecture #2:
On Tolerance - Letter 20
I.
Background
The Addressee
This letter is a response to questions raised by R. Moshe Seidel in a
letter to Rav Kook. R. Seidel was one of Rav Kook’s closest disciples and he
often asked Rav Kook philosophic and ideological questions. Several of the most
significant philosophical letters were written as answers to his questions. In
this letter, Rav Kook addresses him, as usual, with many terms of endearment and
with a great showing of love.
Here is some biographical information about R.
Seidel:
Seidel, Moshe
(From The Encyclopedia of Religious Zionism)
Born
in Kierkels, a town in
He
obtained a Jewish education at the Telshe Yeshiva. Studied be-chavruta at
various points with Rav Kook, R. Elchanan Wasserman, and R. Avraham Eliyahu
Kaplan.
After
studying in yeshiva, he left in 5665 to study in
In
5691, he immigrated to Eretz Yisrael, and for twenty-two years he
administrated the Mizrachi Women’s Teachers Seminary in
Yerushalayim.
He
published studies of Scripture and language in Hebrew and foreign-language
outlets starting in 5671. Some of these were gathered into a collection called
Chikrei Lashon. In 5722, for his seventy-fifth birthday, a festschrift
called Sefer Zeidel, which included biblical and linguistic studies from
various scholars, as well as a thirty-entry bibliography of his own writings,
appeared. These were all collected into Chikrei Lashon, published by
Mossad Ha-Rav Kook in 5746.
He
dealt extensively with the parallels between different biblical books and
introduced many novellae in his writings.
The Time and
Setting of the Letter
This is one of the first letters in the collections. It is dated 10
Nissan, 5665 (1905), just a few months after Rav Kook’s arrival in Yaffo to
serve as the rabbi of the town and its surroundings.
The progression of events that preceded the writing of the letter is
interesting and important in and of itself, so I will expand on it a
bit.
The issue begins with an essay published by Eliezer Ben Yehuda in his
periodical Ha-Hashkafa, which was the continuation of his polemic about
the Uganda Proposal that Herzl had raised at the Zionist Congress two years
earlier (1903). Ben Yehuda was one of the greatest proponents of the proposal,
whose main principle, as may be recalled, was the (at least temporary)
settlement of Jews in the remote British colony of
One
other claim… the Zionists of Zion claim about the Ugandists that they… turn
their backs on our entire past. There is much hypocrisy in this claim. Let us
have no illusions… we have all turned our backs on our past, and
that is our praise and our glory (Ha-Hashkafa, No. 48,
5665).
This sentence incurred the wrath of Rav Kook, and he published an open
letter against Ben Yehuda’s words, which he saw as blasphemous. The letter was
formulated as a letter to young Jews in their defense against the charge that
Ben Yehuda leveled at them. Many copies of the letter were published and even
posted on city streets. Rav Kook came out against the generalizations used by
Ben Yehuda and, of course, primarily against the claim of abandoning the
past.[1]
In his letter, Rav Kook contended that the different paths taken by the
different Jewish movements are all connected to tradition and to the living soul
of Judaism. He recalls the fact that there were even Mizrachi members who
supported the
Despite
my love of learning and teaching the fundamentals of our thought, far be it from
me to demand authority over anyone’s opinions; nowadays it is
unacceptable.
The
full open letter was published in Iggerot Ha-RAY’H (I:18), and it is
recommended that you read it in its original.[2]
The aforementioned sentence caused R. Seidel to question whether this is
a le-khatchila position (“din Torah” in his words) or if it stems
from a recognition of the current reality in which there is no religious
leadership with coercive power in the Jewish Yishuv in Eretz
Yisrael. From this, Rav Kook goes on to discuss tolerance in general, its
limits, and its special expression in context of the Jewish
People.
From a broader perspective, it seems that the question emerged in the
wake of the unique situation that arose with the expansion of the Yishuv
and the arrival of Rav Kook to Yaffo as the rabbi of the surrounding
settlements. The Eda Chareidit in Yerushalayim never had to address the
question of tolerance in the sense that it is being discussed here; from the
outset, it adopted a strategy of separatism and did not maintain any meaningful
relationship with those settlements. As such, it never had any claim to
authority or sovereignty. Jewish existence in the Diaspora could raise these
questions only on the personal or communal level, and the attitude toward a
deviant or heretic was addressed in the framework of their damage to communal
unity or the sensitivities of individuals within it. The new situation that was
created along with the development of the Yishuv and, no less than it,
the dream of establishing national sovereignty raised the question of tolerance
to the national-political plane: What is the attitude of the present rabbinic
authority (assuming it has any power) – or what should the attitude of a
Jewish national government be – to those who express negative opinions from the
religious, ethical, or national perspective? Must there be a censor, and should
there be punishment in cases of clear deviation on the ideological or normative
plane?
Thoughts
before
Note that at issue here is not pluralism in the sense of relating to a
multiplicity of truths as such, but to freedom of thought as a political
problem. Pluralism as a philosophical stance addresses the possibility of the
existence of different and sometimes contradictory truths simultaneously, as
well as our intellectual relationship with that multiplicity of ideas. Tolerance
is a problem of real human relationships, and it pertains both to the
relationships between different ideological communities and to the relationship
between the social majority and smaller ideological communities. On the
political level, the question is posed to the government and its authority to
silence certain opinions or even to punish those who espouse them. Pluralism
will be addressed in a different lecture. Of course, there can be a link between
a person’s being pluralistic and his actually having a positive attitude toward
other opinions and, vice versa, between the negation of pluralism and opposition
to free opinion in the state; however, this link is not one-to-one, as will be
explained in our discussion below.
The question of tolerance is one of the central questions addressed by
modern political philosophy, and it is sufficient to mention the classic works
of Moses Mendelssohn, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, who are but three of
many. Is the model of liberal democracy, which defends freedom of thought,
possible from the perspective of authentic Judaism?
The question of the Jewish or halakhic stance cannot, in this case, have
a simple answer, for two main reasons:
1.
We
have barely any philosophical or halakhic literature from the era when Jews had
political sovereignty. Thus, issues pertaining to political life are addressed
briefly and without connection to actual reality. Sometimes, they are not even
addressed at all.
2.
The
idea of freedom of thought as a political ideal is fundamentally modern. Even if
we could point out Jewish or even general ancient sources that move in that
direction, they are only sporadic examples that do not express any broad
movement. Additionally, ancient social structures were far more homogeneous.
Although the manner in which Chazal dealt with the Sadducee ideology or
the early Christian heresy, for example, can be instructive for these purposes,
the gap remains great.
(Translated
by
You are now
welcome to read the explained and annotated letter.[3] Next week,
please God, the lecture on the main topics that appear in the letter will
appear.
The following translation is taken, with slight variations, from Rav
A.Y. Kook: Selected Letters, translated by
II. Letter
#20
In reference to my words in the open letter,[4] where I stated that
I do not seek to control anyone's opinion, you asked whether this is out of
necessity or also the law of the Torah.
Indeed, in my language there is no ambiguity, since I stated "because in
our time it is unacceptable." So it follows that had it been acceptable, such a
requirement would have its place. The issue, however, requires great mountains
of study to clarify its boundaries, and since it is impossible for me to write
at length I will write briefly and hope it will suffice for someone as
discerning as you.
You should know that common sense is always a very important principle in
law, be it applied law or legal theory. We therefore always have to reach the
core of the truth, and when we see a truth contradicting another truth, there
then must be a determining factor, and this will be the place for new study.
Thus we will see how far the limits of freedom of thought, considered a basic
truth by most enlightened men in the world today, extend according to reason.
Perhaps you say it has no bounds – that, however, cannot be said. For one,
because we do not have even one virtue in the world which extremism will not
harm.[5] Furthermore, the
nature of the matter requires that there be a limit to freedom of thought, for
if there is no such limit, every person would cast away all obligations of
accepted morality until he reaches in his own mind an understanding of what he
stands for, and then the earth would be filled with corruption; a total
separation between opinions and deeds is impossible, because actions to a small
or large extent necessarily stem from opinions. For instance, for a person to
accept at heart that there is no wrong in murder is definitely a sin, for if
this acceptance flourishes, the existence of the world would be destroyed, and
the same is true for other examples. Thus we learn there is a limit to freedom
of opinion, but the difficult issue is to determine this limit.
It follows that the limit is not identical in every society. For example,
the full consensus that there is no harm in walking naked in the streets for one
who consents to this and calls for people to actually behave in this manner is a
sin in our society, and deservedly so, but this would not be a sin among the
savages on the islands of Guinea, for example.[6]
As there are necessarily differences between societies, the differences are not
static, but rather continue to differentiate in accordance with the multitude of
conditions. With regard to
religion, there is a marked distinction in this matter between
There is no other nation in the world whose acknowledgement of the name
of God, blessed be He, as the Lord of the universe, keeper of the covenant,
lovingkindness, and all ways of righteousness, which are attributes of the Holy
One, blessed be He, is the basis of its national life, and a unique condition of
its restoration to its land and the establishment of its rule.
In order for us to realize national sovereignty,[12]
it is necessary that the powers of the nation reach complete perfection. But in the meantime, to avoid national
rule totally is also impossible, because the spiritual character of the nation
is, blessed be God, always alive: "David, King of Israel, is alive and
enduring."[13]
Hence this is the counsel of the Lord, who is wonderful in counsel, and great in
wisdom, that the nation's capacity [to control opinion] diminishes to the same
extent that the nation's [spiritual] powers weaken,[14] and that this
inability [to control opinion] is a sign of God's will. There are many ways to
do this: sometimes it is a
practical obstacle, such as the fear of the state, and so forth; sometimes it is
a spiritual obstacle, such as the obligation not to say things which are
unacceptable.[15]
We accept obstacles such as these gladly because we recognize that it is divine
providence in our times. And this is why we find in the Jerusalem Talmud that
As for the law, you should know that even though it is utterly prohibited
and diseased for one to doubt and wonder about matters of perfect faith, we do
not find the Sages applying the law of heresy [in such a case], but only in the
case of an unbeliever, that is, one who definitely affirms the
opposite.[17] And absolute belief
in the opposite can be found in Israel only amongst those who are inherently
wicked and deliberate liars, because even the greatest evil [influence] can only
cast a doubt in weak-minded persons; therefore someone who dares to say that he
is unequivocally an atheist is completely wicked and is fit to be judged
according to all the explicit laws, since there is no justification to the
argument that he was compelled to think thusly. And if the atheistic idea in our
generation was genuine, it would always claim uncertainty[18] and its doubts could
easily be clarified; but it lies deliberately and claims certainty at a time
when even he most weak-minded are at most doubtful [of the existence of God].
The atheistic idea is in brazen pursuit of malice, and is thus liable to all the
laws in the hands of man and heaven in accordance with the harm it does. Clarification of the details of this law
would, of course, require many lengthy books. This is clear; that whoever reaches the
understanding that any denial of faith, in relation to Judaism, is nothing but a
feeble argument of doubt, a combination of a lack of actual knowledge, lack of
feeling, and shortcoming in virtue, will immediately become whole with his faith
and God fearing. The more he attaches himself to Torah scholars, true seekers of
God, the more he will be exalted and filled with an unshakable faith of wisdom
and knowledge: "No weapon formed against you shall succeed; and every tongue
that rises against you at law, you shall condemn. Such is the lot of the
servants of the Lord, such their triumph through me, declares the
Lord."[19]
[1] It is interesting to note that several years later, Ben Yehuda's son, Itamar Ben Avi, bore the brunt of a proclamation published by Rav Kook, after the former claimed that the Jews actually brought anti-Semitism upon themselves in some form or another. The son’s hatred of the Diaspora, the past, and everything related to them was even more virulent than his father’s.
[2] Additional documents relating to this matter were published by R. Neriya in his work Chayei Ha-RAYH (Tel Aviv, 5751), pp. 123-131.
[3] Letter 20, Iggerot Ha-RAYH, pp. 19-21.
[4] This refers to Iggerot I:18, in which Rav Kook issued a sharp statement against the Eliezer Ben Yehuda, who wrote about all Zionists: “We have all turned our backs on our past, and that is our praise and our glory.” See the first part of this lecture for historical background.
[5] Here, Rav Kook employs the principle of the “middle path,” which originates in the doctrine of virtues. See Rambam, Hilkhot Deot ch. 1; Shemoneh Perakim (Introduction to Tractate Avot), chs. 3-5. Tolerance is generally perceived as an ideological stance, and not as a matter of virtue. It is possible that Rav Kook believes that the principle of shunning extremes applies to opinions as well, although it is more reasonable (and it also emerges from his words, “there is no virtue”) that he sees tolerance as both an opinion and a virtue. See the discussion below.
[6] This example of the naked man is one of the Rambam’s classic examples of the realm of “conventions,” i.e., norms rooted in broad human consensus stemming from human experience and conditioning. See Moreh Nevukhim I:2 and II:30.
[7] The meaning is that without fulfilling the destiny of bearing God’s Name, the Jewish nation will not succeed in establishing its political and practical existence. The weakness of the Jewish People is apparently primarily the inability to live an independent political and historical life. National strength, honor, etc. are not vital to it in the same way that they are vital to other nations. The power of the religious life of Israel on the individual plane, which protected them in exile, is also the source of their weakness, which their exile made palpable; the disconnection of national life from their religious purposes caused the deterioration of national strength and thus to the loss of national independence (see, for example, the essay “On the Progression of Ideas in Israel” in Rav Kook’s Orot).
[8] The source of this motto of “bearing God’s Name” is, of course, the patriarch Avraham, regarding whom it is written in several places, “and he called out in the Name of God.” The connection to the covenant stems from the verse in Devarim: “God has affirmed this day that you are His treasured people…” and the corresponding verse: “you have affirmed this day that the Lord is your God, that you will walk in His ways…” (26:17-18).
[9] See
note 5. The claim is that deficient religious knowledge, when it appears in a
national context, negatively impacts the actual existence of the political power
of
[10] This is clearly a reference to Pinchas, who, as a result of his “being jealous with My zeal amongst them,” was given “an everlasting priestly covenant” (Bamidbar 25:11-13). Through his actions, Pinchas not only defended the norms, but the very existence of the nation, and therefore, according to Rav Kook, he was worthy of serving as a kohen, the nation’s representative before God, who is worthy of praying on its behalf and functions as its aide.
[11] Lack of wisdom means lack of ability to see the true place of one’s own thought and the proper place of the thought of others. When lack of wisdom combines with weakness of character – that is, lack of self-confidence and inner strength – it leads to violent aggression against one who holds a different opinion and who, according to the narrow thinking of the zealot, threatens the stability of his existence. Zeal that is not on the level of the zeal of Pinchas is a weakness, not a strength.
[12] That is, the monarchy, the Sanhedrin, the priesthood, etc. In context of this letter, this refers to imposing sanctions against or preventing the activity of those who damage the spirit of the people.
[13] David represents the majestic aspect of the Jewish people, both in the
sense of the kabbalistic sefira of malkhut, of which he is bearer
(in the sefiriotic table), as well as by virtue of his being both the root of
the Jewish monarchy and its hope for the future. In light of this, the
explanation of this sentence is: King David of
[14] In other words, the spiritual weakness of
[15] “R. Ila’a said in the name of R. Elazar b. Shimon: Just as it is a mitzva for a person to say something which will be accepted, so too it is a mitzva not to say something that will not be accepted. R. Abba said: It is obligatory, as it says: ‘Do not rebuke a cynic, lest he hate you; rebuke a wise man and he will love you’” (Yevamot 65b).
[16] “Forty years before the destruction of the
[17] See Rambam, Hilkhot Teshuva 3:8: “Three are called heretics: One who says that prophecy does not exist and there is no information that reaches the human mind from the Creator; and one who denies the prophecy of Moshe; and one who says that the Creator does not know of human actions. Each of these three is a heretic. Three are deniers of the Torah: One who says that the Torah is not from God – even one verse or one word, if he says that ‘Moshe said it on his own,’ he denies the Torah; similarly, one who denies its interpretation, which is the Oral Law and who opposes those who recount it, such as Tzadok and Boethus; and one who says that the Creator replaced one mitzva with another mitzva and that this Torah has been superseded, even if it was from God, such as the Muslims. All three of these are deniers of the Torah.”
[18] I.e., “I do not know” or “I have no proof,” but not: “I know that it is not or that it never was.” The second type of claim is not part of intellectual inquiry; rather, it is evil, since from a philosophical viewpoint it is possible to plant doubt in faith, but not to negate it certainly. Thus, those who do so do not hold possible opinions, but are brazenly wicked.
[19] Yeshayahu
54:17. In
other words, with regard to