Reasons for the Mitzvot (4)

 

C. SPIRITUAL LAW OR HALAKHIC ABSTRACTION

 

There is a fundamental disagreement about those mitzvot which fall into the category of "chukim" (statutes), namely, mitzvot that are viewed as not being based upon common sense. In this context, Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi records a famous analogy:

 

These conditions which render man fit to receive this Divine influence are not in the scope of human knowledge. It is impossible for him to gauge their quantity or quality, and even if he would know their essence, he would not know their time, place, composition, or manner of preparation. For all this, he needs Divine knowledge, coming fully explained from God Himself … But … such a person offers sacrifices and burns incense according to speculation and conjecture, not knowing the essence of what is needed for that purpose, or how much, in which way, in which place, at what time, by whom, in which manner, and many other details, the enumeration of which would take a very long time.

 

To what is this akin? To an ignoramus who enters the medicine chamber of a doctor who is known to all for his beneficial medications, at a time when the doctor is out. When he sees crowds of people congregating outside the chamber, seeking cures for their ailments, he begins to dispense medicines out of the vials, knowing nothing about the medications or the appropriate dosages for each person. Thus he kills people with the very medicines that could have cured them. (Kuzari, I, 79)

 

Rabbi Yehuda Halevi sees the purpose of "chukim" as directing divine influence in the world. According to him, the world is governed by spiritual laws that parallel the physical laws. The mitzvot are guidelines and principles that suit the spiritual laws that exist in the world.

 

In contrast, we find in the words of Chazal a different approach to this question:

 

An idolater asked Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai: "These rites that you perform look like a kind of witchcraft. You bring a heifer, burn it, pound it, and take its ashes. If one of you is defiled by a dead body you sprinkle upon him two or three drops and you say to him: 'You are clean.'" Rabban Yochanan asked him: "Has the demon of madness ever possessed you?" "No," he replied. "Have you ever seen a man possessed by this demon of madness?" "Yes," said he. "And what do you do in such a case?" "We bring roots," he replied, "and make them smoke under him; then we sprinkle water upon the demon and it flees." Rabban Yochanan said to him: "Let your ears hear what you utter with your mouth! Precisely so is this spirit a spirit of uncleanness; as it is written: 'And also I will cause the prophets and the unclean spirit to pass out of the land' (Zekharya 13:2). Water of purification is sprinkled upon the unclean person and the spirit flees." When the idolater had gone, Rabban Yochanan's disciples said to their master: "Master! You dismissed this man with a flimsy answer; what explanation do you give to us?" Said he to them: "By your life! It is not the dead that defiles nor the water that purifies! The Holy One, blessed be He, merely says: 'I have laid down a statute, I have issued a decree. You are not allowed to transgress my decree.'" As it is written: "This is the statute ('chukat') of the law" (Bamidbar 19:2). (Bamidbar Rabba 19, 8)

 

Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai proposes an approach that is entirely different from that of Rabbi Yehuda Halevi. The laws of ritual impurity constitute an area of Halakha that is perhaps best understood using the idea of spiritual laws. Yet even in this area, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai rejects such an understanding. Ritual purity and impurity have no spiritual significance as independent entities. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai does not explain the purpose or reason for the laws of ritual purity and impurity. In light of what we have seen above, there is no need, nor is it even reasonable, to assume that he is arguing that mitzvot have no rationales. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai is telling his disciples that we are dealing here with a halakhic abstraction, which has no direct spiritual parallel ("it is not the dead that defiles nor the water that purifies"), and whose reason is unknown to us. There is a reason – psychological, social, religious, or the like – but we do not know it. There is one set of reasons that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai rejects, namely, magical reasons, according to which the mitzvot have curative powers that blend in with the spiritual laws of the universe. It is very possible that he rejects such rationales on theological grounds, for they encroach upon God. Judaism shrinks from magic, and commands: "You shall be perfect with the Lord your God" (Devarim 18:13). It would be unreasonable for Judaism to deviate from this position precisely in the area of the mitzvot.

 

Two additional points are worthy of note. What stands out in the aforementioned story is the fact that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai's disciples immediately understood that their master's response to the heathen had not been serious. Many people living in our own day would probably be persuaded by his argument, but this only demonstrates how the generations have declined. Similarly, many in our generation would probably relate to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai's response to his disciples as a mere "dismissal with a flimsy answer." His disciples, however, understood the depth of his answer – limited as it may be – and the shallowness of the detailed response that had been given to the heathen.

 

D. mitzvot as symbols

 

Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch argues that the mitzvot are symbols: the particulars of the mitzvot express a symbolic message, informing us of the spiritual and moral values that God wished to bestow upon us. Our study of the mitzvot and their rationales clarifies this symbolic significance for us. Thus, for example, the obligation of wearing the ritual fringes [tzitzit] on four-cornered garments symbolizes, among other things, the blossoms [tzitzim] – the fruits and benefits - to be derived from doing God's will.

 

Prof. Shalom Rosenberg (Be-ikvot ha-Kuzari, p. 181) notes the problematic nature of this position. Indeed, this is not such a simple proposal, for in the final analysis according to Rabbi Hirsch, the mitzvot serve merely as a means of transferring speculative information. Moreover, this is not even a particularly effective way of transferring such information, for most of the people who observe the mitzvot are oblivious to their rationales, and most of those who have in fact pondered their reasons have arrived at altogether different conclusions. Prof. Rosenberg argues that Rabbi Hirsch's proposal requires modification. He suggests that the symbolism of the mitzvot should be understood as being directed not only at man's intellect, but at his emotions and sub-conscious as well. The mitzvot impart spiritual and moral values not only through intellectual study, but primarily through their sub-conscious effect on the personality.

 

According to this interpretation, the rationales for the mitzvot focus on the psychological effect on the individual observer, through symbols that give expression to spiritual values.

 

E. are the reasons for the mitzvot Historical or spiritual?

 

In one of his major essays, "The Halakhic Mind," Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik relates to the unique quality of religion, demanding that it be studied with its own unique tools, and that we not impose upon it methodologies borrowed from other branches of knowledge. The essay's title faithfully reflects its primary goal: charting the way for constructing a Jewish world outlook based on Halakha. Halakha, argues Rabbi Soloveitchik, is the objective norm that represents Judaism in the clearest and most faithful manner. Thus, any attempt to construct an original Jewish belief system must focus on an analysis of Halakha.

 

But how is it possible to extract the system of values that underlies Halakha from the Halakha itself? Rabbi Soloveitchik deals with this issue in the closing chapters of his essay. He distinguishes between two fundamental approaches: the "causalistic" or "genetic" approach on the one hand, and the "reconstructionist" approach on the other. Proponents of the causalistic approach try to understand how religious institutions, ideas, and laws developed, and what is the spiritual and conceptual background that shaped them. Rabbi Soloveitchik rejects such an approach, and proposes in its stead the reconstructionist method. He argues that one must take the "objective" religious data as they are, and strive to understand what they, in and of themselves, tell us about the spiritual and conceptual foundations of the religious man. As was stated, Rabbi Soloveitchik argues that this methodology is especially necessary with regard to the sphere of Halakha and understanding the rationales of the mitzvot.

 

Why does Rabbi Soloveitchik reject the causalistic approach? He argues, first of all, that this approach is highly speculative. It is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to uncover a causal connection in such a delicate, sensitive, and unstable realm. Who can guarantee that a particular cognition or emotion fashioned a certain mitzva (The Halakhic Mind, p. 89)? Human consciousness in general, and religious consciousness in particular, are so complex and complicated, that the attempt to uncover systematic causality in them is a hopeless pretension (pp. 95, 98).

 

Over and beyond the limits of knowledge and cognition, however, Rabbi Soloveitchik raises an additional problem. The causalistic approach tends to search for causality that is within the realm of man's recognition – namely, causality that is sociological, historical, psychological, or the like:

 

It has already been made clear that philosophically the causualistic method invariably leads to circumrotary explanation, and never to penetrative description. (The Halakhic Mind, p. 98)

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik does not deny that the creation of certain religious institutions and norms has a historical background; he argues, however, that this fact need not effect our evaluation of their contents in and of themselves (p. 87). Even when the causalistic methodology leads to an explanation of a mitzva based on values, the explanation remains within the realm of human values – moral, esthetic, hygienic, and others. Thus, religion is denied its autonomy, and it is subordinated to explanations from a different realm (p. 95). In contrast to this approach, Rabbi Soloveitchik argues that the religious realm enjoys full autonomy, and, therefore, moral or esthetic rationales for religious norms should not be sought (p. 90).

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik argues that it was precisely for this reason that the chapters in Rambam's More Nevukhim dealing with the rationales for the commandments never had a major impact on the Jewish world. Rambam adopts there the causalistic method, trying to explain why the mitzvot were legislated as they are. The moment he chose this methodology, he was automatically drawn to historical-genetic explanations, and these, argues Rabbi Soloveitchik, "neither edify nor inspire the religious consciousness" (p. 92).

 

In contrast to the genetic-causalistic approach, Rabbi Soloveitchik proposes the methodology of reconstruction. This approach respects the autonomy of the religious realm, and does not try to erect religious structures on foundations taken from other realms. Proponents of this approach take the objective religious structure – in our case, the mitzva – and strive to understand from it the spiritual and conceptual foundations that are implied by and concealed in it. No attempt is made to reconstruct why a certain mitzva was legislated, or why a certain custom developed. The only issue is what they tell us in their current form.

 

Let us summarize the unique aspects of the methodology of reconstruction: Because it shifts the emphasis from cause to meaning, it does not pretend to uncover a clear and unequivocal causal system, but only to reveal the fundamental conceptual motifs that stem from the mitzva. Moreover, it does not glide into historical and sociological explanations, or moral and esthetic reasons. The reconstructionist methodology tries to uncover the meaning of the mitzva for the faithful believer, and to examine how it fits into his religious consciousness. It respects the autonomy of religion, and does not account for religious phenomena by referring to external explanations.

 

In order to illustrate the difference between these two methodologies, we shall bring two examples cited by Rabbi Soloveitchik himself. The first example is taken from Rambam's Mishne Torah, which according to Rabbi Soloveitchik, reflects – in total contrast to his More Nevukhim – the methodology of reconstruction:

 

Although the blowing of the shofar on Rosh ha-Shana is a decree of the Holy Writ, nevertheless there is a hint to it, as if saying, Ye that sleep, bestir yourselves from your sleep, and ye that slumber, emerge from your slumber. Examine your conduct, return in repentance and remember you Creator (Hilkhot Teshuva 3:4)

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik notes that there is no attempt here to uncover the "true" reason for the obligation to hear the shofar blast. Rambam opens with the assertion that blowing the shofar on Rosh ha-Shana is a "decree of the Holy Writ." He adds, however, that "there is a hint to it," i.e., it is possible to extract moral and spiritual meaning from the law of shofar blowing. The question raised is not why was the law of blowing the shofar enacted, but rather what is the spiritual message arising from it, and what is its meaning for the believing Jew. In contrast to this approach, Rabbi Soloveitchik cites the position of Rav Sa'adya Gaon who relates to the historical functions of the shofar when it served as a signal for alarm or as a summons to a joyous celebration (p. 95). This is the causalistic method, which Rambam carefully avoids in his Mishne Torah.[2]

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik cites as an additional example the controversy between Rambam and Ramban regarding sacrifices. According to Rambam in More Nevukhim, the sacrifices were intended to serve an educational purpose – to wean the Jewish people away from idolatry, sacrifices being the central rite of the heathens of that day. Ramban, on the other hand, stresses the eternal and universal significance of a sacrifice. An animal sacrifice helps man internalize the recognition that he should in fact offer himself as a sacrifice to God. We are dealing here with two explanations that are fundamentally different one from the other: Rambam offers a causalistic interpretation (why God gave the laws of sacrifice), which by its very nature tends to the historical-relativistic realm; Ramban, on the other hand, uses the retrospective reconstruction method, extracting from the laws of the sacrifices their eternal meaning, suitable for believers of all generations (p. 131, no. 108).

 

It should be noted that it is not always easy to distinguish between the two methods. At times the causalistic explanation remains within the realm of religion, and sometimes it is the reconstructionist explanation which appears causalistic. It seems, however, that Rabbi Soloveitchik has succeeded in clarifying that we are dealing here with two different approaches, distinct in their objectives as well as in their results.

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik first determines the nature of the rationale that he is seeking: he is looking not for a historical or sociological explanation, but for a purely spiritual rationale, one that relates to eternal human nature, and not to changing social circumstances. He also proposes a method: one should not attempt to reconstruct God's intention in enacting the mitzva, but rather one should strive to understand the meaning of the mitzva for the believer. Here Rabbi Soloveitchik leads us into a new realm, namely, the method for uncovering the reason for a mitzva.

 

4. the Methodology for uncovering the reason for a mitzva

 

As was stated above, Rabbi Soloveitchik says that uncovering the reason for a mitzva involves an attempt to understand the mitzva's meaning to the contemporary believer, rather than to reveal God's original intention when He enacted the mitzva.

 

There are also other methodological questions that merit our attention. For example, what are the sources on the basis of which we should formulate our opinions regarding the reasons for the mitzvot? One possible source is the Written Law. We cannot understand the reason for the prohibition of mixing meat and milk, if we disregard the verse, "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk," which implies that the reason for the prohibition is the cruelty that the act involves (for the verse emphasizes the family connection between a steak and chocolate milk). To the best of my knowledge, this rationale finds no expression in the details of the prohibition. Another possible source is Midrash, which adds the rabbinic perspective on the mitzva. A third possible source is the books of the Rishonim and Aharonim devoted to Jewish thought.

 

The primary source, however, must be the Halakha itself. In this lecture series, we shall focus almost exclusively on this source. The title of our course is "The Philosophy of Halakha," and not just "The Reasons for the Mitzvot." We shall deal with the reasons and meanings of the mitzvot to the extent that they are reflected in the Halakha itself. Our goal is not merely to uncover the reasons for the mitzvot, but to demonstrate how halakhic principles usually reflect conceptual principles, and so we shall focus on the details of the laws. It should also be noted that this method has a clear advantage: it is less likely to rely on baseless speculations. As opposed to the Midrash and other works of Jewish thought, we shall try to stick to the basic laws and understand – to the extent possible – the moral and conceptual message inherent in them.

 

It should also be noted that there are certain disadvantages to this method. Sticking close to the laws and restricting speculation can be confining to the imagination. This is a limitation regarding the thought process. There is also a limitation regarding the Halakha. Intellectual honesty compels us to recognize our inability to integrate every detail of the law into a single overall conceptual structure. We must, therefore, relate only to the main principles, recognizing that the formal integration of the idea requires a halakhic framework that does not correspond in its entirety to that idea.

 

Footnotes

 

[2] Regarding the differences in approach to the reasons for the mitzvot between Rambam's More Nevukhim and his Mishne Torah, see also Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah), (New York, 1980), p. 430.

 

(Translated by Rav David Strauss)