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Iyun in Sota -
Lesson 8

Iyun Masechet Sota: 6a

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1. Rav Sheshet

 

The statement of R. Sheshet at the beginning of our sugya that the water is ineffective if witnesses exist, even if unbeknownst to us, is a function of the supernatural qualities of the water and the Torah's reluctance to harness miraculous mechanisms when a valid, natural alternative exists.  Regardless of our concept of sota as an interpersonal or tuma problem and the role of the water within this context, the Torah does not grant supernatural powers to the sota waters for either purpose, if the option of human testimony is possible.

 

The chiddush of R. Sheshet, though, is not only that natural means are to be preferred, but that even if the water was drunk, it will not have any effect.  Hence, we arrive at a situation in which kinui and setira have occurred but there is no possibility of clarification through the drinking of the water, and therefore the woman remains prohibited to her husband. 

 

The rule that a sota who cannot drink remains in a status of issur is a well established halakha that expresses itself in various cases throughout the masekhet (the major instance of this rule is the series of cases that appear in the first mishna of the fourth perek).  The reason for this regulation is dependent upon our previous discussions regarding the nature of issur sota.  As there will be no drinking of the water, the grounds for the prohibition are the kinui and setira alone.  Thus, if we accept the theory that kefeida deba'al – the betrayal and breakdown of the interpersonal relationship expressed by the kinui and setira – is at the root of the issur, it is obvious why she is prohibited to her husband, despite the fact of safek and chazaket heter/kashrut that she has.  Just as we have seen in previous shiurim that the Rambam's shita is that a shomeret yavam who undergoes kinui and setira is prohibited from performing yibum due to the kefeida deba'al of the kinui and setira alone, so, too, in our case, she is prohibited to her husband because of the kefeida deba'al.  However, if we choose to approach the concept of sota from the perspective of tuma, the issur is rooted in the act of tuma that is unknown to us and not in the evident kefeida deba'al; therefore, we must claim that the kinui and setira provide the circumstantial evidence ("raglayim ladavar") that uproots her presumption of innocence (chezkat kashrut) and cause us to assume that she has been defiled.  Halakhically, this idea is translated into the rule that in sota "sfeika kevado'ah;" i.e. that we treat the stira as equivalent to tuma until proven otherwise (the implications and applications of this concept are the subject of most of the fifth perek). 

 

Upon further reflection, though, it becomes clear that the suggestion that kinui and stira themselves, without the presumption of tuma can be the cause of the issur, convincing as it is, cannot be applied to our sugya, since it does not limit itself to the prohibition of the wife to the husband but discusses the issur of eating truma as well.  Unlike the question of the permissibility of conjugal relations between husband and wife that may be perceived as a function of the marital relationship, the perogative of eating truma is independent of the state of trust between the marriage partners, so that the only problem to be addressed is the issue of tuma that can prevent the woman from eating truma due to her defiled status.  Therefore, our sugya must assume that the kinui and setira presuppose tuma, unless proven otherwise. 

 

[The independence of the truma issue from the kefeida deba'al concern is true not only according to the Bavli's opinion that a spouse eats truma as a function of "kinyan kaspo" (i.e., the legal relationship of marriage, which is certainly unaffected by the ups and downs of their personal relationship, but also according to the Sifri and Yerushalmi that consider it a result of membership in the household unit ("bayit"), since the "household" is a domestic unit inclusive of all family members, including children, and not an intimate relationship.]

 

2. Rav Amram

 

Rav Amram, in his attempt to prove Rav Sheshet's claim, assumes that the mechanism of the water it is a foolproof method, without any false negatives, and therefore can even overrule eidim and determine that their testimony is false.  Rav Yosef, though, disagrees as the woman may have personal merits that suspend the power of the water to harm her (zechut tola), so that the fact that she did not succumb to the effects of the water are not necessarily proof of her innocence.  As the gemara points out, the possibility of a false negative in the sota ceremony is a machloket between R. Shimon, R. Yehuda HaNasi and (maybe) Rabanan.

 

This argument cuts to the heart of the matter of the sota ceremony – is it essentially intended to mete out divine PUNISHMENT to the woman for her sin and the resulting spiritual contamination of Machane Yisrael that it causes or is it a mechanism of CLARIFICATION designed to solve the mystery of the setira?  In more classical Yeshiva terminology, the machloket between them is whether the water is an "onesh" or a "berur."  The idea that zechut tola is eminently logical if we assume that it is a punishment.  In similar manner to many (or most) other events in the life of the individual or the community, where we cannot even establish absolutely an immediate causal connection between deeds and/or misdeeds to reward and/or punishment, despite the basic rule of Divine Providence that the righteous are rewarded and the sinners punished, so, too in sota we accept the fact that an incompatibility between the stated ideal and the unknown workings of the actual world is possible.  Zechut tola is a presumed rationale of deviation from a strict compatibility between behavior and retribution in all these cases, a point that holds true in sota as in other areas of life.  If we can accept the fact that a mechalel shabbat is not smitten by the KBH because of zechut tola (or other considerations), we can also accept such a reality regarding adultery.  Thus, if the drinking of the water is intended as a punishment, the possibility of zechut tola cannot be discounted and a false negative result is certainly possible. 

 

R. Shimon denial's of zechut tola is not because he thinks that personal merits are insignificant as a factor that can suspend Divine punishment; rather it is due to his opinion that the primary role of the water is not to punish but to determine whether or not there was tuma or not.  Therefore, the results must be reliable, for otherwise the whole ceremony is pointless.  A punishment can be suspended, postponed or overruled but a litmus test is worthless if it can be influenced by such factors.  This is the reason that the gemara claims that R. Shimon and Rabanan's disagreement about zechut tola applies to question of the trustworthiness of the sota ceremony in our sugya's case of witnesses abroad as well.  Had their machloket been focused upon the metaphysics of zechut, it would have been impossible to project their opinions unto a different case that may have a different metaphysical calculus.  However, since their machloket revolves around the nature of the ceremony and not the nature of the zechut, the issue – whether the ceremony is foolproof or not -  is identical in both cases. 

 

[The gemara's actual quote of R.Shimon's position emphasizes the public role of the sota ceremony as a deterrent to other women rather than an attempt to clarify the facts of the case as such; however, the terminology consistently employed by the gemara, both in our sugya and in the sugyot of the third perek, consistently refers to the ability of the water as a TESTING mechanism – "BADDKI la maya" "BODKIN" etc.]

 

The role of the water is the subject of an additional machloket Tana'im that we shall treat in greater detail, b"n, in the third perek.  Briefly, R. Akiva and R. Yehuda argue whether the sota is coerced by Bet Din to drink the water if she refuses.  R. Yehuda claims that her mouth is pried open by force if necessary and the water poured down her throat.  R. Akiva protests that such a proceedure is totally unnecessary since the whole purpose of the ceremony is to find out if she commited the sin of tuma or not.  Therefore, there is no need to perform the proceedure if she admits to adultery, since the desired information has been provided (unless she is overwhelmed by fear, in which case R. Akiva admits that her confession is rejected as unreliable).  R. Yehuda, though, conceives of the ceremony as a punishment and not a crystal ball; therefore, the fact of her confession and the knowledge gained by it are irrelevant.  The obligation to punish her remains in effect and must be enforced by bet din.  Just as the verdict against a murderer or mechalel Shabbat is imposed upon them, whether they act cooperatively or not, the same rules apply to an adulteress woman who refuses to cooperate with the kohen.

 

In conclusion, we should relate the role of the sota ceremony to our previous discussion regarding the woman's presumed status after kinui and setira.  If we treat the safek seriously and are in real doubt as to her guilt regarding the suspicion of tuma, it is quite reasonable to assume that the drinking of the water is designed to clarify our doubts on this score.  However, if we trust the circumstantial raglayim ladavar and consider her guilty beyond doubt (unless proven otherwise), the rationale of supernatural punishment rather than investigative powers is the more convincing.

 

Source for next week's shiur:

Sanhedrin 37a Tosafot s.v. HaTorah

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