Shiur #18: Shehiya ֠Part 2
The Laws of Shabbat
Yeshivat Har Etzion
Shiur #18: Shehiya Part 2
By HaRav Baruch Gigi
Translated by David Silverberg
The Various Views Among the Rishonim
In the previous shiur, we discussed the Gemara's question as to whether the Mishna (Shabbat 36b), which forbade leaving food on an uncovered stove, refers to leaving food on the stove before Shabbat to continue cooking on Shabbat, or to returning cooked food to the fire on Shabbat itself. According to the first possibility, the Mishna follows the majority view of the Chakhamim, who require covering the stove or removing its coals before leaving food on it before Shabbat to continue cooking on Shabbat. The second reading, by contrast, understands the Mishna as referring only to returning food to the fire, such that it permits leaving uncooked food on an uncovered stove before Shabbat, in accordance with the minority view of Chananya.
Although the straightforward reading suggests that it indeed speaks of placing food on the stove before Shabbat, some Rishonim nevertheless accepted as Halakha the lenient position of Chananya. Tosefot even asserted that for this very reason the Gemara went to such great lengths to try and explain the Mishna in accordance with Chananya's view. We will not elaborate here on the different claims advanced by the Rishonim in determining whether to follow the view of Chananya or of the Chakhamim. We will, however, discuss some of the views among the Rishonim, before proceeding to the rulings of the poskim and contemporary practice.
Rashi writes (37b s.v. ve-Rav Sheshet):
And we, who leave pots on a stove that is not cleared [from its coals] rely on Chananya, since the plain Mishna follows his view, as it says, "We may infer that if it [the dough] forms a crust [before Shabbat] it is permissible [to place it in the oven to finish baking on Shabbat]," even though it is not fully cooked.
Rashi here uncharacteristically takes a clear halakhic position, in favor of Chananya's view, but elsewhere in his commentary a more complex picture emerges. Commenting on the Gemara's discussion of kedeira chayeta, where it allows leaving on the fire before Shabbat a pot of raw food (18b), Rashi writes (s.v. u-vashil), "A fully-cooked [food] may be placed, for it does not require stirring [and there is thus no concern that one might stir the coals to expedite the cooking process]." Rashi here explains the Gemara differently than Tosefot, who interpreted the word "cooked" in the Gemara as referring to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, in order to have this sugya accommodate Chananya's position, which Tosefot accept later in the Masekhet (37b s.v. amar). Indeed, Rashi's comments there, which indicate that only fully-cooked food may be placed on the fire before Shabbat, appear to contradict his position taken in our sugya, where he accepts Chananya's lenient view.
We might suggest two approaches to reconcile Rashi's seemingly contradictory comments.
First, Rashi perhaps rules leniently only with regard to a stove. In an oven, however, all agree that one may place before Shabbat only fully-cooked food. Since ovens had narrow openings which allowed them to retain their heat very well, even minimal stirring would be effective in hastening the cooking process. The concern therefore arises that one might stir, even if the food has already reached the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai. The Ba'al Ha-ma'or advances this theory explicitly (10a in the Rif):
I had thought that "cooked but not cooked" means the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, and according to all views this is forbidden in an oven, for we find that it is more stringent than a stove It is therefore forbidden to leave a pot in the oven [before Shabbat] unless it is fully cooked.
The Ba'al Ha-ma'or accepts the Chakhamim's position, because the straightforward reading of the Mishna supports their view, and in his comments to 37b he seeks to explain the widespread practice to rely on Chananya's view.
Alternatively, Rashi perhaps accepts Chananya's view in all cases, and the earlier sugya (18b) can be explained only in accordance with the position of the Chakhamim. The Gemara there delineates three categories: raw food, partially cooked food, and cooked food. It would be difficult to accept this categorization within Chananya's view; it is far simpler to explain these levels according to the Chakhamim, as follows: "raw" means until the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai; "partially cooked" refers to the period until the food is fully cooked; and "cooked food" of course means food that has completed the cooking process. Should one wish to explain this sugya in accordance with Chananya's view, he would be forced to explain as Tosefot do that "raw" refers to food that has not been cooked at all, "partially cooked" means that it had begun cooking but has yet to reach the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, and "fully cooked" means that the food has reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai. Given the difficulty in establishing a precise definition of the first category, of food that has not been cooked at all, it is far simpler to understand the sugya as following the Chakhamim's view.
Thus, Rashi personally sides with the position of Chananya, but the halakha of kedeira chayeta was said within the Chakhamim's view.
I then discovered that the Sefat Emet explains the sugya of kedeira chayeta along similar lines:
"It is permissible to place a pot of raw food [in the oven] just before dark on Erev Shabbat." At first glance, we must explain that only just before dark this is allowed, but slightly earlier is forbidden, because once bein ha-shemashot [the period between sunset and nightfall] sets in it will no longer be raw. However, it is somewhat far-fetched to explain the Gemara's discussion as referring specifically to somebody involved in his work actually until bein ha-shemashot. And if we say that once he placed it in the oven when it was raw his mind was distracted from it, and even if some cooking occurred once bein ha-shemashot set in it is still permissible, then we encounter difficulty with what is said in the chapter Kira, that is forbidden to leave on a stove [before Shabbat] anything that has not been cooked to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai. However, according to those who rule against Chananya, and hold that so long as continued cooking is beneficial [for the food] it is forbidden [to leave it on the fire before Shabbat], here [the sugya of kedeira chayeta] becomes understandable. For we may explain that anything that is not at the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai is called "raw," and "partially cooked" means specifically if it reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai. And it seems to me that this was the Bach's view, cited by the Taz (253:1); you will see that the Taz found it difficult. But in my view, there is no difficulty whatsoever, for indeed, those who follow Chananya did not accept this rule of kedeira chayeta, which is said according to the Chakhamim, who argue with Chananya. The Tur and Shulchan Arukh, who bring this rule, follow the view of those who side with the Chakhamim; this is what I believe to be the Bach's view. However, the Magen Avraham there (253:2) rules that it must be actually raw before dark.
2) Rabbenu Chananel
Rabbenu Chananel writes (37a):
The conclusion [of the sugya] is that the Mishna refers to returning [food to the fire on Shabbat, rather than leaving food on the fire before Shabbat]. Now there is somebody who says that since it was not explicitly concluded that [the Mishna refers to] returning, we do not rely on the [Gemara's] responses and [we must explain] the Mishna [as referring to] leaving [on the fire before Shabbat]. And there is somebody [else] who says that the halakha is that the Mishna refers to returning We deduce from here that Rabbi Yochanan held that the Mishna refers specifically to returning.
On the basis of these comments, it appears, the Rosh wrote (3:1):
And Rabbenu Chananel z"l did not conclude the halakha in accordance with anybody neither like the Chananya nor like the Rabbis, with regard to a food that had not been fully cooked. But regarding a fully-cooked food, he determined the halakha that [even] if continued cooking is beneficial, it is permissible [to leave the food on the fire before Shabbat].
Tosefot, however, wrote that Rabbenu Chananel followed Chananya's position, as other Rishonim likewise write in his name. It indeed appears even from the aforementioned citation that Rabbenu Chananel leans toward this conclusion. In fact, he writes explicitly later (39b):
It turns out that it is forbidden in two instances: [if the food is] cold, and has not been warmed at all, and a food that has begun to cook but did not reach ma'akhal Ben Derusai. And it is permissible in two instances: hot food that was heated but not cooked at all, and that was cooked to ma'akhal Ben Derusai, even (if it was not) fully cooked it is permissible.
Tosefot likely relied on these comments in determining Rabbenu Chananel's final conclusion.
3) The Rosh
After citing the debate among other Rishonim as to which view is accepted as Halakha, the Rosh writes, "Since many views exist regarding this ruling, and the Jewish people are fervent in the mitzva of oneg Shabbat and will not obey a stringent ruling, let them continue the practice that they have observed in accordance with those who side with Chananya."
His son, the Tur, wrote (253), "But Rashi and the Ri ruled that anything that has reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai may be left on the stove [before Shabbat], even if it was kindled with peat and wood, and even if it is not cleared or covered My mentor and father [= the Rosh] z"l concurred." The Derisha (253:8), however, objected: "I see no indication in the Rosh's comments that he concurred; for he wrote, 'Since many views exist let them continue the practice '" The Bei'ur Halakha (s.v. ve-nahagu) seems to have shared the Derisha's understanding of the Rosh:
He cited the comments of the Rosh, who wrote that since the Jewish people are fervent in the mitzva of oneg Shabbat, and they will certainly pay no attention to us, they should therefore be allowed to continue; see his comments there. It appears from this that only for this reason he did not wish to object.
One might claim that the Rosh actually concluded upon Chananya's view because this had become the accepted practice, as the Tur understood. True, had this not been the widespread practice he would have perhaps considered a different approach, but in the face of the common custom he felt we may rely on this practice. But it still remains unclear whether he felt that one should preferably follow the stringent view. I then discovered the following comments of the Chazon Ish (37:3):
It would appear, however, that the Rosh did not mean that, "It is preferable that they [transgress] inadvertently" [and only for this reason advocated allowing people to rely on Chananya]. Rather, he z"l meant that since those who rule stringently are great sages it would have been appropriate to be stringent so as to avoid the dispute. But since this would often result in the loss of oneg Shabbat, people would not obey the stringent ruling; rather, so long as one can strictly speaking be lenient, they would want to be lenient. And strictly speaking, those who are lenient may do so because they are the descendants of those who acted leniently on the basis of their rabbis' instruction, and also because this [prohibition] was enacted by the Sages [and is not forbidden by the Torah]. Therefore, we allow them to rely on their rabbis who ruled leniently, and perhaps one need not be stringent once the great sages were not stringent for themselves.
The Shulchan Arukh, Rama, and Acharonim
The Shulchan Arukh (253:1) brings two views on the issue. The first follows the position of the Rif and Rambam, who accepted the Chakhamim's position, and forbids leaving food on a stove before Shabbat, even if it has been fully cooked, if continued cooking is beneficial for it, unless the stove is cleared of its coals. The Shulchan Arukh then cites a second opinion the "yeish omerim" ("Some who say") following Chananya's view. A commonly accepted principle dictates that when the Shulchan Arukh cites one view anonymously and then a second opinion in the name of "yeish omerim," he prefers the first view. It thus appears that he accepted the stringent position of the Chakhamim.
Many Acharonim, however, noted that other rulings of the Shulchan Arukh appear to contradict this implication. For example, he writes in 254:2:
One may not roast onions, eggs or meat over coals [before Shabbat] unless it can be roasted on both sides while still daytime [before the onset of Shabbat] to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, which is the point of half-cooked But once it is roasted to ma'akhal Ben Derusai, we are no longer concerned that one might come to stir.
This ruling appears to correspond to Chananya's position, that allows shehiya with food that has reached the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai. This indeed emerges from the sugya (on 20a) that cites Chananya's ruling in the context of the halakha stated in the Mishna, which is the halakha codified here in the Shulchan Arukh. In fact, the Amora'im (37b) relied on this very halakha in ruling in favor of Chananya.
The work Minchat Kohen Mishmeret Shabbat (2:5) wrote that the Shulchan Arukh followed Chananya's position, in light of his comments in 254 that prove that he adopted the second view he documented in 253. Many others, however, refuted these proofs, and in fact the Rishonim already raised a possible distinction between roasting and cooking on a stove. Specifically regarding a stove, perhaps, Chazal were concerned that one might stir even if the food had reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai, whereas during roasting, where the meat is directly exposed to the fire, no such concern arises once the food reaches ma'akhal Ben Derusai, since by stirring one runs the risk of burning the food. The Ran (6b in the Rif) writes:
There [in the case of roasting], they themselves are placed on the fire, and thus once it reaches ma'akhal Ben Derusai if one stirs the coals he will burn them even though he ruled in the chapter Kira that it is forbidden to leave [food before Shabbat] on a stove that has been neither cleared nor covered so long as continued cooking is beneficial, against [the ruling of] Chananya.
Yet another explanation emerges from the Rambam's comments (Hilkhot Shabbat 3:16):
One may not roast meat, onions or eggs on the fire, unless they can be roasted while still daytime and be suitable for consumption. If they are then left on the fire on Shabbat to be fully roasted, this is allowed, because they are considered mitztameik ve-ra lo [foods for which continued cooking is detrimental], such that if one stirs he will burn them, given that they are over the actual fire.
According to the Rambam, roasting resembles cooking on a stove in situations of mitztameik ve-ra lo, which all views allow leaving over an uncovered stove before Shabbat.
The Shulchan Arukh further writes (254:4), "Fruits that can be eaten raw one may place them around the [bottom of a] pot, even if they cannot be roasted before dark." This ruling originates from the comments of Tosefot (Shabbat 48a):
Rabbenu Shemuel says that one may place apples near the fire just before dark, even though they cannot be roasted while still daytime, for they are more commonly eaten raw than foods cooked to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, which is allowed [to be placed on a stove before Shabbat]. And although the Mishna (19b) states, "One may not roast meat, onions or eggs unless they can be roasted while still daytime," despite the fact that people occasionally eat raw onions, nevertheless it [an onion] is not suitable for consumption raw like apples, and one wishes to diminish their sharpness and sweeten them by cooking it.
Tosefot base this halakha on the comparison between apples and foods cooked to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, and thus they would permit leaving the apples near the fire only within Chananya's view. The Bei'ur Ha-Gra (254:16) therefore writes that this halakha applies only according to the view of Tosefot, who rule like Chananya. And although Tosefot write that apples are more commonly eaten than foods at the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, nevertheless, since continued cooking is beneficial for the apples, and the Chakhamim forbid shehiya even in such a case, the Shulchan Arukh's ruling seems difficult to explain.
This difficulty becomes even more acute in light of the Shulchan Arukh's own comments in the Beit Yosef (253):
Rabbenu Yerucham wrote that fruits that can be eaten raw have the status of a food cooked to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai and for which continued cooking is beneficial, and one may not leave it on a stove that has not been cleared or covered. This is in accordance with the view of the Rif and his followers; but according to Rashi and his followers, this is permissible, as is the case with a food that has been cooked to ma'akhal Ben Derusai, which, as explained earlier, is permitted [according to Rashi].
The Minchat Kohen, in the aforementioned passage, draws further evidence from here that the Shulchan Arukh adopts Chananya's position. The Sha'ar Ha-tziyon (254:22) writes that the Shulchan Arukh allowed placing the fruits only directly over the actual fire, which has the status of roasting, which he permits, as discussed earlier. But if one places the fruits around the pot such that they are cooked by the heat of the pot, rather than directly by the fire, only Chananya would permit doing so. The Vilna Gaon likewise understood the Shulchan Arukh in this vein.
In my humble opinion, however, one could claim that the Beit Yosef sought to explain that even Rabbenu Yerucham, who forbade leaving the apples near the fire, did so only within the view of the Rif and Rambam, whereas according to Rashi this would be allowed. But the Beit Yosef himself, however, perhaps held that even the Rif and Rambam would allow leaving the fruits near the pot, since they are edible even without cooking and hence there is little concern that one might stir the coals. The Shulchan Arukh therefore allowed leaving them near the pot even if they would not fully roast before Shabbat, given the low degree of motivation to stir. This approach would require further analysis.
Another point worthy of attention regarding the Shulchan Arukh's rulings involves his understanding of Chananya's position. In the previous shiur, we encountered different views in interpreting Chananya, and it behooves us to determine to which approach the Shulchan Arukh refers in documenting the second position. He writes (253:1):
Some say that anything that was cooked to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, or that was fully cooked and would benefit from continued cooking, may be left on the stove [before Shabbat] even if it is not cleared or covered. [The requirement] of clearing and covering applies only when it began cooking but did not reach the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai.
The Hagahot Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Peri Megadim (Mishbetzot Zahav, 1) detected an inherent contradiction within this passage. The Shulchan Arukh first writes that shehiya is allowed if the food has been cooked to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, or has completed cooking and it would benefit from continued cooking. This implies that if the food has not been fully cooked, and has reached only the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, then if it would benefit from continued cooking shehiya would be forbidden in accordance with the view of the Ba'al Ha-ma'or discussed in the previous shiur. At the end of the passage, however, he writes that one must clear the stove to allow shehiya only if the food has not even reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai, indicating that if the food has reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai, shehiya is permitted under any circumstances. Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Peri Megadim offered no solution for this difficulty. The Peri Megadim concludes that in any event common practice allows shehiya the moment the food has reached the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, and he accepted this practice as the halakha.
In my humble opinion, however, the Shulchan Arukh never intended at all to express the view of the Ba'al Ha-ma'or, and refers to the position of Rav Hai Gaon mentioned in the previous shiur. Rav Hai Gaon understood that shehiya is allowed with food that has reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai regardless of whether continued cooking would be beneficial or detrimental to its taste. However, some Amora'im forbade shehiya if the food has been completely cooked and continued cooking would be beneficial. (See previous shiur for explanation.) The Shulchan Arukh therefore makes the point that in his understanding, shehiya is permitted even in such a case, in accordance with those Amora'im who ruled leniently on this issue, and as Rav Hai Gaon himself ruled. Practically, then, the Shulchan Arukh understood Chananya as permitting shehiya under all circumstances if the food has reached the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai.
The Rama writes that common practice follows the lenient position of Chananya. The Bei'ur Halakha, however, makes the following comment:
Since the Rosh wrote that "because the Jewish people are fervent in the mitzva of oneg Shabbat they will certainly not listen to us, and therefore let them continue" this implies that only for this reason he did not wish to object. Likewise, the Beit Yosef himself, from the fact that he cited the first view anonymously and the second view in the name of "yeish omerim," seems to also be inclined to rule stringently. But nevertheless, we do not have the wherewithal to object to those who act leniently, for the people already have the practice of following the yeish omerim, as the Rama wrote. Thus, according to this, it is certainly preferable to optimally ensure that the food is fully cooked before dark and remove it from the fire. If, however, it happened that the matter was delayed, such as if guests arrived before sundown and one had to cook some food for them, he may place it on the tripod to cook; even if it will cook only halfway by sundown, this suffices. He should let it stand on the tripod until it finishes cooking, and one may remove it from it at night.
In his view, one should preferably follow the stringent ruling of the Chakhamim, and rely on the lenient position only in situations where a particularly pressing need arises. By contrast, we cited earlier the comments of the Chazon Ish, who held that one need not act stringently in opposition to the widespread practice to be lenient.
As for the final halakha, it would seem that Ashkenazim may follow Chananya's view even le-khatechila (optimally), whereas Sefaradim should preferably act in accordance with the stringent view of the Chakhamim, as this is likely the position of the Shulchan Arukh. Yet, the Acharonim have reported that even among Sefardic communities the practice has developed to act in accordance with Chananya's view, and therefore Sefaradim who have adopted the lenient practice have on whom to rely. But those who le-khatechila act stringently tavo aleihem berakha (they are deserving of blessing).
Kedeira Chayeta Placing Raw Food on the Fire Just Prior to Shabbat
Earlier we mentioned the Gemara's discussion (18b) concerning kedeira chayeta, a pot of raw food, which one may place before Shabbat on a stove that is not covered or cleared, and we addressed the question of whether this applies even according to Chananya. As for the final halakha, it has clearly been accepted that the leniency of kedeira chayeta applies according to all views.
This rule is limited to situations where the food has not undergone any cooking at all before Shabbat, and therefore one must place the pot on the fire immediately prior to sundown. If one placed the pot on the fire earlier and it will manage only to get warm before sundown, it is still permissible (Mishna Berura 253:12, based on Rav Hai Gaon and the Rashba). One may not, however, leave it on the fire if it will begin cooking before Shabbat, unless the fire is covered.
One might raise the possibility of allowing leaving raw food on the fire even earlier, in light of the Sefat Emet's contention (in the passage cited earlier) that according to the Chakhamim, we consider the food "raw" so long as it has not reached the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai. In truth, however, one should not rely on this theory, given that the straightforward reading of the Rishonim's comments indicate that the food must be actually "raw." This is certainly the implication of the Shulchan Arukh. Furthermore, since the widespread practice has become to follow Chananya's lenient position, we cannot "take the rope at both ends" by allowing shehiya once the food has reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai in accordance with Chananya, and also before it reaches ma'akhal Ben Derusai in accordance with the Chakhamim. In practice, then, one may rely on the law of kedeira chayeta only if the food will not be cooked at all before Shabbat.
The Gemara explains the reason for this halakha as follows: "Since it is not suitable for the nighttime, one does not have his mind on it and he will not come to stir the coals." The question arises whether the focus here is on the fact that the food will in any event be ready only the next day, or on the individual's mental distraction from the food. This question will yield practical ramifications in two situations:
1. If a person leaves regular food (as opposed to completely raw food) on the fire before Shabbat for it to be ready the following day. According to the first reason, this would be forbidden, whereas according to the second reason we would allow it. The Shibalei Ha-leket (57) and Mordekhai (Shabbat, beginning of the 3rd chapter) allow shehiya with food intended only for the following day, whereas most Rishonim rule stringently. This also appears to be the implication of the other authorities, who make no reference to such a distinction. The Beit Yosef (end of 253) indeed writes that most Rishonim disagree, and Halakha follows this majority view.
2. If the food could be ready in time for the nighttime meal, but the individual's mind is distracted from it, then according to the first reason we would forbid shehiya, while the second reason would warrant permitting it. The Gemara comments that even if the pot is not entirely raw, but one placed in it a single piece of raw food, shehiya is allowed. Rashi explains that by adding the raw piece, the individual has expressed his intention not to partake of the pot's contents that night; this suggests that Rashi subscribed to the second reason for this halakha, that it hinges on the person's mind's distraction from the food. This also appears to emerge from the formulation of the Rambam and the Shulchan Arukh. The Tur, by contrast, suggests otherwise, as he writes that since the individual needs the food only the following day, and it can easily cook without stirring by the next day, there is no concern that he might stir the coals.
Practically speaking, one should not leave food on the fire for the following day unless it cannot be ready for consumption until the next day. And although the Shulchan Arukh's formulation suggests that this halakha depends on whether the person's mind is on the food, it is likely that we do not accept the view among the Rishonim that any shehiya performed for the next day necessarily entails the distraction of one's mind from the food. It must be objectively established that one has no thoughts of the food before the next day. One therefore should leave food on the fire for the next day only if he performs a demonstrative act, such as adding a raw piece of food, to express his disinterest in the food for the nighttime meal.
The Bei'ur Halakha writes that if the oven is exceedingly hot, and the food will be ready in the late hours of the night, after the meal, one may nevertheless leave it in the oven before Shabbat, because his mind is certainly distracted from the food. It appears from the Bei'ur Halakha that shehiya is forbidden for any raw food that one plans to eat during the night, since one has his mind on the food. The Chazon Ish (37:22), by contrast, held that the law of kedeira chayeta applies even if one plans to eat the food at night, because "generally speaking one leaves a pot of raw food [on the fire before Shabbat] only for the following day."
In the next shiur, we will deal with the practical definitions of garuf ve-katum (a "cleared" or "covered" stove) and the practical applications of the laws of shehiya in modern times.
1. See Tosefot, Shabbat 37a s.v. le-olam. The student is advised to carefully review the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Shabbat 36b-37a and take note of the difficulty inherent in this reading of the Mishna.
2. See the discussions of among others the Rif, Ba'al Ha-ma'or and Ramban.
3. Tosefot there conclude upon this position, as well.
4. This approach, however, is far from simple. It emerges from the Gemara (38b) that an oven has a more stringent status than a stove only in situations that demand that the stove be cleared of its coals; the halakha would be stringent in these cases even in ovens that have been cleared. But when Halakha is lenient regarding a stove that has not been cleared, it treats ovens the same way. Accordingly, Chananya, who permits leaving food at the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai in a stove that has not been cleared of its coals, would likewise permit doing so in an oven that has not been cleared. The Ba'al Ha-ma'or's approach thus requires further explanation.
5. In his comments to 34b (s.v. gezeira), too, he appears to follow the Chakhamim's position.
6. Emphasis added.
7. This follows Tosefot's view.
8. The Korban Netanel (7) understood as a given assumption that Rabbenu Chananel held that shehiya would be permitted only if the food has been fully cooked, in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan's view. And he understood that Rabbi Yochanan voiced a middle position, in between Chananya, who permitted shehiya once the food reached ma'akhal Ben Derusai, and the Chakhamim, who forbade shehiya even if the food was fully cooked. Later, however, we will see that Rabbenu Chananya sided squarely with Chananya.
9. It would seem that whether or not the text should read "that is not" hinges on the view of Rav Hai Gaon, which we mentioned in the previous shiur, concerning the issue of whether Chananya allows shehiya even after the food has been fully cooked.
10. It is clear from context that he refers to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai.
11. Review the comments of the Sefat Emet, cited earlier.