Nekima - Revenge
Bein Adam Le-chavero: Ethics of
Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
Shiur #29: Nekima (Revenge)
The Introductory Questions
In last week's lesson, we
introduced the prohibitions of netira and nekima, bearing a grudge
and taking revenge, respectively. We pointed out that the prohibited revenge is
not limited to vigilantism and violence; it includes the mere refusal to lend
items to another due to a prior similar act. While we have dealt with the
prohibition of bearing a grudge at length, the injunction against taking
revenge, nekima, must be dealt with in more depth.
The most important issue
is what exactly is to be included under the proscription of nekima. Are
all forms of revenge to be treated equally? In fact, in this lesson we will
quote some opinions that limit the prohibition greatly. If this is the case,
what does this mean about the Torah's desire to maintain peace and harmony?
Understanding the Prohibition
Is nekima a
technical prohibition or a fundamental one? A given act may be forbidden even
though on its own it may not be objectionable, for fear that it may lead to
something worse; such an act would be classified as a technical prohibition. A
fundamental prohibition is one in which the act is forbidden because it is
inherently extremely objectionable. Even if the prohibition of nekima is
to be viewed as fundamental, is the act of retribution fundamentally prohibited,
or is the Torah really concerned with the destructive mindset of one waiting for
the right moment to take revenge?
In last week's lesson, we
saw that the Talmud (Yoma 23a) defines the prohibition of nekima
as the refusal to lend out a tool to one who has previously refused to do so. It
seems self-evident that this passage does not mean that the only type of
prohibited nekima is refusing to help another with one's property.
Notably, the Sifra (Kedoshim 2:4) uses the same examples, but it
introduces them differently. Instead of What is revenge and what is bearing a
grudge? the Sifra asks: How far does the power of revenge extend? and How
far does the power of bearing a grudge extend? This seems to indicate that even
though these prohibitions extend to speech, certainly much more severe forms of
vengeance would be included as well.
Indeed, this might lead
one to understand that the Torah is focused on developing a healthier mindset
towards the minor offenses of others; it is not truly fearful of things getting
out of hand.
A number of commentators
focus their explanation of the prohibition on the negative mindset that seeking
revenge can develop in a person. The Torahs aim is to educate man as to what is
truly important in life and what is not worth agonizing about.
The Rambam's Rationale
The Rambam (Hilkhot
De'ot 7:7) speaks of the attitude of one who seeks revenge and the
unnecessary anger that interpersonal disputes can cause.
Even though it is not punishable by lashes, it is a
very bad trait. Instead, a person should be forgoing of his rights as regards
all mundane things, for men of understanding consider all these things as vanity
and emptiness which are not worth seeking revenge for.
However, at the end of the next law (8), the Rambam identifies netira
as being the root cause of taking revenge. One who is able to avoid bearing a
grudge will not come to avenge himself or herself. The Rambam there concludes by
advancing a practical benefit of this behavior.
A person who acts in this manner violates the
prohibition against bearing a grudge. One should
eradicate the thing from his heart and not bear a grudge. For as long as one
nurses a grievance and keeps it in mind, one may come to take vengeance.
Therefore, the Torah emphatically warns us not to bear a grudge, so that the
impression of the wrong shall be obliterated and no longer remembered.
This is a proper quality
which permits a stable environment, trade, and commerce to be established among
people.
Evidently, the Rambam is not oblivious to the
positive societal benefits of a society free of revenge. However, the focus of
the prohibition is the negative mindset one displays.
This idea of the Rambam,
that vengefulness demonstrates undue care for mundane matters, is also expressed
by the Keli Yakar (Vayikra 19:18). He writes:
Nekima and netira are [the manifestation of]
negative character traits, for it is not proper to seek revenge upon any person
from among your countrymen. Ostensibly, revenge is sought for injury to your
body or your possessions, but these things are not so treasured and important to
justify taking vengeful action
for physical infractions, God does not want man
to take revenge.
The Keli Yakar continues with a parable. A
child at play builds a structure, and another person comes along and demolishes
it. The screaming child wants to wreak vengeance upon the wrecker, but the
parent realizes that the incident is insignificant. Similarly, God sees many
things which anger us, which we often consider to be of utmost importance, but
from God's standpoint, as long as they don't injure a person spiritually, they
should be overlooked.
The Keli Yakar's
explanation provides a rationale for understanding that the desire to take
revenge reveals that ones priorities are in the wrong place. What is
particularly astounding regarding his approach is that he declares all physical
slights as unimportant and not worthy of any grudge or act of revenge.
The Chinnukh (Mitzva 241)
also provides an explanation for the prohibition based on one's mindset, though
he differs from the previously cited views, arguing that all insults and
injuries really originate with the One above, and, therefore, it is futile to
take action against humans below.
We are prohibited from
taking revenge upon another Jew. This applies to a case in which a Jew has
harmed or inflicted pain on another in any manner, so that the common custom
would be to pursue he who was wronged them unceasingly until they have paid him
back for his evil action or until they have given him pain as he had given them.
The Torah forbids us to do so by saying, "You shall not take vengeance
At the root of the
precept lies the purpose that a man should know and reflect that whatever
happens to him, good or bad, is caused to him by God; nothing which happens to
man by any person or by a brother can occur without God willing it so.
Therefore, should another inflict pain or suffering on him, let him know in his
soul that his bad deeds have caused God to will this result upon him, and let
him not set his thoughts to take revenge from him. Indeed, the perpetrator is
not the primary cause of his trouble, since it is God that brought it about.
Thus, King David said, "So let him curse, for God has told him" (II Shemuel
16:10); David attributed the matter to [his own] sin, not to Shimi ben Gera.
Though the Chinnukh's focus is on the
attitudinal problem, he also concedes that there is a societal benefit as well.
Moreover, there is
another great benefit resulting from the precept: to stop contention and remove
hate from people's hearts. And when there is peace among people, God makes peace
for them.
Forbearance: The Power to Shun Grudges and
Revenge
In Lesson 12, we learned
about ones being maavir al middotav, acting with forbearance towards
those who have done him or her wrong. We also discussed Rav Soloveitchik's
definition of the halakhic view in his Catharsis: man is purified by
displaying the might to control one's emotions and withhold one's natural urges.
In fact, the Rashbam (Vayikra 19:18) explains the verse as a mitzva to be
maavir al middotav when one has been wronged.
The most basic practical
question is the following: is there any mechanism to ingrain within a person the
power to resist the emotional tendency to bear a grudge and take revenge? After
all, the mere realization that bearing a grudge is forbidden may prove
insufficient, much as one may want to try to forgive and forget. Rav Avigdor
Nebenzahl (Jerusalem Stone, page 328) remarks:
We are neither required
nor expected to forget the wrongs done to us. We are forbidden to act in
response to them or to allow them to affect negatively our relationship with the
person involved.
Rav Nebenzahl explains that the individual who
represents this forbearing capacity more than any other is Yosef, in his
dealings with his brothers. Yosef clearly remembers his brothers' actions, but
his greatness lies in his ability not to act on this memory. (See his analysis
ibid. in which presents a number of rationales for how Yosef found the
inner strength of character to forgive the brothers who threw him into a pit and
led him into more than twenty years of exile from his family.)
Limitations on the Prohibition: Personal
Insult
So far, we have seen
rationales behind the Torah's prohibition of nekima which would readily
explain a blanket prohibition of taking revenge in any and every situation,
while, according to the Keli Yakar, it is only financial or physical damage
which is to be forborne, not spiritual attacks. The Talmud in Yoma,
however, seems to place a number of possible limitations on the prohibition,
some related to the nature of the grievance which serves as an impetus for
revenge, others focused on the individual who chooses to take revenge.
But before we turn to the Talmudic
limitations, we should note that from the biblical source itself, it is clear
that not every time that one is harmed by another must he or she be forbearing
and just let it go. The Ramban (ad loc.) points out that this prohibition
does not apply when there is room for due process according to the law:
Our Rabbis have already
explained that the matters of taking revenge and bearing a grudge apply only to
cases in which there is no monetary indemnity
For in a case where his fellow
owes him money, because of damage that he caused him or for similar reasons, one
is not obliged to let his fellow go free. On the contrary, he should sue him
before the court and receive payment from him
How much more so is this true in
capital cases! One must be vengeful and bear a grudge towards him until the
blood of his brother shall be redeemed by a court that will render judgment
according to the laws of the Torah.
The Ramban cites the case of the blood
redeemer, the kinsman of a blood redeemer who is mandated to avenge his
relatives death by calling upon the court system to mete out punishment.
Essentially, the Ramban classifies the courts as the permitted means of taking
revenge. (See also Lesson 13, where we noted the Chinnukh's opinion that during
the heat of an attack, one is permitted to respond, though this may not be the
optimal reaction.)
However, the Talmud (Yoma
22b-23a) seems to open up room for revenge even outside of the courts. The
Talmud addresses Rabbi Yochanan's statement in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben
Yehotzadak: "Any Torah scholar who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge
like a serpent is no true scholar." Ostensibly, this would contravene the verse
prohibiting nekima and netira. The Talmud responds with a
startling answer: That prohibition refers only to monetary affairs, citing the
passage which we saw last week, which applies nekima and netira to
physical items, tools and clothing. Regarding situations where one is personally
offended, on the other hand, there is no prohibition; in fact, a Torah scholar
is obligated to take revenge. (In our next lesson, we will examine this concept
at length.)
The Talmud's statement
seems to put our understanding of the prohibition in a completely new light.
Relegating the prohibition to monetary matters seems to require an entirely new
analysis of the basis of the prohibition. It is quite understandable that
neither the Rambam nor the Chinnukh cite Rabbi Yochanans ruling, indicating
that they may, in fact, not view it as normative law.
In fact, it is
interesting to note that the Chinnukh chooses to quote the aforementioned
passage from the Sifra, which seems to use the example of refusing to lend items
as a novel case included in nekima; surely personal offenses would be
included! The Chinnukh writes:
These are the words of
the Sifra: How far does the power of revenge extend? If one asked another "Lend
me your sickle
." With regards to such cases, it says "You shall not take
vengeance." All similar cases are included as well.
He might have understood the Sifras view as
arguing with that of the Talmud, with the formers opinion being that there is
no difference between monetary matters and personal offenses.
Similarly, the Minchat
Chinnukh (ad loc.) notes that the Rambam does not mention any permissive
ruling regarding nekima for personal offenses.
In truth, the Rambam
mentions no explicit prohibition regarding personal offenses (arguably the
Chinnukh concurs). It may very well be that they too accept the limitation but
for some reason choose not to mention it.
Rav Avraham Yitzchak
Ha-Kohen Kook (Mitzvat Reiya, page 98) posits that even the Rambam
accepts the limitation, but he chooses not to mention it openly so as not to
give people the license to be permissive in regards to nekima even in
cases in which it is clearly prohibited.
Others in fact try to
find sources where the Rambam might indeed refer to this distinction, while
still others attempt to explain why the Rambam might reject it. The Rambams
son, Rabbi Avraham, in his responsa (Maaseh Nissim 13), cites an
alternative text of the Talmud which differentiates between mundane matters and
Torah matters. Regarding any form of mundane matters, be they monetary or
personal, the prohibition applies, while regarding the honor of God (such as
when a Torah scholar is disgraced), the prohibition does not apply.
Save the Rambam and the
Chinnukh, almost all other Rishonim seem to accept Rabbi Yochanans dictum,
indicating that the prohibition of nekima is limited to monetary matters.
This opinion is accepted explicitly by the Semag, Semak, and Rabbeinu Yona. In
fact, the Yereim explains the reason why we should understand the verse in this
manner. He makes reference to the exegetical principle that we must interpret
and analyze laws based on their context. He adds that the various interpersonal
laws stated in the surrounding verses primarily concern monetary matters;
therefore, the prohibition of nekima should presumably be understood in
this context. However, he does add that even though the examples cited by the
Talmud specifically address lending physical items, there is no good reason to
limit them to these cases. Since the Torah does not give these examples, they
are not absolute, but revenge should be forbidden only in similar cases, i.e.
monetary offenses.
In his Mishna Berura (OC 196:4),
Rav Yisrael Meir Ha-Kohen Kagan quotes this view of the Yereim that all
monetary matters are included in the prohibition, not only lending and
borrowing. Though it would seem that he would also accept the reasoning of the
Yereim that revenge for personal insults is not forbidden, his statements
elsewhere seem to indicate otherwise.
The same author, in his
Sefer Chafetz Chayim (Introduction, Negative 8-9) writes that even though
most commentators accept the Talmudic exception for personal insults,
nevertheless, because the Rambam and the Chinnukh (as well as the Ritva) seem to
rule otherwise, this is a matter of doubt concerning a Torah prohibition, and
therefore it must be treated stringently.
Practical Ramifications of the Nature of the
Prohibition
This approach to the
prohibition also may affect the question of its scope. If the reason for the
prohibition is that seeking revenge encourages negative character traits, there
is reason to believe that no affront, even a personal offense, should be
sufficient license to damage one's character.
Secondly, the Chinnukh's
reasoning regarding accepting life's vicissitudes, even if brought about through
the acts of another, as being divinely ordained should hold true for personal
insults. In fact, the verse quoted by the Chinnukh explicitly makes reference to
King David's reaction to a personal insult!
As we mentioned, in
Sefer Chafetz Chayim, Rav Kagan rules that we must treat these biblical
prohibitions stringently. In The Right and the Good (p. 112), Rav Daniel
Feldman cites a number of possible ramifications regarding the scope of the
prohibition that might be dependent on its fundamental nature. For instance, is
the prohibition of nekima violated if one attempts to take revenge but
for some reason fails to reach the targeted party?
There might be other
circumstances under which the opinion of the Rambam and the Chinnukh might
actually turn out to be more lenient and permissive of nekima. For
instance, can one take monetary "revenge" on behalf of a third party? For
instance, if one witnesses an individual refuse to lend another his ax, can one
afterward refuse to lend him a sickle, in order to show him that it is
unpleasant when one doesn't lend. The Rambam and Chinnukh might allow this, as
this is not an act of personal score-settling but rather moral education; on the
other hand, the Yereim would probably forbid such an act, as there is not
sufficient reason to withhold beneficence.
In practical terms,
though a number of commentators seem to ban taking revenge of any sort, even
after personal insults, the concept of nekima as an outright violation
under all circumstances seems to be difficult to accept.
The Yad Ha-ketana's Approach
The Yad Ha-ketana
provides a fascinating outlook into this mitzva by calling into question the
very assumption that vengeance is to be viewed negatively. He notes that such an
approach would contradict numerous mitzvot which are seemingly aimed at
exacting retribution from those who have sinned. Requiring a robber to pay
double and punishing perjured witnesses with the exact punishment they intended
to deliver to the defendant are acts of vengeance, so why should they be
permitted and nekima forbidden? Furthermore, he wonders how it is that
the first individual who refused to lend his article is not faulted, while the
one who refuses in return is in violation of a negative commandment. Lastly, he
asks, if indeed nekima is a rotten act, how can a Torah scholar who is
bidden to live a more righteous life be required to be vengeful and grudging
like a snake?
The Yad Ha-ketana uses
these questions as a platform for a fresh look at the prohibition. There is no
prohibition of using the courts as a means to punish an evildoer, even to the
point that the measure of punishment is sometimes akin to nekima. The
prohibition is limited to cases in which one is not required to proceed in a
specified manner, despite the fact that there is a clear, proper way to act.
This is the example provided by the Sages. In cases where the first party
refuses to lend his tools, this act is improper, but it doesn't violate an
explicit commandment. In such an instance, one should not only avoid causing
physical harm in retribution; on the contrary, one should be forgiving and help
the offender, even in the precisely reversed situation. Doing so will ensure
that society gets along well and does not let every little disagreement spiral
into major problems.
The beauty of the Yad
Ha-ketana's explanation is that he uses all his questions as pointers that the
prohibition is very different than originally understood, The Torah forbids
nekima specifically because the first individual was not obligated to do
anything, and therefore there is no reason to hate this individual for the
refusal. Doing so is paying unnecessary attention to an act which the Torah says
should not be taken to heart, and any refusal for the sake of revenge would be
an act of sinat chinnam and destroy the fabric of society.
By the same token, when
an actual sin is performed by the first party, there is no prohibition of
nekima. For this reason, he explains the Talmud's statement that one can
take revenge for a personal insult. That individual has sinned, and therefore
there is no prohibition of nekima. However, still it is proper for one to
be maavir al middotav and to forgo the anger. However, in the case of a
Torah scholar who has been embarrassed publicly, the Talmud states that he is
obligated to be as vengeful and grudging as a snake, as the aggressor
party has violated a mitzva and disgraced the Torah. Any acceptance by the
scholar would be tantamount to degrading Gods honor. Still, after the other
party repents, one must be willing to be forbearing and accepting.
The Yad Ha-ketana adds
just one question which he fears may destroy his whole approach. The basic claim
of his understanding is that the prohibitions of nekima and netira
apply when responding to initial acts which were permissible, though perhaps
improper. However, he notes, refusing to lend tools is in fact forbidden, if
done out of callousness and begrudging envy; he cites a number of sources which
indicate the impropriety of refusing to lend out ones items to another. This
being the case, how can one limit the prohibition of nekima to responding
to a mean but not forbidden act?
The Yad Ha-ketana
explains that certain actions and mitzvot cannot be defined in a short,
concise manner because their application is dependent on the unique
circumstances of each and every case. The failure to lend out one's possessions
is not an outright act of sin, but it may qualify, depending on the
circumstances. One may have a very good reason for refusing to lend out an item,
but the act is forbidden when done out of callousness. Since the responding
individual is unable to judge the true reason for the first party's refusal, the
responder is completely forbidden from bearing any type of grudge or taking any
form of revenge.
Next week, we will
conclude this topic and our series for this year.
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