Tefilat HaDerekh In Modern Times (2)

 Translated by David Silverberg

 DEFINING A "PARSA"

 

The Shulchan Arukh (110:7) states: "One should not recite it unless he has a parsa to travel; [when travelling] less than a parsa, however, one does not conclude with 'barukh'."

 

     A "parsa" is a distance of four "mil," or roughly four kilometers.  But the question arises, what defines a parsa: the actual distance, or the time required to cover this distance - approximately seventy-two minutes?  This issue yields practical ramifications for car travel.  Does one recite tefillat ha-derekh whenever he drives a distance of four kilometers, or only if his trip will take seventy-two minutes?

 

     This question arises in other contexts in Halakha, as well, regarding A) korban pesach, B) aveilut, C) hand-washing before meals, and D) the laws of Erev Shabbat.  Let us, therefore, address each of these areas of Halakha and determine the extent of their relevance to tefillat ha-derekh.

 

A. KORBAN PESACH

 

     One who fails to bring the korban pesach is liable for karet.  If, however, a person was traveling at the time of the korban pesach's offering, he is not liable for this punishment: "But if a man who is tahor and was not on a journey refrains from offering the Passover sacrifice, that person shall be cut off from his kin" (Bamidbar 9:13).

 

     What is the halakha if a person is on a "journey" (meaning, beyond the area of Modi'im, outside Jerusalem) but can reach the Temple quickly with horses and mules?  The Gemara addresses this question in Masekhet Pesachim (94a): "If one stood beyond Modi'im and can arrive with horses and mules, perhaps he is liable?  The verse therefore states: 'and was not on a journey,' whereas this person is on a journey."  It emerges from the Gemara that we ignore these horses and mules, and we define a "journey" based purely on distance, not on the time of travel.  Indeed, the "Petach Ha-devir" (p. 313) cites this Gemara as proof to this effect, based on the Bet Yaakov (siman 35).  Other Acharonim advance this argument, as well. 

 

     Others, however, draw this Gemara as proof to the opposite view.  The fact that the Gemara felt compelled to extract this halakha from a verse indicates that in general, we define a trip based on the time of travel, and only in this specific context of korban pesach does the Torah assess a journey based on geographic distance.  This argument appears in the responsa of the Radbaz (siman 85), Rav Pe'alim (vol. 2, Y.D. 40), and in other Acharonim, including the Yabia Omer (1:13).

 

     In my humble opinion, however, these two issues have nothing to do with one another, and we cannot reach any conclusions regarding tefillat ha-derekh based on the Gemara's discussion of korban pesach.  The exemption from korban pesach most likely stems from the traveler's practical inability to reach the Temple in time for the offering of the sacrifice.  The Ramban writes (Bamidbar 9:10), "For one who stands at the onset of twilight in a place from where he cannot reach the courtyard [of the Temple] at the time of slaughtering – this constitutes a 'long journey' for him, and he is exempt."[8]  Hence, we might have thought that if one has the practical means to quickly reach the Mikdash, he should be liable for punishment regardless of the vast distance.  The Torah must therefore make the point that in such a situation one does not receive karet.  But the hava amina (initial presumption) to consider time the critical factor applies specifically to this issue of korban pesach, and not to other areas of Halakha, where this consideration is not relevant.

 

     Likewise, then, this factor would not necessarily apply to tefillat ha-derekh.  Whether we view this prayer as a request for permission (in which case we must determine the formal definition of "journey") or as a prayer for protection against danger (in which case we must determine for which forms of danger this tefilla was instituted), the discussion concerning korban pesach has no relevance in this context.

 

B. AVEILUT

 

     If someone was unaware of the passing of a family member, and he hears the news only when arrives home in the middle of shiva, does he begin his own shiva observance at that point, or does he join the other mourners and end shiva when they do?  The Shulchan Arukh rules that if he had been within ten parsa'ot of the shiva house, then he may join the others and need not begin a new seven-day observance.  In this respect, too, the Acharonim debate the definition of "ten parsa'ot," whether this refers to distance or time.  The work "Ha-elef Lekha Shelomo" (Y.D. 309) concludes that "ten parsa'ot" are a function of distance, and we do not take means of rapid transportation into account.  The Maharam Shik rules accordingly (Y.D. 361).  These authorities derive this position from the aforementioned Gemara in Pesachim.

 

     By contrast, the Mekor Chayim (20), Zikhron Yehuda (42) and others write that we must take into account horses and the like, because "ten parsa'ot" is a function of time of travel.  They, too, prove their position from the Gemara in Pesachim.

 

     Several Acharonim tried to draw proof from this discussion, too, to the issue of tefillat ha-derekh.  (See Yabia Omer, ibid.)  Once again, however, I believe that one cannot compare aveilut and tefillat ha-derekh.  The concept underlying this halakha concerning aveilut is that if the relative can arrive at the shiva house that day (and Chazal estimated that one can walk ten parsa'ot a day – see Pesachim 94a), then he is considered together with the family already at that point.  Therefore, even if the person finds himself a long distance away from the shiva house, if he has the practical means of arriving there quickly (such as by car), then we should presumably consider him already there, since he can, practically, arrive there that day.  We thus cannot derive from here the halakha concerning tefillat ha-derekh, which involves the definition of a given journey as dangerous.

 

C. HAND WASHING, D. EREV SHABBAT

 

     The Shulchan Arukh writes (163:1): "If one does not have water available within four mil ahead of him, or within one mil behind him, he cleans his hands with a cloth."  The Bei'ur Halakha (se'if 1, s.v. im ein) writes that we determine these distances not based on geographic distance, but rather based on the time required to travel four/one mil.

 

     From this halakha, too, some sought to draw proof to the halakha concerning tefillat ha-derekh.  (See the work of responsa, "Beit Ha-midrash," siman 4, cited in Yabia Omer, 1:13.)

 

     Another discussion among the authorities concerns traveling on Erev Shabbat.  The Gemara establishes in Masekhet Sukka (44b), "A person may not travel on Erev Shabbat more than three parsa'ot," and this halakha is codified in the Shulchan Arukh (249:1).  The Bach, however, permits travelling longer distances by carriage or on horseback.  The Mishna Berura implies that he accepts this leniency.  According to this position, we determine a "trip" based on time, rather than geographic distance.

 

     But it would appear that these two situations, too, cannot serve as proof for the halakha regarding tefillat ha-derekh.  When it comes to netilat yadayim, the relevant issue is tircha – excessive inconvenience, as clearly implied by the Gemara in Pesachim (46a) and the Rishonim's comments there.   It stands to reason that we assess tircha based on loss of time, and the definition of a "trip" for purposes of this halakha would therefore depend on time of travel – specifically, seventy-two minutes.[9]  This would give us no indication as to how to determine a trip with respect to tefillat ha-derekh, which involves a different concept entirely.

 

     The prohibition against traveling on Erev Shabbat evolves from the concern that one will come home late, as the Shulchan Arukh writes: "One should not travel on Erev Shabbat more than three parsa'ot, in order that he will arrive home early in the day and make the necessary preparations for the Shabbat meal."  Naturally, the determining factor will be time, rather than distance, and we thus cannot derive from here the definition of "parsa" for purposes of tefillat ha-derekh.

 

     The distinction we raised between the case of netilat yadayim and tefillat ha-derekh is necessarily correct according to the Mishna Berura, who otherwise presents contradictory rulings.  In the context of netilat yadayim, the Mishna Berura rules that we define a "parsa" as a function of travel time, whereas regarding tefillat ha-derekh he holds that a "parsa" depends on distance (110:30; see also below).  These two rulings are easily reconciled in light of the distinction suggested above between netilat yadayim, which depends on the factor of tircha, and tefillat ha-derekh.

 

TEFILLAT HA-DEREKH

 

     If we view tefillat ha-derekh as a request for permission, then we should presumably define "trip" for purposes of this halakha based on distance.  In truth, however, this point is practically irrelevant, for, as we saw, this view likely requires the recitation of tefillat ha-derekh even when embarking on a trip shorter than a parsa.

 

     If, however, tefillat ha-derekh stems from the dangers of travel, we can consider both possibilities.  On the one hand, one might claim that the definition of "danger" would depend on the length of the trip, given that a longer journey features more danger.  On the other hand, one might define "danger" based on the duration of time spent on the road.  The more time one spends in transit, the greater the danger he faces.  According to this approach, only a seventy-two minute period of travel would qualify for the recitation of tefillat ha-derekh.

 

     It is difficult to understand why the Acharonim who address this issue do not raise this second argument.  In fact, some claim that to the contrary, if tefillat ha-derekh involves the danger of travel, "what difference does it make if one travels this parsa over the course of seventy-two minutes or if he traverses this parsa very quickly?  It stands to reason that this depends on territory, not time" (Az Nidberu, 6:66, cited in Derekh Yeshara, chapter 1, note 32).  And even those who prefer defining a "trip" based on travel time try proving their stance from aveilut, korban pesach and the like, issues which, as we explained, differ from our context, and these poskim do not mention the argument presented above.

 

     I believe we may draw support for this argument from the comments of the Orchot Chayim (Hilkhot sheni va-chamishi, 24):

 

"If you ask: If one walks under a leaning wall or over a bridge, which, as we say [in Masekhet Berakhhot 55a], brings to mind one's sins, should he recite the berakha [of 'ha-gomel'] after he crosses?  Nevertheless, [one recites the berakha] because something short, not long, can be traversed quickly and is not considered dangerous like wayfarers [traveling on] a long trip, and several incidents can occur on a long trip."

 

This passage lends itself to two understandings.  The Orchot Chayim here combines two different factors: "short, not long" and "can be traversed quickly."  He perhaps meant that the operative factor is the possibility of passing through quickly, and this finds expression in the situation of walking under a bridge, which is "short, not long."  Meaning, the dangers of travel arise when one spends a considerable amount of time in transit, whereas crossing the bridge – albeit a dangerous trip – does not take long, and we would therefore not consider this a situation of danger for purposes of the berakha.  Accordingly, the travel time becomes the determining factor with respect to tefillat ha-derekh.

 

     One may, however, understand the Orchot Chayim differently.  The critical point here is, in fact, that the trip is "short, not long"; because of the short distance, we cannot consider this territory a dangerous location.  The fact that it "can be traversed quickly" merely indicates the shortness of the trip, but the determining factor is distance rather than time.

 

     In any event, many Rishonim clearly held that we define a "trip" for purposes of tefillat ha-derekh as a function of distance, rather than time.  This position also emerges from the fact that these Rishonim draw no distinction between walking by foot and traveling by boat, and did not establish a different criterion for sea travel.  The Ravya, for example, writes (Berakhot, 85), "But once one has traveled a parsa [without reciting the berakha], be it in a boat or on dry land, this [falls under the category of] 'An error cannot be corrected'."  This comment, however, was made within the position of Rashi.  But in truth, we find these sentiments even among those who follow the Behag's view.  The Maharam, for example, is cited as saying that if one plans on traveling four mil in a ship, he should recite tefillat ha-derekh.  (This is brought in the Kolbo, 87, and elsewhere.)  The Aguda similarly writes (siman 99), "Within a parsa one can recite the berakha, both in a boat and on dry land."

 

     The Mishna Berura (110:30) adopts this approach based on the Eliyahu Rabba: "There is no difference between traveling by boat and traveling on dry land.  Accordingly, even one traveling by train should recite tefillat ha-derekh, even if he travels only a parsa."  Although some poskim rule differently, based on the laws regarding korban pesach, aveilut, or netilat yadayim, we have already explained at length that one cannot compare those cases to our issue, and we cannot reach conclusions about tefillat ha-derekh from these halakhot.  It seems more reasonable to derive this halakha based on the laws of tefillat ha-derekh itself, and we would therefore prefer, as we have seen, the approach viewing a parsa as a function of distance, meaning, four kilometers, in accordance with the Mishna Berura's ruling.[10]

 

     There is room for further elaboration at this point on the fundamental nature of tefillat ha-derekh, but since the Halakhic ramifications of this issue stem mainly from the problem addressed in the next section, we will discuss it there be"H.

 

TO BE CONTINUED:

 

NOTES:

 

8. This is all within the view of Rabbi Akiva (Pesachim 93b), according to whom this sugya follows, and which has been accepted as Halakha.  However, HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein shlit"a, when reviewing this material, noted that those who argue with Rabbi Akiva (Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yossi), seem to hold that the exemption afforded to one on a journey does not stem from the inability to be present, for according to their view, even just beyond the threshold of the Temple qualifies as a "journey."  (This is indeed the implication of their comments recorded in the mishna.)

 

9. In the halakhot of hand washing for tefilla, the Mishna Berura (92:17) posits the halakha plainly and briefly, drawing no distinction between riding and walking.  This requires further clarification.  In any event, in the context of hand washing for meals, he elaborates at length in the Bei'ur Halakha and explains himself very clearly, indicating that these comments are the true expression of his sentiments on this issue – particularly given the fact that the approach taken there appears more logical.

 

10. This also appears to be the view of the Steipler Gaon, in his work, "Shiurin Shel Torah" (end of the book, 33).