"You Shall Not Place a Stumbling Block Before the Blind" (2)

 

Translated by David Silverberg 

            Last week, we introduced the basic principles of "lifnei iver lo titen michshol," the prohibition against helping others commit Torah violations.  As we saw, the gemara limited this prohibition to cases of "two sides of the river," meaning, where the perpetrator would have been unable to achieve his goal without the assistance received.  Today we will explore the possibility of a rabbinic prohibition of "mesayei'a li-dvar aviera," helping one commit a violation, even in such cases.

 

IV. "MESAYEI'A": ASSISTING A SINNER WHEN HE COULD PERFORM THE ACT INDEPENDENTLY

 

            Tosafot (Avoda Zara 6b) write that one may not hand a forbidden food item to a Jewish idolater (who presumably does not observe halakha) even if the idolater himself owns the item, since he will certainly partake of the forbidden food.  Tosafot restrict this prohibition to cases where the recipient is unable to take the item without the giver's assistance.  If, however, the idolater could reach the item independently, then one may hand it to him despite the certainty of the ensuing violation.  A similar view emerges from the Ramban (cited by the Ran, end of the first chapter of Avoda Zara), Semag ("lavin" 168) and Radbaz (vol. 3 535).

 

            Tosafot in Masekhet Shabbat, however, take a different position.  The mishna (Shabbat 2a) describes a case of a poor person standing outside a house where he has come to collect charity who places his basket in the hands of the homeowner standing inside.  In such a case, the mishna rules, the beggar has violated the prohibition against transferring items from one domain to another on Shabbat.  The homeowner, by contrast, has not.  The gemara (3a) adds that optimally the homeowner may even receive the basket; no prohibition exists whatsoever.  Tosafot there raise the obvious question of why the homeowner does not violate "lifnei iver" for having assisted the pauper's Shabbat violation.  Despite the fact that the beggar could easily place the basket inside the house without the owner's involvement, write Tosafot, "nevertheless there is a rabbinic prohibition, for he must separate him from the prohibition."  According to Tosafot, even when the violator could commit the sin independently, thus rendering "lifnei iver" inapplicable, a rabbinic prohibition forbids assisting him in his sinful endeavor.  (Tosafot therefore interpret the mishna as dealing with a case of a gentile beggar.)

 

            Theoretically, one can understand this prohibition in three ways:

1.           As a rabbinic prohibition associated with the Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver;

2.           As a rabbinic prohibition associated with the Biblical imperative of "hokhei'ach tokhi'ach," which requires reprimanding Torah violators;

3.           An independent prohibition against helping one violate halakha, called "mesayei'a" ("helping").[1]

The final approach is the generally accepted one.

 

            The Rema (Y.D. 151:1) cites the two positions of Tosafot, in Avoda Zara and Shabbat:

 

"Some say that the prohibition against selling them [idolaters] items used for worship applies only if they have no other, similar items… If, however, they can purchase them elsewhere, one may sell them anything.  Others are stringent, but common practice is to be lenient."

 

            Whereas the Rema understands the two positions of Tosafot as arguing on one another, the Shakh reconciles the two.  He draws a distinction between assisting a Jew commit a transgression, regarding which there is a rabbinic prohibition of "mesayei'a," and helping a gentile or Jewish heretic.  Tosafot in Shabbat dealt with the former case, of assisting a Jew, and therefore raised the issue of "mesayei'a."  In Avoda Zara, however, Tosafot addressed a situation of assisting a non-Jew or Jewish idolater, regarding which no prohibition of "mesayei'a" exists.  (We will later elaborate on the issue of the applicability of lifnei iver to assisting gentiles commit transgressions.)  According to the Rema, by contrast, the prohibition of "mesayei'a" applies even to helping a gentile or Jewish idolater commit a transgression.

 

            Other approaches to reconcile the two positions of Tosafot have been suggested, as well:

 

1.         The Ritva (Avoda Zara 6a) claims that one may assist a violator if he could have performed the act independently only when the latter does not clearly express his desire to commit the sin.  In such a case, then even should the likelihood of the violation exist, one may give the prospective violator the forbidden item, since he has access to it anyway.  If, however, the individual requests the item for the explicit purpose of a transgression, fulfilling his request violates the prohibition of "mesayei'a," even if the sinner could achieve his goal independently.  If the violator could not commit the sin without assistance, then one may not hand him the given object even if his sinful intentions are not explicit.

 

            We may explain this approach based on an important distinction between the two concepts of lifnei iver, which forbids assisting a sinner who cannot perform the act independently, and "mesayei'a," forbidding even non-vital assistance.  The Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver is violated by the very fact that someone committed a sin on account of another.  "Mesayei'a," by contrast, forbids lending a helping hand to Torah violators; it thus cannot apply before establishing that the individual indeed plans to perform a forbidden act.[2]

 

2.         The Ketav Sofer (Y.D. 83) distinguishes between assistance offered prior to the forbidden act and that lent as the violation occurs.  Helping to facilitate a sin prior thereto is permitted when the sin could have occurred regardless.  For example, one may sell an animal to an idolater (who will likely use the animal for pagan worship) if he already owns suitable animals (and thus lifnei iver does not apply).  During the performance of the forbidden act, such as when the beggar places an item into the hands of the homeowner, the prohibition of "mesayei'a" prohibits lending assistance, even when the violator can commit the violation independently. 

 

            Here, too, this view becomes clear in light of the distinction between the two concepts.  Lifnei iver prohibits providing one with the possibility of committing the violation.  It therefore applies even before the sin takes place.  "Mesayei'a," however, forbids the participation in the prohibited act, and can thus apply only as the violation occurs.

 

            In light of this distinction drawn by the Ketav Sofer, we may easily reconcile the position of Tosafot in Avoda Zara and that in Masekhet Shabbat.  The gemara in Avoda Zara deals with two cases: handing a glass of wine to a nazir and selling an animal to a pagan.  Both involve assistance prior to the transgression.  Thus, as Tosafot write, in these cases one may lend assistance if the sinner could just as easily have committed the act on his own.  The gemara in Masekhet Shabbat, by contrast, addresses the case of the poor man placing an item into the hands of the homeowner inside.  The homeowner assists in the pauper's violation as it happens.  Therefore, the prohibition of "mesayei'a" forbids such participation even though the beggar could place his basket inside without the homeowner's help.  (Rav Yaakov Etlinger, Binyan Tzion 15)[3]

 

            The Ketav Sofer brings proof for his position from the mishna in Masekhet Gittin 61a, which allows lending sieves to women suspect of using shemitta produce past the point at which it becomes forbidden ("she'at biur").  Although they will presumably use the utensils in the preparation of forbidden food, one may lend them these items.  The mishna forbids, however, performing the work together with these women.  Rashi explains: "For it is forbidden to actively assist those who commit sins at the time of the sin."  (Rashi makes a similar implication in his commentary later in the same mishna.)  It thus appears that the prohibition of "mesayei'a" applies only when the violation occurs.

 

            One may, however, easily refute this proof in light of the mishna's explicit mention of "darkhei shalom" (concern for peaceful relations with others) as the basis for this halakha[4].  Strictly speaking, it would perhaps be forbidden to lend cooking utensils to shemitta violators.  But for the purposes of "darkhei shalom," halakha permitted assisting them so long as this assistance is not overtly associated with the transgression (such as when lending them utensils before they begin working).  Indeed, the Netziv, in Meishiv Davar (vol. 2, 31-32), refutes the Ketav Sofer's proof from the aforementioned comments of Rashi.  However, he does bring support for this view from Tosafot's comments on the same sugya and rules in accordance with this distinction of the Ketav Sofer.[5]

 

            We should note, however, that the Ritva, in Bava Metzia 5a-5b, indicates otherwise.  The gemara there states that shepherds are generally under suspect of theft since they often bring the animals to graze in the property of others.  However, one who shepherds the flock of another is not under suspect, since "a person does not sin if it yields him no benefit."  The gemara proves this exception from the widespread, accepted phenomenon of people entrusting shepherds with their sheep.  If we must suspect shepherds of bringing even the animals of others to graze illegally, then anyone hiring a shepherd should be in violation of lifnei iver.

 

            The Ritva comments that the gemara refers here not to the Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver, but rather to the rabbinic prohibition of "mesayei'a."  Since the shepherd has animals of his own that he will bring to graze on stolen property in any event, lifnei iver would not prohibit entrusting him with one's animals, even should he be suspect with regard to the animals of others.  Alternatively, the Ritva suggests, the gemara may have been speaking about a shepherd with no animals of his own.  In his first approach, the Ritva applies the prohibition of "mesayei'a" to placing one's animals into the care of the unscrupulous shepherd.  Although the participation in the crime takes place well before it is committed, the Ritva applies the prohibition of "mesayei'a," against the position taken by the Ketav Sofer.

           

V.   LIFNEI IVER IN CASES OF RABBINICALLY-ORDAINED PROHIBITIONS

 

            Tosafot in Masekhet Avoda Zara (22a) write that lifnei iver forbids even facilitating an "issur de-rabbanan," a prohibition introduced by Chazal.  They prove their argument from the gemara's application of lifnei iver to a case of "melakha" (forbidden activity) on Chol Ha-moed, prohibitions that are de-rabbanan by origin.  The Ramban, on the other hand, proves from this same gemara that the Torah itself forbids melakha on Chol Ha-moed.  (The Ramban maintains that the concept of forbidden activity on Chol Ha-moed originates from the Torah, but it was left for Chazal to determine its parameters.)  According to the Ramban, then, lifnei iver does not apply to helping others violate issurim de-rabbanan.

 

            The Chiddushei Ha-Ran posits yet a third view.  He argues that melakha may be forbidden on Chol Ha-moed only mi-derabbanan, as Tosafot claim, but one who assists in such a violation does not transgress the Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver.  Rather, the gemara refers here to a rabbinically-ordained prohibition of lifnei iver.[6]

 

            We thus have three views as to the applicability of lifnei iver to cases involving issurim de-rabbanan.  According to Tosafot, in such an instance one violates the Biblical prohibition of lifnei iver, while the Ran considers assistance in such cases a rabbinic expansion of lifnei iver.  According to the Ramban, one does not violate lifnei iver at all when assisting in the violation of an issur de-rabbanan.

 

            In light of last week's discussion, however, one encounters great difficulty justifying the positions of the Ran and Ramban.  As we saw, offering unsound advice also falls under the prohibition of lifnei iver.  Why should causing one to violate a prohibition on any level be considered any less?

 

            One violates lifnei iver by providing bad counsel only when the victim is unaware of his having been misled.  Lifnei iver as it pertains to leading others to sin, however, applies even when the sinner knows full well that with the other's help he now commits a Torah violation.  Therefore, according to all views, leading someone to unknowingly violate an issur de-rabbanan undoubtedly violates lifnei iver.  If, however, the individual is fully aware of the rabbinic prohibition he now proceeds to transgress, then one who assists him does not violate lifnei iver (according to the Ramban). 

 

            Next week, please God, we will examine whether lifnei iver constitutes an independent prohibition, or an extension of the transgression resulting from the assistance granted.  As we will see, this fundamental question will yield several important, practical ramifications.

 

 

FOOTNOTES:

 

[1] We do not address here a broader issue regarding the obligation mentioned by Tosafot to "separate" others from violations of halakha ("le-afrushei mei-issura"), whether or not it extends beyond the prohibition of assisting in sinful pursuits.

 

[2] A similar theory emerges from a ruling of Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, Y.D. 72).  Rav Moshe maintains that handing the item to the prospective transgressor violates the "mesayei'a" prohibition only if it is an item that will be soley used in a forbidden manner.  Giving the sinner an item that is normally used in a permissible manner is allowed even if he will likely perform a forbidden act therewith.  Therefore, an owner of a wedding hall may rent the facility to people who will likely use it for forbidden activities.  (He bases his ruling on the mishna in Masekhet Shevi'it 5:6:

"These are the utensils that an artisan may not sell… The general principle is, anything whose usage is reserved for a sin, is forbidden [to be sold]; for both prohibited and permissible activities, is permitted [to be sold]."

 

[3] He brings additional support for this view from the mishna (Avoda Zara 55b) which speaks of a Jew who presses grapes while ritually impure, thereby transmitting his impurity to the "terumot" and "ma'asrot" in the wine.  As doing so violates a prohibition, the mishna forbids others from participating in the actual process of pressing the grapes.  The mishna allows, however, helping the violator bring barrels in preparation for pressing.  Apparently, the prohibition of lending assistance applies only while the violation occurs, not before.

 

[4] We will have more to say later about the issue of "darkhei shalom" as it relates to lifnei iver.

 

[5] This appears to be the position of the Magen Avraham, as well (169:6), citing the Bach.  However, the Seridei Eish (vol. 2, 19) permits assisting before the violation only if the possibility exists that the individual does not plan on committing a sin.  A further restriction on the Ketav Sofer's provision was introduced by the Dovev Meisharim (vol. 2, 20), who applied the leniency only to cases of rabbinically ordained prohibitions.  See the Ketav Sofer and Binyan Tzion with regard to the limitations on this leniency.

 

[6] If this constitutes but a rabbinic obligation, there is room to discuss whether Chazal equated this prohibition with its Biblical counterpart, or if it allows room for leniency.