YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
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HALAKHA: A WEEKLY SHIUR IN HALAKHIC TOPICS

Berakhot During a Meal (Part 2)
By Rav Mordechai Friedman

[This is a continuation of last week's shiur.]

VI. UNEXPECTED COURSES

Let us return to the passage from Rabbenu Yona cited earlier, in which he explained how fruit brought in the middle of a meal can join the meal and thereby become exempt from a beracha. This halakha is based on three assumptions:

1) 	Ha-motzi is a berakha on the entire entity of the meal.
2) 	Even food not normally eaten with a meal can be joined to a meal and thus not require a berakha.

	Rabbenu Yona makes a third assumption, as well: 

3) It is possible to exempt foods from a berakha even if the individual did not plan to include them as part of the meal when he recited birkat ha-motzi.  

In other words, even unexpected courses of fruit can be exempt - even when consumed without bread.

	The Ba'al Ha-maor [14] argues, suggesting a different answer to the questions raised against Rashi's position than that offered by Rabbenu Yona [15]:

If we had only the source of the mishna [44a] we would have thought that this rule [of ikar and tafel] applies [only] to something that was served together with the bread, such that when he blessed over the bread his mind was on it [i.e. the other food], as well.  But here [i.e. Rav Papa's case], at the time he recited the berakha of "ha-motzi," they had not yet brought him these items that normally come as part of the meal; his mind was never on it [i.e. the food] at the time of the berakha. I might have thought that it requires an [additional] berakha before it. [So Rav Papa] comes to teach us that since it [i.e. the food] is tafel, it does not require a berakha.

To my mind (and keeping with both the methodology I subscribe to and the conceptual structure of this particular sugya), the reasoning of the Ba'al Ha-maor is clear:

If we had only the mishna of "ikar and tafel," I might have thought that only a tafel served before making the berakha on the ikar is exempt by the ha-motzi.  The reason for this notion would be that the very nature of the exemption in all instances of ikar and tafel is that the berakha on the ikar relates to, or doubles as a berakha for, the tafel. R. Papa comes to teach that this is conceptually wrong. The exemption from a berakha over tafel works through nullification.  With regard to the obligation of birkot hane'henin, the "tafel" is nullified by the "ikar."  To paraphase the Ba'al Ha-maor, "R. Papa comes to teach us that since the food is tafel, and hence nullified, it does not require a berakha, even when brought unexpectedly after one had recited a berakha on the ikar."

	According to the Ba'al Ha-maor's understanding of Rashi, it turns out that Rashi halakhically agrees with Tosefot regarding the concept of a "birkat ha-seuda."  "Ha-motzi" would exempt any foods usually eaten as part of the meal that were intended as such during its recitation.  R. Papa, however, addresses a situation of an unexpected course that can be exempt only if it is eaten as a spread, since bread exempts accompanying foods through nullification. [16]

	The Beit Yosef [17], however, based on what he saw quoted by the Rashba [18], understood the Ba'al Ha-maor differently.  Had it only been for the mishna, one might have thought that just as in all cases of ikar and tafel, when eating bread, too, one must have the tafel in mind at the time of the berakha of ha-motzi.  R. Papa teaches us that bread is an exception, as we presume a general intention at the time of ha-motzi to include any meal-food available in one's house at the time.  Thus, with regard to ha-motzi, we consider the person as having intended his berakha to apply to the foods served later.  In other words, we assume that the berakha on the ikar generally doubles as a virtual berakha on the subordinate tafel. The mishna introduces the principle that intention for the tafel is required at the time of the berakha's recitation over the ikar, in order for that berakha to apply to the tafel. According to the Beit Yosef, R. Papa accepts this underlying assumption as to the nature of the exemption of tafel from a berakha.  He merely adds that when the ikar happens to be bread, no specific intention is required, as we may presume general intention for any food subsequently brought to the table.

	There are conceptual differences between our first interpretation of the Ba'al Ha-maor/Rashi and that of the Beit Yosef:

1) 	The nature of the exemption of ha-motzi - "nullification" or a "virtual berakha" [or "multi-berakha"].
2) 	The nature of the exemption of ikar and tafel -  "nullification" or virtual berakha.

One major practical halakhic difference is the situation of the unexpected course when bread is not eaten.  According to the Beit Yosef, surprise foods are not covered by the berakha recited over the ikar.  One must always have the tafel in mind while reciting the berakha over the ikar.

	This applies to both meal foods as well as a regular tafel.  Let us look at a common application of this issue: one who adds raisins onto his cornflakes.  According to the Beit Yosef, if one intended to sprinkle before he recited the berakha, he is considered has having recited a berakha over the raisins, as well.  If AFTER reciting the berakha over the cornflakes he decided to add some raisins, he would require a separate berakha.

	According to our first understanding, however, the raisins ALWAYS become "nullified" by the cornflakes, even when they were not initially intended to be eaten.  The Magen Avraham [19] adopts the interpretation of the Beit Yosef and rules that indeed, a separate berakha on the tafel is required.

	This practical difference applies to a meal setting, as well.  According to our first understanding of the Ba'al Ha-maor/Rashi, ha-motzi's ability to exempt operates through nullification, as discussed.  Even if a friend arrives unexpectedly with some humus spread after one had recited ha-motzi, no additional berakha is required.  (This is precisely the point R. Papa wished to convey.  If the friend had brought porridge, it would require a berakha, as it does not become nullified by the bread).  According to the Beit Yosef, this is not the case.  The general intention to include all meal-foods that we presume a person has when reciting ha-motzi pertains only to food in the house at the time of the berakha.  If one had no idea that his friend would bring him a bowl of porridge, his ha-motzi does not exempt the unexpected gift from a berakha. Accordingly, the Shulchan Arukh [20] rules that an additional berakha is required in such a case.  The Mishna Berura points out that this would apply even to food eaten together with the bread, such as humus.

[Halakha le-ma'aseh, in the case of "second-thought raisins," one can satisfy all views by eating some of the raisins (or other tafel food) separately with a berakha.  The unexpected dish brought during the meal should be initially eaten without bread with a berakha before it. The consensus among the Rishonim and Poskim is that this does not constitute a "berakha she-eina tzerikha" (an unnecessary berakha) since it was recited in order to avoid a situation of a halakhic doubt.]

Proofs to our first understanding of the Ba'al Ha-maor/Rashi:

1) 	It successfully resolves both difficulties raised by Tosefot regarding Rashi's approach. Tosefot had questioned Rashi's explanation based on the rule established in the mishna (42a), "birekh al ha-pat, patar et ha-parpaeret," that bread has the ability to exempt all foods of the meal - even ma'aseh kedeira, or porridge.  According to our understanding, Rashi accepts that exemption, but claims that R. Papa adds the additional exemption of nullification, which features the unique characteristic of requiring no prior intention.  It is limited, however, to a SPREAD eaten solely with bread.

2) 	The actual text of the Ba'al Ha-maor states, "And his mind was never ("me'olam") on it [i.e. the additional food] at the time of the berakha ... [R. Papa] comes to teach us that since it is tafel, it does not require a berakha."  The Beit Yosef and Magen Avraham, perhaps based on the partial citation of the Ba'al Ha-maor by the the Rashba, quote this segment differently.  Their citation lends itself to the interpretation that the individual is considered as having had the unexpected course in mind when he recited ha-motzi.

3) 	Finally, the Sefer Ha-Pardes Le-Rashi [21] (which was actually written by a student of Rashi's) clearly spells out our approach, that TWO separate exemptions exist.  

The first (what we equated with Tosefot) applies in normal situations, when the person knew what would be served at the time of ha-motzi.  The blessing "on the seuda" includes all meal-foods, including porridge (despite the fact that it is never eaten together with bread).  The Sefer Ha-pardes points out that if one did not know ahead of time of the arrival of a given food - such as if a friend suddenly brought it - it would require a berakha.  He then equates this type of exemption with a case of two different foods that require the same berakha, where a berakha on one exempts the other only if they were both present before the individual at the time of the berakha's recitation.[22]

The second type of exemption operates not via "ha-motzi," but rather through the bread. "Foods normally used as spreads ... brought to the meal AFTER one had recited a berakha on the bread - even though they were not present at the time of the berakha, they do NOT require a berakha ... the bread is the ikar and it exempts the tafel." 

The second exemption does not require prior knowledge because it is based on the concept of nullification.[23]

	At this point, I would like to step back from the conceptual and practical aspects of our discussion in order to relate to methodology.

	A person trained in what is called "the Brisker method" receives particular enjoyment from this sugya.  The numerous, clear-cut symptoms point to one central, conceptual issue: the nature of the exemption of meal-foods from berakhot.

	We saw three basic approaches:

1) The Ritva understands the phrase, "ha-motzi lechem..." to mean, "He who gives sustaining foods..." 
2) Tosefot maintain that a given food's inclusion in the unified meal grants it an exemption from a berakha rishona. (This possibility lends itself to two possible understandings: a) its inclusion in the meal results in the food's NULLIFICATION insofar as the berakha obligation is concerned; or b) the inclusion allows the "ha-motzi" to relate to each food.)
3) Rashi holds that the exemption stems not from the berakha (Ritva) or from inclusion in the meal (Tosefot), but rather directly from its use as a spread with the bread.  As bread constitutes the primary food, its accompanying spread is rendered insignificant and hence nullified.

	The Brisker method seeks not to blur differences between positions, but rather to the contrary, to clarify the essence of each opinion.  It is clear, in our sugya, that Tosefot and the Ritva directly disagreed with Rashi and each other.  The approach of the Beit Yosef and Magen Avraham does more than accept both views of Rashi and Tosefot le-halakha.  They seem to prefer to blur the differences between the two positions until they appear as one cohesive opinion.  By choosing to explain the Ba'al Ha-maor/Rashi as they did, they emerge with one, single position.  Specifically, the "ha-motzi" relates individually to each food included in the meal, and the importance of the bread enables it do define the meal as such.  Thus, porridge ("daysa") is also exempt (Tosefot), and an unexpected food brought by a friend after "ha-motzi" requires its own berakha, even when eaten as a spread (Rashi, according to the Ba'al Ha-maor as understood by the Beit Yosef and Magen Avraham).

FOOTNOTES:

[14] Berakhot (29a in the Rif)
[15] Reminder: The question raised against Rashi was, if R. Papa's din applies only when using the food as a spread with the bread, then he seems to unnecessarily repeat the halakha of "ikar and tafel" presented in mishna 44a.
[16] This seems to be the direction of the Riaz, as well.
[17] O.C. 177, end of s.k. "veda" (and s.v. "u'mihu").
[18] The Rashba abbreviated the Ba'al Ha-maor's comments. The Beit Yosef's citation of the Ba'al Ha-maor differs significantly from the version of the Ba'al Ha-maor in our texts.
[19] O.C. 212, end of s.k. 2.  The Shulchan Arukh Ha-Rav rules this way, as well.
[20] O.C. 177:5
[21] Chap.70 - a "must read"!
[22] For further clarification from the Sefer Ha-Pardes - see chap. 31, which states that porridge served only AFTER ha-motzi (without the individual's prior knowledge) requires its own berakha, as opposed to the understanding of the Beit Yosef and Magen Avraham, that one has general intention for all meal-foods while reciting ha-motzi.
[23] Even according to our conclusion, as corroborated by the Sefer Ha-Pardes Le-Rashi, that le-halakha Rashi held there were TWO exemptions, they are still of two DIFFERENT natures.