YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
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PHILOSOPHY OF HALAKHA
By Rav Chaim Navon

LECTURE #16a: reasons for the Mitzvot (Part III)

3. what type of reason?

Having concluded in the previous lecture that the mitzvot do indeed have rationales and that it is fitting for us to discuss them, we face a new question: What type of reasons do the mitzvot have? Theoretically, the reasons could be social, ritual, mystical, psychological, etc. Of course, we cannot discuss here all the different approaches regarding the nature of the reasons for the mitzvot, but we shall try to address a number of pivotal questions. It is also reasonable to distinguish between different kinds of commandments, some having reasons of one type and others having reasons of another type.

A. Do the mitzvot bring benefit to god or to man?

We shall cite here in full Ramban's classic discussion regarding the mitzva of setting the mother bird free before taking the eggs or chicks:

"If a bird's nest chance to be before you" (Devarim 22:6). This also is an explanatory commandment of the prohibition, "You shall not kill it [the dam] and its young both in one day" (Vayikra 22:28), because the reason for both [commandments] is that we should not have a cruel heart and be merciless. Or it may be that Scripture does not permit us to destroy a species altogether, although it permits slaughter [for food] within that group. Now, he who kills the dam and the young in one day or takes them when they are free to fly [is regarded] as though he cut off that species.

Now, the Rabbi [Rambam] wrote in More Nevuchim (III, 48) that the reason for the commandment to release the mother bird when taking its nest and the prohibition against killing the dam with its young on one day is in order to admonish us against killing the young within the mother's sight, for animals feel great distress under such circumstances. There is no difference between the distress of man and the distress of animals for their young, since the love of the mother and her tenderness to her offspring are not the result of reasoning or [the faculty of intelligent] speech, but are produced by the faculty of mental images which exists among animals even as it is present in man. [This is the view of Rambam.] But if so, the main prohibition in killing the dam and its young applies only when killing [first] the young and [then] the dam, and the rest is all an extraordinary precaution. It is more correct [to explain them as prohibitions] to prevent us from acting cruelly.

And the Rabbi [Rambam] said further: "Do not contradict me by quoting the saying of the Sages, 'He who says in his prayer: Even to a bird's nest do Your mercies extend' [we silence, for he treats the ordinances of God like expressions of mercy, whereas they are merely decrees]"(Berakhot 33b), for that is one of two opinions, namely the opinion of the Sage who holds that the commandments have no other reason but the will of the Creator. We, however, follow the second opinion that there is a reason for all commandments." And the Rabbi raised a difficulty from a text in Bereshit Rabba [44:1], which reads: "And what difference does it make to the Holy One, blessed be He, whether an animal is slaughtered from the front of the neck or the back? Surely you must say that the commandments were given only for the purpose of refining men through them, as the verse says: 'Every word of God is refined' (Mishlei 30:5)."

Now, this theory, categorically stated by the Rabbi concerning commandments that have a reason, is indeed very clear. There is a reason, benefit, and improvement for man in each of them, aside from the reward by Him who commanded it, blessed be He. Our Sages have already stated (Sanhedrin 21b): "Why were the reasons for the commandments not revealed? etc." And they further interpreted (Pesachim 119a): "'And for stately clothing' (Yeshaya 23:18) – this refers to one who uncovers matters that were concealed by the Ancient of Days. And what are these matters? They are the reasons for [the commandments of] the Torah." The Rabbis have further expressed themselves on the subject of the red heifer (Bamidbar Rabba 19:3-4) concerning which Shlomo said: "I achieved [a knowledge of the reasons for] everything, but the section of the red heifer I examined, inquired into, and searched: 'All this have I tried by wisdom; I said, I will get wisdom, but it was far from me' (Kohelet 7:23)." And Rabbi Yose the son of Rabbi Chanina said: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moshe, "To you I reveal the reason of the red heifer, but for others it is a statute. For it is written: 'And it shall come to pass in that day, that there shall not be light, by heavy clouds vekipa'on [and thick]' (Zekharya 14:6). The word is spelled yekipa'on, intimating that matters concealed from you in this world are destined to be revealed in the world-to-come, like a blind man who suddenly sees, as it is written: 'And I will bring the blind by a way that they knew not' (Yeshaya 42:16); and it is written: 'These things have I done and I did not leave them undone' (ibid.), for I have done them already to Rabbi Akiva."

Thus, the Rabbis explained that our lack of knowledge of the reasons of [the commandments of] the Torah is but a blindness in our minds, and that the reason for the most difficult of the commandments [i.e., the red heifer] has already been revealed to the Sages of Israel. There are many such texts among the words of the Rabbis, and Torah and Scripture, which teach to that effect; and the Rabbi [Rambam] mentioned some of them.

But those Aggadic statements, presenting difficulty to the Rabbi, are in my opinion, intended to express another thought as follows: The benefit from the commandments is not derived by the Holy One himself, exalted be He. Rather, the advantage is to man himself, to withhold from him physical harm or some evil belief, or unseemly trait of character, or to recall the miracles and wonders of the Creator, blessed be He, in order to know the Lord. It is this [which the Rabbis intended when they said] that the commandments were given "for the purpose of refining men," namely, that they might become like refined silver. For he who refines silver does not act without purpose, but to remove therefrom any impurity. So, also, the commandments remove from our hearts all evil beliefs, and inform us of the truth, so that we may remember it at all times. Now this very same Aggada is mentioned in the Yelamdenu in the section of "These are the living things" (Tanchuma, Shemini 8): "And what difference does it make to the Holy One, blessed be He, whether one eats of an animal which is ritually slaughtered or if he just stabs it? Do you benefit Him or harm Him at all? Or what does it matter to Him if one eats clean animals or unclean? 'If you are wise, you are wise for yourself' (Mishlei 9:12). Surely the commandments have been given only to refine men, as it is said, 'The words of the Lord are pure words' (Tehilim 12:7)' and it is further said, 'Every word of the Lord is refined' (Mishlei 30:5). Why? So that [the word of God] should protect you." Thus it is clearly stated here that the Rabbis merely meant to say that the benefit is not for His sake. exalted be He, [nor] that He is in need of the light of candelabrum as one might think, or that He needs the food of the offerings and the odor of the incense as might appear from their simple meanings. Even regarding the memorial He made for His wonderful works, that He commanded us to perform in memory of the Exodus and Creation, the benefit is not for Him, but so that we should know the truth and be meritorious enough to be worthy of his protection, for our utterances and remembrances of His wonders are accounted by Him as things of naught and vanity.

And the Midrash brought proof from [the law regarding] slaughter by cutting the neck in front or in the back, meaning to state that all the benefits are to us and not to the Holy One, blessed be He. For it is impossible to say concerning slaughter that there is more benefit and glory to the Creator, blessed be He, by cutting the neck in front than by cutting it in the back or by stabbing the animal. Rather, all these advantages are to us – to lead us in paths of compassion even during [the process of] slaughtering. And the Rabbis brought another proof: "Or what does it matter to Him if one eats clean things," – that is, foods permissible to the eater – "or eats unclean things," that is, forbidden food, about which the Torah said: "They are unclean to you," implying that [these laws were given to us] so that we might develop a fine soul and be wise men perceptive to the truth. By quoting the verse, "If you are wise, you are wise for yourself," the Rabbis mentioned the principle that the commandments pertaining to rites such as slaughter by [cutting of] the neck are intended to teach us traits of good character. The divinely ordained commandments which define the species [of animals and birds which are permissible to us] are to refine our souls, just as the Torah said: "And you shall not make your souls detestable by beast, or by fowl, or by any thing wherewith the ground teems, which I have set apart for you to hold unclean" (Vayikra 20:25). If so, all the commandments are solely for our advantage. This is as Elihu said: "If you have sinned, what do you do against Him? And if your transgression be multiplied, what do you unto Him (Iyyov 35:6). And again he said: "If you be righteous, what do you give Him? Or what does He receive of your hands?" (ibid., verse 7). This is a consensus in all the words of the Rabbis. Thus they asked in Yerushalmi Nedarim (9:1) whether they may open the way to [to release a vow or a oath] by reason of the honor due to God in matters between man and God. On this question the Rabbis answered there: "What is an example of [a vow being released because of] the honor due to God? [If you say that it is a case where he swore 'I shall not make a sukka, I shall not take a lulav, I shall not put on tefilin' – but do you call this 'by reason of the honor due to God?' It is for oneself that [the observance of the commandments] helps, just as it is says: 'If you be righteous, what do you give Him? Or what does He receive of your hands? If you have sinned, what do you do against Him? And if your transgression be multiplied, what do you do unto Him?'" Thus the Rabbis have explained that even the lulav, the sukka and the tefilin concerning which He commanded that they "shall be for a sign upon your hand, and for frontlets between your eyes; for with a mighty hand the Lord brought us forth out of Egypt" (Shemot 13:16) – are not ordained to honor God, blessed be He, but to have compassion on our souls. And the Sages have already arranged for us in the [closing] prayer on the Day of Atonement, stating: "You have singled out man from the beginning and considered him worthy of standing before You. Who can say to You: 'What are You doing?' And even if he is righteous, what can he give You?" Similarly, it states in the Torah, "which I command you this day for your good" (Devarim 10:13), as I have explained. So also, "And the Lord commanded us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always," (Devarim 6:24). And the intent in all these expressions is "for our good," and not for His, blessed and exalted be He. Rather, everything we have been commanded is so that His creatures be refined and purified, free from the dross of evil thoughts and blameworthy traits of character.

So too regarding what the Rabbis have stated: "Because he treats the ordinances of God like expressions of mercy, whereas they are merely decrees" (Berakhot 33b). This means that it is not a matter of God's mercy extending to the bird's nest or the dam and its young, for His mercies do not extend so far into animal life as to prevent us from accomplishing our needs with them, for if so, He would have forbidden slaughter altogether. But the reason for the prohibition is to teach us the trait of compassion and that we should not be cruel, for cruelty proliferates in a man's soul as it is known that butchers, those who slaughter large oxen and asses are men of blood; they that slaughter men, are extremely cruel.  It is on account of this [cruelty] that the Rabbis have said: "The most seemly among butchers is a partner of Amalek" (Kiddushin 82a).

Thus these commandments with respect to cattle and fowl are not a result of compassion upon them, but they are decrees upon us to guide us and to teach us traits of good character. So too, the Rabbis refer to all commandments of the Torah – positive and negative – as "decrees," as they said in the parable of the "king who entered a country, and his attendants said to him: 'Promulgate decrees upon them.' He, however, refused, saying: 'When they will have accepted my sovereignty, I will promulgate decrees upon them'" (Mekhilta, Bachodesh 6). Similarly did the Holy One, blessed be He, [say to Israel]: "You have accepted My sovereignty: 'I am the Lord your God' (Shemot 20:2), accept My decrees: 'You shall have no other gods, etc.' (ibid, verse 3)." (Ramban, Commentary to Devarim 22:6)

Rambam had interpreted a number of midrashic statements as claiming that the mitzvot are arbitrary decrees, having no reasons whatsoever. Ramban rejects this interpretation, arguing that these midrashim merely mean to say that the purpose of the mitzvot is not to benefit God, but rather to improve us, men of flesh and blood.[1] God does not need the mitzvot. Ramban argues this point strongly, adducing many proofs. The idea that God needs the mitzvot is, however, very prominent in Kabbala, especially in the school of the Ari. (Rav Chayyim of Volozhin greatly developed this approach in his book "Nefesh ha-Chayyim"; he, however, placed special emphasis on the educational significance, namely, the responsibility that such an idea places on man.) Anybody who before performing a mitzva recites the "Leshem Yichud" formula ("for the sake of the unity of the Holy One, blessed be He, and His Shekhina") effectively believes that the mitzva is necessary for God. Even Ramban himself alludes that God's resting His Shekhina upon Israel was necessary not only for man, but also for God Himself (Shemot 29:46). The proponents of a more rationalistic religious outlook view this position as a highly problematic position: it implies that God, as it were, is deficient and needs our help. Those who stress the element of fear in the service of God also have reservations regarding this position, without any connection to rationalism.

B. do the mitzvot have PSYCHOLOGICAL OR REAL EFFECT?

In the course of his discussion, Ramban raises another significant question. According to Rambam, the mitzva of setting the mother bird free has a concrete external goal – preventing the mother bird's suffering. Ramban suggests another possible concrete result – preventing the extermination of the species. He concludes, however, that the Torah is not concerned here with the birds; the objective of the mitzva is to enhance our sensitivity – to reduce our cruelty and heighten our compassion. We are dealing here with a fundamental question: are the mitzvot intended to improve the external world around us or the internal psychological world of each of us? Are the mitzvot directed outward or inward? Is the mitzva of charity intended to improve the condition of the poor, or to correct the morals and sensitivity of the rich? It should be noted that the controversy between Rambam and Ramban regarding this point is restricted to the mitzva of setting the mother bird free; there is no general dispute between them on the issue.

Footnotes

[1] The central question is not whether the mitzvot are beneficial to us, but whether they are intended to have an effect upon us.

(Translated by Rav David Strauss)