YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
*********************************************************

GEMARA SOTA 5761
By Rav Mosheh Lichtenstein

Shiur 22: Sota 21b 

The issue of talmud Torah for women has two separate focal points: 
1) the halakhic status of women regarding the mitzva of talmud Torah, and 
2) the educational question regarding the advisability of women engaging in Torah study, regardless of their halakhic obligation.  

	These two perspectives are addressed in two different sugyot.  The former is dealt with in the gemara in Kiddushin (29b), within the the sugya discussing women's obligations and exemptions from mitzvot, while the latter is the topic of our sugya.  Obviously, had the gemara in Kiddushin decided that woman are obligated in the mitzva of talmud Torah, there would be no need to discuss the educational legitimacy of teaching Torah to women (though there might still have been room to discuss the scope and extent of it), since the mitzva would be incumbent upon women.  However, since the clear and unequivocal decision of the sugya is that women are exempt from the mitzva, the question of educational advisability arises.  This is the focus of the machloket in our sugya between Ben Azzai and R. Eliezer.

Much has been written in recent years on this topic; polemical and non-polemical works have appeared, and writers with and without an agenda have addressed the topic and placed our sugya at center stage.

At first glance, our sugya seems to present a machloket between Ben Azzai and R. Eliezer regarding the advisability of exposing girls to talmud Torah, even though Ben Azzai's rationale is not necessarily based on Torah's positive effect on them.  Since talmud Torah is not a mitzva incumbent upon women, and R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua rule that Torah should not be taught to a woman, an obvious conclusion would be that they deny any value to female learning.  The Rambam, though, rejects such a position, drawing a clear distinction between the validity of a woman's talmud Torah and the advisability of teaching women.  In this regard, his psak reflects the dual aspect of the talmud Torah question that was mentioned above.  Thus, on the one hand, he rules (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 1:13) that a woman who studied Torah, although exempt from the obligation, has fulfilled a mitzva and is deserving of reward.  Nevertheless, he adds that Chazal mandated that a person not teach his daughters Torah (despite its status as a mitzva), since most women are not serious enough to focus upon their learning.  

The logic behind this seemingly self-contradictory position is that the first half of the psak relates to the validity of a woman's learning and its status as a mitzva, while the second half (which denies such an opportunity to women) is concerned with educational policy.  Therefore, if a woman learned seriously and maturely, she has fulfilled a mitzva and engaged in Torah just like a man; however, since Chazal assumed that more often than not this will not be the case, they established a policy that advised against initiating such learning.

The upshot is that our sugya presents not a halakhic dictum but an educational directive regarding talmud Torah for woman.  This being the case, it is not an absolute prohibition upon womankind, but rather an assessment that must be viewed in light of the relevant educational reality.  An interesting application of this point appears in the sixteenth-century work Ma'ayan Ganim (Venice 1553), later cited by the Torah Temima (Devarim 11:19), who is in turn quoted by R. Ahron Soloveichik in his commentary on the Rambam (Parach Mateh Ahron).  In a responsum to a woman who desired to learn, the Ma'ayan Ganim asserted that the Mishna's statement that teaching a woman Torah is akin to teaching her tiflut (frivolity) applies only to teaching young children, but not to adult women who are mature and capable of a proper appreciation of Torah: 

"These will certainly ascend the mountain of God and reside in His dwelling place since they are outstanding women, and therefore the sages and leaders of the generation should encourage, praise and support them…"  

Here the Ma'ayan Ganim draws attention to a shift in the Rambam's terminology: in the opening passage he praises a WOMAN's learning, while objecting in the latter half to teaching one's DAUGHTER Torah.  But aside from the textual distinction between "woman" and "daughter" in the two statements, there is a basic educational difference as well.  Since the sugya is dealing with educational policy rather than pure halakha, such a claim is eminently reasonable.  

The same logic guided the Chofetz Chaim in his Likutei Halakhot on our sugya, where he rules that the sugya's injunction against talmud Torah for women must be modified in current generations, since women now receive general education.  The rationale behind such a claim is a dual one, although the two reasons come from totally differing perspectives.  On the one hand, contemporary women's experience of education and the exposure to serious learning instilled in them learning habits that had been lacking in the time of Chazal, when women engaged solely in domestic chores and were, more often than not, illiterate.  Chazal never dreamt that there is something inherent in Torah itself that more readily lends itself to be perceived by the unlearned as frivolity; rather, it is the lack of acquaintance with a rigorous logical discipline and systematic legal thinking that causes Torah to be perceived as frivolous and nitpicky.  Therefore, the sea change in women's education that took place in the last century has removed the obstacle that formerly existed, so that women can now study Torah and achieve the mitzva of talmud Torah without the accompanying concerns voiced by R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua.  

On the other hand, not only is talmud Torah for women now possible and desirable due to the academic training available to them, but it is also imperative because of this new state of affairs.  Serious exposure to general knowledge without a corresponding involvement with texts of Torah creates an intolerable situation in which women are familiar with science and general culture as a sophisticated system of thought, while their knowledge of Torah and Judaism remains at a basic and rudimentary level.  This imbalance is wrong in itself, and it distorts one's perception of the centrality of Torah to our life, altering the spiritual balance between Torah and human knowledge.  Moreover, in times of religious upheaval and uncertainty it is outright dangerous to the very essence of our commitment to Torah, since if a person is prevented from studying Torah but engages in other intellectual activity in depth, Torah may be perceived as inferior to other disciplines, chas ve-shalom.  

The Chofetz Chaim's explanation for his claim is somewhat different from what we have outlined.  His rationale is that in a society in which the walls of tradition are crumbling, Torah must serve as a written substitute for the vanishing oral transmission of emuna (faith).  R. Ahron Soloveichik (ibid.) quotes the Chofetz Chaim and elaborates on the point that nowadays talmud Torah is vital to women from a religious standpoint, independent from its intellectual value.  The focus in both of these discussions is upon Torah facilitating belief in God, and not upon the need to engage in Torah at the same level of sophistication that one is involved with general knowledge.

This brings us to a most important point.  Up to now, we have addressed the issue of talmud Torah as pursuit of knowledge, and have discussed the implications of seeking general knowledge without a corresponding effort to engage in serious in-depth Torah learning.  However, talmud Torah is not only a religiously mandated intellectual endeavor, but is also an act of worship of and dialogue with the KBH.  In other words (without entering into a lengthy treatment of a topic that requires a shiur of its own), talmud Torah belongs to Sefer Ahava as well as Sefer Madda.  Therefore, there is an obligation to engage in talmud Torah even if there is no gain in knowledge, since the act of learning itself is of religious significance.  

Any evaluation of talmud Torah for women must take this into account.  Although women are halakhically exempt from the obligation of talmud Torah, it is educationally imperative to provide them with one of the most basic religious experiences in Yahadut.  Their exemption from the intellectual pursuit of Torah knowledge cannot be used to prevent exposure to an elemental religious act, unless we are convinced that it will not be regarded as such due to an inability to properly appreciate it.  Thus, our sugya's recommendation not to engage in talmud Torah must be understood as assuming that the experience is not available to women.  However, the moment such an option becomes possible due to the above-mentioned social changes, the question is not only one of providing women with advanced knowledge, but also of offering them the ability to achieve avodat HaShem through the learning experience.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the Rambam draws a distinction between Torah she-be'al peh, which is considered frivolity if taught to a woman, and Torah she-bikhtav, which isn't considered frivolity, but which he also recommends not teaching to women.  The first point should be understood in light of  our previous assumption that it is the unfamiliarity with in analytical depth learning that brings about the attitude that Torah is frivolous.  The second point, though, is more perplexing.  If the written Torah is more readily understandable, why recommend that women not study it?  And if it is not more readily understandable, what is the distinction between it and the oral Law?  From the Rambam's language, it appears that the oral Law requires greater subtlety; however, he does not explain the basis for his recommendation to refrain from teaching women the written Law as well.

It should also be mentioned that many authorities hold that women are obligated to learn the halakhot that relate to them (see Beit HaLevi 1:6).  This is not a function of talmud Torah, but of the necessary preparations to perform those mitzvot.  Nevertheless, this ruling assumes that such learning will be productive and will not become frivolous.  This, too, may be understood according to the Rambam's assumption that it is the subtle logic of creative analysis and not factual knowledge that concerns R. Eliezer and R. Yehoshua.