Holiness

 

     The word "holiness" ("kedusha") denotes a virtue that is unique to the religious world. Just as the term "good" is used to describe the pinnacle of the moral realm, so the designation "holy" is used to depict the zenith of the religious sphere. The Hebrew term "kedusha" is usually translated as "holiness" in English, as "heilige" in German, and the like. But are the meanings of these terms really identical? Many modern thinkers have dealt with the precise meaning of the idea of the holy. It certainly stands to reason that the ideal religious value will vary from religion to religion and from culture to culture. In this lecture, we shall attempt to clarify the meaning of the term "kedusha" as it is understood in Judaism, and primarily in Halakha.

 

Judaism uses the designation "holy" both in reference to man and also in reference to God. Moreover, the Torah connects these two usages in a well-known verse:

 

You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy. (Vayikra 19:2)

 

What is the import of this demand to be holy? And what is the meaning of the appellation "holy" with respect to God? The Sages and the biblical commentators point us in a certain direction of thought regarding these questions:

 

"'You shall be holy' – this means, separate yourselves from forbidden sexual relations and from sinful thoughts, because wherever you find a command to fence yourself in against such relations you also find mention of 'holiness.'" This is the explanation of Rashi. In Torat Kohanim, however, I see that there is no specification, [but only]: "Separate yourselves."  And it is similarly taught there: "'Sanctify yourselves, and be holy, for I am the Lord your God' (Vayikra 20:7) – just as I am holy, so too you shall be holy; and just as I separate Myself, so too you shall separate yourselves." (Ramban, ad loc.)

 

Two important insights into the concept of holiness are found here. First, the recognition that in Scripture holiness is always associated with a "fence against forbidden sexual relations," as stated by Rashi. This idea is particularly prominent in the sections in parashat Kedoshim dealing with forbidden sexual relations. In this context, holiness is associated not with the active performance of a religious deed, but with the passive abstaining from negative actions. Moreover, it is associated not with the lofty spiritual aspects of life, but with its lowliest material components. Ramban notes here that the obligation to separate oneself is not restricted to forbidden sexual relations and sinful thoughts, but rather it is a more inclusive value. In principle, however, he agrees with Rashi's understanding of holiness.

 

     This concept of holiness also finds expression in the arrangement of Rambam's code of law. One of the fourteen divisions of his Mishne Torah is the "Book of Holiness." What is included in this book? Does it treat the laws governing the sacrificial order, or the laws of purity, or perhaps the laws of prayer?

 

The Book of Holiness is the fifth book. Its groups of laws are three, in the following order: The laws concerning forbidden sexual relations, the laws concerning forbidden foods, and the laws concerning ritual slaughter. (Rambam, opening lines of the "Book of Holiness")

 

The "Book of Holiness" includes those areas of law appearing in the Torah under the rubric of "holiness": forbidden sexual relations and forbidden foods.

 

     The second insight into the concept of holiness is the principle that emerges from the rabbinic dictum cited by Ramban: In the same way that God is holy and separates Himself, so too we must be holy and separate ourselves. This demand may be understood on two levels. We may be dealing here with yet another application of the general principle of imitato Dei, "'And you shall walk in His ways' – just as He is gracious and merciful, so too you must be gracious and merciful, etc." Here too – just as He separates Himself, so too you must separate yourself. According to this understanding, however, the meaning of God's separation is unclear. We, therefore, propose a more sophisticated explanation. God's "separation" expresses itself in the fact that He is not part of nature. In contrast to various pantheistic outlooks, Judaism never identified God with nature. According to the Jewish credo, God is distinct from nature. This belief already expresses itself in the opening verse of the Torah, which clearly distinguishes between God and nature (and also speaks not of "birth," but of "creation").

 

     God's commandments demand of us a partial separation from nature. This is for two reasons: 1) Since God is not found in nature, nature is not necessarily good. That which is natural is not necessarily good, and that which is good is not necessarily natural. The mitzvot distill natural life, separating out its positive elements. 2) Our very separation from nature has value in that it expresses acceptance of the yoke of Heaven, irrespective of whether nature is good or bad. Avraham's readiness to slaughter his son Yitzchak was the noblest achievement of religious surrender, regardless of whether Yitzchak's slaughter would have been good or evil.

 

     Returning to the matter at hand, the concept of "holiness" can be understood in two possible directions: 1) Closeness to God. 2) Performing God's will in this world. Halakha places special emphasis on the second approach. It, therefore, applies the concept of holiness to contexts involving a withdrawal from the negative aspects of nature.

 

     Thus far we have spoken of "holiness" as a halakhic category encompassing certain areas of law that sanctify man. But "holiness" is also a halakhic concept that describes a certain status of objects, times, and places. The land of Israel is holy, teruma is holy, the sacrifices are holy, a Torah scroll is holy, etc. This status has many halakhic ramifications. At first glance, it would appear that in this context expression is given to the more conventional understanding of holiness – God's presence in nature. There is certainly no room to speak of separation from sin with regard to a Torah scroll!

 

     Upon closer examination, however, it seems that here too we can follow the direction of thought proposed above. Holiness may indeed represent human life conducted and directed by God's commands, but it need not necessarily be limited to "turning away from evil." We can expand the concept of holiness so that it represents not only separation from sin (though this seems to be the original meaning of the term), but also all other aspects of religious life that man leads in accordance with Halakha. According to this understanding, holiness does not represent Divine presence, but rather human action.

 

     This point needs to be emphasized, and for the moment it shall be the focus of our discussion: If we understand holiness as Divine presence, then it is God who creates it, man merely revealing it. If we entertain doubts about holiness in nature and understand holiness as human action, then man is its creator, and not only its revealer. In Halakha, quite astonishingly, there is hardly a single instance of holiness that is not created by man:

 

Holiness is created by man, by flesh and blood. Through the power of our mouths, through verbal sanctification alone, we can create holy offerings for the Temple treasury and holy offerings for the altar. The land of Israel became holy through conquest, Jerusalem, and the Temple courts – through bringing two loaves of thanksgiving (Jerusalem) or the remainder of the meal offering (Temple court) and song, etc. It is man who sanctifies space and makes a sanctuary for his Creator. (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man, p. 47)[1]

 

We do not always fully consider the ramifications of the fact that holiness does not exist until man creates it! Even the land of Israel – according to the plain sense of Halakha – lacked holiness prior to its conquest by the Jewish people![2] This formal halakhic dimension reflects a profound idea: holiness is a human creation on the essential level as well. Holiness is not Divine presence that has become implanted in a certain object, but rather human action performed for the sake of Heaven. This was emphasized by the author of Meshekh Chokhma, Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk:

 

…Do not think that the Temple and the Mishkan are holy of their own accord, God forbid! God, may He be blessed, dwells among His children, but if they like Adam transgress His covenant, all holiness is removed from them, and they become like mundane utensils, robbers entering and profaning them. Titus entered the Holy of Holies with a prostitute, and was not harmed, for its holiness had been removed. Moreover, the tablets of law, "the writing of God," they too are holy only for your sake. But when the bride prostituted herself in her bridal chamber, they were esteemed as earthen pitchers. They have no holiness of their own accord, but only for your sake when you keep them … All forms of holiness stem from the Creator's command to build a Mishkan so as to offer sacrifices in it to the Blessed One alone. (Meshekh Chokhma, Shemot 32:19)

 

     Rabbi Soloveitchik understood the deep significance of this halakhic fact:

 

Holiness is not a supernatural designation that descends from heaven to earth, becoming attached to a certain object. Things do not become sanctified of their own accord. Would things receive automatic sanctification, Judaism would turn into a magical cult, God forbid. Holiness is a human creation. It is through human innovation that holiness becomes applied to the external world. Holiness gives expression to a spiritual stance of man in set places and times; it focuses exclusively upon his psychic [=spiritual] reaction to special cognitions. (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Divrei Hashkafa, p. 117)

 

On the formal level, holiness is created through a halakhic act of man. On the essential level, holiness represents a special cognition of man who sanctifies a particular time or object for the service of God. Here Rabbi Soloveitchik translates the formal level into the essential level. Holiness is not merely a formal halakhic description; rather, it represents man's actual dedication to the service of God. The holiness of the Temple Mount, for example, represents the fact that man sanctified the place for the service of God, and that from a spiritual perspective he experiences there special devotion to God and His commandments.

 

     Is this the sole stratum of holiness? It may be argued that Halakha, by its very nature, tends to emphasize the aspect of holiness connected to human endeavor, and conceals the aspect associated with Divine presence. This second aspect of holiness is connected less to Halakha, and more to prayer and mystical experience. Moreover, even Halakha does not entirely disregard holiness that expresses Divine presence. It is impossible to ignore a second layer in Halakha, represented by times, objects, and places that are sanctified by the very presence of God or nearness to Him, without any connection to human action. Consider, for example, Shabbat, whose holiness is "fixed and established," so that it has no need for human sanctification.

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik, however, in his "Shi'urim Lezekher Abba Mari," proves that the kiddush that we recite on Friday night adds holiness to the preexisting holiness of Shabbat. Thus, even Shabbat has a layer of human sanctification. One of Rabbi Soloveitchik's main proofs is the talmudic passage in Pesachim which discusses why it is preferable to recite kiddush as early as possible on Friday night, but there is no similar preference regarding the havdala that is recited on Saturday night:

 

There is a difference between ushering the day in and ushering it out. Ushering it in, the earlier we do so the better, as it shows that we cherish it. Ushering it out, we delay it, so that it should not appear as a burden upon us. (Pesachim 105b)

 

The Gemara asserts that on Friday night it preferable to recite kiddush early, so as to usher in the holy day of Shabbat as early a possible. Rabbi Soloveitchik asks: If kiddush is merely a recitation of words of praise, why then is it preferable to recite it early? This passage proves that on a certain level, kiddush bestows holiness upon the day, its sanctity being incomplete until kiddush is recited.

 

     We find another example in the law governing a firstborn animal, which is holy from birth. Here too the Gemara asserts that there is a mitzva to sanctify the firstborn:

 

They said in the name of Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi]: From where do we know that when a firstling is born in his house, there is a mitzva to sanctify it? For the verse states: "The firstling males you shall sanctify" (Devarim 15:19). (Nedarim 12b-13a)

 

According to one opinion in the Gemara, which has been accepted as Halakha, there is a mitzva to sanctify a firstling animal, even though it is already sanctified from birth. The Gemara implies that we are dealing here not with a meaningless recitation of words, but with a real addition of sanctity. Even though the firstborn animal's sanctity is already fixed and established from birth, there is an additional layer of holiness created by man. But we cannot overlook the fact that the primary layer of the holiness of a firstborn is the preexisting Divine sanctity, which is not dependent upon human action. Rabbi Soloveitchik, in his essay "U-bikashtem Misham" as well as in other places, does not ignore this aspect of sanctity.

 

     We find another example of this layer of holiness in a famous passage of Rambam:

 

Why do I say regarding the Temple and Jerusalem that the first sanctity is a sanctity for the future, while the sanctity of the rest of the land of Israel regarding the sabbatical year, the tithes and the like, is not a sanctity for the future? Because the sanctity of the Temple and Jerusalem is on account of the Divine presence, and the Divine presence is never cancelled. Surely the verse says: "And I shall bring your sanctuaries to desolation" (Vayikra 26:31) – and the Sages said: Even when they are desolate, they remain in their sanctity. But the obligation of the land with respect to the sabbatical year and the tithes is only on account of the communal conquest. Once the land was taken from their hands, the conquest was cancelled, and it became exempt by Torah law from tithes and the sabbatical year, for it is no longer part of the land of Israel. (Rambam, Hilkhot Bet ha-Bechira 6:16)

 

Rambam distinguishes here between different types of sanctity. The holiness of the land of Israel is created by man, whereas the holiness of the Temple and Jerusalem is created by God. It too is only created in the wake of human action, but following the initial sanctification, the place swells with Divine presence, which is no longer dependent upon further human action.

 

     A distinction may be made on two different plains: we can distinguish between different areas, as did Rambam, each area having a different type of sanctity. Or we can distinguish between different aspects of holiness in each area, so that every instance of holiness is comprised of these two layers of sanctity. Rabbi Yuval Sherlo formulated this argument as follows:

 

The sanctity whose source is in the heavens and the sanctity of human conduct are one and the same. It is merely problematic reality and faulty conduct that severs between them. (Rabbi Yuval Sherlo, Vehayu Le'achadim Beyadekha, p. 79)

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[1] See also Meshekh Chokhma, Shemot 19:13.

 

[2] Rav Kook disagrees and argues that the land of Israel was endowed with holiness even before its conquest.

 

(Translated by Rav David Strauss)