Dan Le-khaf Zekhut - Judging Others Favorably
Bein Adam
Le-chavero:
Ethics of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin Zimmerman
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Hakarat Hatov LHakadosh Baruch Hu
For all the Chessed He Has Bestowed Upon Us
Ma Ashiv LHashem Kol Tagmilohi Alai
Mishpachat Katlowitz
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Shiur #04: Dan Le-khaf Zekhut Judging Others Favorably
The Obligation to Judge
Others Favorably
In our second lesson, we examined the verse in Parashat Kedoshim (Vayikra
19:15) that seems to address the judges, commanding them to be diligent in
executing their duties.
Do not perform iniquity in justice.
Do not give special consideration to the poor, and do not show preferential
honor to the great. Judge your comrade
righteously.
Nevertheless, as we saw, the
verse in its entirety (especially its final clause, Be-tzedek tishpot
amitekha) is significant for all sectors of society. Its impact is not restricted to the
judicial system.
The Talmud (Shevuot 30a) records four laws derived from the conclusion of
this verse, the second of which is the obligation to judge others positively.
Judge your comrade righteously you must judge your fellow favorably.
The other
laws learned from the verse relate to proper and honest court
proceedings, but this law seems to be quite clearly universal. One should not be overly hasty to
judge another negatively; instead, one should give another the benefit of the
doubt. Colloquially, we may say that
the Talmud mandates judging others not only with strict tzedek,
righteousness, but rather with tzedaka, charity.
The Nature of the
Obligation
While the above-stated passage would seem to indicate
that there is a biblical obligation to judge others favorably, the Mishna in
Avot (1:6) seems to record an almost identical statement as an eitza tova,
good advice attributed to Yehoshua ben Perachya.
Yehoshua ben Perachya says, You must make for yourself
a teacher, acquire for yourself a friend and judge everyone favorably.
Yehoshua ben Perachya seems to be advising one to develop relationships with
others a teacher, a friend and to view human actions in a favorable way. Evidently judging people favorably is
essential for developing positive relationships with people, but is only as
obligatory as acquiring a teacher and a friend.
It is certainly beneficial, but in no way compulsory.
Setting aside the question of whether in fact there is
an obligation to judge others favorably or just a suggested practice, the
terminology employed in Avot is slightly different than that in
Shevuot, and this may prove significant. The former speaks of judging
everyone, et kol ha-adam (literally: all of the man) favorably, while
the latter speaks of judging chaverkha, your fellow, seemingly
limiting the obligation of judging favorably to ones friends or acquaintances.
It is not only this Mishnaic dictum which seems to challenge the understanding
that there is in fact a biblical obligation to judge others favorably. Questions abound, leaving ample room
to understand that the status of judging others favorably may not only be
postbiblical, but possibly not obligatory at all.
Firstly, the very fact that the verse quoted in the Talmud seems to be dealing
with judges and also acts as the source of a number of
laws specifically geared towards
judges may suggest that the essential application of the verse is limited to the
legal system. Judging others
favorably outside of the courtroom would therefore be either meritorious
behavior or a rabbinic obligation; it would not really be learnt from the verse.
In fact, the Talmud (Shabbat 127b) records a teaching of the Sages that
one who judges others favorably will have others judge him or her favorably as
well, seemingly adding weight to the understanding that this is not compulsory
but rather suggested behavior. The
Talmud there continues by citing a fascinating story about the extent to which
one individual judged his employer le-khaf zekhut and was given the
blessing that he too would be judged favorably:
As for you, the same way you judged me favorably, may the Omnipresent judge you
favorably.
The simple understanding of
the passage indicates that it is a meritorious practice for which one will be
compensated, but not an obligation.
Furthermore, a second difficulty with the conviction that there is a
full-fledged obligation to judge others favorably is that others sources seem to
speak of a specific requirement to give the righteous the benefit of the doubt. The Talmud (Berakhot 19a)
teaches:
In the academy of Rabbi Yishmael, they taught: If you see a Torah scholar
commit a transgression by night, harbor no ill thoughts of him by day
He has certainly repented.
The Talmud then qualifies this
teaching:
However, this applies only to personal matters; regarding monetary
transgressions, he must first return the object to the original owner.
Thirdly, the whole concept of
judging others favorably at all costs and under any circumstances is seemingly
not in line with other statements of our Sages.
As they note, it is sometimes dangerous to assume that people are
innocent and therefore deserve to be judged favorably. In the minor tractate Derekh
Eretz, (Pirkei Ben Azzai 3:3) we find a startling statement regarding
how one should view others (referenced by Rashi, Taanit 23b):
People should always be in your eyes like thieves, but
honor them like Rabban Gamliel.
The passage continues to tell the story of Rabbi Yehoshua, who allows a wayfarer
into his home, gives him to eat and drink and then shows him his sleeping
quarters in the attic. However,
Rabbi Yehoshua secretly removes the ladder to the attic afterwards. During the night, the guest takes all
the valuables from the attic and attempts a quick escape. Failing to notice that the ladder has
been removed, he falls and is injured.
In the morning, Rabbi Yehoshua found him on the ground and berates him:
Fool, you aroused our suspicions last night!
The passage concludes by reiterating this teaching of Rabbi Yehoshua:
though he might have honored the guest as if he were a prince, nevertheless
Rabbi Yehoshua was as careful with him as if the guest were a robber, which in
fact he was.
This source would seem to indicate that excessive
application of Be-tzedek tishpot amitekha is dangerous and ill-advised. This idea is often referred to as Kabbedehu
ve-choshdehu, Honor him but suspect him.
If there is in fact an obligation to judge others favorably, how may one
suspect his fellow Jew? Why is doing
so not adverse to the obligation to judge others favorably?
The Rambams View
At first glance, the language of the Rambam might be used as a support for the
view that the need to judge others favorably is in fact not an obligation at
all, but an act of piety. The Rambam (Hilkhot Deot 5:7) lists judging
others favorably as one of the defining characteristics of a Torah scholar,
though it is not required.
A Torah scholar
judges every person favorably.
On the face of it, the Rambam
seems to give voice to our earlier suggestions.
The fact that he lists judging others favorably as an aspect of the
uniquely positive character of a scholar would seem to indicate that doing so is
meritorious behavior but not obligatory.
However, a more in-depth look at the Rambams language, as pointed out by the
Chafetz Chayim, indicates that the Rambam understood otherwise. He writes (Sefer Chafetz Chayim,
Introduction, Positive Commandment 3, Beer Mayim Chayim):
The reader should not try to refute my argument, namely that all major
commentators agree that the obligation to judge others favorably is biblical in
nature, by using the words of the Rambam, which seem to indicate that it is a
meritorious practice of scholars, but not obligatory
Such an understanding of
the Rambams view is incorrect, for the Rambam is explicitly dealing with
individuals of unknown character, as he himself indicates. It is specifically these individuals
concerning whom there is no obligation of judging favorably; it is merely a
meritorious act.
The Chafetz Chayim cites as a
proof for his view the statement of the Rambam himself in Sefer Ha-mitzvot
(Positive Commandment 177). There
the Rambam discusses Be-tzedek tishpot amitekha, and he indicates that
the mitzva has three parts, two for judges and one for society at large.
Included in the verse is the obligation to judge ones fellow favorably.
Thus, the Rambam clearly
states that it is an obligatory part of the mitzva, not merely a recommendation.
However, if so, how is one to understand
the Rambams ruling in Hilkhot Deot?
The explanation of the Rambams view ties up the loose ends, answering a number
of questions we have seen earlier. A
careful reading of the Rambams language in the two sources cited above
indicates that in Hilkhot Deot he quotes the language of the Mishna in
Avot, kol ha-adam, while in Sefer Ha-mitzvot he makes reference
to the language of the Talmud in Shevuot, chaverkha.
The Chafetz Chayim points out that the Rambam clearly understands that there is
no contradiction between Avot and Shevuot, as they are each
speaking about different individuals.
When dealing with ones chaver, known to be an upright Jew, one is
obligated to judge him favorably.
For this reason, the Talmud in Shevuot derives this obligation from
Be-tzedek tishpot amitekha, and the Rambam cites it in Sefer Ha-mitzvot
as a biblical obligation.
The Mishna, however, makes reference to kol ha-adam, which is more
general and refers to any individual one might come into contact with and have
reason to suspect of wrongdoing.
Being that one doesnt know this individuals character, one is not required to
judge him or her favorably. However,
the Mishna quotes Yehoshua ben Perachyas dictum that it is meritorious to give
them the benefit of the doubt as well.
Thus, the Rambam records in Hilkhot Deot the meritorious practice
of scholars to judge kol ha-adam, everyone, beneficially.
By the same logic, recognizing that different sources are speaking of different
individuals, the passage in Berakhot, which discusses a scholar who does
something suspicious, is referring to a third type of individual altogether. Someone who is known to be righteous
takes the Law of God seriously, and one should be willing to go out on a limb to
assume that such an individual would not sin. Even
if it is clear that the righteous individual has indeed transgressed, one should
view it as a temporary lapse, an out-of-character aberration; one must assume
that the individual repented immediately afterwards.
Different Strokes for
Different Folks
Essentially, the need to give others the benefit of the doubt is moderated by a
realistic approach which balances the positive trait of being slow to judge with
the level-headed need to be cautious.
The same mode of thought would also require us to treat individuals known to be
lax in their performance of commandments with a special measure of suspicion. Just as some individuals have earned
the right to be viewed favorably, others who have acquired their negative
reputations equally deserve to be deprived of the benefit of the doubt and
even to be presumed guilty. Imagine
the used-car salesman, notorious for cheating people and selling lemons as if
they have just rolled off the assembly line, telling the customer that a given
car is the best in the world. Would
anyone trust the salesman simply because the car looks great, is being sold at
an amazing price and the pitch is convincing?
Halakha recognizes that certain people display traits which earn them unenviable
reputations. The used-car salesman
in fact may be telling the truth, but his previous behavior has convinced us not
to believe him in the current situation.
Similarly, certain individuals have earned the presumption of guilt
because they have established that they tend to act illicitly whenever they
think they can get away with it, and sometimes even if they know they will be
caught.
With this in mind, we can understand the language of the verse with which we
began. The verse subscribes ones
amit with tzedek. Not
everyone can rightfully be considered an amit; only one who is a
chaver and actively follows the mitzvot is included in the
obligation.
In fact, the idea of evaluating individuals along a sliding scale is an idea
that already appears in the Rambams commentary on the Mishna in Avot. There he differentiates between
various individuals and circumstances.
A person may be unknown to you, so that you do not know
whether he is a righteous man or an evil one.
If he does an act or if he says something that could be interpreted as
either positive or negative, judge him favorably, and do not think of him as
having done wrong.
Another person may be well-known as a righteous man of
good deeds. Therefore, even if you
see him do an action which seems to be unequivocally bad, so that the only way
to justify it is by stretching things to an extreme and assuming a very remote
possibility, it is still obligatory to interpret the act positively, based on
that possibility.
Conversely, a person may be evil and his deeds
infamous. Therefore, even if you see
him do an action which seems to be unequivocally good, so that the only way to
malign it is by assuming a very remote possibility, one must be wary of him and
not believe that it is good, based on that possibility that it is bad. This is
based on the verse (Mishlei 26:25), When he supplicates with his voice,
do not believe him, for seven are the abominations in his heart.
If one is unknown and his act may be interpreted in one
of two ways, piety obligates that he be judged favorably, whichever way that may
be.
The Rambam essentially explicates a four-tiered approach for analyzing the
actions of others. The Chafetz
Chayim points out that the opinion of the Rambam is basically accepted by
Rabbeinu Yona and other commentators, and he summarizes the laws.
(See Minchat Asher, Parashat
Kedoshim for the discussion of a minor difference.) There are four groups of individuals,
and ones analysis of others actions also takes into account the types of
actions under consideration.
1.
The righteous must be judged favorably even if the matter seems very likely
negative.
2.
Average individuals, who are
careful not to sin but sometimes slip up, must be judged favorably if there is
an equal chance of good or bad. The
Chafetz Chayim adds (3:7) that even if it is more likely that the negative
interpretation is correct, it is still proper to leave the doubt unresolved in
ones mind and not judge the other negatively.
The Chafetz Chayim here adds an important caveat (3:8):
Even where the negative possibility is more likely, and
there is therefore no prohibition against judging him negatively, this is
restricted to his own perception of what happened. Therefore, he must not go and
speak negatively about the person
3.
Wicked individuals have
lost their rights to a judging favorably, and they are not to be given the
benefit of the doubt. Even when
their actions appear positive, they should be viewed as negative.
4.
Unknown individuals
have an intermediate status. While there
is no obligation to judge them favorably, it is a good quality for one to assume
that such people have merit and give them the benefit of the doubt (as we learn
from the stories in Shabbat 127b).
Defining Righteous
and Wicked
Certain individuals are known to be sincere and pious in all their endeavors, so
that one would be obligated to judge them righteously no matter what the
situation. Others might have certain
areas of conduct in which they are totally righteous, and one can be completely
confident that they will not slip.
However, at the same time, these individuals may be less proficient in other
areas and even prone to violating certain required behaviors. These individuals could be defined as
righteous in certain areas and wicked in others, as they have no trouble
doing the right thing regarding certain endeavors, while others they find
difficult to accomplish. In certain
areas, they will be presumed innocent, while in others, they will be presumed
guilty.
Essentially, judging others favorably requires taking into account each
individuals reputation and analyzing his or her actions accordingly. One might even view this as an
obligation to judge fairly. There is
an added call to give the benefit of the doubt to those who havent proven that
they dont deserve it.
The Rationale behind
the Obligation to Judge Others Favorably
Clearly giving a seconds thought before jumping to conclusions about others is
personally beneficial and creates a more harmonious community. Giving others the benefit of the
doubt is certainly beneficial to society.
By assuming that others are innocent instead of jumping to conclusions
about their guilt, people may live together harmoniously.
It emancipates the individual from
worrying that others are acting improperly or out to get him or her. By judging others favorably, one will
also fulfill the directive You shall your fellow as yourself, (Vayikra
19:18); conversely, judging others unfavorably would constitute a violation of
Do not hate your brother in your heart (ibid. v. 17).
The Chinnukh (Mitzva 235) explains the composition of this directive:
Judging others favorably is also part of the mitzva, and it is a factor in
creating peaceful and friendly relationships between people. Essentially, the main purpose of all
the aspects of this mitzva is to direct communities into establishing fair
judicial systems, and to bring it about by removing suspicion from others.
Besides the societal benefits,
the commentators note additional benefits to be gained through judging others
favorably. The Meiri (Chibbur Ha-teshuva, 1:4) notes that one who
suspects others wont be able to be influenced positively by them and will look
at society without respect. Rav
Yehoshua Leib Diskin points out that judging others favorably leads one to have
a positive view of society, a view which will lead one to act properly, as one
will desire to be in good standing within the community.
Beyond these benefits for ones own behavior, the Yismach Moshe on Avot explains
that positive judgment of others minimizes the negative effect and the
chillul ha-shem that is created through anothers improper behavior. (An elaborate discussion of these
issues may be found in Rav Daniel Feldmans book, The Right and the Good,
pp. 120-121.)
The reasons behind the law are in no way merely academic. There is a halakhic discussion
regarding whether one has the right to waive the responsibility of others to
judge him favorably. If the reasons
for doing so benefit the observer more than the one being judged, then
understandably it cannot be waived (see Responsa Az Nidberu 12:4).
The Questions which
Still Remain
While we have laid out the general guidelines, (for a more expansive and
explicit delineation of the relevant
laws, please see Sefer Chafetz Chayim, Hilkhot Lashon
Ha-Ra, Rule 3 at length), one still might wonder: how far does this
obligation go? Must one really think
of every far-out possibility in order to avoid passing negative judgment on
another?
What seems to emerge is the Torah is pushing us to recognize an inner good in
everyone, but to be realistic that everyday difficulties, and moments of
weakness might interrupt a persons strive for spiritual success. Judging others favorably changes our
way of thinking; our eyes start to see beneath the dirt that might corrode the
exterior and identify the inner beauty.
Dealing with our unanswered question may provide a glimmer of understanding for
the whole mitzva. We have pointed
out that the verse which acts as the biblical source for the obligation to judge
favorably seems to be directed primarily to the judges. Though we have explained that it also
refers to the individual in society, looking at others from the standpoint of
the courtroom of his mind, there remains an unsolved difficulty. The explication of the end of the
verse as a requirement to judge those with upstanding reputations positively
seems at first glance to contradict the earlier part of the verse, which
obligates the judge to be impartial.
Judging everyone favorably might be good for society, but that is not how a
courthouse is supposed to be run; indeed, it would not be effective!
The Contradiction
Which Explains it All
Rav S.R. Hirsch (Vayikra 19:15) deals with this difficulty by pointing
out that the Talmuds understanding of the verse seems to contain two apparently
contradictory laws.
The statement be-tzedek tishpot amitekha is a source for two seemingly
contradictory laws. On the one hand, this statement
obligates a judge to issue his verdict on the basis of absolute justice, in
strict accordance with the law. On
the other hand, from this same statement we learn that, outside the court of
justice, the rule we are to follow is to judge our fellows favorably, i.e., try
to find justifications for their actions.
Rav Hirsch begins with this
apparent contradiction and then goes on to explain how, in fact, the beginning
of the verse can demand from judges uncompromising impartiality which ignores
the character of the litigants while telling observers outside the courthouse to
do just the opposite.
In reality, there is no contradiction.
For judgment in a court of justice and judgment of ones neighbor do not
serve the same purpose. The duty of
a judge in a court of justice is to examine only the act itself, whether it is
in accordance with the dictates of justice or not. He should disregard all the
individual and personal circumstances and all the motives. There are actions that though
unjustified are excusable, and yet in court they must be judged as punishable. Society, on the other hand, is
interested primarily in ones personality and character. In societys view, every action is
merely a symptom of the integrity or inadequacy of its members.
The attribute of justice dictates that the judge must himself disregard the
personality of the actor and consider only the act itself. Yet this same attribute of justice
dictates that, in the societal realm, we must take into account all the possible
circumstances that may vindicate the person and his character. Justice says: Do not be quick to
condemn your neighbor; rather judge your neighbor favorably!
This is the same attribute of justice
that says of judging others Do not judge your fellow until you have been in a
similar position (Avot 2:4).
It differentiates between social and forensic judgment to such an extent that to
the judge of the court, it says, When the parties stand before you, consider
them both in the wrong, but once they have accepted your decision and have left
you, regard them both as good men (Avot 1:6).
Essentially, Rav Hirsch
teaches us that one must recognize the limits of judgment outside the courtroom. The same attribute of justice which
pushes the judges to clarify the unique circumstances of each case also
recognizes the impossibility of doing so outside of the courtroom. This difference between justice in
and outside the court may explain how the directive to judge others favorably
constitutes a necessary concession to the limits of societal judgments.
A court must itself hold its judgment until the facts have been elucidated, the
witnesses cross-examined and all supporting evidence produced. The average onlooker does not have
that luxury of doing so, and therefore, the ability to condemn another outside
of a court is almost impossible.
Just as a judge would not decide to convict without having all the facts before
him, the community, which lacks so much information, cannot adequately assess
the situation.
In giving people the benefit of the doubt outside the courtroom, we recognize
two fundamental principles. Firstly,
we accept the fact that there is doubt outside of the courtroom. Secondly, when in doubt, the tie
goes to the runner, and we choose to view others positively.
In the next lesson, we will further analyze the nature of this positive outlook
that the Jew is taught to inculcate into his or her personality.
We will seek to understand how doing so
not only allows one to judge others favorably, but to change the way one looks
at life and the world.
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