MODERN
RABBINIC THOUGHT
By
Rav Yitzchak
Blau
*********************************************************
Dedicated in
loving memory of
Shmuel Nachamu ben Shlomo Moshe HaKohen
(whose yahrtzeit
falls on 10 Tevet),
Chaya bat
Yitzchak Dovid (whose yahrtzeit falls
on 15 Tevet),
and Shimon ben
Moshe (whose yahrtzeit falls on 16 Tevet).
*********************************************************
Shiur #10:
Idolatry and Impurity in the Thought of R. Hirsch
R.
Hirsch views utilitarian philosophy (evaluating things from the
perspective of personal profit) and materialistic philosophy (the idea that
human beings are just like all other kinds of matter) as the great
intellectual dangers of his time.
The former engenders a self-serving attitude indifferent to the call of
noble idealism, while the latter leads to the denial of human freedom. His analyses of idolatry and impurity
enable us to explore his thoughts on these two issues against the backdrop of
the above philosophies.
Idolatry
Paganism does not think of gods as
having a moral-religious message; rather, gods are terrifying beings who humans
try to placate with offerings.
Humanity attempts to manipulate these cosmic forces to achieve material
advantage. For R. Hirsch, idolatry becomes
more a moral problem than a theological error. It reflects a worldview alien to
authentic idealism.
In an essay entitled Hellenism,
Judaism and Rome,
R. Hirsch
identifies the Roman world with this idolatrous approach. Roman culture thought only in terms of
material gain, and its religion consisted of sacrifices intended to assuage the
wrath of the gods. In addition, the
state cynically utilized religion to keep people in line. This essay contrasts the Roman worldview
with the far more positive Greek outlook.
Not Hellenic idealism, but Roman materialism, is what we have to fear
(p. 208).
The worship of Molekh, which centered
on a form of child sacrifice, typifies for R. Hirsch the pagan perspective. He explains that the grammatical form of
the term molekh means the abstract concept of rule or control, just as
kodesh means holiness. This
form of worship is rooted in the idea of powers of fate that control the
world. From this standpoint, people
engage in idolatrous acts to influence or manipulate these forces in order to
achieve some kind of control over their own fate.
For R. Hirsch, this explains an oddity in the
laws regarding the worship of Molekh.
The gemara (Sanhedrin 64b) says that the punishment for Molekh
worship only applies to a person who sacrifices some of his children and not to
a person who offers all of his children.
This halakha certainly seems counter-intuitive. Would one not assume that the more
children one sacrifices, the worse the act and the more deserving of
punishment?
Some explain that the particular pagan
practice that the Torah was responding to happened to involve offering only some
of ones children. According to these thinkers, there is no inherent logical
distinction between offering all or some of ones offspring. Others maintain that the person who
gives Molekh all of his children has committed an act so evil that he does not
merit the atonement that punishment brings (see Torah Temima, Vayikra
18:21, note 57).
In characteristic fashion,
R. Hirsch uses
this odd halakhic detail as a clue to the rationale behind this
prohibition. He explains that the
Torah singles out Molekh to combat an ideology that believes in giving certain
things to the forces of fate for the sake of worldly success. The parent who relinquishes all his
children would not be guilty of the specific crime addressed by this
commandment because the sacrifice has left him nothing to enjoy. Sacrificing all of ones children is
terrible, but it does not reflect the attempt to bring cosmic forces under
control (commentary on Vayikra 18:21).
R. Hirsch warns that this way of thinking could
enter into Judaism as well. He does
not clarify precisely to what he is referring, but we can make an educated
guess. The use of religious amulets
and charms to fend off harm is very close to this pagan mindset. These items have little to do with
genuine religious and moral striving and much to do with the attempt to win the
cosmic forces over to ones side.
This concern animates R. Hirschs reading of other
biblical sources. After the
eight-day ceremony consecrating the Tabernacle and the priests, Moshe and Aharon
enter the ohel moed one more time before God reveals His presence. Apparently, they need to add another
prayer before divine revelation can occur.
R.
Hirsch contends that if the divine glory had appeared
immediately following eight days of offerings, the people could have mistakenly
adopted the pagan conception that sacrifices are devices that enable us to
control and influence the gods. The
delay clarified the falsehood of this notion. God cannot be manipulated, but He can
freely choose to respond to the authentic spiritual striving of His people
(commentary on Vayikra 9:23).
A similar idea helps R. Hirsch solve a famous
conundrum. Vayikra 16
outlines the detailed service that the High Priest has to perform in order to
enter the Holy of Holies. Only at
the end of the section (verse 29) does the Torah inform the reader that this
service takes place on Yom Kippur.
Why leave this crucial bit of information for the end? Several acharonim, including the
Vilna Gaon, suggest that Aharon was able to enact this service and enter the
inner sanctum on any day of the year, whereas future generations of High Priests
would be able to enter only on Yom Kippur.
The beginning of the chapter addresses Aharon; therefore, it does not
mention a specific calendar date.
R. Hirsch offers an alternative answer. Perhaps the Torah was nervous that Jews
might view the sacrificial order as the essential atoning component of Yom
Kippur. Atonement would then be the
product of sacrificing goats and bullocks more than of a true spirit of
repentance. The Torah leaves the
mention of Yom Kippur for the end to create some separation between Yom Kippur
and these offerings. These
offerings are obviously a mitzva, but the essence of Yom Kippur remains
independent of them (commentary on Vayikra 16:29).
Ethics
With regard to other mitzvot as
well, R. Hirsch
distinguishes between a self-serving approach and a more idealistic one. Hillel famously taught the prospective
convert: What you dislike, do not do unto your neighbors (Shabbat
31a). R. Hirsch forcefully argues against a
reading that reduces Hillels maxim to a clever social precautionary measure
of calculating cleverness. In
other words, Hillel was not teaching us to be nice to other people so that they
will reciprocate. Such an
understanding reduces ethical idealism to naked self-interest.
The biblical verse parallel to
Hillels maxim clarifies the falsehood of this view. The Torah commands: Love your neighbor
as yourself; I am God (Vayikra 19:18). What does the closing phrase, ani
Hashem, add to the commandment?
R.
Hirsch teaches that this phrase negates the pragmatic approach
to loving others. We do not love
others in the hope of receiving some future benefit in return. Rather, we do so as a consequence of our
accurate conception and emulation of Gods loving and compassionate nature.
Prophecy
This same divide influences
R. Hirschs
reading of the Torahs discussion of prophecy. The Torah contrasts nations who rely on
soothsayers and necromancers with Israel, who receive instruction from
prophets (Devarim 18). Where
does the essential difference lie?
Some commentaries think that the prophet has a better prophetic batting
average than the soothsayer. Only
for the authentic prophet does each detail of every prophecy come
true.
R. Hirsch views the difference between prophet
and soothsayer as far more fundamental.
People go the latter for advice about furthering their material
advancement. When one should plant
his crops or how one should invest in the market are questions for the
soothsayer. In contrast, people do
not come to the prophet for their own benefit. Rather, the prophet comes to them with
the commanding words of God. The
verse says not elav tishalun but elav tishmaun
(Devarim 18:15). Prophecy
does not help us find out through him what we would like to know. It tells us what is Gods will that we
ought to know (commentary on Devarim 18:15).
Impurity
What religious idea motivates the
details of ritual impurity? Why do human corpses, dead animals, leprosy,
childbirth, and seminal emissions all bring about ritual impurity? One approach is that of Rambam, who
argues that these laws help generate reverence for sanctified places and
things. Frequent visits diminish
reverence for a place, but the many laws of ritual impurity ensure that the
average Jew will not make a daily trip to the Temple (Guide of the Perplexed
3:47). Another possible
explanation is that these impure things cause actual harm, either in a
metaphysical or hygienic fashion.
We have
already noted R.
Hirschs rejection of hygienic explanations for the
commandments. Let us look at the
impurity of tzaraat (often translated as leprosy) as an example.
R. Hirsch cites
many proofs against the idea that the leper must leave the camp as a form of
quarantine protecting others from infection. R. Hirsch refers to this dismissively as
the sanitary approach to Torah.
Priests are the ones who deliver rulings about these leprous blemishes,
but we do not see the priests serving a medical role in other contexts. Additionally, why would the Torah select
one particular illness for quarantine, when may other sicknesses should call for
the same treatment? Perhaps the
strongest evidence against the hygienic approach comes from the laws of the
leprous house. The Torah teaches
that the priest should instruct people to remove all the vessels from the house
before he makes his judgment, so that those vessels not become ritually impure
when he reaches such a verdict about the house. From the perspective of hygienic
concerns, such a method is absurd.
Those vessels were exposed to the contagion even if we remove them
before the priestly declaration.
Rabbinic interpretations offer further
support for R.
Hirschs rejection of a hygienic explanation for
tzaraat. The sages say that
the priests would not rule on potential leprosy at the time of the
festivals. From the hygienic
perspective, festivals are the worst possible time to let a leper run loose,
since he could infect the rest of the Jewish people gathered together in
Jerusalem. Furthermore, there are scenarios where
we are lenient about safek negaim, doubtful cases of blemishes. Based on the principle that we take
danger to life more seriously than halakhic prohibitions (chamira sakanta
me-issura), we should rule stringently regarding doubtful blemishes. Clearly, the laws of blemishes have
little to do with health concerns (commentary Vayikra, end of chapter13).
R. Hirsch creates an overarching theory to
explain the various categories that generate ritual impurity. He explains that these laws combat the
materialistic perspective that views man as the plaything of grand
freedom-negating forces. In each
case, the source of ritual impurity consists of something that could make
humanity focus on powerful physical forces and feel that humans have no free
will. From this viewpoint, it is
obvious why human death represents the strongest form of ritual impurity. Seeing a corpse can lead to the thought
that mere physicality, devoid of an animating spirit, was all the human being
ever was. The laws of ritual
impurity demand distance from the symbols of that mindset in order to remind us
not to lapse into that mistaken conception.
Animal corpses defile for the
identical reason. In fact,
R. Hirsch
explains that only those corpses that somehow resemble the human body generate
ritual impurity. Therefore, dead animals transmit impurity while dead fish and
fowl do not. R. Hirsch even goes so far as
to suggest that the eight sheratzim (crawling creatures) that generate
impurity are those whose skeleton bears some similarity to a human
skeleton. Alternatively, he posits
that these eight sheratzim are those that live in the vicinity of
humans. Since humans normally see
these creatures full of life and vitality, an encounter with a corpse from the
eight will make mankind think that all life comes to nothingness because matter
is the true essence of existence and not the spirit (Vayikra 11:47). Again, we see R. Hirschs insistence on integrating the
details of the mitzva into his explanation.
The same idea explains the ritual
impurity of seminal emissions and of menstruation. Sexuality and the rhythms of the human
body are powerful forces that might make people feel that they are pawns under
the control of larger forces. The
laws of tum'a exist to prevent that conclusion (commentary on
Vayikra 15:31).
R. Hirsch explains the ritual impurity caused
by a birth in the same way. This
particular source of tum'a has generated much astonishment. Surely, the act of giving birth
represents one of the finest moments in a human life. Why should it be a source of
tum'a? Especially noteworthy
is the fact that many tumot stem from death, while this form comes from
the beginning of life. If ritual
impurity is all about death, the yoledet does not belong on the
list. According to R. Hirsch, there is no
question. The powerful contractions
that overtake a woman during labor also create a sense of humanity being
controlled by extremely powerful external forces. Here, too, we need the laws of ritual
purity to assert human freedom and choice (commentary Vayikra 12:2).
[We will have one final shiur
on R. Hirsch
next week and then proceed to the thought of R. Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, Rosh
Yeshiva of Volozhin.]
, full_html
This website is constantly being improved. We would appreciate hearing from you. Questions and comments on the classes are welcome, as is help in tagging, categorizing, and creating brief summaries of the classes. Thank you for being part of the Torat Har Etzion community!