Torah Study - Creation or Revelation (1)

 

1. Creation or Revelation

 

Several astonishing rabbinic accounts describe for us how God surrendered Himself in certain halakhic matters to the authority of the Sages of Israel. The most well known story – and also the most amazing – relates to the oven of Akhnai. Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagreed about a certain type of oven, whether or not it can contract ritual impurity:

 

It was taught in a Baraita: On that day, Rabbi Eliezer used all the arguments in the world, but they did not accept them from him.

He said to them: "If the Halakha is in accordance with me, let this carob tree prove it." The carob tree was uprooted from its place one hundred cubits, and some say four hundred cubits. They said to him: "One does not bring proof from a carob tree."

He then said to them: "If the Halakha is in accordance with me, let the channel of water prove it." The channel of water turned backward. They said to him: "One does not bring proof from a channel of water."

He then said to them: "If the Halakha is in accordance with me, let the walls of the House of Study prove it." The walls of the House of Study leaned to fall. Rabbi Yehoshua rebuked [the walls], saying: "If the Sages argue with one another about the Halakha, what affair is it of yours?" They did not fall, out of respect for Rabbi Yehoshua; but they did not straighten, out of respect for Rabbi Eliezer.

[Rabbi Eliezer] then said to them: "If the Halakha is in accordance with me, let it be proved from Heaven." A heavenly voice went forth and said: "Why are you disputing with Rabbi Eliezer, for the Halakha is in accordance with him everywhere?" Rabbi Yehoshua rose to his feet and said: "It is not in Heaven." What does "it is not in Heaven" mean? Rabbi Yirmiya said: That the Torah was already given on Mount Sinai, and we do not pay attention to a heavenly voice, for You already wrote in the Torah at Mount Sinai: "After the majority to incline." (Bava Metzia 59b)

 

This is truly an astonishing story. "The oven of Akhnai" is one of the stories that are most familiar to Torah students, yet it is doubtful whether many of them fully understand its revolutionary significance. Chazal tell us that the Sages of Israel may not set aside their own opinions – not even before the supreme and absolute authority of a heavenly voice. There is no doubt that a judgment coming down from Heaven is closer to the truth than a conjecture put forward by man. Thus, the fundamental principle that underlies the world of Torah learning leads us to a revolutionary conclusion regarding the nature of the Oral Law.

 

At first glance, it might be suggested that we are dealing here with a formal issue: while it is clear that the words of a heavenly voice are indeed truer and more correct, the Sages of Israel are not supposed to take them into consideration for a variety of reasons. But if the Sages' goal in their study of Torah was to uncover the "truth," how then can could they have rejected a heavenly voice on the formal grounds that the Torah "is not in Heaven"? Even if this would have involved a deviation from the normal procedure of halakhic decision-making, from the moment the Sages realized that they had ruled wrongly, surely they should have retracted their decision! There may exist a formal rule that halakhic decisions must be made by men of flesh and blood, without the help of a heavenly voice. But once the Sages became aware that their ruling was a mistake and a falsehood, surely they should have reconsidered the matter under discussion!

 

In my opinion, the most persuasive explanation of the incident involving the oven of Akhnai is that the act of Torah study is not aimed at uncovering and revealing an absolute truth, but at creation and advancement. In this respect, Halakha is closer to a work of art than to a rigid mathematical system, in that it does not require a specific and unequivocal conclusion. I believe that this is the most reasonable explanation for the rejection and total disregard of halakhic determinations originating in Heaven. This is the question we shall be dealing with today: Does Torah study involve an act of creation ex nihilo, or does it aim at uncovering an absolute truth? For the sake of candor, I admit from the outset that I side with the first position almost without reservation; it cannot be said, however, that this view reflects the consensus of the Torah world. There are many who resolutely reject it. Be aware, then, that this lecture is not necessarily the consensus, and also not objective.

 

Rabbenu Nissim Girondi (Ran) in his Derashot leans toward understanding Torah study as a creative process:

 

Since the decision-making process in Torah matters was given to them during their lifetimes, and their understanding dictated that it is ritually impure, it is fitting that it be ritually impure, even though this is the opposite of the truth, for that is what human reason dictates. And the others, even though they speak the truth, should not conduct themselves in that manner according to the ways of the Torah. As we find that Rabbi Eliezer's disputants did not declare [the oven] ritually pure, even though they heard a heavenly voice that the Halakha is in accordance with his opinion. (Derashot ha-Ran, derush 7)

 

Following in Ran's footsteps, one of the later Torah giants, Rabbi Arye Leib Hakohen Heller, author of "Ketzot ha-Choshen," expressed himself in similar fashion:

 

… It is well known that human reason wearies itself searching for the truth. About this, [the angels] said [to God]: You put Your ornament to shame. For the world was created for the sake of the Torah, and it is impossible for man with his human understanding to reach the real truth … This is the meaning of: "She opens her mouth with wisdom; and on her tongue is a Torah of steadfast love" (Mishlei 31:26). For the Oral Law was given in accordance with the decisions of the Sages, even when they are not true. And this is called "a Torah of steadfast love." (Introduction to Ketzot ha-Choshen)

 

It should be noted that Rabbenu Nissim and the author of the Ketzot do not actually reach the conclusion that I have proposed. They argue that there exists an halakhic truth that one must strive to uncover. But there also exists a formal rule stating that any decision reached by the Sages of Israel becomes sanctified as part of the Oral Law, even when the decision is false.

 

I go one step further. I maintain that, with respect to the Oral Law, the concept of "truth" is meaningless. The Torah student is not required to strive for the absolute "truth" that is concealed in God's hidden places. The Torah serves as raw material for human creation, and man must develop the Torah in the direction that seems right to him:

 

When the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the Torah to Israel, He gave it to them in the form of wheat to produce from it fine flour, and in the form of flax to produce from it a garment. (Tanna Debei Eliyahu Zuta, ed. Ish-Shalom, parasha 2)

 

This is a revolutionary and sensational formulation: The Torah was given like raw material, and man must utilize it in order to fashion the next layer of the Oral Law. Chazal spoke in a similar vein in other places as well:

 

Had the Torah been given in the form of clear decisions, the world would have been unable to exist. What is the meaning of: "And the Lord said to Moshe"? [Moshe] said to Him: "Master of the universe, tell me the Halakha!" [God] said to him: "'After the majority to incline' – if there are more who favor acquittal, he is acquitted; if there are more who favor conviction, he is convicted. This is in order that the Torah be explained in forty-nine ways favoring ritual impurity and forty-nine ways favoring ritual purity." (Yerushalmi, Sanhedrin 4:2)

 

Some of the more recent authorities follow this position of Chazal. The formulation proposed by Rabbi Joseph Bloch, head of the Telz Yeshiva, comes closer to our view than do the words of the author of the Ketzot.

 

… When the Torah was given to Israel, its laws were given over to the Torah Sages, whose thinking, provided that it is aimed at the Torah's reasons and secrets, establishes the reality of the Torah and the reality of the universe which is dependent upon it. Thus, it differs from the other branches of wisdom, for those who investigate them do not establish the reality of those branches of wisdom, but rather uncover it. For their thinking and decisions will never change reality. This is not the case regarding Torah, for the reality of ritual impurity and purity, forbidden and permitted things, obligation and exemption, are set in accordance with the decisions of the Torah Sages. (Rabbi Joseph Bloch, Shi'urei Da'at, I, p. 21)[1]

 

How can it be that the Torah is merely raw material? How can the Torah Sages give two different answers, both of which are equally valid? In the case of a mathematical problem, for example, 2 plus 2, the problem has only one correct answer. It would seem that halakhic questions should also have only one correct answer! In order to resolve this difficulty, let us consider the words of Ramban:

 

Anybody who studies our Talmud knows that regarding the disagreements among the commentators there are no absolute proofs, and generally there are no irrefutable objections. For this branch of wisdom does not allow for clear demonstrations as does mathematics. (Ramban, Introduction to his Milchamot Hashem)

 

Halakhic considerations are not unequivocal; they depend on the inclination of one's heart. Is damage caused by fire considered as damage caused by a person's property like damage caused by his animal, or as damage caused by the person himself, as if he had shot an arrow? There is no absolute proof one way or the other, and in the end everyone must decide according to his own halakhic intuition. The nature of halakhic reasoning allows us – but does not necessarily require us – to understand the Oral Law as having been given as raw material to be developed by man in the direction that seems right to him. Rashi characterizes halakhic considerations in a similar way:

 

When two Amoraim disagree about the law or about whether something is forbidden or permitted, and each one says, "This seems right to me," nobody is lying. Each one states his own reasoning: this one offers a reason to allow it, and the other one gives a reason to forbid it; this one compares one matter to another in a certain manner, and the other one draws the comparison differently. (Rashi, Ketuvot 57a)

 

It should once again be noted that the words of Rashi and Ramban do not necessitate the position that we are advocating; they only explain how such a position is possible.

 

Next week we shall examine some ramifications of this issue.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[1] It should be noted that Rabbi Joseph Bloch's position does not entirely correspond to our own. See Tamar Ross's analysis of his position in Tarbitz 59(1-2), 1990.

 

(Translated by Rav David Strauss)