Monarchy

 what is the ideal form of government?

     The Torah discusses the appointment of a king over Israel:

When you shall come to the land which the Lord your God gives you, and you shall possess it, and shall dwell in it, and shall say, I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are about me; then shall you appoint a king over you, whom the Lord your God shall choose: one from among your brethren shall you set as king over you: you may not set a stranger over you, who is not your brother. (Devarim 17:14-15)

 

It is unclear from this passage whether the appointment of a king is a permitted option or an absolute obligation. The opening words, "When you shall come … and shall say," seem to imply that we are dealing with a political development initiated by the people. But the command that follows, "then shall you appoint a king," sounds like an unequivocal imperative. The biblical commentators and halakhic authorities disagree about this question. The controversy appears already in the Gemara:

 

Rabbi Yehuda says: Three commandments were commanded [to the people of] Israel upon their entry into the land: To appoint for themselves a king, to destroy the seed of Amalek, and to build for themselves a Temple. Rabbi Nehorai says: This passage [to appoint a king] was only stated in response to their complaint, for it is stated: "And you shall say, I will set a king over me." (Sanhedrin 20b)

 

The talmudic dispute remained unresolved in later generations. Rambam understands the appointment of a king as an absolute obligation:

 

That He has commanded us to appoint for ourselves a king, who will gather together our entire nation and lead us. This is what the Blessed One said: "Then shall you appoint a king over you." (Rambam, Sefer ha-Mitzvot, positive commandment, 173)

 

Rabbi Yitzchak Abravanel has an entirely different position on the matter. He understands the verse as dealing not with an obligatory mitzva, but with a guideline contingent upon the people of Israel's behavior:

 

There is no mitzva here whatsoever, for the Blessed One did not command that they should say this and ask for a king. Rather, it is a foretelling of the future. That is to say, once you are in the chosen land, and after the conquest and all the wars, and after the division [of the land] – this being what it says: "And you shall possess it, and shall dwell in it" – I know that you will be ungrateful, that you will say of your own, "I will set a king over me." [You will ask for a king,] not because of the need to fight the nations and conquer the land, for you will have already conquered it. Rather, [you will want a king] in order to be like the nations who set kings over themselves… And He states that when this happens, they should not appoint a king of their choice, but rather him whom God will choose from among their brothers. This is the true essence of the mitzva, namely: "Then shall you appoint a king over you from among your brethren." [God] is not commanding them to ask [for a king], but rather that when they ask of their own accord, they should not choose [a king] on their own, but rather him whom God will choose from among their brethren. According to this, the matter of [appointing] a king is a positive precept that is contingent upon optional behavior. It is as if the verse said: When you want to do this, even though it is unbefitting, you should do it only in this manner. (Abravanel, Commentary to Devarim 17:24)

 

Abravanel goes on to compare the law of appointing a king to the law regarding a non-Jewish female captive, about which the Sages said that the Torah spoke only to counter the evil inclination, that is, to minimize damages. According to Abravanel, monarchy is not the most fitting form of government. If the people insist upon crowning a monarch, they are bound by the mitzva to select the person whom God chooses. It is most preferable, however, not to opt for a king at all. Why, according to Abravanel, is a monarchal regime so undesirable? Among other things, Abravanel mentions the clear advantages of democracy over monarchy:

 

… It is not impossible for a nation to have many leaders who gather together, unite, and agree upon a single policy, and for authority and judgment to be exercised in accordance with what they say… Why shouldn't their leadership extend for a year or for three years like the years of a hired worker or less than that? And when the turn of other justices or officers comes, they should rise up in their place and faithfully investigate the offenses of their predecessors, and whoever is found guilty should pay in accordance with their guilt… And why shouldn't their powers be limited and regulated by laws and customs … Why should we have to adduce rational arguments? Surely experience overrides reasoning: Look and see those countries governed by kings, and today we see countries governed by judges and temporary rulers elected from among them… Now under the elected governments there is nothing crooked or perverse, no man raises his hand or foot to commit a crime, and they conquer countries with wisdom, understanding and knowledge. (Abravanel, ibid.)

 

While he is obviously exaggerating about the benevolence and serenity that he attributes to the city-states of Venice and Florence, Abravanel is clearly speaking from his extensive political experience.  In today's world, his position would be far more accepted.

 

The reservations raised regarding the institution of monarchy are based not only on reasons of administrative efficiency and the prevention of tyranny, but also on theological grounds. We find in many places divine objections to the appointment of human kings:

 

And Gid'on said to them, I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you; the Lord shall rule over you. (Shofetim 8:23)

 

And the Lord said to Shemuel, Hearken to the voice of the people in all that they say to you; for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected Me, that I should not reign over them. (I Shemuel 8:7)

 

And when you saw that Nachash the king of the children of Amon came against you, you said to me, No, but a king shall reign over us; when the Lord your God was your king (I Shemuel 12:12)

 

All these source present a king of flesh and blood as coming to substitute for or compete against the divine King. "Slaves do not have slaves"; subjection to a human king detracts from one's subjection to the King of kings. This is another reason to prefer a democratic regime, which instead of being based upon submission to a single individual – a situation that detracts from one's submission to God – is based upon civic commitment that is emotionally neutral. This is an additional argument in favor of the views of Rabbi Nahorai and Abravanel, both of whom reject the monarchal system of government.[1] It has been suggested that it is in this way that the mitzva to appoint a king is similar to the law governing a non-Jewish female captive. Rather than flowing from an ideal, it stems from the weakness of the generation and takes into consideration the norms of the period. The ideal form of government, according to the Torah, is not monarchy, but democracy.[2]

 

     Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Berlin (Netziv) proposes an intermediate position between the views of Rabbi Yehuda and Rambam, on the one hand, and those of Rabbi Nehorai and Abravanel, on the other:

 

Indeed, this formulation implies that appointing a king is not an absolute obligation, but rather a permitted option, just like, "And you shall say, I will eat meat" (Devarim 12:20). Surely, however, we know from the words of Chazal that there is a mitzva to appoint a king! Why, then, does it say, "And you shall say"? The reason seems to be that states are governed in different ways, either by a king, or by the people and their representatives. Some states cannot tolerate a monarchy, while others, without a king, would be like a ship without a captain. This matter cannot be mandated by a positive commandment, for issues of government involve danger to human life that would set aside any positive commandment. For this reason it is impossible to issue an absolute imperative to appoint a king, as long as the people have not agreed to bear the yoke of a king, after seeing that the countries around them are governed with greater order. Then there is a positive commandment upon the Sanhedrin to appoint a king. Therefore, the verse says, "And you shall say," that the people should ask for it, and then "You shall appoint." (Netziv, Ha'amek Davar, Devarim 17:14)

 

Netziv puts forward an intermediate position. On the one hand, he maintains that appointing a king is a conditional mitzva. On the other hand, he does not argue that monarchy by its very nature is a negative institution, and that the mitzva was only intended to minimize damage. Netziv argues that every country – and presumably, every period as well – has a particular form of government that is most appropriate for it. It is, therefore, impossible to issue an absolute commandment imposing a single obligatory form of government. There is a mitzva to appoint a king, but only when the people reach the conclusion that monarchy is the correct form of government for them, based on what they have seen in other countries. According to Netziv, we are dealing here with a most interesting, and perhaps unprecedented, situation: there is a mitzva to appoint a king – when the people want a king. This is the sole instance of a mitzva that is conditional upon the people's approval. Halakha does not always want to interfere in communal affairs; it usually leaves it to the community to act in the most correct and successful manner in light of the circumstances.

 

     It should be noted that it is not merely on the basis of his understanding of the rationale underlying the mitzva that Netziv asserts that Halakha cannot impose an absolute obligation to appoint a king. He also puts forward an halakhic argument. Even if there were a mitzva to appoint a king, whenever monarchy would not be the most appropriate form of government for that particular time and place, the mitzva would be superceded by the mitzva to save human life (piku'ach nefesh). This brings us to a fundamental principle governing community law, one that is discussed at length by the halakhic authorities of our time. The criteria for invoking the principle of piku'ach nefesh change when we are dealing with a community, as opposed to an individual. Bad government does not necessarily lead to immediate and tangible danger to human life. But when there is a chronic shortage of food and children suffer from malnutrition, when unemployed workers commit suicide, when road construction comes to a halt and the number of accidents rises steeply – the quality of the government has far-reaching effects on matters of life and death.

 

     Thus far, we have cited those who maintain that when the people do want a king, there is no obligation to appoint one; in such situations, it may even be preferable not to appoint a king. More far-reaching is the position of Rabbi Kook, who argues that other forms of government may also fall into the category of "king":

 

It seems that when there is no king, since the laws pertaining to a king also relate to the general state of the people, the privileges provided by these laws return to the people as a whole … As far as that which pertains to government, whoever governs the people must govern according to the laws of the king, which constitute the entirety of the needs of the people needed for the time and for the maintenance of the world … For regarding the laws of the king which pertain to the government of the community, accepted judges and other leaders stand in place of kings. (Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak Kook, Misphat Kohen, 144, no. 14)

 

Rabbi Kook argues that other governmental bodies, aside from the monarchy, may be invested with the authorities of a king. It may even be possible to go one step further and argue that with the establishment of such institutions we actually fulfill the mitzva of appointing a king.[3]

 

Leader or official

 

In the blessings to his sons, Ya'akov declares: "The staff shall not depart from Yehuda, nor the scepter from between his feet" (Bereishit 49:10). Ramban comments:

 

… Therefore, even if Israel, out of temporary necessity, raises a king over itself from the other tribes, he is not to be anointed so that the glory of royalty should not be upon him. Instead, such kings are to be merely as judges and officers. (Ramban, commentary to Bereishit 48:10)

 

Ramban distinguishes here between the kings of the house of David, which have 'royal majesty,' and the kings of Israel, which are essentially senior officials, "like judges and officers." This distinction between the Davidic kings and the kings of Israel is also reflected in the following halakha:

 

There is no sitting in the Temple courtyard except for the kings of the house of David, as it says: "Then king David went in, and sat before the Lord, and he said, Who am I."(II Shemuel 7:18)

 

Rashi explains why only the kings of the Davidic dynasty are permitted to sit in the Temple courtyard:

 

Except for the kings of the house of David – for God bestowed honor upon them, in order to show that his kingship was whole. (Rashi, Sotah 40b, s.v., ela)

 

The law that only the Davidic kings are permitted to sit in the Temple courtyard reflects a fundamental distinction between them and the other kings of Israel: the Davidic kings are recognized as leaders who represent Israel before their father in Heaven. In contrast, the kings of Israel are merely senior bureaucrats. The obligation to fear and honor them is purely utilitarian: proper functioning of government depends upon a show of respect to its senior officials.

 

     There are, then, two types of rule. A king of the house of David is a leader, whose person embraces the entire people; he also represents the nation before their father in Heaven. In contrast, the other kings of Israel are mere officials who run the ramified branches of government for the benefit of the people; they are not the nation's true leaders.

 

Monarchy and priesthood

 

     We have already cited a section of Ramban's commentary to the verse, "The staff shall not depart from Yehuda, nor the scepter from between his feet." Ramban's discussion focuses on the question of how we are to relate to Jewish kings not of the tribe of Yehuda, who ascended the throne in disregard of the blessing of Ya'akov. Among other things, Ramban addresses the issue of the Hasmonean kings:

 

In my opinion, the kings from other tribes, who ruled over Israel after David, went against the wishes of their father Ya'akov by diverting the inheritance of Yehuda to another tribe… This was also the reason for the punishment of the Hasmoneans, who reigned during the second Temple. They were saints of the Most High, without whom the learning of the Torah and the observance of the commandments would have been forgotten in Israel, and despite this, they suffered such great punishment. The four sons of the old Hasmonean Matityahu, saintly men who ruled one after another, in spite of all their prowess and success, fell by the sword of their enemies. And ultimately the punishment reached the stage where our Rabbis, of blessed memory, said: "He who says, 'I have come from the house of the Hasmoneans,' is a slave," as they were all destroyed on account of this sin. Now although among the children of Shimon, there was cause for punishment on account of the Sadducees, all the children of the righteous Matityahu the Hasmonean were deposed for this only: they ruled even though they were not of the seed of Yehuda and of the house of David, and thus they completely removed "the scepter" and the "lawgiver" from Yehuda. And their punishment was measure for measure, as the Holy One, blessed be He, caused their slaves to rule over them, and it is they who destroyed them.

It is also possible that [in addition to the Hamoneans having sinned for assuming royalty when they were not of the tribe of Yehuda], they sinned in ruling on account of their being priests, who have been commanded: "Guard your priesthood in everything that pertains to the altar, and to within the veil; and you shall serve; I give you the priesthood as a service of gift" (Bamidbar 18:7). Thus it was not for them to rule, but only to perform the service of God.

In tractate Horayot of the Jerusalem Talmud (3:2), I have seen the following text: "We do not anoint priests as kings." (Ramban, commentary to Bereishit 49:10)

 

Following the Yerushalmi Talmud, Ramban emphasizes that there is a separate prohibition against appointing a kohen as king. Kohanim are supposed to perform God's service, and not to engage in matters of government. This is more than just an expression of the principle of the separation of powers, which is intended to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single person. We are dealing here with a fundamental spiritual principle: the priesthood and the monarchy require two different types of personality. A kohen must concentrate on ideals and examine the extent to which the people of Israel conduct their lives in accordance with these pure virtues. The king, in contrast, must execute practical policy, a task which by its very nature involves moral compromises. In the real world, it is impossible to realize all values to perfection, for these values often contradict each other. A king is a man of compromise; a kohen is a man of values. A kohen is a teacher; a king is a man of the real world. When one person plays both roles, one of those roles must perforce suffer. This indeed is what happened to the Hasmonean kings, who almost entirely abandoned that which was expected of them as priests, thus defiling the sanctity of their priesthood.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

[1] This has been argued by Rabbi Y. Shaviv, "Demokratiya ve-Yahadut, Mamlekhet Kohanim ve-Goi Kadosh," p. 291; and by Rabbi Y. Bin-Nun, Techumin XX, p. 139.

 

[2] Rabbi S. Federbush, Mishpat ha-Melukha be-Yisrael, pp. 41-42.

 

[3] Itamar Warhaftig (Techumin XVIII) argues that with the establishment of the State of Israel and its national institutions, we have fulfilled a "half-measure" (chatzi shi'ur)  of the mitzva of appointing a king.

 

(Translated by Rav David Strauss)