Arvei Pesachim #5: 101a - 101b
Yeshivat Har Etzion
GEMARA ARVEI PESACHIM
SHIUR #05: 101a-101b
by Rav Yair Kahn
Ve-R. Yochanan Amar Af Yedei Yayin Yatza
"Yedei yayin" would seem to have nothing to do with kiddush per se. Rather, it is an independent issue relating to the laws of berakhot: Does the change of location constitute an interruption (hefsek) regarding the blessings before eating (birkot ha-nehenin - in this case, the "boreh pri ha-gefen" that precedes wine)? Both Rav and Shmuel agree that it is a hefsek, while R. Yochanan disagrees. This understanding is supported by the fact that the gemara connects R. Yochanan's opinion with his general position concerning berakhot.
However, based on the understanding that kiddush is intrinsically tied up with oneg (as we discussed last week), we can suggest an alternate interpretation, wherein "yedei yayin" relates to an aspect of kiddush itself. Kiddush is not merely a declaration announced in a glorified manner over a cup of wine. It is the initiation of oneg-Shabbat itself. Therefore, it is not only the reciting of kiddush which is significant. The drinking of the wine itself is meaningful in terms of the complete fulfillment of the kiddush obligation, by functioning as the beginning of the Shabbat meal. Thus, yedei kiddush and yedei yayin are two components which together combine for the complete kiddush fulfillment. Yedei kiddush is the declaration which is clearly the major component. Yedei yayin is initiating the seuda via partaking of the wine. The gemara understood that R. Yochanan's position regarding kiddush - that despite the change of location one nevertheless fulfills his kiddush obligation of yedei yayin - is consistent with his general position on berakhot. Since the change of location is not considered a hefsek for the wine blessing, according to R. Yochanan, we view the initial drinking of the kiddush wine as relating to the subsequent Shabbat meal. (See Shiurim L'zecher Abba Mari vol. 2 pp. 114-115.)
According to this understanding, R. Yochanan may accept Shmuel's principle - ein kiddush ela be-makom seuda. However, he argues with the application, since he has a much more flexible definition of makom seuda. (This would solve the problem which Tosafot raise regarding the pesak. See Tosafot 100b, s.v. "yedai kiddush".)
Tosafot s.v. Aval
According to Tosafot, one must recite kiddush in the same room in which one plans to eat. However, within that room one can move about ("from corner to corner"). This corresponds to the laws of berakhot according to Tosafot, who maintain (based on the gemara on 101b) that, although changing rooms is considered a "hefsek" (requiring one to recite a new berakha before eating), moving from corner to corner within one room is not.
From the Rif it would appear that, regarding KIDDUSH, one cannot move even from corner to corner within one room. Nevertheless, regarding BERAKHOT the Rif agrees that moving from corner to corner does not constitute a hefsek. Apparently, the Rif distinguished between the definition of makom seuda regarding kiddush (one LOCATION) and hefsek with respect to berakhot (an interruption).
Rashi seems to agree with Tosafot that two rooms are NOT defined as one makom seuda with respect to kiddush, while moving from corner to corner within one room IS considered makom seuda. However, regarding berakhot, Rashi (101b s.v. Mi-makom) indicates that there is no hefsek even when one moves from room to room within one house.
[Compare Rashi to the Rif: about what do they agree and where do they disagree?]
While Tosafot compare the laws of hefsek in berakhot to the definition of makom seuda regarding kiddush, both Rashi and the Rif have a more restrictive definition of makom seuda in kiddush than of hefsek in berakhot. The position of Tosafot is reasonable if kiddush be-makom seuda is based on considering the cup of wine as an integral part of the meal, which is based on the normal parameters of hefsek.
The Rif and Rashi, on the other hand, apparently view kiddush be-makom seuda differently. Perhaps they view the reciting of the kiddush as a declaratory act which introduces oneg Shabbat, and thus defines the ensuing meal as a se'udat Shabbat. One can argue that this demands a more intimate relationship between the kiddush and the ensuing seuda than is normally required regarding berakhot. After all, concerning berakhot, the meal may continue as long as there is no hefsek which breaks the connection to the meal in process. Kiddush, however, in order to positively effect and define the ensuing meal, must be recited ba-makom, in the actual presence, of the se'uda.
Tosafot s.v Shinui Yayin
The Rashbam (s.v. Echad) mentions that although one does not recite an additional "boreh pri ha-gefen" when drinking a different type of wine, one nevertheless should recite the birkat ha-shevach - "ha-tov ve-hameitiv" - if the second wine is better than the first. Tosafot argue that "ha-tov ve-hameitiv" is required even if the second wine is not necessarily superior to the first. According to Tosafot, the berakha is on the quantitative ABUNDANCE of wine, and is therefore recited, unless the second wine is clearly inferior. According to the Rashbam, the berakha is in response to the QUALITATIVE good bestowed upon us, as expressed by the superiority of the second wine. The ruling of the Rambam (Hilkhot Berakhot 4:9) is in accordance with the opinion of Tosafot.
The Tur (OC 175) claims that one is required to recite "ha-tov ve-hameitiv" even if both types of wines were present during the initial "boreh pri ha-gefen". However, the Rambam (ibid.) mentions only the scenario where the second type of wine was brought to the table AFTER he had drunk from the first. Perhaps the Rambam, who like Tosafot understood the berakha as an expression of the quantitative abundance of wine, felt that it is necessary to have a two-stage-process, whereby MORE wine is subsequently introduced and added. However, those who base the berakha on the qualitative improvement, would have no need for a two-stage-process.
101b Shinui Makom Tzarikh Levarekh
The gemara rules that one, in the midst of eating, who walks away from his initial position, is required to recite another berakha. The gemara qualifies that that this is only when one moves from house to house; however, from "corner to corner" does not obligate a second berakha. According to Rashi, it is unnecessary to repeat the berakha even if one moves from the ground floor to the attic as long as he remains within one house. However, this case is not explicit in the gemara, since from corner to corner would seem to refer to movement within a single room.
The requirement to repeat the berakha can be explained based on the "DA'AT" - one's intentions at the point that the berakha was recited. Since the normal intention is to remain in the same location until completing one's food or drink, a change of location is defined halakhically (based on norms, unless he explicitly intended otherwise) as a hesech ha-da'at - an interruption which requires an additional berakha. The berakha, in other words, is defined by the intention at the time it was made, and does not relate outside of those boundaries. Hence food consumed in another location is not covered by the original berakha. However, when one moves from corner to corner within one room, although this specific person didn't explicitly consider this possibility, it is not considered an interruption based on normal accepted behavioral patterns.
However, according to this approach, it is not clear what pushed Rashi to reject the standard interpretation of "corner to corner" and explain instead that it is unnecessary to repeat the berakha even if one wanders from the ground floor to the attic.
Perhaps Rashi interpreted "shinui makom" in a different manner. The issue is not one of subjective intention but of defining location in objective terms. A significant change of locationishalakhically considered a termination of the initial eating. If one subsequently continues to eat, it constitutes a new beginning, a different act of eating. From this perspective we can appreciate Rashi's insistence that one must actually leave the house and enter a new domain in order to be considered a significant objective change of location.
According to this approach, if one wanted to continue eating after altering his location, he would be required first to recite a "berakha acharona" (berakha after eating) on the initial eating which was terminated, and then recite a "berakha rishona" on the food he is about to eat. (See Rambam Hilkhot Berakhot 4:3.) However, if the issue is one of hesech ha-da'at, it MIGHT be sufficient to repeat the berakha rishona without reciting the berakha acharona. (This will be discussed next week, see Tosafot 101b s.v. Ke-shehen.)
The Rambam (Hilkhot Berakhot 4:3) rules that leaving the house is considered a "shinui makom," even if one remained in the doorway. The Ra'avad disagrees, since the doorway is within eyesight of his initial position. If the issue is one of intention, then the entire area within one's view can be included in his initial intention, as the Ra'avad claims. However, if we are dealing with objective categories of location, then even an insignificant exit from the initial position is considered "shinui makom."
The Rambam (based on the Yerushalmi) rules that going from the east side of a tree to the west side requires a new berakha (ibid., halakha 5). Again the Ra'avad argues, claiming that this ruling of the Yerushalmi is only if one didn't have specific intention initially to eat on both sides of the tree. The Ra'avad's position is consistent with his general approach, that the issue at hand is one of DA'AT. Therefore, specific intention is sufficient in this case where the opposite side of the tree is not in sight.
The Rambam, however, distinguishes between a house whose walls define the boundary of the "makom," and open spaces which has no clearly defined boundary. In such open spaces roaming nearby the initial position does not constitute a new location. However, the wandering to the opposite side of a tree (based on the Yerushalmi) does. (See Kesef Mishneh.)
Devarim Ha-te'unim Berakha Achareihem Bi-mekoman
According to Rashi and the Rashbam, this category is comprised of all the seven species whose eating obligates a berakha achat me'ein shalosh ("al ha-michya", or the parallel "al ha-etz"). This includes anything which is made from grains whose berakha acharona is "al ha-michya;" or those fruits for which Eretz Yisrael was praised (i.e., grapes, figs, pomegranates, olives, dates) whose berakha is "al ha-etz;" or wine whose berakha is "al ha-gefen." (Of course, bread which demands a complete birkat ha-mazon is included as well.)
Based on a number of questions and a variant version of the text, Tosafot (s.v. "ele") argue that only mezonot (cake and pastry, made from grains) whose berakha is "al ha-michya" is categorized as "devarim ha-te'unim berakha acharona bi-mekoman." Tosafot even raises the suggestion that only bread is included.
If Tosafot are willing to include "al ha-michya," why do they argue that "al ha-etz" and "al ha-gefen" are excluded? After all, they are basically the same berakha - "berakha achat me'ein shalosh". (The five grains are themselves included under wheat and barley which belong to the seven species for which Eretz Yisrael was praised - wheat, barley, grapes, figs, pomegranates, olives, dates. See mishna at the beginning of masechet Challa.)
We might suggest that Tosafot argue that this law is not based on the type of berakha but rather of the quality of the eating. Although all berakhot "me'ein shalosh" are similar, only eating of a more permanent nature (mezonot or bread) is defined in terms of location. However, when one merely munches a snack, his position is irrelevant. A meal has a location, a snack does not.
Furthermore, Tosafot may challenge our premise and argue that "al ha-michya" is indeed a different category of berakha than the other berakhot me'ein shalosh. The obligation to recite "al ha-michya" is not because wheat and barley are two of the seven species. Rather, it is due to the filling and nourishing quality of the five grains. This is clearly the case according to the opinion that requires one to recite "al ha-michya" after eating rice bread although rice is not one of the five grains (See Berakhot 37a.) "Al ha-gefen" and "al ha-etz," however, are only a function of the type of species eaten, and the fact that Eretz Yisrael is praised based on those species.
Sources for next week's shiur:
1. 101b "Meitvei benei chabura.... ein tzrichim livarech (end of 102a)"
2. Tosafot 102a s.v. "Ve-akru," Chullin 86b "Modeh haya R. Yehuda ...be-chada."
1. Does davening during a meal constitute a hefsek regarding berakhot?
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