28b-29b: The Rules of Shomrim (1)

Today's shiur includes the vocabulary list for the shiur itself. If you wish to consult the full cumulative vocabulary list, it is found at
http://www.vbm-torah.org/talmud2/vocab.htm.  The grammar lessons appear at the end of the vocabulary lists. 

As usual, the citations to the text of the gemara are linked to the online scan of the daf, for those who do not have an open gemara before them.  The gemara can be found on-line at 
http://www.e-daf.com/daf.asp?ID=30801 and
http://www.e-daf.com/daf.asp?ID=30802.

Key words and phrases are marked in blue, and their translation/explanation can be seen by placing the cursor over them.  Other vocabulary words are marked in red and can be found on the vocabulary list at the end of the shiur.  Particularly important vocabulary words will be underlined and either have a link to the vocabulary list or a pop-up window that will appear if you place the cursor on them. 

Summary of last shiur:  In the last shiur we concluded our discussion of announcing and began investigating the obligations of the finder to maintain a lost object.  In this shiur we will focus on the nature of the finder's obligations. 

    The next sugya is is very dense and complicated.  In order to do it justice, I have divided the discussion into two parts, spread over two weeks.  This week's shiur will include an introduction and overview of the laws of "shomerim", of the laws concerning situations in which one person is placed in (temporary) possession of another's property.  Only then will we be able to address the gemara.  This week we will learn only the beginning of the sugya in which the basic issue at hand is set forth.  Next week's shiur will be based on this week's and will discuss the whole sugya in its entirety.  The schematic analysis for the whole sugya (until the mishna on 29b) will appear this week and will be reprinted next week.  

The Laws of Shomerim

    The halakha has a well developed set of laws regarding situations in which one person is in possession of another's property.  Before outlining the rules let us define some terms:  The object that the owner lends, rents, etc., is called a pikadon  פקדון.  The person who has received the pikadon into his care is called a shomer  שומר (literally a guardian or a 'bailee' in English legalese - we will, as usual, use the Hebrew term). 

    Situations in which one person's property are in another's possession present an interesting problem to any legal system.  The question arises as to the degree of responsibility the shomer bears for the pikadon when it is lost of damaged.  In addition, if there are situations in which we do not hold him or her fully responsible, how does the shomer  prove that he or she is not liable?  These issues are addressed in the Torah in the following verses:

The interpretation of these verses is very complicated and is in fact the subject of a large portion of masekhet Bava Metzia.  We will not try to do that here but merely to outline the way in which the halakha deals with the laws of shomerim (pl. of shomer).  As you can see from the way I divided the verses into sections above, the Torah addresses four different scenarios in which a person can be in possession of another's property (we are not talking about illicit possession, such as theft, but of the different circumstances under which the owner can give the pikadon to the shomer).  They are, in the order of of the verses: 

A shomer who works for free; 
A shomer who works for pay;
A borrower;
A renter. 

As we will see, there are two basic principles that guide the laws of shomerim.   

1.  The degree of responsibility borne by the shomer is proportional to the amount of benefit he gains, relative to the owner, by his possession of the object. 

2.  In cases where the pikadon is lost or damaged in a way that the shomer is not liable, he may establish that by taking an oath. 

Based on these principles, the mishna laid out the four different kinds of shomerim: 

In the mishna, swearing an oath is opposed to paying.  A shomer who has lost the pikadon for some reason or another must describe the circumstances of that loss.  If he is not responsible under the circumstances described, he takes an oath to support his description of the circumstances, and be absolved of payment.  If, however, the circumstances are such that the shomer is held responsible, he must pay.  The degree of responsibility is a function of the relative benefit the shomer gains from his or her possession of the object:

    Before we finally look at the gemara, let's go back to the mishna on 28b.  There we saw that R. Tarfon and R. Akiva disagree as to whether the finder may use the money he or she has set aside in place of a lost object that is too expensive to maintain.  The question of the permissibility of use of the money seems to give rise to the degree of responsibility the finder has for this money.  According to R. Tarfon, since the finder is permitted to use the money, he is also responsible for its loss.  According to R. Akiva, since the finder is forbidden to make use of the money, he is subsequently not held responsible for its loss.  At this point it is not clear why there is such a relationship. 

    With all of this in mind, look now at the gemara on the bottom of 28b, from "ma yehei ba-damim מה יהא בדמים" until "im avdu - patur אם אבדו - פטור" on the top of 29a. Look at Rashi, s.v. ke-shenishtamesh כשנשתמש.  Lines 1-2 in the schematic analysis. 

    This short gemara appears simple but is actually very difficult. The gemara opens with a qualification of the makhloket between R. Tarfon and R. Akiva.  According to the gemara, the makhloket in the mishna applies only when the finder has actually used the money.  Only then does R. Tarfon hold that he is liable for its loss and R. Akiva hold that he is not so liable.  However, if he or she has not yet used the money, both R. Tarfon and R. Akiva would agree that if the money is lost he is not liable. 

    At first glance, this assertion made by the gemara seems simple enough.  The gemara teaches that the crucial point in which the finder becomes fully responsible according to R. Tarfon is when he actually takes the money and uses it.  Before then we do not hold him fully liable.   R. Akiva holds that since he is forbidden to do so, his taking it changes nothing and he is still not fully liable. 

    However, if we think about this for a moment, it does not make any sense.  We can understand why R. Tarfon would limit responsibility to the point in which the finder actually takes the money, but why would R. Akiva say that one is not responsible for its loss when one takes it.  According to R. Akiva, using the money is tantamount to stealing it!  Someone who steals another's property is certainly responsible for returning it!  Because of this difficulty, none of the commentators interpret this gemara literally.  Look at Rashi on 29a, s.v ke-shenishtamesh כשנשתמש. 

    Rashi explains that the crucial point the gemara is trying to make here is not about the actual use of the money set aside but about the right to do so.  The gemara claims that the makhloket between R. Tarfon and R. Akiva about responsibility for the money is a function of the makhloket about the whether it is permitted to use it.  R. Tarfon holds that he is permitted to use it, and this permission itself is deemed to have value.  This added value means that he is a shomer sakhar on these monies, and as such his level of liablity goes up.  R. Akiva holds that he is forbidden to use the money.  He therefore gains nothing from the money being in his possession (besides the performance of the mitzva of hashavat aveida), and as such can only be considered a shomer chinam, with its attendant lower level of liability. 

    With this understanding of the machloket in mind, the gemara confronts a different machloket about the nature of the finder's responsibilities.  Learn now on 29a from "leima tihavi tiyuvta לימא תיהוי תיובתא" until "lo havi shoel alayhu לא הוי שואל עלייהו."  Lines 3-5 in the schematic analysis.

    The gemara suggests that the mishna, as interpreted, seems to undermine Rav Yosef's position regarding the responsibilities of the finder of a lost object.  As the gemara explains, Rav Yosef and Raba disagree about how to categorize the finder of a lost object.  This disagreement is not limited to cases when the object is sold because of maintenance costs, as in our mishna, but rather addresses every case in which someone finds a lost object.  What are his or her subsequent level of responsibility for that object?  According to Raba, the finder is merely a shomer chinam; since, after all, he or she receives no payment for taking care of the lost object. Since he is a shomer chinam, the level of liability should be the lowest. He should not be held responsible for the loss of or damage to the object after it came into his possession, unless it can be established that that loss or damage was the result of negligence. 

    Rav Yosef, however, disagrees.  Rav Yosef thinks we should regard the finder of a lost object as a shomer sakhar, who must reimburse the owner if the object is stolen or lost.  Only if the loss is the result of some unavoidable accident, an ones, אונס should the finder not be held liable.  Why, according to Rav Yosef, does the finder of a lost object have more liability than a person who the owner has asked to take care of his object?  The gemara here does not explain, but look in Rashi, s.v. ke-shomer sakhar כשומר שכר. 

    Rashi explains that according to Rav Yosef, we should regard the finder of a lost object as one who is in fact being paid, at least minimally.  In performing the mitzva of hashavat aveida, he benefits in that while he is busy with the lost object, he is absolved from performing other mitzvot.  This does not seem to clarify things very well.  Let's look in Rashi's source - the gemara in Bava Kama 56b to see if that will clear things up.  There we encounter a fuller discussion of the makhloket between Rav Yosef and Raba.

    The gemara here explains Raba's position as we would expect - the finder receives no compensation for looking after the lost object so there is no reason to regard him as anything but a shomer chinam.  The gemara offers two different explanations for Rav Yosef's position.  First, as the Rashi in Bava Metzia alluded to, Rav Yosef seems to think that the finder does receive minimal compensation.  While taking care of the lost object, he is not obligated in other mitzvot, based on the principle that someone who is doing one mitzva is at that moment not obligated in others.  Since this release can be economically beneficial - e.g. one can thus avoid having to feed a poor person - it has monetary value.  This value counts as benefit gained by the finder, making him into a shomer sakhar. 

    This minimal compensation accrued by the finder seems to be a too formalistic explanation of Rav Yosef's position.  A regular shomer sakhar intentionally accepts a higher level of compensation in exchange for pay.  The finder, on the other hand, does not have a choice.  He or she is obligated to pick up the lost object in order to return it.  Despite the fact that he has no choice and may not want to accept the risk, he is understood to be benefiting and thus is liable for theft and loss.  Presumably, discomfort with this situation gave rise to the alternative explanation of Rav Yosef's position offered by the gemara.

    In this explanation, the greater liability imposed on the finder according to Rav Yosef is not a function of the minimal benefit he receives.  The finder does not become a real shomer sakhar, a hired guardian.  Rather the obligation to return the lost object carries its own weight.  The finder is merely "like a shomer sakhar", i.e. he bears the same level of liability.  The obligation to return the lost object obliges him to look after it as if he were a shomer sakhar, despite the fact that he does not receive real composition. 

    That is the makhloket between Raba and Rav Yosef.  How does it apply to our mishna?  How does our mishna undermine Rav Yosef's position?  The gemara does not elaborate but if we go back to our explanation of the mishna above, the problem will be obvious.   Recall that our mishna relates a machloket between R. Tarfon and R. Akiva regarding the money that a lost object was converted into.  The gemara claims that the makhloket between R. Tarfon and R. Akiva about responsibility for the money is a function of the makhloket about the whether it is permitted to use it.  R. Tarfon holds that he is permitted to use it, and this permission can be understood as having a value.  This added value means that he is a shomer sakhar on these monies, and as such his level of liability goes up.  R. Akiva holds that he is forbidden to use the money.  He therefore gains nothing from the money being in his possession (besides the performance of the mitzva of hashavat aveida) and as such can only be considered a shomer chinam, with its attendant lower level of liability. 

    Implicit in this whole analysis is that the only thing that makes the finder into a shomer sakhar is his right to use the money.  According to R. Tarfon, he has that right, and therefore is a shomer sakhar.  According to R. Akiva, he does not have the right, and therefore is not a shomer sakhar but merely a shomer chinam.  According to Rav Yosef, however, the finder of a lost object should always be a shomer sakhar, regardless of whether or not he may use the money into which  the lost object is converted!  In other words, Rav Yosef must hold that the finder is a shomer sakhar even according to R. Akiva, since he has that status automatically, as the person responsible for a lost object (for the reasons  mentioned above in the discussion of Bava Kama 56b).   How then, does Rav Yosef understand the mishna? 

    The gemara explains that according to Rav Yosef, the machloket about use of the money is not about whether the finder is a shomer chinam or a shomer sakhar.  As Rav Yosef holds in general, the finder is always a shomer sakhar.  R. Akiva and R. Tarfon disagree as to whether the finder may use the money.  If he may, then he becomes a shoel with regard to the money.  If he is not allowed to use it , then he remains a shomer sakhar. 

    As you can see, Rav Yosef interprets the mishna in much the same way as Raba, but from a different starting point.  Raba starts from the assumption that a finder is a shomer chinam and then explains that R. Tarfon, in allowing the owner to use the money, turns him into a shomer sakhar.  Rav Yosef, in turn, starts from the assumption that a finder is a shomer sakhar, and thus the question of added liability based upon the permissibility of use becomes the question of whether he is a shoel.    

We will stop  here for the time being.  This week we learned about the general laws of shomerim.  We saw the machloket between  Raba and Rav Yosef regarding the level of the finder's liability.  We then tried to understand the mishna, and the machloket between R. Tarfon and R. Akiva as to the permissibility of the use of cash gained through the disposal of lost objects, and its attendant question as to the level of liability.  Next week, we will pick up from here and enter the gemara's discussion of the relationship between Raba and Rav Yosef's machloket and R. Tarfon and R. Akiva's. 

Schematic Analysis

Text of gemara

1.  "What happens with the money?  R. Tarfon says he may use it, etc.  

1. מה יהא בדמים? רבי טרפון אומר ישתמש וכו'.

2.  עד כאן לא פליגי . [דף כט עמ' א']אלא כשנשתמש בהן, אבל לא נשתמש בהן, אם אבדו - פטור.

3. Shall we say that this refutes R. Yosef?

3.   לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב יוסף.

Elaboration of Rav Yosef's position vis-a-vis Raba.

4.  דאתמר, שומר אבידה. רבה אמר: כשומר חנם, רב יוסף אמר: כשומר שכר.

5.  אמר לך רב יוסף: בגניבה ואבידה - דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דחייב, כי פליגי - באונסין דשואל. רבי טרפון סבר: שרו ליה רבנן לאשתמושי בגוייהו, והוה ליה שואל עלייהו. ורבי עקיבא סבר: לא שרו ליה רבנן לאשתמושי בגוייהו, הלכך לא הוי שואל עלייהו. 

Difficulty with Rav Yosef's explanation

6.  אי הכי, לפיכך דאמר רבי עקיבא למה לי?

7.  אי אמרת בשלמא בגניבה ואבידה הוא דפליגי - היינו דקתני רבי עקיבא אומר לא ישתמש בהן לפיכך אם אבדו אינו חייב באחריותן, סלקא דעתך אמינא שומר שכר הוי כדרב יוסף, ובגניבה ואבידה מחייב - קא משמע לן, לפיכך, השתא דאמרת לא ישתמש בהן - שומר שכר לא הוי, ולא מחייב בגניבה ואבידה.

8. אלא אי אמרת בגניבה ואבידה דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דחייב, כי פליגי - באונסין דשואל, מאי לפיכך דרבי עקיבא? - הכי מבעי ליה למתנא: רבי עקיבא אומר לא ישתמש בהן ואנא ידענא, דכיון דלא ישתמש בהן - לאו שואל הוי, ואינו חייב באחריותן, לפיכך דרבי עקיבא למה לי?  

9. משום, לפיכך דרבי טרפון. 

10.   ולפיכך דרבי טרפון למה לי? 

11.  He means this: Since the Rabbis permitted him to use it, it is as though he had used it,  and he is [therefore] held responsible for it.

11.  הכי קאמר: כיון דשרו ליה רבנן לאשתמושי בגוייהו - כמאן דאישתמש בגוייהו דמי וחייב באחריותן. 

12.  והא אבדו קתני! 

13. [29b] It is in accordance with Raba; for Raba said [elsewhere]: 'stolen' [refers to a case where something was] stolen by armed robbers, 'lost' means that his ship sank at sea.

13.  [עמ' ב'] - כדרבה, דאמר רבה: נגנבו - בלסטים מזויין, אבדו - שטבעה ספינתו בים.

14. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלכה כרבי טרפון.

15.  ביד רחבה הוה ליה הנהו זוזי דיתמי, אתא לקמיה דרב יוסף, אמר ליה: מהו לאשתמושי בגוייהו?

16.  אמר ליה, הכי אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלכה כרבי טרפון. 

17.   Abaye protested, But was it not stated thereon: R. Chelbo said in R. Huna's name: This refers only to the money [set aside in place] of a lost article, since he took trouble with it,  but not to money which was itself lost property and he did not have to take trouble with it.   

17. אמר ליה אביי: ולאו אתמר עלה, אמר רבי חלבו אמר רב הונא: לא שנו אלא בדמי אבידה, הואיל וטרח בה, אבל מעות אבידה דלא טרח בהו - לא. והני כמעות אבידה דמו. 

18.  אמר ליה: זיל, לא שבקו לי דאשרי לך. 

Selections from Rashi 28b -29a.

Rashi Text

Translation

כשנשתמש - לאו דוקא, אלא משום שכר שימוש קאמר, מפני שמותר להשתמש בהן.

ke-shenishtamesh,when he [the finder] has used it -  not exactly. (i.e. do not interpret that literally).  Rather, he says it is because of the profit from use - since it is permitted to use it. 

כשומר שכר - וחייב בגניבה ואבידה, דשומר שכר מצוה הוא, דהעוסק במצוה פטור מן המצוה.

ke-shomer sakhar, like a shomer sakhar - and liable for theft and loss, for he receives the reward of performing a mitzva, in that while he is performing one mitzva he is absolved from performing another.   

be-gava, be-gavyhu - [with] it, [with] them

hakhi miba'i lei - [like] this it is necessary...

salka da'atakh amina - you would have thought to say

אונס, אונסין

אחריות, אחריותן

למתנא

פקדון

שואל

שוכר

שומר

שומר חנם

שומר שכר