Lifeboat Ethics

Translated and adapted by Rav Eliezer Kwass

 

          The Halakha repeatedly emphasizes the importance of saving human lives.  We are commanded both to rescue others from death, and to preserve our own lives.  What to do when these two values tragically conflict with each other is the subject of a classic dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Petura:

"Two people were traveling, and [only] one of them had a canteen of water.  [There was only enough water so that] if both of them drank they would both die, but if one of them drank [only] he would be able reach an inhabited area [and live].  Ben Petura publicly taught:  'Better that both should drink and die than that one see his friend's death,' until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: '"Your brother should live with you" (Vayikra 25:36) - your life takes precedence over the life of your friend.'" (Bava Metzia 62a)

          There are several ways to understand the consequences of this dispute.  A group of Acharonim explain that Ben Petura and Rabbi Akiva argue about whether a person must give up his life in order to save his friend from death.

          Ben Petura rules that one must give up his life, and therefore concluded that in the above case - where each is obligated to save his friend - both must drink the remaining water.  If the obligation to share the water applies only to one of them - for instance, in the case of a child and an adult - the adult would actually have to give over the water to the child (see Minchat Chinukh #296 and Iggerot Moshe YD 145).

          Rabbi Akiva rejects this principle and believes that there is no obligation for a person to save another's life at the expense of his own.

          At first glance, the way the gemara presents the dispute implies that although Rabbi Akiva may have been open to Ben Petura's logic, the verse forced him to say, "Your life takes precedence."  However, in the parallel source, Torat Kohanim on the above verse, Ben Petura also bases his position on this verse!  If so, the two are not arguing about WHETHER to use this verse as a source, but about HOW to interpret it.  Their argument, then, is a logical one, and in the following explanation, we will attempt to clarify the difference in the positions of R. Akiva and Ben Petura.

          Defending Ben Petura's approach is a challenge; why should one have to give up his own life in order to save another's?  Of course, his seems to be the more altruistic of the two options.  Ben Petura's opinion, "Better ... than to see his friend die," seems to hold the moral edge over Rabbi Akiva's seemingly self-centered dictum, "One's own life takes precedence."  On the other hand, how can Ben Petura ignore the moral and halakhic directive to protect one's own life?  The verse clearly states, "You should watch over your selves ('nafshoteikhem') very carefully" (Devarim 4:15)!  How does this mitzva fit into Ben Petura's approach?

          There is, however, a well-known precedent to Ben Petura's approach.  One whose only way to save his life is by killing another is told by the Halakha (Sanhedrin 74a), "Who says that your blood is redder?  Maybe your friend's blood is redder!"  (This opinion is known in halakhic shorthand as "Mai chazit...")  The value and mitzva of saving one's life ("pikuach nefesh") does not stand in the face of the prohibition of murder.  Therefore, in a case where either he or his friend will end up being killed and at least one life will be lost, Rashi (Sanhedrin 74a) explains, "the King's decree forbidding murder should not be pushed aside." 

          Although this seems to be a precedent for Ben Petura's position, our problem still remains.  The same difficulty - what happened to the halakhic imperative to protect oneself? - arises with the command to give up one's life to save another's.  Does not the King also command us to take care of the bodies that He gave us?  Why protect my friend at my expense? 

TOSAFOT'S APPROACH

          Tosafot (Sanhedrin 74b, s.v. Esther) take an approach to saving lives that can answer the question, "Who says your blood is redder?"  They believe that in certain situations one can save his life through killing.  For example, we learn that if a person is threatened with death unless he allows himself to be thrown on a baby, he may choose to live.  The rule does not apply to PASSIVE killing.  "He can say, 'On the contrary, who says that HIS blood is redder?  Maybe MY blood is redder,' since he does not actively do anything." 

          It seems that Tosafot did not understand "Mai chazit" as conclusively determining that my FRIEND's blood is redder.  Rather, it should be taken literally - we do not know whose blood is redder.  Therefore, the best course of action is inaction, "shev ve-al ta'aseh."  To kill actively to save one's life is prohibited, for one has thereby decided "whose blood is redder."  However, one is not obligated to object when forced to be used passively to cause the death of another.

          Through Tosafot's approach we can explain why one would be able to protect his own life even if as a result another life is threatened, as long as he does not actively commit murder. On the other hand, the problem of Ben Petura is still unsolved because he also objects to leaving the water in one's own hands - passive behavior that allows the other person's death.  According to Tosafot's theory, one can refrain from making an active decision about "whose blood is redder" even if it means the death of another (in this case, by holding on to the water).

          Furthermore, Rav Chaim Soloveitchik (Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chaim Ha-levi al Ha-Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah; other Acharonim agree) proves that the Rambam disagrees with Tosafot and rules that passive murder is prohibited, even when it can save another life.  According to the Rambam, we must find another explanation for the principle, "Who says your blood is redder?"

"MURDER" VS. "NOT SAVING"

          The Rambam would agree that everyone must protect his own life.  However, when faced with a situation where one must decide between killing another person and letting himself die, he must be guided by the consideration of which sin is more severe.  Murder, of course, is much more severe than not saving someone.  Perhaps even passive participation in murder (letting oneself be thrown on a child) is more severe than sitting idly when someone's life is in danger.  If so, we can understand the logic of "Mai chazit" according to Rav Chaim's reading of the Rambam.  According to this approach, we do not choose inaction as a result of our uncertainty over whose life is more valuable; rather we have decided that murder is worse than not saving a person.  Therefore, we avoid MURDERING another even though it means NOT SAVING oneself.

          Rav Chaim uses this distinction - between killing and not saving - in order to support the Rambam's position against Tosafot.  Ben Petura taught that is forbidden to let another die, even PASSIVELY, in order to save oneself.  Even Rabbi Akiva's opinion that "Your life comes first" applies only if it means not giving the water to the other person (= not saving him) - and even for that he needed a special prooftext.  Rabbi Akiva would certainly agree, however, that your life does not come first if it means MURDERING the other person (and this fits nicely with the Rambam's understanding).

          The Chazon Ish (in his glosses to Rav Chaim's commentary on the Rambam) completely rejects the distinction between murder and not saving.  He views "not saving" as merely passive murder, for it also brings about the loss of another's life.  That makes Rav Chaim's explanation of the Rambam unviable and would force the Rambam to agree with Tosafot's opinion that "Mai chazit" demands inaction.

          Nevertheless, if we accept Rav Chaim's distinction between murder and not saving, we can explain "Mai chazit."  However, the difficulty inherent in Ben Petura's approach remains: why must one sacrifice one's life even when confronted with a choice between NOT SAVING oneself and NOT SAVING another?

MAI CHAZIT AS KIDDUSH HASHEM

          We have presented two approaches to understanding the principle "Mai chazit."  Each approach accepts the assumption that there is a conflict between the prohibition of murder and the biblical command of protecting one's own life.  Both opinions try to explain why the Halakha prefers saving another's life before saving one's own (i.e. not murdering the other even if it means he himself will be murdered).

1)  According to Tosafot, one must sit back and NOT DECIDE whose life to save.  This results in one's own life being lost, not because the Halakha prefers another's life, but because we do not know whose life is to be preferred.

2)  According to Rav Chaim's understanding of Rambam, the mitzva of protecting one's own life must be ignored if it involves active murder; murder it is a worse crime than passive inaction that results in death.  It is better not to save oneself than to murder another.

          All of the above has been an attempt to justify ignoring the command to protect one's own life.  We assume that such a command should have applied here but is either overruled by the prohibition of murder (Rambam) or is negated by the need for passivity in light of our inability to take a divine decision into human hands (Tosafot).  However, Rashi's comments in Sanhedrin imply that the obligation to save one's own life DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL if he is given the choice between sacrificing his own life and taking the life of another.  He writes, "The King's word cannot be pushed aside, for he commanded against murder."  It sounds as if there are no other words of the King that this potential murderer encounters.  Additionally, there does not even seem to be any mitzva that is being pushed aside when one gives up his life in order to avoid murdering another. 

          The absence in Rashi of any reference to protecting one's life is confusing at first glance.  I am convinced that a close look at the Rambam's Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-torah will lead to a similar conclusion and will not only explain "Mai chazit," but Ben Petura's difficult approach as well.  In order to explain Rashi and the Rambam, we will have to understand more thoroughly why the principle of pikuach nefesh (based on "Ve-chai bahem" - "live by the mitzvot" and do not die by them) does not apply to murder as it does to other mitzvot.

          In general, all Torah prohibitions are pushed aside in order to save a life (e.g., if someone says, "Commit prohibition x or I will kill you," you must commit the prohibition and save your life).  There are three exceptions to this rule: idolatry, adultery and murder.  (There are several circumstances that affect the application of this rule, but they are not pertinent to our discussion.)  The gemara offers different reasons for each of these exceptions to the rule of "And you shall live by them."  For murder there is a logical argument - "Who says your blood is redder? - while for idolatry and adultery the gemara brings a proof from biblical verses. 

          The gemara proves why "Ve-chai bahem" does not apply to these three prohibitions, but it does not address what mitzva demands sacrificing one's life in these cases.  One could understand that the gemara's starting assumption is that one must sacrifice his life rather than transgress ANY mitzva.  The verse "Ve-chai bahem" then teaches that, on the contrary, preserving one's life is of cardinal importance.  However, where "Ve-chai bahem" is inapplicable, it is natural that by default one must sacrifice his life.  Thus, for the three sins where "Ve-chai bahem" does not apply, we fall back on the original requirement to sacrifice one's life.  The reason one must die rather than murder is derived from the original prohibition of "Thou shalt not murder."

          One gets a different picture from the Rambam's Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-torah 5:1):

"The whole house of Israel is commanded to sanctify God's great Name, for it says, 'I will be sanctified in the midst of the Children of Israel...'  How [is this mitzva fulfilled]?  If an idolater forces a Jew to transgress one of the Torah's commandments under threat of death, he should transgress the commandment rather than be killed, for it says concerning the mitzvot, 'that a man does them and lives by them...'  When does this apply?  With regard to all mitzvot except for idolatry, adultery, and murder; but with regard to these three sins ... one should let oneself be killed rather than transgress ..."

          The Rambam explicitly writes that the obligation to give up one's life rather than transgress these three sins stems from the mitzva of KIDDUSH HASHEM, the sanctifying of God's Name.  Thus, according to the Rambam (Yesodei Ha-torah 5:5), if one murders and does not give up his life, he does not subsequently receive the death penalty, for he did not sin willingly, but rather was "anuss" (coerced).  If so, the exclusive source for choosing death rather than murder must be the mitzva of kiddush Hashem.

          It is now clear that if a Jew is called upon to give up his own life rather than murder, the obligation to protect his own life is not PUSHED ASIDE - it is NON-EXISTENT.  The obligation to protect one's life applies to normal daily living, but obviously not to situations where we are expressly commanded to give up our lives.  The essence of the obligation of kiddush Hashem involves NOT preserving one's life, but rather giving it up for the higher cause - sanctifying God's Holy Name.  "Ve-chai bahem" absolves one of the mitzva of kiddush Hashem with regard to other mitzvot.  However, "Ve-chai bahem" does not apply in a case of murder because a life will be lost in any case, and therefore the obligation of kiddush Hashem applies.  There is no conflicting value that stands up against murder, and thus Rashi's words can be taken at face value; "the King's words 'Do not murder'" are the exclusive words relevant to this situation and cannot be pushed aside.

          This explanation also finally enables us to understand Ben Petura's approach, that there is an obligation to try to save another person who is also dying of thirst.  Can one absolve himself of the need to help the other person based on "Ve-chai bahem?"  Certainly not, because "Ve-chai bahem" does not apply where one person will inevitably die, as in the case of the Jew threatened with death unless he murders.  The same logic that underlies the gemara's decision (according to Rashi and the Rambam) when it applies "Mai chazit" should apply here also: where "Ve-chai bahem" does not apply, the mitzva of kiddush Hashem does apply.  In such situations there is naturally no obligation to protect one's own life; the whole essence of kiddush Hashem makes the commandment of self-preservation totally inapplicable.

"MAI CHAZIT" ACCORDING TO RABBI AKIVA

          If this explanation of the Rambam's and Rashi's opinion about "Mai chazit" is accurate, Rabbi Akiva's conclusion about the two men walking in the desert is difficult.  If "Ve-chai bahem" does not apply to saving a life when one life will certainly be lost, how can he rule that the person with the canteen should save his own life?  The answer is that the Torah expressly tells us otherwise by saying, "Ve-chai achikha IMAKH" ("Your brother should live WITH YOU") - your life takes precedence.  Rabbi Akiva agrees that, looking only at the Torah's approach to kiddush Hashem and "Ve-chai bahem," it is possible to agree with Ben Petura's conclusion.  However, R. Akiva learns from a biblical verse that one's life takes precedence over another's and therefore the line of logic that Ben Petura employs is incorrect.

          Perhaps we can also understand the logical basis of Rabbi Akiva's position.  In his opinion, when two people are walking through the desert with water enough for only one, there is NO OBLIGATION for one to save his friend.  If saving one person's life indirectly brings about the death of another (in this scenario, the person himself), the mitzva of saving another does not apply, because it wouldn't actually be "hatzala" - saving a life.  If so, there is nothing to sacrifice one's life for.  The passage in Sanhedrin, in contrast, was referring to murder.  In this case, the prohibition of murder cannot be pushed aside even if it enables one to save his own life.  Therefore, in order to sanctify the name of God one still refrains from murder.

          Based on this approach, we come to a fourth explanation of "Mai chazit."  It is forbidden to kill another in order to save oneself, because "saving" at the expense of another's life is not considered "saving."  Rashi's comment, that when faced with the choice of murdering or being killed the only halakhic concern is the prohibition against murder (not the obligation to save one's own life), now makes sense, since there is no obligation to save one person when it brings about the death of another.  This is Rabbi Akiva's view on when the mitzva of saving a life applies.  Ben Petura, on the other hand, disagrees with this whole approach, asserting that the obligation to save a life still applies.

SUMMARY

          In summary, there emerge four approaches to explain the law that one must sacrifice his own life rather than murder another:

1. Tosafot (Chazon Ish) - One must remain inactive (shev ve-al ta'aseh).  Murder, "Lo tirtzach," clashes with preserving life, "Ve-chai bahem."
2. Rav Chaim - The sin of murder is more severe than the sin of not saving a life.  "Lo tirtzach" is more stringent than "Ve-chai bahem."
3. Rambam (perhaps also Rashi) - One is obligated to be killed based on kiddush Hashem, sanctifying God's Name.  The mitzva of saving a life does not apply when there is a mitzva of kiddush Hashem.
4. Rashi (possibly) - One must let himself be killed in order to avoid murder, based on the prohibition of "Lo tirtzach."  There is no counter-issue of saving a life because saving one person at the expense of another is not considered "saving."

          Regarding the case of two people in a desert with enough water for only one:

1. Rabbi Akiva's approach ("Your life takes precedence") might be based on understandings #1, 2, or 4.
2. Ben Petura's approach ("Better that they should both drink and die") can be based only on #3.