Tradition in Conflict (1)

 

            Rihal bases his opinions upon the testimony of Jewish tradition.  However, he does not conceal the fact that Jewish tradition up to our very day subsists in a constant state of conflict.  Rihal refers explicitly to two of these conflicts.  The first dispute is with alternate religious traditions.  The most notable of these is the tradition ostensibly held by the people of India, which claims human history to be of greater length than our scriptures acknowledge.  The second conflict is with a different tradition: the assumptions of the academic consensus.  With this group we challenge the truth of philosophical theses which are allegedly the outcomes of logical speculation.  This latter debate is much more fundamental, as it does not dispute the age of the world; it challenges the actual doctrine of creation.

 

            Rihal mentions these two conflicts the first section of the Kuzari.  In the third section, he returns to a more internal conflict: our dispute with the Karaite sect regarding the authenticity of the Oral Law.  The first two conflicts which we mentioned belong by now to the annals of history.  However, we stand to gain much from simply examining the discussion itself, since every battle has rules of its own.  For in every period of history, tradition faces a new conflict with opponents and enemies which typify that period.  However, we will also see that at times the old challenges change their garb, and outfit themselves in keeping with each passing intellectual vogue.

 

 

Confronting the Tradition of Idolatry

 

            Our first encounter is with the Indian tradition [I:60-61].  Thus, a conflict with the religions of the Far East is now added to our conflict with Christianity and Islam.  However, we must be cautious; although India does in fact possess traditions which date history farther back than our chronology, in this section Rihal actually creates an intentional deception.  We are presented with a literature which expresses the battle of idolatry against the monotheistic religions.  The material quoted as the Indian tradition is in fact a sort of philosophical conglomeration of various Eastern groups which attempted to present an alternative to the biblical account of history.  These philosophers "reconstructed" Indian belief, describing its creed as a religion which was not based on revelation.  The Chaver expresses it well: "Their statements regarding the computation [of the world's age] are intended only to anger the religious people, just as they anger them with their idols and their incantations and their tricks, which they believe are beneficial to them" [I:61].

 

            One striking example of this is the new idolatrous literature which was fabricated during the assault upon the Scriptures.  The Chaver describes it to us thus: "The book 'Nabatean Agriculture' in which the names of Yanvoshad and Sagrit and Davena are mentioned, who, according to the book, existed before Adam."  We find ourselves contending with an intentional, controversial attempt to create an imaginary history of the period prior to the existence of Adam, interwoven with many Scriptural elements.  Thus the story of Yanvoshad, Adam's teacher, was created, a story which seemingly testifies to the existence of a history prior to the creation of Adam, and which is intended to undermine the reliability of the Scriptures.  This "new" idolatrous literature is not history but bogus propaganda, an attempt to revive idolatry.

 

            In his "Guide to the Perplexed," the Rambam used these books in order to discover the practices of the idolatry which ancient Judaism fought against, and thus to enrich our understanding and exegesis of the Bible.  And indeed, if not for the deciphering of archeological remains, and the remnants of pagan literature, the idolatry of the biblical period would have been eternally hidden from medieval philosophers.  For this reason, the Rambam used these pseudo-classical books in his attempt to reconstruct the lost idolatry.  And indeed, despite the lack of authenticity in this literature, the Rambam made good use of it for his purposes.  In any case, the Chaver is certainly correct when he states that this literature is historically insignificant, and cannot prove a thing.  At the same time, the Chaver introduces us to an entire literature consisting of fabricated attempts to fill in the gaps, the empty chapters of history, not as they truly were, but as they should have been according to the writer's theory.

 

            The fact that a tradition exists does not guarantee its authenticity; there are other phenomena to be taken into account.  For although various Indian traditions have been discovered, they were based on the ideas of individuals.  These individuals proposed their theories.  Cults evolved around these theories, each one jealously guarding a so-called "tradition."  This sheds no light on the actual authenticity of any of these traditions.  Rihal's example of Indian religions proves this point.  Rihal's generation was not aware that this literature was fraudulent.  Therefore, Rihal calls our attention to the fact that these books were written by individual people, whose goal was to perturb the religions with their opinions, "just as they anger them with their idols and their incantations and their tricks."  These books are not historical.  They fall under the category of fictional or mythological works, in company with astrology books.

 

            We must realize the full implications of Rihal's statement.  Rihal teaches us that the main test of a tradition's authenticity lies in its acceptance by the public, by the nation as a whole.  Although this is not the only prerequisite, it is essential.  We must be wary of so-called "traditions" which are merely the chimera of an individual, or the artificial creation of a interest group.  Rihal will further develop the characteristics of revelation later in his essay.  A central component among these characteristics is that the revelatory experience is a sudden breakthrough; it does not come about through the slow evolutionary change which characterizes the growth and development of opinions.

 

            Idolatrous traditions are not grounded enough.  They contain mythological traditions which have no historical basis; and they contain traditions, such the Indian tradition quoted by the Kuzari, which are obvious fabrications.  The common link between all these traditions is that they are not based on a reliable chain of transmitters and receivers.

 

Confronting the Philosophical Tradition

 

            This time we are not speaking of India, which was negated as a challenge to the thinker because of its unreliable tradition, but of Greece, which bases itself on philosophical speculation, not history.  The discussion moves from the historical to the philosophical plain, to the prevailing question of the eternal existence of the world.  Greece does not speak of a history of hundreds of thousands of years; it discusses the infinite perpetuity of the world:

 

            "The Kuzari said: Insofar as I have argued with you   regarding an uneducated rabble, and people who do not       concur upon a single opinion, your answer has been   appropriate.  However, what will you answer with regard to the philosophers, who have reached the levels they            have attained through research and investigation, [who]     do not agree with [your] opinion [negating] the eternal            existence of the world; and eternity is not an issue of         [the difference between] tens of thousands of years and         thousands of thousands; [it]... has no end." [I:62]

 

            In this section, the Kuzari responds to the Chaver's words.  Faced with the general consensus which lies at the base of the biblical tradition, the Kuzari presents us with an opposing consensus, the consensus of the philosophers regarding the eternal existence of the world.  This, of course, is a consensus of a different kind.  The first consensus is historical, which gives evidence of the reliability of the testimony, whereas the second is a philosophical consensus, seemingly based on proof.  Yet, here as well a "general consensus" exists.  True, a mathematical statement does not become truer if it is proved one hundred times over.  However, despite the rationality which underlies its approach, scientific investigation functions according to the test of consensus.  However cynical it sounds, we must admit that the scientific community actually decides what is true and what is not.

 

            Of course, this does not alter our position.  For the philosophical consensus has not necessarily solved the problem.  Has the eternal existence of the world been proven?  Or is this an ongoing error based on the pseudo-tradition of a community of experts who continue to err in the footsteps of their teachers?

 

            At this point Rihal adds a historical principle:

 

            "The Chaver: We may not reproach the philosophers, since    they are persons who did not inherit wisdom or religion,  for they are Greek, and Greece is a descendent of Japheth  who resided in the east, while wisdom, which is an  inheritance from Adam, [I refer to]... the wisdom which   is supported by the divine influence, was transferred from Adam only to the descendants of Shem, the chosen son  of Noah, and which [wisdom] has and always will remain    among these chosen ones.  As regards the Greeks, this wisdom only reached them after they conquered the nations that fought against them.  Only then was that wisdom transferred to them from the Persians, who received it from the Chaldeans.  Only then did the famous  philosophers arise in that kingdom; and what more, since the Roman conquest, the Greeks have not produced one philosopher of note." [I:63]

 

            The Kuzari claims that Greek culture was cut off from the ancient tradition, which was the tradition of the sons of Shem.  Greek science is no more than a development of the Babylonian science that preceded it, the science of the Chaldeans.  Of course, even if this is true, the central problem remains unresolved, namely, that the philosophical claims are not based on a tradition at all but rather on logical proofs.  Rihal does not attempt to deceive us.  He himself warns us of a logical pitfall.  No claim deserves to be disqualified simply based on the personality or the qualities of the person who suggests it.  And indeed, the Kuzari responds appropriately: "And does this compel us not to have faith in Aristotle's wisdom?" [I:64].  A stolen proof is still a proof.  Aristotle's authority does not stem from the existence of a tradition, but from his wisdom, from the fact that he discusses the questions and proves them logically.  Thus, the doctrine of the eternal existence of the world could be true even if it is not based on any tradition.  As an answer to this question, we read a very important section:

 

            "The Chaver: Certainly [Aristotle loses credibility because he lacks a tradition]!  Because he had no reliable tradition from people whose word he trusted, Aristotle exerted his mind and applied his faculties to  investigate the origins and end of the world: he found it  equally difficult to imagine that the world had a  beginning, or that it had existed for eternity, and only through his abstract analysis did he decide in accordance   with the proofs which lean toward the theory of eternal existence - and therefore he saw no need to concern  himself with the generations that preceded him, nor with the attitude of [other] people; however, if the philosopher was a member of a nation in which true   opinions were passed down through a well-known and   irrefutable chain of tradition, he would have employed  his logical proofs to bolster the faith in a created  world, with all the difficulties in [this theory], just   as he did in his attempt to strengthen the idea of the world's eternal existence,[which is] a less likely idea." [I:65]

 

            This response would later be developed by the Rambam in his "Guide to the Perplexed."  Creation cannot be proved or disproved logically.  If we use the instruments of philosophy, the enigma of creation will remain forever sealed.  We cannot prove either position to be true.  Both responses are conceivable, and logic cannot help us choose between them; both bear equal weight.  Neither has rational precedence over the other, and no proof could compel us to adopt one over the other.  We face the dilemma with complete freedom.  In terms of philosophy and rational thought, we may build two alternative world views, one based on creation, the other on eternal existence.  Faced with the two possibilities, Aristotle decided in favor of eternal existence, without the support of any logical proof.  His choice is arbitrary.  Thus we read later on:

 

            "The Kuzari: And what [arbitrary] decision is possible when a logical proof exists?

            The Chaver: Has a logical proof ever been found [with  regard to] this question?  Heaven forbid that the Torah  contradict something which is obvious, or something which   has been logically proven!  The Torah does mention     miracles, which involve some alteration in the natural    order, either through the creation of new objects or  through the transformation of one object into another;   however, all these [changes] only come to demonstrate    that the Creator of the world can do whatever He desires, whenever He so desires.  However, the question of the  eternal existence or creation of the world is a difficult    question to resolve, and the proofs for both claims are  equal, and what tipped the scales toward creation is the tradition from Adam, Noah and Moses, may they rest in   peace, prophetic testimony, which is more reliable than the testimony of logic.  And despite all this, if the believer in the Torah felt logically compelled [to   accept]... the opinion about previously existent hylic matter coupled with the opinion that our world was  preceded by many other worlds, it would not taint his  belief that our world came into being only a certain   period of time ago, and that its first human inhabitants  were Adam and Noah."

 

            Rihal emphasizes the fact that although the Greeks did develop philosophy, the genesis of this philosophy was significantly influenced by the Jewish people.  This accepted position, which claims that philosophy stems from Jewish writings [II:66], was recognized by many medieval thinkers, and can also be found in Jewish writings from Alexandria.  I believe in this theory in a different form.  As we have mentioned before, history teaches us that the source of all religious philosophy lies in the encounter between Greek philosophy and the Scriptures, which took place at the end of the ancient period, in Alexandria in particular.  The outstanding representative of this synthesis is Philo.

 

            Philosophy itself must certainly be viewed as a universal phenomenon which appears and develops at varying levels of technique and sophistication in all periods and places.  Some thinkers might disagree with my opinion.  Rihal's modern successors might accept this position in a different form: let us say that philosophy came into being in Greece, under the influence of the encounter with the East.  Rihal calls it the wisdom which they received "from the Chaldeans;" his modern successors would have called it the great philosophical work transmitted through the descendants of Shem, which our Sages like to call the "yeshiva of Shem and Ever," a work which has influenced the development of cultures the world over.

 

            It would be difficult to convince me of a religious obligation to maintain that the Jewish people or the heavens  are to be credited for classical philosophy.  But it is also possible to understand why the ancients thought that this was the case.  They were part of a culture which believed that philosophy was the key to truth, happiness, meaning, even immortality.  Therefore, it was of paramount importance to know who had received the key to these gifts from its owner.  We of the modern age understand the significance of philosophy differently, and are willing to "allow" other nations their contribution, and accept the fact that philosophy stems from the contributions of all the nations.  Prophecy is the hallmark of the Jewish contribution.

 

            "Since the Roman conquest, the Greeks have not produced one philosopher of note." [I:63]

 

            This simple statement has important ramifications, which would later be developed in the thought of the nineteenth-century Jewish philosopher Rabbi Nachman Krochmal (known by his acronym, Ranak).  The Greeks developed a philosophy, however, for them it was a temporary creation.  Their philosophy was the whole world's inheritance, yet from the Greek perspective it was only significant historically.  There are no more Greeks, in the classical sense of the word; neither is Greece itself a center of philosophy any longer.  Whereas, Ranak writes, Jewish history teach us that Jewish philosophical creativity suffered a decline, yet this creative force revives again and with greater force in each new phase of history.

 

(This lecture was translated by Gila Weinberg.)

 

Copyright (c)1997 Prof. Shalom Rosenberg, Yeshivat Har Etzion.  All rights reserved.