Judaism and Nature (3)

 

Imagine

 

Jewish folklore tells of a matchmaker instructing a young man before his date with a prospective bride.  In light of the young man's questions, the matchmaker suggests a few topics to discuss.  "Talk," he says, "about family and about love."

"And what if we exhaust those topics?" asks the young man anxiously.

"Then talk about philosophy."

The story preserved the transcript of the conversation:

"Do you have any brothers or sisters?"

"No."

The first topic was now at an end.

"Do you love lokshen [noodles]?"

"No."

The topic of love failed as well.  However, philosophy was still an untried source. 

"If you had a brother, would he like lokshen?"

The hero of our tale saw philosophy as dealing with imagining realities.  And to a large extent he was right.

 

     Children very quickly learn to use "if."  If you put your finger in the socket, you will get an electric shock.  It is much harder to imagine realities that do not exist.  The child undergoes an important stage in his development when he learns to do this.  It is the ability to move outside the existing framework and think, or dream, of another framework.  It means that I do see either my reality or the laws of the nature as the only dimension.  The deepest meaning that we can glean from the fact that our world was created and has not always existed, is that the world could have been different.  Despite all the laws of nature that I see before me, I can imagine a completely different system of laws.  And even if I cannot think of another system, I can imagine that the world did not exist at all.  Imagination constitutes a great revolution in human thought.

 

     Perhaps at this juncture we may ask the Chaver to relate to the approach of the philosophers' spiritual grandson, Baruch Spinoza (and thus examine his view of the relationship between Judaism and Nature).

 

     Any discussion of a philosophical theory is, above all, an attempt to discover the value of the truth in its claims, but we cannot do that here.  On the other hand, I do not want to make claims against Spinoza the man.  And yet, we must take note of the implications of his ideas.  We will try to do this further on.  In this regard, I feel that we must examine those conclusions which Spinoza stated outright.  It is, of course, possible to try and defend any thesis and attach it to another respected approach.  However, this type of defense cannot hold ground against explicit statements presented in a theological political manifesto.

 

     As far as I am concerned, these statements form the "J'accuse" against his approach, and against those who in certain areas, either knowingly or unknowingly, followed in his footsteps.  It is a "J'accuse" listing eight transgressions:

 

1. The sin of immanence: the loss of human ethics

 

This is the first sin, the father of all other sins: "God is the world."  However, this is not merely a philosophical claim.  Nature is the world of facts.  Above nature spreads the world of values, which are not facts.  There is no distinction between nature and norm.  He who draws his values from nature, accepts the decree of nature: the law of the jungle and the conviction that might is right.

 

     In this regard I see Kant as the polar opposite of Spinoza.  The contrast between the law born of logic and the law of nature, including human nature, is none other than a reformulation of classical Jewish ethics.

 

2. The political sin: the omnipotent state

 

The identification of nature with a political norm, means that the law is laid down by those in power.  The person who has no power to enforce his rights has no rights.  Power and rights are synonymous!  The final conclusion from these ideas was developed in the philosophy of Nietzsche.  He tried to teach us to extract all the implications of various philosophies, be they as paradoxical and appalling as may be.  A new concept must arise in place of the Judeo-Christian ethic.  Nietzsche was willing to take this theory to its ultimate conclusion, which would have meant detention and extermination camps.  Nietzsche's Jewish admirers can comfort themselves with the fact that the victims of his approach were not supposed to be Jews.  However, this does not change the moral and political implications of his approach.

 

3. Politics of Power

 

Spinoza's moral positions result in a Machiavellian approach.  In the footsteps of Isaac Folkar, Spinoza teaches us that destruction is the result of a "feminine" politics which does not rely heavily enough upon force.

 

4. General Implications and Conclusions

 

As Rabbi Nathan, the student of Rabbi Nachman taught, money and nature are intertwined.  We find the conclusions stemming from the idea of divine immanence in nature, applied to economics as part of Marx's approach.  Marx felt that it is impossible to base the improvement of society on the ideals of man.  Prophetic visions and other such philosophies constitute a mere "Utopian Socialism" in the Marxist view.  In the face of social visions, the Marxists created scientific socialism, which is not in the hands of man's will, but rather constitutes a process which functions and develops on its own. 

 

5. Nature and Freedom

 

Man is part of nature.  To give expression to this idea is to deny human freedom.  This seems like a way of overcoming Dualism.

 

     The conclusions from this principle were expressed by Darwin and in the Darwinian philosophy in general.  I do not intend to discuss the evolutionary process here.  However, it is impossible not to note the fact that the Darwinian social philosophy is a logical conclusion from Spinoza's philosophy.  According to this position, it is the struggle and the overcoming of moral restraints that will ultimately bring  about the progress of humanity. 

 

6. Elitist Freedom

 

The conclusion which stems from Spinoza's view is that freedom is significant only in the world of thought.  Everything is in the hands of the government, except philosophy.  Everything is permitted for the government, except to forbid an elitist group to develop and believe in its own philosophies.  This is an elitism which we find in the representative of philosophy to the Kuzari king.

 

     This fact had a long-ranging result regarding Jewish existence.  The government has the right to place religious obligations on the citizens of the country without exception.  Here we are witness to the debate between Spinoza and Mendelsohn, who fought for the religious freedom of the Jewish minority.

 

7. Spinoza and Judaism

 

     Some people try to present Spinoza as the first secular Jew.  Out of his complex attitude to Judaism I will note only one aspect which seems to me to be especially significant.

 

     Spinoza was a victim of the great temptation which lies in wait for every philosopher.  The involvement in philosophy is abstract.  He sees in his mind a fascinating war of ideas, but whoever is outside cannot perceive the tension and the attraction it holds for him.  The philosopher is tempted to give a tangible representation of the abstract.  Spinoza did this.  The representation he gave to his philosophy in a theological-political manifesto, transformed the conflict of ideas into a kind of philosophical Western.  The good philosophy was represented by Jesus, the bad by Judaism.  This had significant and disastrous results.  Thus, philosophical antisemitism was born, which affected various philosophers in Spinoza's wake.

 

8. Spinoza and Jewish National Rebirth

 

Religious rights are merely a function of political power.  The Torah is none other than the constitution of the Jewish state.  This means that only the birth of a Jewish state could usher in the binding power of the Torah.  Until then, it can have no power, and the state has the absolute right to pass religious laws which are binding upon its Jewish citizens, without any limitations.  There are those who try to see Spinoza in a positive light based on his comment about the possibility of a rebuilt Jewish state.  This is an interesting theory; however, the context teaches us the real meaning of this statement.  Wagner also made a statement which could imply a recognition of a Jewish state; this did not make him any less of an antisemite.

 

 

(This lecture was translated by Gila Weinberg.)