The Problem of Evil and Divine Providence (2)

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik's Approach

 

Rabbi Soloveitchik discusses the question of evil and suffering in his work "Kol Dodi Dofek." His interpretation echoes the book of Job in rejecting the answer of philosophy. There is an answer, he claims, but are we capable of understanding it? In a wonderful analogy he compares the divine cosmic plan to a gorgeous wall hanging, similar to the Chagall wall hangings in the Knesset. Each thread has significance as part of the complex tapestry. However, we see the wall hanging from the wrong side. All we see are thread ends, and the beautiful picture is meaningless to us. Any attempt to solve the riddle is doomed to failure. This is our state, the state of faith. In other words: despite the fact that I am on the wrong side, I must believe that there is a picture, and that my suffering has meaning.

 

     We cannot attempt here to summarize the history of the search for the meaning of suffering in Jewish thought. Rabbi Soloveitchik tries to direct our gaze towards a different direction, so that we may rediscover the halakhic meaning of suffering. Our Sages state that one ought to repent as a result of suffering. Here Rabbi Soloveitchik presents us with a halakhic-philosophical approach to the issue. There are two types of repentance. The first type is the repentance that must follow a sin. The second type of repentance is a response to suffering, rather than to any specific sin. After one suffers, he must repent not because he is aware of his rating on the divine scoreboard and understands which sin has caused him to be sentenced to suffer, but because of a different principle. Suffering is a terrible "gift" that was given to mankind, which we must use to create a different, better life for ourselves.

 

     Despite the difference between their approaches, we can connect Rabbi Soloveitchik's idea to the beautiful parable created by Rabbi Nachman of Breslov. Rabbi Nachman was sensitive to the danger of sadness and emotional suffering. Imagine, says Rabbi Nachman, a wedding where a circle of people are dancing, and one person stays outside and refuses to join the circle. Sometimes we force him against his will to join the dance. Who is it who stays outside the circle of dancers? Sadness. We must force sadness too into the dance of joy. In the same way, Rabbi Soloveitchik teaches us that although we do not know the explanation of suffering, we must use it in a positive way. This is why we must repent. The person who does not repent "wastes" his suffering! Our sages expressed this approach with a daring term: "suffering [which comes] from love." However, they set a limit to this type of suffering: when one can no longer study Torah because of the intensity of one's suffering, the suffering is no longer from love.

 

     This approach must not lead us to a masochistic conclusion. As we have seen, the faith in our ability to overcome suffering is a central Jewish idea. Pleasure is not a crime, nor is attempting to relieve suffering. When someone we know is sick, we must try to cure him, and if this is not possible, we must at least try to lessen his pain. We know that we ought not to prolong his life artificially. However, when a person's suffering simply cannot be relieved, Jewish law tells us that he may not take his own life. Why not commit suicide? Adherence to this law must not be viewed as a masochistic decision. The suffering is heaven sent, and man must take advantage of it, so to speak. Suffering helps build humanity. Suffering, more than riches and pleasure, gives man the ability to understand and forward the development of  humanity. In this context, suffering also becomes a pedagogic punishment, like work after the sin in the Garden of Eden and nationalism after the sin of the Tower of Babel. Man cannot know why he suffers. But he must construct an answer to a second question: what is the purpose of his suffering?

 

     We will not give up our belief in divine justice; therefore, we must say that a complete understanding of what happens in this world is not possible, unless we take the world to come into consideration as well. We do not receive this belief in divine justice as philosophers but as believers receiving their legacy of faith. The Kabbala understands divine providence differently. The sages of the Kabbala connected divine providence to the concept of reincarnation.

 

Rihal and Suffering

 

The study of a great book is similar to an attempt to scale a mountain peak. We are not yet familiar with the path we must take: the content of the book. Yet we climb under the pressure of the attempt to find the right path. Once we are already familiar with the path and we ascend a second time, we are capable of noticing the roadsides, blossoming with flowers, which we did not notice the first time around. We can write a general structure of Rihal's book, composed of theories about the divine essence and the uniqueness of the Jewish people. However there are roadsides everywhere, which blossom with stunning flowers. One of these flowers touches on the question of suffering. What does the Kuzari say regarding this question?

 

     We have seen that one of the central principles of Judaism is the belief that God accompanies us on our life's journey. Biographical events are not mere coincidence. Divine providence exists. However, we cannot construct the human biography because we do not have a general picture.

 

     Redemption is the plan for the nation and the world as a whole, but there is also justice for the individual, through the immortality of the soul. The story does not end in this world.

 

     Rihal discusses this question in the third section of the Kuzari [3:11, pg. 109]:

 

"...Afterwards he accepted the concept of 'tziduk ha-din' [faith in divine justice], so that is might serve him as shield and shelter against the dangers and troubles that occur in this world. And he also came to accept the justice of the Creator towards all animals."

 

     The Chaver discusses the question of divine justice and suffering in this section. However, he uses as a model the question of justice with animals. This brings us, indirectly, to the question of evolution. As it is generally understood, evolution constitutes an attempt to deny divine providence over the world in general. In other words, it is an attempt to deny that the order in the world, in nature and in each living organism proves the wondrous involvement of God or His messengers. God, not chaos, is responsible for biology. However we are children of prophets and not children of philosophers, and this is not enough for us. We are interested in one stage higher than that. God is interested not only in biology, but in biography as well, and of course in history. This is individual divine providence.

 

     Let us use general divine providence as a model. We look at the animal kingdom and see wonders which only a blindly stubborn, evil or hypocritical person could deny, or claim that they are the result of coincidence. Rihal presents us with a creature. It is perfect on its level, and this perfection is made possible by the harmony between its various parts. However, this harmony is not merely internal. It exists in relation to other animals as well. And it is even more amazing than that, for we find that a certain type of flower needs a certain type of insect for its fertilization, and that this insect needs this same flower for its food. In the context of the history of species, we find ourselves faced with a paradox, for we find that two species are in need of each other to exist, and neither could have existed at any time without the other. And yet both exist! Rihal also draws our attention to the fascinating fact that the psychology of animals is fitting and appropriate to their anatomy and physiology.

 

     Now we begin to discuss the question of justice in the animal kingdom. Immediately, the devil of the intellect pops up and brings up [Kuzari 3:11] "the injustice done to the hare when it is eaten by the hyena, like the fly eaten by the spider." The Chaver does not believe that this reality is the result of mere chance. It is impossible to see this wonderful order in nature and at the same time claim that "the hunting of the hare by the hyena and the hunting of the fly by the spider are [the results of] chance." The Chaver sees that a wise planner has given "the lion courage and ability, and given him hunting weapons, teeth and nails, and has given the spider the talent of cunning" - meaning the technology - "to make his web like a garment without having learned this, so that he may weave snares for the fly, and given him appropriate tools for this task, and presented him with the fly for his sustenance...and presented  many of the fish of the sea with other fish for their food." In other words, everything has been planned intelligently, and "what can I say if not that this is all from an intelligence that I cannot comprehend?"

 

     Rihal did not accept the position mentioned by Nachmanides, which claims that divine providence controls the fates of the spider and the fly as well. Maimonides as well as Rihal disagreed with this position. They did not give human significance to the workings of nature. Rihal's discussion is of general divine providence, and it constitutes a model for the problems of man.

 

(Translated by Gila Weinberg)