In a Manner Expressive of Freedom
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Dedicated in memory of HaRav HaGaon R. Chaim Heller zt"l,
whose yahrzeit falls on the 14th of Nissan,
by Vivian S. Singer.
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In memory of Pinhas ben Shalom (Paul) Cymbalista z”l,
niftar 20 Nissan 5752.
Dedicated by his family.
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Dedicated in memory of Sidney Gontownik,
brother of Jerry Gontownik,
on the occasion of Sidney's upcoming twelfth yahrzeit,
on the 24th of Nissan. May his memory be for a blessing.
The Gontownik Family
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Ma’aseh (Action) and Kiyyum (Fulfillment) in the Mitzvot of Pesach
Introduction
This shiur will deal primarily with the mitzvot of the seder night, but first I wish to clarify two points.
First, generally speaking, a distinction must be made between a halakha and its reasons: The reasons for a mitzva may be important and worthy (and many Jewish thinkers have dealt with them), but they are not necessary for the performance of the mitzva. One need not experience or remember the reasons for the mitzva in order to fulfill one's obligation.
As an illustration of this point, Rav Hai Gaon explains that the inner meaning of the mitzva of blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashana relates to the story of the Akeida, but it is clear that a person fulfills the obligation even without contemplating the connection between the shofar and the ram that was sacrificed in place of Yitzchak. Why? Because the reasons for a mitzva, as important as they may be, are irrelevant on the "pure" halakhic plane.[1]
Second, a distinction must be made between the "act [ma'aseh] of the mitzva" and the "fulfillment [kiyyum] of the mitzva" – that is to say, between the action performed in the framework of the mitzva and the content or goal of the mitzva itself.
A good example of this distinction can be seen in the mitzva of circumcision: the mitzva act is the cutting of the foreskin (over which one recites the blessing, "who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us about circumcision"), but there is an additional "fulfillment" of entering into the covenant of Avraham Avinu (over which one recites the blessing "to bring him into the covenant of the patriarch Avraham"). Admittedly, this distinction does not usually find practical expression; regarding most mitzvot, the act of the mitzva and its fulfillment are identical. However, there are cases where this distinction has an effect, as we will see regarding the mitzvot of Pesach.
The Reason for the Mitzva
“In a Manner Expressive of Freedom”: The Four Cups of Wine at the Seder
The night of the seder is unique with regard to the distinction between a halakha and its reasons, as the halakhic requirements of the seder include conceptual aspects. While the tendency in most instances is to remove such matters from the definition of the mitzva and leave them exclusively on the conceptual level, on the night of the seder, we instead draw them in to the realm of halakhic obligation.
One of these conceptual elements is the goal of acting "in a manner expressive of freedom." This idea arises in several mitzvot of the night, including the eating of matza and the drinking of the four cups of wine. For example: In the time of Chazal, a distinction was made between "raw" wine, which had a strong taste, and "diluted" wine, which had water added in order to temper the flavor. The Gemara in Pesachim addresses whether raw wine may be used for the four cups that must be drunk at the seder:
If he drank them raw [undiluted], he has discharged [his duty]. Rava said: He has discharged [his duty] of wine, but he has not discharged [his duty] of [expressing his] freedom. (Pesachim 108b)
Raw wine is also wine, but it is not the wine of cultured people (in the time of Chazal).[2] Thus, Rava argues that drinking such wine does not fulfill one’s obligation of drinking the four cups. Why? The Rambam[3] emphasizes that there are two separate aspects of the mitzva: "four cups" and "a manner expressive of freedom"; with raw wine, one fulfills only the first aspect:
A person who drank these four cups from wine which was not mixed [with water] has fulfilled the obligation to drink four cups of wine, but has not fulfilled the obligation to do so in a manner expressive of freedom. (Rambam, Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:9)
Following on the distinction between "four cups" and "freedom," the Griz, Rav Yitzchak Soloveitchik (in his novellae on the Rambam, Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:7), explains that there are two different laws relating to the four cups: First, that the blessings recited on the night of the seder (Kiddush, the blessing of redemption, Grace after meals, and Hallel) must be recited over wine – just as Kiddush and Havdala are recited over wine every Shabbat. On the night of the seder, there are four blessings, and it therefore turns out that we drink four cups, one cup for each blessing. Second, that one drink "in a manner expressive of freedom" – i.e., a large amount of wine. This second aspect is unique to Pesach and does not necessitate specifically four cups; the main point is that one should drink a large amount of wine.
We see here a good application of the distinction between the "act of a mitzva" and the "fulfillment of a mitzva": Regarding the first aspect of the law of the "four cups," the act and the fulfillment are identical; both involve the drinking of wine. In contrast, regarding the second obligation – "in a manner expressive of freedom" – the act of the mitzva is the drinking, whereas the "fulfillment" is not the drinking itself, but the expression of freedom through liberal drinking. Since raw wine was not favored by free men in the time of Chazal, one who drinks raw wine discharges his duty of wine – with respect to the obligation to drink wine with each blessing – but does not discharge his duty of expressing his freedom.[4]
The Reasons for Matza and Maror
The idea that our obligations on the night of the seder go "beyond" the ordinary acts of a mitzva also arises in relation to the mitzvot of eating matza and maror: they must be not only imbibed but tasted. Once again, it is Rava who presents this idea:
Rava said: If one swallows matza, he discharges his duty; if he swallows maror, he does not discharge his duty. (Pesachim 115b)
Rashi and the Rashbam (ad loc, both s.v. bala matza and bala maror) disagree about the case of one who swallows maror, whether the text should read that he does not discharge his duty (as in our printed editions) or that he does discharge his duty. Thus, they disagree whether "it is impossible that he did not taste the taste of maror" (Rashi – and thus, he has discharged his duty) or whether "we need the taste of maror, and there is none" (Rashbam – and thus, he has not discharged his duty). Either way, they agree on the basic principle: In contrast to other mitzvot that involve eating, the mitzva of maror requires not only that one eat it, but also that he sense its bitter taste.
The Rashbam proposes a similar idea regarding the "taste of matza":
"If one swallows matza" – without chewing it, he discharges his duty, for he fulfilled "in the evening you shall eat unleavened bread," for it is eating. Nevertheless, ideally we require the taste of matza. (Rashbam, Pesachim 115b)
The Rashbam's source is in the Gemara in Berakhot (38b, in connection with the blessing recited over cooked vegetables), where it is stated that "we require the taste of matza" (and thus the matza may not be boiled); he proves from this statement that there is significance not only in eating the matza, but also in tasting it. Nevertheless, the Rashbam explicitly writes that tasting the matza is the optimal way of fulfilling the mitzva, but it is not indispensable.[5]
The requirement of "the taste of matza" also arises in the context of the law that "one does not conclude after the Paschal [lamb] with an afikoman" (Mishna Pesachim 10:8). The Gemara there (120a) explains after a short discussion that the same law applies in our time: one may not eat any other food after eating the matza of "afikoman," which serves as a remembrance of the Paschal offering. Though there are others who adopted a different explanation, the Ba'al ha-Ma'or (Pesachim 26b in the pages of the Rif) argues[6] that this law stems from the fact that there is a requirement of "the taste of matza" even with respect to the matza of afikoman.[7]
To summarize: As with the four cups, so too with matza and maror, we find an extra requirement that goes beyond the "ordinary." Regarding the four cups, the requirement is to drink the wine "in a manner expressive of freedom," while regarding matza and maror, there is a special requirement that one sense the taste – in contrast to all other mitzvot that involve eating.
Mentioning Pesach, Matza and Maror
Thus far, we have seen two instances on the seder night of a blurring between a mitzva and its reasons. We now turn to the clearest example of this phenomenon, namely, the mention of "pesach, matza, and maror."
Rabban Gamliel used to say: Anyone who does not make mention of these three things on Passover does not discharge his duty. And these are they: The Paschal offering, matza, and maror. (Mishna Pesachim 10:5)
This law in itself is quite surprising. In a modern formulation, we might say as follows: If you did not offer a midrashic exposition, you have not discharged your duty.
Indeed, because of the exceptional nature of this duty, some Rishonim did not codify it. The Rambam did codify it, however, in the context of the obligation to retell the story of the exodus from Egypt:
Anyone who does not mention these three matters on the night of the fifteenth has not fulfilled his obligation. They are: the Paschal sacrifice, matza, and maror. (Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:5)
The meaning of the phrase "does not discharge his duty" is unclear. The Ramban (Milchamot Hashem, Berakhot 2b) writes, on the one hand, that "he has not fulfilled his obligation in proper manner," but also emphasizes that this does not mean he has not fulfilled his obligation at all. As he puts it: "This does not mean that he must go back and eat again the Paschal offering, matza, and maror." In any case, it is clear that mentioning the Paschal offering, matza, and maror is part of the mitzva; even if we say this mention is not indispensable, it certainly involves a mitzva.
The Mitzva of Relating the Story of the Exodus
Sharpening the Difficulty
In all these examples, we see that on the night of the seder, the experiential aspects are part of the fulfillment of the mitzva: Regarding the wine, in addition to the requirement to drink it, the drinking must be done "in a manner expressive of freedom." Regarding the maror and matza, there is significance in their tastes – which are reminiscent, respectively, of the hard labor in Egypt and the redemption from it. And most of all, Rabban Gamliel rules that in order to fulfill one's obligation, one must also make a special statement of "the Paschal offering, matza, and maror."
The central point that ties all of these examples together is that without internalizing the content, without the experience, one does not fulfill his obligation on the night of the seder: With the wine and the maror, internalizing the content (by drinking the wine "in a manner expressive of freedom" and by sensing the bitter taste of the maror) is indispensable for fulfilling one's obligation, whereas with the matza and the recitation of the words of Rabban Gamliel, that internalization is required at least for the optimal fulfillment of the mitzva (even if it is not necessarily indispensable). Why?
“A Man Must Present Himself”
If we return to the Rambam in Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza, we see that the explanation for this is quite simple: the special requirement of internalizing the content, beyond the ordinary requirement of performing the "act of the mitzva," stems from the mitzva of relating the story of the exodus from Egypt.
Anyone who does not mention these three matters on the night of the fifteenth has not fulfilled his obligation. They are: the Paschal sacrifice, matza, and maror… These statements are all referred to as the Haggada. (Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:5)
The mitzva of relating the story of the exodus does not only include speech; it also has a practical expression – acting "in a manner expressive of freedom" while drinking the four cups of wine and while reclining:
Therefore, when a person feasts on this night, he must eat and drink while he is reclining in the manner of free men… (Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:7).
That is to say, drinking wine and reclining express the same "manner of freedom" that is obligated by the mitzva of relating the story of the exodus – the Haggada. It also stands to reason that this is why special importance is attached to the experiences of the night, as expressed by "the taste of the maror" and "the taste of the matza" that we saw above.
The Rambam mentions another requirement in the framework of the mitzva of relating the story of the exodus:
In each and every generation, a person must present himself as if he, himself, has now left the slavery of Egypt…. (Rambam, Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:6)
The question, of course, is: What does this requirement entail? The answer seems to be simple: The Rambam's ruling that "a person must present [le-har'ot] himself" indicates that the mitzva is not only to remember the exodus, but to live it. On this night, each person goes out from slavery to freedom.
In contrast to the Rambam's halakhic ruling that one must mention "the Paschal sacrifice, matza, and maror," the text of the Rambam's Haggada includes an addition at the beginning of this statement, following the Mishna in Pesachim (10:5):
Rabban Gamliel said: Anyone who does not mention these three matters on Pesach has not fulfilled his obligation: the Paschal sacrifice, matza, and maror. (Rambam, Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza, text of the Haggada)
In the Haggada, we cite not only the halakha that one must mention "the Paschal sacrifice, matza, and maror," but also the introduction to it, namely, the words: "Rabban Gamliel used to say." Why?
The reason is that the mitzva is to live the exodus from Egypt. On this night, the Jew goes out from slavery to freedom. The mitzva to relate the story of the exodus goes beyond knowledge of the dry history, and includes a renewed experience of the exodus. This experience is not created through the reading of history books, but by way of a story: "Ask your father, and he will declare to you; your elders, and they will tell you" (Devarim 32:7). A person must know from where he comes and to where he is going. It is therefore important to emphasize that Rabban Gamliel said this: We act by virtue of the earlier generations and continue them. This is the central idea of the night of the seder.
The Renewed Experience on the Night of the Seder
“A Remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt”
Now we can understand the difference between the telling of the story of the exodus from Egypt on Pesach, on the one hand, and on the other hand – the mitzva of remembering the exodus from Egypt every day, and in general, the rest of the mitzvot that serve as "a remembrance of the exodus from Egypt. Unlike the latter category, the night of the seder is not exclusively about remembrance.
Throughout the year, there is an obligation to remember our history – as on the festival of Sukkot, which mentions the exodus from Egypt: "That your generations may know that I made the children of Israel dwell in booths, when I brought them out of the land of Egypt" (Vayikra 23:43).[8] But regarding the mitzva of the Haggada and relating the story, we are not only remembering history; we are also engaged in a renewed experience of the exodus from the slavery of Egypt, as the Rambam rules: "In each and every generation, a person must present himself as if he, himself, has now left the slavery of Egypt" (Rambam, Hilkhot Chametz u-Matza 7:6). That is to say, we are dealing with an internalization of the exodus from Egypt – now.
This is the "fulfillment" of all the various reasons for mitzvot that we saw: the four cups, the taste of maror, the taste of matza, the Haggada – these are all "fulfillments" of the obligation to retell the story of the exodus from Egypt. The speech and the actions are meant to cause us to internalize the idea that the exodus is not something that happened a long time ago, but something that is happening right now: We were there, and therefore our lives were embittered, we were redeemed, and thus we went out to freedom.
Therefore, the various acts of eating are accompanied by taste: One should really feel that "they embittered their lives" (Shemot 1:14), which in essence are our lives. This is true also of the experience of redemption that occurs when we eat the matza and taste it. Of course, for the same reason, there is a special requirement of mentioning "the Paschal sacrifice, matza, and maror" – as part of the retelling of the story of the Haggada.[9]
The Redemption that Takes Place Every Year
Understanding what happened in the exodus from Egypt is only the beginning, because slavery and freedom are experiences that everyone has all the time. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that "man is born free but everywhere is in chains" (The Social Contract, Book I , Chapter One), and thus he ignited the modern freedom movement that assumes that man is fundamentally born free and yet is shackled. Judaism, however, says the opposite: We were created enslaved, and only with a mighty hand and outstretched arm did God break the iron rods and redeem us from Egypt. In other words, a Jew's natural condition is slavery; were it not for God, the Torah, and miracles, he would not be free – and therefore, he needs to be newly liberated every year.
This is the uniqueness of Pesach as compared to the other festivals: Every year before Pesach, each and every one of us is a slave, just as our ancestors were slaves, and on the festival he is liberated anew, just as they were liberated. One must strongly internalize that we really came out of Egypt, and thus re-experience the redemption every year.
The renewed liberation begins with the statement that had we not been redeemed, we would still be slaves in Egypt; it intensifies with the eating of the maror, which has the taste of the bitterness of Egypt, and with the eating of the matza, which has the taste of God's redemption. A Jew eats both the bitterness of Egypt and the redemption so that the experience should be real, so that he will be truly free. The requirement that "the taste of the matza and the Paschal sacrifice be in his mouth" (Tosafot, Pesachim 120a, s.v. maftirin) stems from the fact that the desired fulfillment is not merely eating and chewing, but being free. This is achieved through the taste and through leaving it in one's mouth even after the meal.
Rabbi Yosef Soloveitchik used to say that the Haggada includes a retelling of the story of the exodus from Egypt by way of speech, and here, in the words of Rabban Gamliel, begins the retelling of the story of the exodus by way of actions. This is the additional and deeper level that we experience on the night of the seder, and this is the special nature of the experience of the Haggada of Pesach – to be redeemed every year anew.
(Translated by David Strauss)
[1] In the same way, even in the (exceptional) cases where the Rambam brings a reason for a mitzva, he emphasizes the distinction between the mitzva itself and the reason, which he calls an "allusion": "Even though the sounding of the shofar on Rosh Hashana is a decree, it contains an allusion. It is as if [the shofar's call] is saying: Wake up you sleepy ones from your sleep…" (Hilkhot Teshuva 3:4).
[2] The reality today is different, and it is not clear that this detail of the halakha applies in our time.
[3] The Rashbam (Pesachim 108b, s.v. yedei cheirut) similarly wrote that "this is not a complete mitzva," but he did not explain what he meant.
[4] Thus we can understand the next line of the Gemara there: "If he drank them [all] at once, Rav said: He has discharged [his duty of drinking] wine, but he has not discharged [his duty of] four cups."
[5] To explain this using the terminology of Brisk, it may be argued that the Rashbam maintains there must be a taste of matza in the object [cheftza], but there is no obligation falling upon the person [gavra] that he actually taste it (though it is preferable).
[6] The Gemara states that the prohibition to eat something else after eating the matza is self-evident, and therefore it is not mentioned in the Mishna. It explains there that one may not eat after the matza of afikoman because "its taste is not strong." This argument, which is formulated in the negative, was adopted by the Ba'al ha-Ma'or in the positive.
[7] There is a great controversy among the Acharonim regarding this halakha: In order to allow people to continue the meal even after midnight and still fulfill their obligation according to all opinions (regarding the latest time one can eat the afikoman), the Avnei Nezer proposed eating the afikoman before midnight, continuing the meal after midnight, and then eating an additional afikoman – with the stipulation that if the end of the time for eating the afikoman ends at midnight, he will fulfill his obligation with the first afikoman, and if it ends at dawn, he will fulfill it with the second afikioman. Rav Chayyim of Brisk maintained that this does not help, because in his opinion the taste of the matza must stay in his mouth until the morning, while according to this proposal, the taste of the first afikoman will certainly stay in his mouth only until midnight.
[8] Admittedly, the Bach (OC 625:1) maintains that regarding the mitzva of sukka as well, remembering the reason for the mitzva is part of its fulfillment – but his opinion has not been accepted.
[9] For example, according to the Maharal, the Paschal offering expresses the selection of Israel.
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