Peshat and Midrash Halakha (1)

a.            Introduction

Having established, in previous shiurim, that the biblical commentators saw fit to draw a distinction between the peshat (plain meaning) of the text and midrashim, we will now go on to examine a more complicated issue: the relationship between peshat and midrash Halakha,[1] which is to say between the simple reading of the text and the readings of classical works which mine the Biblical verses for their practical halakhic significance.[2] This complexity arises from the fact that the way in which we interpret "halakhic" verses would appear to have practical, normative significance.

The instances of discrepancies between the peshat and midrash halakha can be divided into two groups.

a.          The more common scenario is where the midrash derives a certain law which is not necessarily suggested by the plain meaning of the text. In such instances, we might well ask whether we may also interpret the verse in accordance with peshat – in a way that does not match the midrash halakha.

b.          There are instances where the halakhic instruction indicated by the text is not merely different from the one established in accordance with the midrash halakha, but actually contradicts it. Here the question of the legitimacy of exegesis in accordance with peshat becomes more acute, and also gives rise to a different question: if indeed we may understand the verse on the basis of peshat even in these cases, as some of the greatest commentators indeed did, then why does the discrepancy between peshat and midrash halakha exist, and how are we to relate to this phenomenon?

We will first examine midrashei halakha that merely differ from the peshat; afterwards we will deal at greater length with the complex issue of midrashei halakha that contradict the peshat.

b.         Midrashei halakha that differ from peshat

Among the early biblical commentators we find two main approaches in explaining the gap between midrashei halakha and the plain meaning of the text.

i.              The majority approach adopts Chazal's well-known teaching concerning the verse, "Is not My word like fire, says the Lord, and like a hammer that shatters the rock?" (Yirmiyahu 23:29) – "Just as a hammer produces many sparks, so a single verse has many interpretations" (Sanhedrin 34a). According to this principle, the nature of the Divine word is such that it contains many different meanings. Thus, the Torah, which is God's word, has many valid interpretations and meanings, rather than a single one.

            In the previous chapter we saw how Rashi uses this principle to justify explaining a verse in accordance with peshat as well as citing a midrash aggada. Similarly, the principle of textual polysemy is also widely accepted among the commentators with regard to midrashei halakha.[3] Ramban sets forth this principle very clearly. He proposes a straightforward understanding of the verse, "Any cherem that has been banned from man shall not be redeemed; he shall surely be put to death" (Vayikra 27:29), indicating that the king, or the Sanhedrin, is entitled to declare certain items cherem, and anyone who violates this dedication is to be put to death, as in the story of Shaul and the honeycomb (Shmuel I 14:24-45). Ramban notes that Chazal propose other possible ways of understanding the peshat, and writes:

"Do not silence this explanation just because our Sages interpreted this verse in a different way – some understanding it (Arakhin 6b) in the context of estimating the value of someone who is condemned to death, while others understand from it that those deserving of karet (spiritual excision) and those sentenced to death at the hands of the court cannot be redeemed with money, as taught in Ketubot (35a). Despite these interpretations, this verse cannot be stripped of its plain meaning – as it is written, 'God spoke one utterance; yet two thing have I heard' (Tehillim 62:12). The verse supports both interpretations. Take note that our Sages teach (Sanhedrin 27b), concerning the verse, 'Fathers shall not be put to death for sons' (Devarim 24:16) – 'at the testimony of their sons'; and similarly 'sons shall not be put to death for fathers' (ibid.) is understood to mean, 'at the testimony of their fathers'… Nevertheless, a verse cannot be stripped of its plain meaning,[4] as it is written, 'But he did not put to death the children of the murderers, as it is written in the Torah of Moshe, "Fathers shall not be put to death for sons, and sons shall not be put to death for fathers"' (Melakhim II 14:6). Thus we learn that the Torah has several facets of truth." (Ramban, Mishpat ha-Cherem)

The conventional approach among the commentators is thus that all of Chazal's interpretations are halakhically binding, but they do not void the validity of the peshat reading of the text.[5]

ii.         For those who do not accept the principle of polysemy, and believe that the text has one authoritative meaning, a different approach must be sought. Ibn Ezra explains the gap between peshat and derash as arising from the fact that the derash is not meant as an interpretation of the verse, and the halakha is in fact not derived from the verse. Rather, the source of the halakha is the oral tradition, while its attachment to the verse came at a later stage, as an "asmakhta."[6] This principle is stated explicitly in his short commentary on Shemot 21:8:

"And I state here the general rule in the Torah there are instances where the Sages are known to utilize anasmakhta, but they know the essence of the matter."

Ibn Ezra cites a few examples of this principle, the first concerning the verse, "And if his father has no brothers, then you shall give his inheritance to his kinsman who is next to him of his family, and he shall possess it…" (Bamidbar 27:11). According to the plain meaning of the verse, the Torah states that if the deceased has no first-degree relatives (sons, daughters, or brothers), nor even second-degree (fathers' brothers), then his inheritance passes to even more distant family members. Chazal arrive at a completely different understanding of the verse: from the words, "of his family, and he shall possess it," they conclude that a husband inherits his wife (Bava Batra 111b and elsewhere).[7] This teaching is not based on the plain meaning of what the verse says, but rather on the seemingly redundant phrase, "and he shall possess it" (otah – the feminine form, seemingly referring to the inheritance – nachala – which is a feminine noun).

Ibn Ezra has no argument with the law that a husband inherits his wife; he simply disagrees with the manner in which this law is derived, since it does not sit well with the plain meaning of the text:

"It was known through the oral tradition that a husband inherits his wife, and Chazal interpreted this verse as a hint. For all of Israel knows that the verse should be understood in accordance with its plain meaning, for it is impossible that someone should say, 'Give Reuven's inheritance to Shimon' while intending exactly the opposite – that Shimon's inheritance be given to Reuven… So the proper understanding of the verse is in accordance with its plain meaning, while Chazal add another layer of meaning that is part of the oral tradition."

Since the midrash here indeed contradicts the plain meaning of the verse – which deals with the question of whom a person leaves his inheritance to, and not with whom he inherits from, it should not be regarded as an interpretation of the verse, but rather as an already-known law relying upon the verse only[8] as asmakhta.[9]

From this perspective it becomes clear how it is possible to understand verses in accordance with their plain meaning, contrary to the midrash halakha. In the realm of exegesis, the peshat is the only way of understanding the text, but when it comes to halakha, the Oral Law is binding – even where it does match the plain meaning. The source and authority of the halakha do not arise from the verse, but rather from the oral tradition; the connection to the verse serves only as an asmakhta.[10]

In summary, we have seen two broad approaches to the relationship between peshat and midrash halakha. The first, championed by Rashi, Ramban and others, focuses on the multiple valid interpretations of the text, thus making room for both the peshat and the legal inference. The second, put forward by Ibn Ezra and others, maintains that the peshat is the only correct way to read the text, and that the conclusions of the midrash halakha are not to be viewed as readings of the text in and of themselves, but rather as independently received traditions which are then hinted at or alluded to in the Biblical verses.

(to be continued)

Translated by Kaeren Fish