Shiur#14: Bi-Khedei She-Ya'asu
Talmudic Methodology
Yeshivat Har
Etzion
Lecture #14: Bi-Khedei She-Ya'asu
By
The
gemara in Beitza (24b) claims that if a gentile performs
melakha (forbidden work) on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat or holiday, the
Jew may not benefit from that service on the day proper, and even after that
Shabbat or holiday, he must wait the amount of time it took to perform the
melakha before benefiting from it.
The
basis concept - known as "bi-khedei she-ya'asu" is debated between
Rashi and Tosafot. The latter claim
that the entire principle is merely a deterrent against initiating requests for
forbidden melakha. Knowing
that no benefit can be derived from the request discourages lodging one in the
first place. Whatever is
accomplished by the gentile during Shabbat or chag is to no avail since
an equivalent amount of time must transpire after the day is over before
benefiting.
Rashi
claims that the prohibition is far more substantive. FUNDAMENTALLY, no benefit may be derived
from melakha of Shabbat or chag; by waiting a commensurate amount
of time, no benefit will be received.
Various
applications of this issur are raised amongst the Rishonim. It is quite clear that according to
Tosafot any situation which might invite future infraction is a candidate for
the bi-khedei she-ya'asu principle.
Where no concern exists because the likelihood of future violation is
slim, bi-khedei she-ya'asu is not necessary. For example, only the Jew on whose
behalf the melakha was performed must wait be-khedei she-ya'asu,
while others may partake immediately after Shabbat.
According
to Rashi, however, the parameters of this principle are less evident, as the
nature of the underlying prohibition is unclear. What would Rashi say regarding
other people benefiting from the melakha; may they partake immediately
after chag and before bi-khedei she-ya'asu? Presumably the khedei she-ya'asu
principle pertains to the intended beneficiary. He may not receive benefit from yom
tov activity and must therefore wait an equivalent amount of time. Alternatively, we may redefine the issue
of non-benefit from a melakha violation. Perhaps the prohibition surrounds the
actual ITEM which has been prepared on the chag, as opposed to the PERSON
for whom the melakha is performed.
The gemara in Chullin (15) cites the position of R.
Yochanan Ha-Sandlar, who claims that items cooked on Shabbat are forbidden to
ingest at any time. He claims that
just as Shabbat is sacred, the items prepared on that day are as well. Clearly, this extreme position discerns
a Biblical prohibition pertaining to the ITEM itself, and not just a restriction
against a person benefiting from Shabbat activity. Although we do not accept R. Yochanan's
radical stance, Rashi's definition of be-khedei she-ya'asu may be
a moderated version of this theory; the ITEM which has been invested with
Shabbat resources may not be benefited from until the duration of
'melakha time' has elapsed.
If this is true, we may prohibit ANYONE from benefiting from the
melakha, and not merely the one for whom the melakha was
performed.
Another
issue which may be impacted by the understanding of Rashi's issur is the
amount of time which must elapse in order to fulfill the requirement of
bi-khedei she-ya'asu.
Should the person wait the entire amount of time for the process to be
performed or only the time it took for the element of issur within the
process to elapse?
For
example, if the gentile traveled a distance to pick a fruit for the Jew, should
the Jew wait after shabbat a few seconds the time it would take to pick a
fruit, or should he wait a few hours, to include travel time? The Rishonim who cite Rashi are
uncertain regarding this issue and Rashi himself provides little
indication. If Rashi defines the
prohibition as "person based," or an "issur gavra," the beneficiary may
have to wait the entire duration, since the entire process is what yielded him
benefit. However, if the
prohibition defines the item as a forbidden Shabbat element, the object
would no longer be defined as Shabbat produce after waiting the time it took to
perform the actual issur alone. If Rashi's prohibition is meant to define
items as containing yom tov kedusha, waiting the time it took for the
infraction to take place would probably be sufficient to eliminate that
status.
A
related situation concerns the question of melakha which is not
objectively necessary to yield benefit, although in a particular situation, it
did contribute to the process. The
gemara in Eruvin (40a) describes gentile gardeners who would
provide Jews with flowers on Shabbat.
Rava claimed that the full period of be-khedei she-ya'asu
must elapse before deriving benefit from fragrance. The Ran in Beitza (14a in the
pages of the Ri"f) questions this rule, since the forbidden melakha -
picking the flower - was not absolutely necessary to enable smelling its
fragrance. According to many
positions in the gemara (Sukka 37b), non-edible flowers may be
smelled on Shabbat even when still attached. The Ran justifies Rava's ruling since
the particular recipient in question, was reliant upon the act of picking for
his ultimate benefit. As he was not
near the location of the flowers, he would never have been able to smell them
without prior picking. He must
therefore wait be-khedei she-ya'asu before deriving benefit from the
fragrance. Be-khedei
she-ya'asu obtains if the melakha contributed to the experience,
even if it was not absolutely necessary in order to derive benefit. The Ran justifies this subjective
perspective by adopting Tosafot's view of the issur of be-khdei
she-ya'asu; any time an infraction assists a Jew, he must "wait out" the
equivalent time to avoid any incentive to premeditate Yom Tov
violation.
We
are left to wonder whether Rashi would agree with the Ran's view. Would the objective irrelevance of
picking flowers for fragrance exempt from be-khedei
she-ya'asu, or would the subjective contribution still warrant
this rule? Presumably the question
would revolve around how Rashi defines the principle of be-khedei
she-ya'asu. If the person himself is forbidden from benefitting from
forbidden melakha, we may again scrutinize the specific situation and
instruct distance from any subjective benefit assisted by Yom Tov
activity. However, if
melakha of Yom Tov imposes a status of issur upon an item,
we may follow a more objective standard; only melakhot absolutely
necessary to facilitate the universal experience in question would confer
issur status to the item.
A
final question pertaining to Rashi's position is the question of the
applicability of the be-khedei she-ya'asu principle when items
were illegally transported on chag form outside the techum. Should the rule apply even to this
unique law of chag?
Rishonim are split over this issue; the Terumot Ha-deshen
and Tosafot deny the application of principle, while the Mordechai and the Rif
(in a teshuva) apply it.
Rashi's
statements are vague, but again we may infer his conclusion based on the nature
of this prohibition. If the person
may not receive any benefit from Yom Tov manipulation, we may extend the rule to
all forms of Yom Tov melakha, even the case of techum. However, if the violation confers an
issur status upon the object of the melakha, the issur
applies in situations in which the melakha transformed the
item. Fruit picked on chag
is transformed into prohibited food since the melakha produced detached
fruit. Violation of techumim
transportation, which does not alter the physical or chemical properties of the
item, may not be the type of Yom Tov violation capable of rendering an
issur upon the object.