Siman 152: Demolishing a Beit Knesset

 

Towards the beginning of tractate Bava Batra the gemara retells how the wicked Herod came to rebuild the second Temple in great magnificence according to the advice of the Tanna Bava ben Buta. We learn there:

 

Rav Chisda said: We may not demolish a beit knesset until another beit knesset is built. There are those who say that this is due to possible negligence, and those who say because of [the need for a place of] prayer. The difference [between the reasons] is if there is [already] an alternative place to pray, [in which case there is only the problem of negligence].

 

Merimar and Mar Zutra would demolish and rebuild [presumably this means to "renovate"] a summer beit knesset in the winter, and a winter one in the summer.

 

Ravina said to Rav Ashi, what if the [building] funds are already collected? [Perhaps then there is no fear of negligence.] He said, perhaps there will arise a need to expend the funds for redeeming prisoners. What if the bricks and beams and joists are already prepared and arranged? He said, perhaps there will arise a need to sell them for funds for redeeming prisoners. He said, [if so,] even if the building is already built! [We couldn't demolish the old one since we may need to sell the new one for ransoming prisoners!] He said to him, We don't sell someone's dwelling. [See MB s.k. 4.]

 

All this assumes that we do not notice signs of deterioration, but if we notice signs of deterioration we may demolish and  build. Like Rav Ashi, who noticed signs of deterioration in the beit knesset of Mata Machsia. He demolished it and put his bed inside, and did not remove it until they built [even] the gutters.

 

And how did Bava ben Buta advise Herod to destroy the Beit Mikdash [and only afterwards rebuild it]? . . . I could say that he saw signs of deterioration, or I could say, the Sovereign is different, as he does not retract. As Shemuel said, if the Sovereign says "I will uproot a hill", he will uproot the hill and not retract.

(Bava Batra 3b)

 

The stories of Merimar and Mar Zutra and of Ravina and Rav Ashi bear on the question of what is the "real" rationale for Rav Chisda's dictum, as we will presently discuss.

 

The story of Rav Ashi, who moved into the building site, is the source for the rule mentioned in the SA to work with utmost diligence even when renovations are permitted. (As explained in the Bach and Magen Avraham. It is also a source for the lenient approach mentioned in the MB on last week's siman, 151:18.)

 

(The story about Bava bet Buta and Herod is brought to emphasize the extremely respectful attitude which our sages displayed towards the Sovereign; and also to emphasize that this respect extended even to a king over the Jews who was exceedingly wicked and not really a king but one who usurped power in a most illegitimate fashion, characteristics of Herod which are made salient by the story told in Bava Batra. Rav Amital often reminds us that this lesson of Herod's reign can teach us something about the appropriate attitude towards the events of this time of year. Rav Amital refers us to the Mishneh Torah, Megilla and Chanukah 3:1, where the Rambam explains that we celebrate the fact that at Chanukah sovereignty returned to the Jewish people until the destruction of the Temple - that is, including the reign of Herod's family.)

 

A parallel source is in the fourth chapter of Megilla, which is the source for most of this whole section of the SA dealing with laws of the synagogue structure.

 

Rami bar Abba was building a beit knesset, and he wanted to tear down an old beit knesset and bring bricks and beams from it to the new one. He wondered if this violated Rav Chisda's saying. Here we may not tear down a beit knesset until another beit knesset is built. Perhaps that refers only to a case where there is a fear of negligence, but what about this case? He asked before Rav Pappa, who forbade him, and before Rav Huna, who forbade him.  (Megilla 26b)

 

WHICH IS THE REAL REASON?

 

The gemara in Bava Batra gives two possible rationales for Rav Chisda's dictum that we may not demolish one Beit Knesset in order to build a new one but instead must wait until the replacement is already built. (Shouldn't there be a Torah prohibition to destroy a "miniature Beit Mikdash?!" See BH d.h. "shelo".) One reason is that the congregation may INTEND to build a new structure but delay doing so, and the other reason is that the congregation will be left IN THE MEANTIME without any place to assemble to pray. Are both reasons in question or only one? Which are relevant according to the poskim?

 

The story of Merimar and Mar Zutra, who would renovate one season's synagogue in another season, seems to prove that negligence is not a concern - only having a place to pray is of importance. But Tosafot suggest other possibilities including:

 

1. Having a place to pray is a leniency according to that is not concerned with negligence even if the other place is not a synagogue. But if there is actually another synagogue, then we are not worried even about negligence.

 

2. A structure "out of season" is according to the circumstances like one which shows signs of deterioration; or perhaps there really were signs of deterioration. [For other cases of "circumstantial", as opposed to structural, deterioration, see MB s.k. 9 and BH d.h. "dina hakhi".]

 

3. We are concerned about negligence which puts off building a few months, but not a whole season.

 

The Ran likewise concludes that the problem of negligence exists only when the congregation is praying in a temporary abode. [Do the Acharonim concur with this understanding? See Beur Halakha d.h. "shelo".]

 

The story of Ravina, on the contrary, seems to assume that the real problem is negligence, since all his questions relate to that issue.

 

Rami bar Abba, in the passage in Megilla, concluded that negligence was not a problem when taking building materials directly from demolition to construction. Here there seems to be a clear proof that BOTH reasons are relevant. Rami bar Abba is concerned about the problem of negligence; concludes that it is absent in his case; and asks if he may then demolish one structure in order to build its replacement. He receives the response that even when there is no problem of negligence, we need to be concerned - evidently about a place for prayer!

 

This seems to be the understanding of the Hagahot Ashrei (glosses on the Rosh), citing Ohr Zarua. The gloss reads: "And so it is forbidden to take from an old beit knesset in order to put them in the new, since there is no place to pray [in the meantime]."

 

The Bach also explains that the problem of negligence is absent here, since once building is STARTED, even if it is not yet completed, the problem of negligence disappears. He concludes that BOTH reasons for Rav Chisda's dictum are relevant.

 

(What does the MB say about this reason for discounting negligence? See MB s.k. 7, and BH d.h. "bonim" at the very end. Rashi gives a different explanation. He explains that there is a problem of negligence only when the demolition and the building are two separate steps. But here the actual building materials from the dismantling of the old synagogue are being installed in the new one, so this concern seemingly doesn't exist.)

 

However, the Rif, Rambam, and Tur all mention ONLY the reason of negligence. How do they understand the story of Rami bar Abba?!

 

The Beit Yosef, trying to explain this seeming omission, turns the proof from Rami bar Abba on its head. Since there are two possible rationales for Rav Chisda's dictum, and since Rami bar Abba only mentions one, it must be, says the Beit Yosef, that the other one was not relevant. In other words, it must be that there WAS already another place to pray, and Rami bar Abba was anxious to avoid transgressing either rationale. His question was not, what do we do if there is no fear of negligence? Rather, the question was, is the situation genuinely one in which there is no such fear? The answer is that despite the reason for thinking that negligence is not a danger here (perhaps that given in Rashi, or perhaps that of the Bach) the fear of negligence persists. [See MB s.k. 10.] And in the SA, he also mentions only the one rationale.

 

There seems to be a subtle irony here, however. By emphasizing that there must have been an alternative prayer location, the Beit Yosef is assuming that Rami bar Abba was wary of BOTH rationales for Rav Chisda's ruling. In the course of proving that the gemara is DISCUSSING the rationale of negligence, he also proves that the gemara ASSUMES the rationale of a place to pray. And so we again must ask, why to the Rif, Rambam and Tur omit this rationale?!

 

Since the Beit Yosef writes that the MAIN reason ("ikar taama") is due to negligence, perhaps he means that the reason of having a place to pray is self-evident. The gemara in Bava Batra says that some say because of negligence and others ONLY because of a place to pray. Merimar and Mar Zutra were indeed worried ONLY about the latter reason, but we see that the other Amoraim were concerned about negligence ALSO. (The Beit Yosef later brings the opinion of the Ran that Merimar and Mar Zutra were also concerned about negligence - namely, EVEN about negligence.)

 

Again, this rationale is so self-evident that it must not have been Rami bar Abba's question. Even according to his assumption that no problem of negligence exists in simultaneous demolition and building, how could he even have CONSIDERED leaving the congregation adrift? Rather, Rami bar Abba made sure there was a place to pray and then pondered if his case was immune from negligence.