SIMAN 185 - DEPORTMENT FOR BIRKHAT HAMAZON

LEVELS OF DRUNKENNESS

We encountered the problem of tipsiness in berakhot in two other contexts:

1.  In siman 99:1 we learned that one who drank a revi'it of wine may not daven, and if he can't speak before a king his tefilla is invalid.  However, other blessings may be said even if one is drunk.

2.  In siman 128:38 we learned that a kohen who drank a revi'it of wine at once may not duchan (say birkhat kohanim, the priestly blessing), and if he drank MORE than a revi'it he may not duchan even if he drank it over a period of time. (See also OC 38:7.)

In our siman we learn that someone who drank enough that his speech is slurred may say birkhat ha-mazon, but in a state of actual drunkenness it is forbidden to bench and there is even a doubt whether the obligation for birkhat ha-mazon is fulfilled.

The MB mentions an additional level, "shikhruto shel Lot," where a person is so drunk that he doesn't have his wits about him at all, and is unfit to fulfill any mitzvot.

Where do all these levels come from?

PROHIBITION TO DAVEN WHILE TIPSY

The source is a passage in Eiruvin:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Even a day laborer or hired hand can be given an eiruv [for eiruv chatzerot].  Rav Nachman said, what a fine decision that is!

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who drinks a revi'it of wine may not make a ruling.  Rav Nachman said, that decision isn't so fine.  Until I drink a revi'it of wine, my mind isn't clear! Rava said to him, how could you say such a thing? Did not Rebbe Acha bar Chanina say, "One who keeps company with harlots [zonot] dissipates his riches" (Mishlei 29:3) - anyone who says "This decision is nice [zeh naeh], that one isn't nice" loses the riches of Torah! He said to him, I retract.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said, one who is tipsy [shatui] may not pray, but if he did pray, his prayer is prayer [i.e., he fulfills the obligation to pray].  One who is drunk [shikor] may not pray, and if he prayed, his prayer is an abomination.

What is the difference between tipsy and drunk? As Rebbe Abba bar Shumni and Rav Menashia bar Yirmiah of Gifti said to each other as they parted at the Yufti ford: Let each of us say something that his fellow never heard, as Mari bar Rav Huna said, a man should part from his fellow with a word of halakha, and this way he will remember it [or him].  One began and said, what is the difference between tipsy and drunk? Tipsy - one who can speak before the king; drunk - one who can not speak before the king. (Eiruvin 64a)

This passage also teaches that it is forbidden to give a ruling while drunk, and this is mentioned in the Rema YD 242:13.  The following difficulty remains: While we can understand why it was inappropriate for Rav Nachman to give marks to the rulings of his predecessors, ultimately his objection is a cogent one - if he actually thinks more clearly after drinking, then certainly a bit of wine is not inappropriate.  One solution given in the Rishonim is that Rav Nachman drank DILUTED wine to clear his mind, whereas a revi'it of UNDILUTED wine prevents making a ruling.

On the following page we read:

Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rebbe Elazar ben Azaria, I could absolve the whole world from judgment from the day the Beit Ha-Mikdash was destroyed until now, as it is said, "Therefore hear now, miserable one; and drunk - but not from wine" (Yishayahu 51:21).  [Nowadays we are all drunk with sorrow.]  They replied [from a beraita]: A drunk person's sales and purchases are valid, if he committed a capital offense he is killed for it, if lashes are prescribed he is whipped.  In general: he is exactly like a sober person except that he exempt from tefilla! When he said, "I could absolve," this too means from tefilla.

Rebbe Chanina said, this is only if he did not reach the drunkenness of Lot, but if he reached the drunkenness of Lot he is exempt from everything.

Here we learn about the "drunkenness of Lot," which the MB mentions in our siman.

PERMISSION TO BENCH WHILE TIPSY, AND PROHIBITION ON KERIAT SHEMA

The permission to say birkhat ha-mazon while drunk is from a passage in the Yerushalmi.  After presenting the same halakha we just saw from Eiruvin, the gemara continues:

Rebbe Zeira asked before Rebbe Issi, what about benching? He said, "And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless" - [bless] even if you are fuzzy [from satiety of wine].

We need only to ask, what about saying keriat shema? Abba bar Avin said, a certain chasid once asked Eliahu of good mention, what about saying keriat shema [while drunk]? He said to him, "And no unseemly thing [ervat davar] shall be seen in you" - this refers to an unseemly word [dibbur]. (Trumot 1:4)

From this we learn the similarity of keriat shema to tefilla, which is also mentioned in the Rema in OC 99:1 in the name of the Mordekhai.  Actually, this likeness is a subject of debate.  Berakhot 9a tells of a pair of Yeshiva students who got drunk at a wedding, and only sobered up after daybreak (alot ha-shachar).  Rebbe Yehoshua ben Levi told them that since they missed keriat shema because of duress, they could rely on the opinion of Rebbe Shimon bar Yochai and recite the nighttime keriat shema after daybreak.  But the first mishna of Berakhot tells of the sons of Rabban Gamliel who came home late from a wedding, and their father told them that they could recite nighttime keriat shema only if it was BEFORE daybreak.

The Beit Yosef suggests that the sons of Rabban Gamliel were only drunk, and could have said keriat shema.  Only prayer is forbidden.  But the two students fell asleep from their drinking, and were truly "anus" (under duress).  He deals with the objection from the Yerushalmi by pointing out that there are variant readings of this passage.  But the Rema in the Darkhei Moshe suggests that it is much simpler to say that the sons of Rabban Gamliel weren't drunk at all, they were merely out late.  We then can accept the more accepted reading of the Yerushalmi that keriat shema too is forbidden when tipsy.

SPECIAL RULE FOR BIRKHAT KOHANIM

The gemara on Ta'anit 26b learns that a drunk kohen is forbidden to duchan.  This is learned from the proximity in the Torah of the parshia of birkhat kohanim to that of the nazir, who is forbidden to drink wine.  (Both in Bamidbar 6.)

While the Beit Yosef mentions an opinion in the Rishonim that birkhat kohanim is likened to tefilla, the Magen Avraham takes the likeness to nazir literally, and rules that only wine is forbidden, since a nazir is permitted to drink other intoxicating beverages.  The Magen Avraham rules that regarding ordinary drunkenness, saying birkhat kohanim is the same as saying any other blessing.  Indeed, it is more lenient: since birkhat kohanim is a Torah obligation, the Magen Avraham rules that it should be said until "shikruto shel Lot," even though other blessings are not said le-khatchila as long as one can not speak before the king.

Other Acharonim rule that there is no difference between wine and other liquor, and that birkhat kohanim should not be said whenever davening is forbidden.

Altogether we can distinguish four or five states:

1.  Sobriety.

2.  Drinking an amount of alcohol equivalent to a revi'it of wine makes a person tipsy and unfit for keriat shema and tefilla.  This is because these two recitations require a particularly high degree of intention.

3.  Drinking a revi'it of wine makes a person unfit for birkhat kohanim.  According to the Magen Avraham, this is true only of wine; according to other opinions, wine is the same as other intoxicating beverages and therefore levels 2 and 3 are the same.  After drinking a revi'it of wine or its equivalent, other blessings may be said, even if the speech is slurred.

4.  A person who is so drunk that he can not stand before a king may not say even other berakhot and perhaps doesn't even fulfill his obligation.  (The Magen Avraham, however, indicates that he should say berakhot that are a Torah obligation.)

5.  One who is as drunk as Lot is altogether incompetent to perform mitzvot.

The MB in s.k. 6 points out a difficulty in placing level 4 beyond level 3.  Clearly, a person would never dare stand before a king with slurred speech!  Rav Kook explained one Purim that the inability to stand before a king does not relate directly to a person's LEVEL of drunkenness but rather to the ability to OVERCOME drunkenness.  One who is a bit tipsy may find himself uttering a few Spoonerisms, but if he had to stand before a king he would rapidly get a hold of himself due to the awe of the king.  (The same holds for the awe of a police officer.)  So level 3 refers to one who is tipsy but could get a grip on himself if he had to, and level 4 to one who is tipsy and can not regain control.  (Moadei HaRayah, Purim, as we explained in the shiur on siman 99.)

SIMAN 186 - WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN BIRKHAT HAMAZON

A WOMAN WHO IS NOT SURE WHETHER SHE BENCHED

What do we do if we are in doubt about whether we are obligated in a mitzva?  The gemara gives us a general principle: If the obligation is a Torah one we are stringent; if a Rabbinical one we are lenient (Beitza 3b).

Therefore, regarding most blessings, which are a Rabbinical obligation, we do NOT say them if we are in doubt, but regarding birkhat ha-mazon, which is a Torah obligation, we DO repeat it out of doubt (SA OC 184:4).  But a double doubt (sefeik-sefeika) is exempt even regarding a Torah obligation, as explained at great length by the Shach on YD 110.

What if the doubtful obligation has an intermediate status between de-oraita and de-rabanan - i.e., it is a "sefeika de-oraita?" This is the case of birkhat ha-mazon for women, for the gemara Berakhot 20b asks if there is a Torah obligation for women and does not reach any conclusion.  (Rashi explains that the source of the doubt is in blessing God in thanks "for the good land which He gave you," since women did not inherit the land - except in certain instance via the fathers.)  Most authorities consider this a legal doubt (uncertainty what the law is, as opposed to a situational doubt what the circumstances are).

The Chayei Adam (47:2) writes that this case remains a "sefeika de-oraita."  After all, we are not sure that there is no Torah obligation to bench.

Conversely, the Pri Megadim on our siman calls this a "sefeik sefeika." Perhaps benching for women is only a Rabbinical requirement - then we have a "sefeika de-rabanan." And even if it is a Torah requirement, perhaps the person already benched.

The logic of this reasoning seems impeccable.  Why indeed is this not an ordinary "sefeik sefeika?"  The answer is that this reasoning is really "double dipping" into the situational doubt of whether the person benched or not.  We use the same doubt to exempt us from the Rabbinical obligation (turning it into a doubtful Rabbinical obligation) and also to reduce the level of the Torah obligation.  This is getting a lot of mileage out of one doubt.

Another way of looking at this is to apply the criterion of a "reversible doubt."  Many Acharonim rule  (based on the Rishonim) that any "sefeik sefeika" must be "reversible" - we have to be able to start with either doubt.  Among the examples the Shach gives of a "reversible" sefeik sefeika: We know a creepy thing crawled toward the food.  Is the food tamei?  Perhaps the critter didn't touch the food, and even if it did, perhaps it was not a tamei critter.  Or, if you prefer the other way around: perhaps the critter was not tamei, and even if it was, perhaps it didn't even touch the food.

Here is an example the Shach brings of a non-reversible sefeik sefeika: We see a tamei critter wandering around outside the food container.  Is the food tamei?  Perhaps the critter never went in; and even if it did, perhaps it didn't touch the food.  Try it the other way: Perhaps the critter didn't touch the food, and even if it did, perhaps it never went in?!  This is what we could call a "nested" doubt - one possibility is a proper subset of the other.  Many Acharonim think that this is really only one doubt - the critter did or did not go in and touch the food.  (Though the Shach recognizes some exceptions to this approach.)

Here are some examples in the context of benching.  Reversible sefeik sefeika: a person doesn't know if he has eaten wheat bread or a clever soy imitation, and he doesn't know if he has benched.  There is a double doubt: perhaps he only ate soy, and even if he ate bread, perhaps he benched anyway.  Or if you prefer: perhaps he benched already, and even if he didn't, maybe he only ate soy.  (I don't use the example of mezonot because in that case we would just say "me-ein shalosh" which according to many opinions fills the Torah obligation for benching.)

Non-reversible sefeik sefeika: I ate a meal but don't remember if I had a roll with it.  Perhaps I didn't have a roll at all, and if I did perhaps it was soy.  Backwards: Perhaps the roll was soy, and even if it was wheat maybe I didn't eat it?!  It's clear there is only one doubt here: I had a wheat roll with my meal, or I didn't.  The soy roll is merely a "deus ex machina" brought artificially into the picture to save me by providing an additional safek.  I might as well say, perhaps I had no starch at all, and even if I had one, perhaps it was potatoes. 

Now, the Pri Megadim's doubt is not quite reversible.  Try: perhaps I already benched.  And even if I did NOT bench, perhaps women's obligation to bench is only Rabbinical.  Well, even if it is only Rabbinical I have to bench, since I am looking at this obligation from the point of view of the contingency that I have not benched yet.  We could view this as a single doubt: either I fulfilled whatever obligation I had, or I didn't fulfill it.

See what the MB concludes in s.k. 3 and in the BH.