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Mishna Berura -
Lesson 47

Simanim 80-81: Passing Wind

20.01.2016
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            It is important to note the difference between a need to pass wind and a need to eliminate: Even feeling a need to eliminate puts a person in a state of "bal tishaketzu" ("don't make yourself repulsive" - Makkot 15, SA 3:17) and creates a problem for davening and KS (SA 92:1 in Rema); whereas by passing wind there is no problem with feeling a need, only actually passing wind creates a problem.  (As we see in our siman that if one can hold off one may pray.)

 

            The SA is somewhat ambiguous.  Only tefilla is explicitly prohibited if one lacks "guf naki."  But since the TIME of KS is referred to one could possibly infer that KS should also be skipped.  What does the MB say about this inference?  See s.k. 3.  For a definite proof of the MB's position, compare SA 38:2.

 

 

SIMAN 81 - WASTE OF AN INFANT

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            This is a very important halakha since very young children can dirty a lot of diapers, and it can be a problem to distance oneself from them every time a berakha needs to be said.

 

"Once a child can eat a kezayit of grain, one is obligated to distance oneself four amot [paces] from his feces and his urine.  Rav Chisda says, only if he can eat so much in 'bikhdei akhilat peras.'  [About five minutes.]  Rav Chiya barei de-Rav Yeiba says, regarding a grown person - even if he can not eat it in bikhdei akhilat peras, as it is written: 'And the more knowledge, the more distress.'" (Sukka 42b)

 

            The average grown person is certainly capable of eating a kezayit in a five-minute period.  Rav Chiya is evidently talking about a PARTICULAR grown person who can't.  It would seem obvious, then, that Rav Chisda is interested in whether a PARTICULAR child can eat so much, in determining whether one needs to distance oneself from his waste.

 

Two possible reasons could be given:

 

1.  The simplest explanation is that it is grain which makes the feces smell.  According to this, even if the child is used to eating grain, his feces are not a problem if he hasn't eaten grain in a while.  This seems to be the understanding of Rashi.

 

2.  The ability to eat grain is considered a milestone in a child's development - see Berakhot 40a.  Once this child can eat a certain quantity, he has reached the stage of development where his feces are like those of any other person.

 

            The Beit Yosef, while admitting that the above explanation is the simplest one, claims that the early authorities reject the inference from context and give a third rule:

 

3.  Once a child reaches the age where it is customary to be able to eat a kezayit in a time period of bikhdei akhilat peras, then he is old enough for his feces to be considered like that of a grown person.

 

            This obviously creates a problem for Rav Chiya barei de-Rav Yeiba, since all grown people have reached the stage where Rav Chisda says that waste is problematic.  For this reason many Acharonim - such as the Bach - rule like Rashi.

 

            The Mishna Berura succeeds in partially reconciling approaches 2 and 3 - s.k. 2.  Approach 1 is also mentioned as a be-di'avad consideration in s.k. 3.

 

            Two shiurim ago, we explained the conceptual basis for avoiding saying words of kedusha in the presence of uncleanness.  We explained, based on the Nefesh Ha-Chaim and Ruach Ha-Chaim of Rav Chaim Volozhin, that feces are the symbol and in fact embodiment of the fact that the world contains evil - experiences which can not be used to further holiness and Godliness and so must be extracted and eliminated.  This reality began with the sin of Adam and Chava, and in fact until then food was eaten without the need for elimination.

 

            According to this, it is logical that an individual's waste is only a problem when he reaches the stage where he can begin to distinguish between right and wrong - when his material "berur" (sorting of usable from waste matter) could be considered a function of his spiritual "berur."  R. Yehuda (Berakhot 40a) suggests that the tree which Adam and Eve sinned with was actually wheat.  The reason is that a child begins to distinguish at the age when he eats wheat.  The parallel to our ruling, which relates when a child's waste products violate holiness to the age at which he eats wheat, is very much in line with Rav Chaim's idea.

 

BATHROOMS

 

            In discussing the status of modern bathrooms, let us start by examining the discussion in the gemara:

 

"One may not cover oneself [for KS] with putrid water nor with waste water until he adds [fresh] water to them.  And he must distance himself from them, as well as from feces, four amot." (Mishna Berakhot 22b)

 

"Rava said in the name of Rav Sechora in the name of Rav Huna: that [four amot] is if it is behind him, but if it is in front of him it must be out of sight - and likewise for prayer.

 

"But did not Rafram bar Papa say in the name of Rav Chisda that a person can stand before a bathroom and pray?

[From this we learn that a bathroom itself is considered to be like putrid water, since we assume that the leniency for a bathroom extends also to the water. See SA 83:1.  The Beit Yosef infers that such a comparison would be impossible if we were actually referring to a bath-ROOM; it must be that all these rulings refer only to a toilet, but if there are walls and there is a proper bathroom, there is no prohibition - also in 83:1.]

That is referring to a bathroom with no feces in it.

But did not Rav Yosef bar Chanina say that "bathroom" refers even to one without feces in it, and that "bathhouse" refers even to one with no one there?

[From this we learn that even a clean bathroom is considered like any other foul place - also in 83:1.]

Rather, this [permissive ruling of Rav Chisda] refers only to a NEW bathroom [which has never been used].

And why do we need [a special law to tell me that a new bathroom is permissible]?  Because of Ravina, who posed the question of a bathroom which was only designated, wondering whether designation alone is sufficient [to consider the place a bathroom], to tell us that his question only regarded praying inside the bathroom, but not praying in front of it [which is permissible without question].

[From this it is clear that praying in front of a new bathroom is permissible, and praying inside of one is questionable - 83:2.]

Rava says: the toilets of the Persians are considered sealed up, and even if there is filth in them, one may read KS there.[SA 83:4]" (Berakhot 26a)

 

            There is a very important discussion among contemporary authorities if today's toilets are considered to be a "beit ha-kiseh" [BHK].  There are three possibilities:

1.  A bathroom is like a BHK for all intents and purposes. This means that one can not say KS etc. even facing the room - even if it is clean!  (Like the ruling in SA 83:1.)

2.  A bathroom is not a BHK, but it is like a place which is designated for a toilet.  One can say KS facing it, but not inside.  (Like the ruling in SA 83:2.)

3.  A bathroom is not a BHK at all, and if it is completely clean, fundamentally one could say KS etc. even inside.  (Like the ruling in SA 83:5 - referring to a toilet seat which is used in conjunction with a chamber pot.  When the chamber pot is not there, there is no dirt, and according to the SA it is not considered a toilet at all.  The parallel to a modern toilet is evident.)

 

            The Minchat Yitzchak (I:60) tends toward the third option - that a modern bathroom is not a BHK at all.  There are three main reasons:

1.  He cites the "Gadol mi-Tarna" who considers a modern bathroom to be like a Persian BHK, according to the gemara cited.

2.  It may be considered to be a chamber pot made of a rinseable substance (in this case, glazed porcelain) which when cleaned is no longer considered foul; alternatively, a chamber pot is only forbidden if the filth remains there for an extended period, not for just a few moments.

3.  If the bathroom also has a sink and/or shower, as is very common, the room is not dedicated as a toilet alone, and therefore is not as repugnant as a designated toilet.

 

            In the end, however, he concludes that it is best if one does not say divrei kedusha in the room itself.  However, one may wash netilat yadayim in such a room.

 

            In Yabia Omer OC III:2 Rav Ovadia Yosef relates to each of the points raised in the Minchat Yitzchak:

1.  He points out that in a BHK of the Persians the uncleanness doesn't remain in the room at all - as soon as it is discharged it goes into another domain.  But in modern bathrooms, it is true that all filth is rinsed away, but in the meantime it is found in the bathroom.

2.  He points out that porcelain is generally considered to be like ceramic (cheres) - which can not be rinsed completely - and not like glass or metal; likewise, he proves that a chamber pot is forbidden (to read KS near it) even if the feces were in it for only a short time.

3.  He points out that a room is judged according to its main purpose, and the main purpose of most bathrooms is for toilet needs - not for washing.

 

            Therefore, he considers a bathroom to be like an ordinary BHK except for a great exigency where one may rely on the lenient opinions.

 

            Some authorities take a middle ground, stringently considering the toilet to be a BHK but leniently considering a symbolic partition in the bathroom, such as the edge of a counter or a curtain, to constitute a separate domain.

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