Rationalism and Revelation (1)

 

                 During the course of this lecture we will analyze selections from the Kuzari which address the theme of creation.  However, a variety of relevant issues necessarily arise in this context, which will broaden the scope of our discussion.  Rihal, in fact, expounds upon the topic of creation in other places, particularly in the fifth section.  The student who is interested in the philosophical discussion itself is referred to those sources.  In the texts which we will examine, Rihal does not deal with the actual proof of the theory of creation; here he concerns himself with establishing the ground rules.  Thus, he attempts to define the status and significance of the theory of creation within the framework of Torah precepts, while demonstrating the ground rules for a philosophical method of proof.  Rihal's discourse thus grants us insight into a number of significant issues.

 

Creation or Eternity: the Logical Stalemate

 

            We have already discussed the first idea that Rihal develops in this section.  As previously noted, this concept reaches its fullest development in the Rambam's writings [Guide to the Perplexed, II:15-17].  The Rambam's claim is that logical proofs lack the ability to establish or refute the theory of creation.  From the standpoint of philosophy and science, the question of creation will forever remain unresolved.  We face a philosophical dilemma, and we will not be able to prove either side in the present or in the future.  There is no rational preference for one position over the other.  No proof exists that could compel us to follow one direction.  We face the dilemma with complete freedom to choose.  As far as philosophy and rational thought are concerned we may construct two alternative worldviews, one based upon the assumption of creation, and the other on that of eternity.  The Rambam claimed that Aristotle was also aware of the aura of doubt surrounding this issue.  Aristotle chose one of the two equally likely alternatives, eternity, without basing himself upon any decisive proof.  His decision was arbitrary.  Clearly, it was influenced by a Greek philosophy of life.

 

            Would Aristotle agree with this statement?  This is a historical and literary question which does not concern us here.  The Aristotelian philosophers with whom our rabbis contested sincerely believed that decisive proofs ("mofet" is the philosophical term of their period for such indisputable proofs) for the claim that the world has been in existence for eternity did indeed exist, while Rihal and the Rambam maintained that no such proof existed, and the riddle of the world's inception remains in a philosophical stalemate.  The truth cannot be rationally derived as one of the two alternatives.  As far as the intellect is concerned, we have the right to freely choose either one.  We are faced with a doubt which neither philosophy nor science can solve, and we have the right to choose our subjective position freely.  This position is influenced by the divination of prophecy.

 

            Why is it impossible to reach a conclusion?  To translate the Rambam's words into the language of our day, the central reason for this is that in the argument for the eternal existence of the world, we extrapolate, we make an irresponsible leap of logic, beyond the boundaries of legitimate experience.  Any attempt to prove the eternal existence of the world is based upon the assumption that what is true today was equally true in the past, and the laws of nature which are operative today were equally valid at the time of nature's inception.  The Rambam illustrated this with a (now classic) parable, about a parent and child, sole survivors of a shipwreck, who found shelter on an island which is completely uninhabited.  The father educates his son himself, and at a certain stage even attempts to explain to him how children come into the world.  The father explains the process of development of the fetus in the womb and how, after nine months, it is born.  The child sees this explanation as patently absurd.  In fact, the theory that children are brought to the world by a stork, or that they are born in a large cabbage appear to the child more reasonable.  How is it possible that for so many months my mouth was sealed? he asks himself.  It goes against empirical experience, which proves the opposite.  This child's 'healthy' claim is based upon that leap of logic from our experience today, the experience of existence, to the unknown, to the experience of coming into existence.  The child does not imagine that the development of the fetus could be different from the development of an adult.

 

            The same may be said of the world.  Is today's nature, 'resting nature,' in the Rambam's terms, the same nature that determined the ways in which the world came into being, or did other principles, what the Rambam calls 'acting nature,' rule during the world's inception?  This extrapolation can be illustrated through another example.  Let us consider the elections which take place in our country every few years, simplifying the process slightly for clarity's sake.  Let us imagine, for example, the thirteenth Knesset announcing the elections for the fourteenth Knesset.  Let us assume that this is the standard procedure.  Thus, the twelfth Knesset announced the elections for the thirteenth Knesset ... the fourth Knesset announced the elections for the fifth Knesset, etc..  What will we  suppose when we reach the first Knesset?  Will we assume the existence of Knesset assemblies with negative numbers, or must we assume the existence of a revolutionary beginning for the whole process; that this chain, whose links are identical and are interrelated in a particular way, begins with a completely different stage.  The first Knesset was not established as a result of the legitimate decision of the previous Knesset, but stems rather from an act which is in a sense illegitimate, for of course, it is not "legal," according to contemporary law.

 

            An examination of the philosophical questions themselves is beyond the scope of this discussion, and belongs, as previously noted, to the fifth section.  Our central question is whether we can indeed assume the existence of an endless chain of Knesset assemblies, each of which announces the elections for its successor; or does such a process contain an irreparable logical flaw.  Those philosophers who maintain that creation is provable assert, among other claims, the impossibility of such an endless repetition.  Others believe that this flaw may be overcome.  In any case, without entering into the claim itself, we learn from these examples that all potential responses must be viewed as mere speculation, fraught with the difficulties inherent in taking the leap beyond nature, with only our natural experience to guide us.  In this instance philosophy must stand as a sinner at the gates of repentance, and humbly admit that while it can suggest theories, it lacks the ability to prove them.

 

Who is Rational: Logic and Tradition

 

            Until this point we have discussed Rihal's first thesis, the impossibility of proving the theory of creation or of eternity.  Now we shall focus upon his second assertion.  As we delve into the Chaver's discourse, we discover that Rihal adds a seemingly irrelevant historical basis to his claim.

 

            "The Chaver: We may not reproach the philosophers, since    they are persons who did not inherit wisdom or religion,       for they are Greek, and Greece (Yavan) is a descendent of Japheth    who resided in the east, while wisdom, which is an    inheritance from Adam, [I refer to]... the wisdom which         is supported by the divine influence, was transferred       from Adam only to the descendants of Shem, the chosen son             of Noah, and which [wisdom] has and always will remain    among these chosen ones.  As regards the Greeks, this             wisdom only reached them after they conquered the nations that fought against them.  Only then was that wisdom            transferred to them from the Persians, who received it            from the Chaldeans.  Only then did the famous       philosophers arise in that kingdom; and what's more, since the Roman conquest, the Greeks have not produced   one philosopher of note."[1:63]

 

            The Kuzari claims that Greek culture was cut off from ancient tradition, the tradition of the children of Shem.  Greek science is none other than a development of ancient Babylonian science, the science of the Chaldeans.  The Greeks received the principles from the Chaldeans, and later developed them themselves.  Of course, even if this is true, it does nothing to solve the central problem, that the philosophical claims are not based on tradition at all but rather on logical proofs.  Rihal is not trying to deceive us here.  He is, in fact, warning us of a logical error.  No claim should be disqualified because of the personality or the character traits of the person who suggests it.  And indeed the Kuzari responds appropriately: "and should this fact obligate us not to believe Aristotle's wisdom?"  A stolen proof is still a proof.  Aristotle's authority does not stem from the existence of a tradition but rather from his wisdom, from the fact that he discusses the questions and demonstrates his solutions with rational proofs.  Thus, the Chaver informs us that the theory of eternal existence is viable even if it is not based on any tradition.  The Kuzari's question regarding Aristotle's credibility receives the following noteworthy response:

 

            "The Chaver: Certainly [Aristotle loses credibility       because he lacks a tradition]!  Because he had no             reliable tradition from people whose word he trusted,             Aristotle exerted his mind and applied his faculties to       investigate the origins and end of the world: he found it         equally difficult to imagine that the world had a      beginning, or that it had existed for eternity, and only             through his abstract analysis did he decide in accordance   with the proofs which lean toward the theory of eternal          existence - and therefore he saw no need to concern           himself with the generations that preceded him, nor with        the attitude of [other] people; however, if the            philosopher was a member of a nation in which true   opinions were passed down through a well known and       irrefutable chain of tradition, he would have employed          his logical proofs to bolster the faith in a created     world, with all the difficulties in [this theory], just      as he did in his attempt to strengthen the idea of the         world's eternal existence,[which is] a less likely idea."            [1:65]

 

            Rihal emphasizes that while the Greeks developed philosophy, the origin of that philosophy was decisively influenced by the Jewish people.  This position, which maintained that philosophy originated in Jewish writings [2:66], was prevalent among many medieval thinkers, and it is present in Alexandrine Jewish thought as well.  I support this theory in a different form.  As we have seen, history teaches us that the origin of religious philosophy lie in that same momentous encounter between Greek philosophy and Scripture, which took place at the close of the ancient times, particularly in Alexandria.  Philo of Alexandria is viewed as the most prominent representative of this encounter.

 

            Clearly, philosophy itself must be viewed as a universal phenomenon which appears and develops to some extent in all times and all places.  Various philosophers would no doubt disagree with my "modest" opinion.  Perhaps Rihal's modern successors may accept this position in a different form.  Philosophy was born in Greece under the influence of the encounter with the east, the wisdom that Greece "received from the Chaldeans;" or in the words of Rihal's modern successors, the encounter with the east is represented by what our Rabbis termed the "yeshiva" of Shem and Ever, the great philosophical compositions of the children of Shem, which influenced the development of cultures the world over.

 

            It would be difficult to convince me of a religious obligation to credit the Jews or God with the creation of classical philosophy.  Yet, the fact that the ancients thought so is not difficult to understand.  They belonged to a culture which believed that philosophy held the key to truth, happiness, meaning; indeed, to immortality.  Therefore, it was imperative to know who received the key from the master of the house.  We, the children of the modern world, view the meaning of philosophical works in a different light, and are willing to credit other nations for their contributions, and to accept the fact that philosophy is actually based upon the contributions of all nations.  The significance of the Jewish contribution is found in prophecy.  However, a final note regarding the origins of philosophy  was necessary: "Since the Roman conquest, the Greeks have not produced one philosopher of note."[1:63]

 

            This simple statement has important ramifications, which would later be developed in the thought of Rabbi Nachman Krochmal, known by his acronym, Ranak.  The Greeks developed a philosophy; however, in their eyes it was a temporary invention.  Their philosophy was public property, yet, for them it was purely of historical interest.  There are no more Greeks, in the classical sense of the word.  However even if you are told, "There is philosophy in Greece," do not be fooled.  As Ranak expressed it, Jewish history teaches us that despite its temporary decline, Jewish philosophical creativity rises anew and with greater force in each new epoch.

 

(This lecture was translated by Gila Weinberg.)

 

 

Copyright (c)1996 Prof. Shalom Rosenberg, Yeshivat Har Etzion.  All rights reserved.