Foreknowledge and Free Will

 

Our belief in the principle of freedom brings us to an age-old question: the question of foreknowledge and free will. 

 

     It would seem that we are not free in our actions.  Let us assume for example, that on the first of Nissan, in a given year, a horrible murder will take place.  Does God know beforehand, that the murder will take place?  We cannot say that He does not know, for that would limit our conception of God.  If, on the other hand, He does know, then it would seem that the murderer was not free to choose his actions.

 

Three Options

 

There are three possible philosophical approaches to the topic of freedom.

 

1.  The first option chooses knowledge over free will.  The classic example is found in Islam and in various Protestant groups, who claim that human freedom is a blow to the greatness and omnipotence of God.  The Rambam furiously opposed these positions, in the Laws of Teshuva and in his work "Eight Chapters."  In the Laws of Teshuva, the Rambam writes that this approach, which limits human freedom, is accepted by the simpletons of the world and the fools [lit: golem] among the Jews.  The reason for this distinction is significant.  These are not mere derogatory phrases.  The Rambam is hinting that in other religions and theologies we do in fact find a belief that man's freedom is limited.  The Rambam felt that whoever believes in such things is a simpleton.  However, among the Jews, this is not part of the theology, and whoever accepts these things is a Golem; in other words he has not completed his religious development [see previous shiur - Editor].

 

     Despite this, we must say that there were a small number of philosophers who thought that Judaism could admit the negation of human freedom.  The most outstanding of these were Rabbi Chasdai Crescas and Rabbi Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin.  The true meaning of their position is under debate.  It seems to me that although they limited human freedom, they left a small area of life in which man is still free.

 

2.  The second possibility is to limit the knowledge of God.  This was the position of the Ralbag.  It is well-known that his position aroused much anger.  It has been said of him that the name of his book, "God's Wars," describes its contents correctly, however he is not fighting for God, but against Him.

 

The Theory of the Continuous Present

 

3.  The third possibility is essentially the search for theories.  One of the most interesting theories is the theory of the continuous present, which we will describe here briefly.  This is the classic answer that religious philosophy has given to the paradox.

 

     If we return to the example with which we began, I must admit, according to this theory, that I have actually made a mistake in the formulation of the question.  I asked if God knows in Adar about a murder which will take place in Nissan (the next month).  The expression "God knows in Adar" is based on a mistaken idea.  For God's existence is not within the framework of time, therefore I cannot say that He "knows in Adar."  He knows what has happened and what will happen; it is an eternal knowledge.  Let me give you an example just to explain this idea, even if it is far from accurate.  Imagine that we are traveling on a mountainous road and we do not know what awaits us beyond the next turn.  This is true for us, but the person who is above, at the top of the mountain, has the correct perspective and can see the road in its entirety.  Similarly, God has a different time perspective, a perspective above and beyond all of time.

 

     The application of these ideas in order to foresee the future, has much to teach us.  If I were to prophesy which hand Mr. Jones will lift in five minutes time, then one of two interpretations of the events will be possible.  Either he is not free, or I do not know but am merely guessing.  If I were to combine these two things, and claim that I do know and yet, he is still free to choose, I would reach a paradox.  However, let us assume that I am looking at Mr. Jones in what we call today "real time," in other words while he is doing the act.  If I look not at the future but at the present, then both his raising of the hand, and my knowledge of it, are two things which happen simultaneously and do not contradict one another.  God exists in a continuous present, in which knowledge of the future is the same as knowledge of the present.  This is the philosophical meaning of the description of God as He who "was, is and will be."

 

The Rambam's Position

 

The Rambam did not construct the entire theory of the continuous present; in his opinion we are faced with two different concepts of knowledge.  The paradox stems from our attempts to create analogies between our knowledge and God's knowledge.  However since this is an invalid analogy, we cannot solve the paradox; we cannot even formulate it.

 

     Rabbi Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, author of the Meshekh Chokhma  and the Or Sameach, understands that the theory of eternal truth is in fact the Rambam's theory.  Rabbi Meir Simcha added an important dimension to the above description.  The theory of the continuous present solved the paradox; however, the correct solution is that knowledge is God's alone.  If this knowledge were given to a prophet, then the paradox arise once again.  This has an important and surprising implication: there are dimensions of the Torah that cannot be understood by prophets nor by previous generations.  These levels are revealed to us from time to time.  These revelations constitute "chidushei Torah," inspired novel interpretations of the Torah.

 

     To past generations, this approach to the paradox seemed peculiar.  In our day, the relativity of time and the theoretical possibility of time travel, as presented in popular movies such as Back To The Future, have become so accepted that these wild possibilities no longer frighten us.  And perhaps the reader will not even be frightened by another model and by the wild possibility which apparently is included in the Rasag's writings, that God receives information from the future, information which flows in the opposite direction to time.  One of the speculations of modern physics speaks about tachyons, particles which travel in the opposite direction to the arrow of time.  In these particles the movement towards the past becomes a reality!

 

     The theory of the continual present claims that the paradox does not exist.  However, there were philosophers who did not believe in the power of the human mind to solve the paradox, and felt that we must accept that this inability is not going to change.  This was the position of Rabbi Nachman of Braslav.

 

     [Rabbi Nachman taught us that there are two types of paradox.  The difference between them is described in the language of the Kabbala.  One type is the type of paradox whose origin is in the "breaking of the vessels."  These are paradoxes that can be solved, although the process is continuous.  Another type is connected to the empty space that was created through the "tzimtzum."  These are questions that were born with creation, and no human intellectual effort can solve them.]

 

Determinism

 

We will not go into the second half of the problem here, the question of determinism.  I will only mention that this is a problem that man has constantly had to deal with.  Here too, twentieth-century science has opened new vistas in our understanding.

 

     Classical science believed that the world is run by absolute determinism.  The future is set absolutely.  This faith reached its height in the nineteenth century.  It was well formulated by the French mathematician Leplace. who said that if he knew the placement of all the molecules at the initial state of the world and had a complete description of all the laws of physics, all of universal history could have been written in advance.  This is mechanicism. 

 

     The twentieth century discovered that determinism is not absolute.  This is one of the outcomes of the discovery of quantum physics.  In various microscopic phenomena nature is faced with two alternatives, and chooses one of them at random.  Take, for example a block of radioactive material.  If we ask whether a particular atom in this block will break up within a certain time frame or not, there is a certain probability that it will break up, and that is all.  We cannot formulate any absolute law.  We have not denied the existence of a set of laws, but we know that this system of laws is not absolute.  Completely random events do occur.

 

This opens a new gate to understanding the question of free will.  It does not solve all of the riddles; yet, it is clear to us today that the system of laws which exists in the world is neither absolute nor universal.  Today this is a definite truth.

 

(This lecture was translated by Gila Weinberg.)