MODERN RABBINIC
THOUGHT
By Rav
Yitzchak
Blau
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This shiur is
dedicated in memory of
our beloved father, Harry Meisles (Elchanan ben
Yitzchak) z"l,
whose yahrzeit
falls on 26 Adar the Meisles family.
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Lecture
21:
R. Meir
Simchas Breadth of
Commentary
and his Attitude to
Physicality
R. Meir
Simchas Meshekh
Chokhma exhibits its authors significant breadth of knowledge and
interest. One intellectual interest
exhibited in this commentary, which does not appear in many commentaries on
Chumash, is his concern with philosophical topics. R. Meir Simcha frequently refers to
Rambams Moreh Nevukhim and to R. Yosef Albos Sefer
ha-Ikkarim. In an earlier
shiur, we mentioned his extensive discussion of the classic Jewish
philosophical texts on the problem of human freedom and divine
foreknowledge. He even indicates
knowledge of issues debated in Western philosophy. For example, he references the efforts
of thinkers to determine the relationship between the soul and the body. Apparently, R. Meir Simcha was aware of
different theories regarding the mind-body problem.
Although he certainly
does not engage in a sustained response to Bible critics, one passage may be
responding to criticism. Those
arguing that Halakha played no role in the First Temple period note the absence of
reference in the prophets to certain halakhic practices. For example, the prophets make no
mention of observing Yom Kippur. R. Meir Simcha explains that the Yom
Kippur service during the First Temple period was dominated by the
Kohen Gadol. As the people
played a lesser role, this holy day receded from the biblical account, which
focuses on the Jewish nation. In
contrast, prophetic books do include accounts of Pesach, a festival on which
everyone brought his own paschal offering.
Yom Kippur took on a stronger national element during the Second Temple period because the Jews returning
from the Babylonian exile were hungry for the return of prophecy and they
thought that coming to witness the High Priest on the holiest day of the year
might inspire the prophetic spirit.
R. Meir Simchas breadth is also
reflected in the many different Torah disciplines included in his
commentary. Halakhic analysis,
interpretations of aggadot and midrashim, novel readings of
biblical passages and his own philosophy of Judaism all make frequent
appearance. This shiurs
discussion provides good examples of the wide-ranging nature of the
commentary.
When studying
R. Hirschs
thought, we highlighted his emphasis on sanctifying the physical. While this theme is less prominent in
the writings of R. Meir
Simcha, it does appear several times. When we recall that R. Yosef Dov
Soloveitchiks writings include the identical theme,
we may conclude that this idea reflects a trend in recent rabbinic writing. Perhaps the rabbis of modernity have
been more inclined to reject ascetic tendencies and to stress elevating the
mundane.
R. Meir
Simcha argues that Halakha
does not negate physical drives; rather, it channels them in a positive
religious direction. Eating,
drinking, and having relations all have their place in the Jewish legal
system. Based on this assumption,
he provides a creative reading of the midrashic idea that people have two
hundred and forty eight limbs and three hundred and sixty five sinews,
corresponding to the positive and negative commandments in the Torah. R. Meir Simcha understands this
midrash as conveying the idea that the Torah corresponds to the human body and
its needs, and does not negate that body.
For that reason, the Torahs passage about arayot stresses I am
the Lord your God. God declares
that He made humanity and gave them a Torah attuned to the human body. Those who appreciate this point will not
view halakhic restrictions as creating an unnatural physical existence.
R.
Shimon ben Elazar
says: Inclination, a baby, and a
woman - a person should bring close with his right and push away with his left
(Sota 47a). The first
category, the yetzer, works beautifully with our theme. We do not allow our instinctual drives
free rein, nor do we totally nullify them.
R. Meir
Simcha explains that the right represents wisdom, while the
left symbolizes natural instincts.
We utilize our intelligence from the right to channel the drives in an
appropriate fashion. In his
symbolic scheme, the baby and the woman refer to nature and necessity. Thus, the entire statement teaches us
about relying on human thought (the right) to redeem natural drives.
For R. Meir Simcha, human
instinctual drives differ from corrupt intellectual beliefs. The former have their appropriate place
and can be purified, but we fully reject the latter; they have no
legitimacy. This distinction finds
symbolic realization among the different sin offerings. Standard sin offerings atone for
inadvertent sins; by definition, these are not sins of the intellect. We bring such offerings on the outer
altar. The chataot
ha-penimiyot, on the other hand, atone for sins of the intellect. The offering when a beit dins
ruling misleads the people reflects an intellectual error. The bullock of the Kohen Gadol on
Yom Kippur atones for intentional violation of the ritual purity of the
Mikdash, another intellectual transgression. We bring those offerings on the inner
altar, which symbolizes the intellect.
Priests eat from the first group of sin offerings since the physicality
of such sins finds redemptive outlets.
No one eats from the latter group because sins of the intellect lack
positive potential.
Of course,
sanctifying the physical does not entail an endorsement of hedonism. R. Meir Simchas commentary
expresses concern about unbridled materialistic pursuits. When the people in the desert
complain about the absence of meat, God says: Sanctify yourselves, for tomorrow
and you will eat meat (Bemidbar 11:18). R. Meir Simcha says that only the
prior act of sanctification justifies meat consumption. Human beings merit the right to eat
animals after the humans achieve intelligence and realize their unique role
within the created order. If humans
remain immersed in bestial behavior, what right do they have to eat
animals? According to many
commentaries, the deeper roots of Jewish complaints in the desert were anger and
frustration with their new life of halakhic restrictions. God told them that eating meat depends
upon rising above physical cravings and realizing the moral potential unique to
humanity. For that reason, the
gemara in Pesachim (49b) says that an am ha-aretz is forbidden to
eat meat.
This conception
resolves the Talmudic tension regarding the relative superiority of the fully
righteous and the penitent. With
regard to sins of the flesh, we need not uproot the desires; therefore, the
penitent is superior to the fully righteous. The penitent certainly had those
desires but succeeded in ennobling them.
Regarding sins of the intellect, we tolerate no truck with these
thoughts. As a result, the fully
righteous is preferable to the penitent.
Rav Kook provides an
instructive contrast here. He
taught that all ideologies contain elements of truth and he even attempted to
find the positive in contemporary atheism and secular Zionism, as well as in the
thought of Spinoza and Schopenhauer.
For R. Kook, we can extract something positive from intellectual mistakes
if we realize the partial truth embodied in those mistakes. R. Meir Simcha apparently
disagrees. From his perspective,
ideologies that deny the existence of God or the distinction between good and
evil lack all redeeming quality.
Along related lines,
R. Meir
Simcha adopts Rambams distinction in the sixth chapter of
Shemoneh Perakim. Rambam
asks: who is superior the person tempted to do the wrong thing who still
desists or the person devoid of temptation? Do we prefer the kovesh yetzer or
the chasid? Rambam says that
verses in Tanakh, as well as the philosophers (Aristotelian virtue
ethics), prefer the chasid, whereas some statements in Chazal
apparently hold up the kovesh yetzer as a superior model. His resolution distinguishes between
sins that the philosophers recognize as evil and sins that we only know about
due to the Torah. Having a desire
to murder or steal reflects poorly on a person and the moral paragon rises above
such thoughts. Wanting to eat pork
or wear garments combining linen and wool does not reveal negative character;
here, the kovesh yetzer reigns supreme.
R. Meir
Simcha locates this
doctrine in a well-known verse in Yeshayahu. The wicked man should forsake his way
and the man of iniquity his thoughts (Yeshayahu 55:7). The prophet instructs the first type of
sinner to forsake his way, his evil actions; the second type of sinner must even
abandon his sinister thoughts. The
former refers to sins such as eating non-kosher food, where the inclination per
se deserves no opprobrium. On the
other hand, someone with thoughts of theft and deceit must find ways to forsake
the very inclinations.
While this debate
reflects a question logically distinct from that of physicality vs. asceticism,
some overlap exists. In both
contexts, R. Meir
Simcha does not view physical desires as bad. Desire for a cheeseburger need not be
silenced, just overcome.
Analogously, physical desires find their outlet in halakhically
permissible and mandatory eating and the like. We sanctify physicality rather than
suppress it.
Concern with the
corrupting impact of excessive physicality helps R. Meir Simchas interpretation of
one halakhic gemara. The gemara
(Berakhot 48b) attempts to use a kal va-chomer (a fortiori)
argument from the obligation to say birkat ha-mazon after eating in order
to derive an obligation to make a blessing before eating. The argument goes: if we bless
when full, all the more so we should bless when hungry. At the end of the day, Halakha does not
accept this argument. Why not? R. Meir Simcha answers that a good
meal can produce a feeling of prideful satisfaction that sometimes leads to
forgetting God. In contrast, a
hungry person has a greater realization of dependency. If so, the blessing after the meal
becomes more imperative and the kal va-chomer falls
away.
This also enables us
to understand possibility raised in the Talmud that a meal of kodshim
does not require grace after meals (Arakhin 4a). Perhaps eating sanctified foods in
a context of holiness would not lead to the hubris that we counter with
birkat ha-mazon.
Therefore, such meals need not be followed by a blessing. The gemara does not accept this argument
because eating a korban can also be quite enjoyable to the palate. Dangers of physicality apply here
as well, and Halakha demands birkat ha-mazon.
R. Meir
Simcha notes that we do the
opposite regarding the study of Torah: we demand a blessing beforehand but not
afterward. He suggests that we are
concerned that people may learn Torah for the wrong reasons. We make the berakhot beforehand
to create an atmosphere that encourages Torah lishmah. However, we are less concerned about the
aftermath of Torah study. Though
such study can also lead to arrogance, Halakha relies on the ennobling character
of Torah texts to lessen the dangers.
Here, R. Meir Simcha weaves together
halakhic analysis with religious existential concerns.
Not surprisingly.
R. Meir
Simcha endorses Rambams golden mean, calling it the essential
intention of the Torah. We
normally call for a balanced approach to physicality, neither overindulging nor
ascetic. However, he admits to one
set of exceptional circumstances that hinges upon his conception of
repentance. R. Meir Simcha wonders
what the mitzva of repentance consists of. It cannot simply command improving our
ways, because we are already required to fulfill the Torahs laws without the
mitzva of teshuva telling us to do so. A Sabbath desecrator must desist due to
the regular Shabbat prohibition and not because of an additional commandment to
repent.
Perhaps the
commandment to repent adds the need for confession. This explains why Rambam focuses on
confession in the beginning of his Hilkhot Teshuva. Alternatively, the commandment mandates
the unusual behavior sometimes needed by the penitent. R. Meir Simcha adopts Rambams idea
that someone with an imbalance regarding a particular trait should temporarily
go to the other extreme in order to end up in a healthier middle ground. A glutton must spend some time in a more
ascetic stance before returning to the proper measure of consumption. Perhaps the mitzva of repentance
commands this taking on of extreme measures in the pursuit of religious
improvement.
Broadly speaking,
Meshekh Chokhma integrates halakhic, aggadic and biblical material and
arrives at a coherent and consistent worldview. In our context, we have seen that
R. Meir
Simcha rejects asceticism, calling for a sanctifying of the
physical. Along the same lines, he
does not view the desire for forbidden foods as evil. At the same time, he expresses
concern about the dangers of excessive physicality. With rare exceptions, he instructs us to
strive for the golden mean.
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