Lying for the Sake of Peace
TALMUDIC AGGADA
By Rav Yitzchak Blau
*********************************************************
Dedicated in memory of our parents Jack Stone z"l and Helen and Benjamin
Pearlman z"l
and in honor of Esther Stone by Gary and Ilene Stone
*********************************************************
NEW PUBLICATIONS FROM YESHIVAT HAR ETZION:
Rav Aharon Lichtensteins
Varieties of Jewish Experience
is now available in Israel!
Rav Amital memorial volume
Le-ovdekha Be-Emet (in Hebrew)
is now available in the USA!
Discounted prices for VBM readers.
Details here: http://www.haretzion.org/torah/yeshiva-publications.
Shiur #10: Lying for the Sake of Peace
R. Ilae said in the name of R. Elazar the son of
Shimon: It is permissible to lie for the sake of peace, as it says:
Your father commanded before he died, saying:
So shall ye say unto
Joseph: Forgive, I pray you now, the transgression of your brothers, and their
sin
(Bereishit 50:16). R. Natan said: It is a
mitzva, as it says: And Shmuel said: How can I go? When Shaul hears, he will kill me (Shmuel
I 16:2). It was taught in the house of R. Yishmael: Peace is so great that
even God lies for its sake. Initially, it says: And my husband is old (Bereishit
18:12). Later it says: And I
am old (Bereishit 18:13). (Yevamot
65b)
The Gemaras three proofs work in ascending order. In the first proof, Yosefs brothers
fabricate an account of their father Yaakovs deathbed advice in order to
encourage harmonious relations with their brother. This verse indicates the
permissibility of lying for peace.
In the second proof, God instructs Shmuel to tell Shaul that he is traveling in
order to offer a sacrifice (not to anoint David as the new monarch) so that
Shmuel will avoid Shauls wrath. Since
this directive comes from God, R. Natan derives that such behavior constitutes a
mitzva. Finally, God Himself
engages in this practice. Sara was
incredulous that her elderly husband Avraham could father a child, but God tells
Avraham that Sarah expressed doubt about her own ability to conceive children. The Divine strategy prevents Avraham
from taking offense that his wife deems him too old.
Each of the three proofs is problematic and demands further analysis. How does the Gemara know that Yaakov
did not in fact instruct Yosef to forgive his brothers? One midrash argues that we
know Yaakov did not give this instruction, because the Torah never records
Yaakov saying so (Bereishit Rabba 100:8).
However, this argument from omission does not seem sufficiently strong
to establish lying as permissible.
Several Torah stories leave out details that are filled in later. Only after the brothers are in Egypt
do we discover that Yosef cried out from the pit, and that Reuven told the
brothers not to harm Yosef (Bereishit 42: 21-22). Similarly, we only know that sending
spies was the people of Israels initiative from the account in Devarim
1:22, but not from the original account of the story in Bemidbar 13. So too, this final message from
Yaakov may have been omitted earlier and filled in only in the brothers account
after the fact.
Two other factors support the Gemaras assumption that Yaakov never gave
this instruction. Rashi (Bereishit
50:16) explains that Yaakov did not suspect Yosef of vengeful feelings. Throughout the biblical account,
Yaakov has an extremely high opinion of Yosef; therefore, Yaakov would not worry
that his beloved son would want to punish his brothers, and he would never feel
a need to send such a message.
Maharsha adds that the previous verse in Bereishit also supports this
reading. And when Joseph's brethren
saw that their father was dead, they said: 'It may be that Joseph will hate us,
and will fully requite us all the evil which we did to him (Bereishit
50:15). The placement of this verse
immediately prior to the brothers approaching Yosef provides a context and a
motivation for their conversation with him. Fear
of reprisal inspired them to play loose with the truth.
The second proof assumes that Shmuel prevaricated when speaking to Shaul. However, the prophet did bring an
offering, so werent his words technically true?
Meiri explains that Shmuels true reason for going was to anoint David,
and saying that the purpose of the trip was otherwise constitutes a falsehood,
even if he does bring an offering along the way.
I believe Meiris point of crucial significance. Some rely on rabbinic sources
to suggest that as long as a person says what is technically true, it does not
matter if the words mislead the listener.
For example, one midrash parses Yaakovs reply to his blind father
in such a way that he did not speak an untruth.
I am
but Esav is your first born (Bereishit Rabba 65:18). This approach attempts to protect
Yaakov from criticism, while potentially sending a dangerous message that
deceiving another is fine, as long as you avoid any literally false words. Meiris reading removes that possible
conclusion. Though Shmuel did offer
a sacrifice, only the pursuit of peace can justify misleading Shaul.
Other midrashim refer to Yaakovs statement to his father as a lie
(see Tanchuma Vayetza 11 and Balak 18). Even the midrash that
creatively reads his statement as a truth may be arguing that lying has two
components: uttering falsehood and misleading others. The rereading only exempts Yaakov
from the first aspect of fabrication, but not the second. Meiri clarifies that the second
aspect of fabrication, misleading others, suffices to forbid certain speech
unless that speech is motivated by the pursuit of peace.
Several acharonim (later rabbinic authorities) wonder how Gods
instruction to Shmuel proves that lying is allowed for the sake of peace; after
all, the prophets life was in danger.
Since we permit almost any halakhic violation to preserve life, Shmuels
lie does not indicate a special leniency in the case of pursuing peace; there
must be a life threatening situation. R. Yaakov Ettlinger (Arukh La-ner)
suggests that, as a messenger of God, Shmuel had a guarantee that he would
suffer no harm. Therefore, the
Gemara can establish that peace overrides truth even when there is no potential
loss of life, because Shmuels life is not really in danger here. This answer is quite difficult
since the Gemara (Pesachim 8b) clearly states that the principle,
messengers for performing a mitzva will not be harmed, does not apply
to a dangerous scenario. In fact,
that gemara proves the principle from Shmuels concern in this very
story. R. Ettlingers responds that
our gemara in Yevamot reflects a different Talmudic opinion that
expands the scope of the principle, messengers for performing a mitzva
will not be harmed, to include even dangerous circumstances. This solution seems forced.
The third proof may not even involve a lie. Sarah says: After I have
withered, will I become gentle again, and my husband is old (Bereishit
18:12). She does not believe that
she can still bear a child on account of both her own and her husbands advanced
years. If so, God does not
prevaricate when he records her as focusing on her own age; He merely relates
only part of what Sara said. How
does this omission indicate that we can lie to avoid hurting anothers feelings? Ritva contends that the first part of
Saras statement is not a rhetorical question; rather, it refers to a past event
in her life. According to one
aggada (rabbinic story, on Bava Metzia 87a), Sarah resumed having
her period on that very day, after a time during which she no longer
menstruated. According to this
reading, Sara says: After I withered, I have turned gentle again, but my
husband is old. Only Avrahams age
prevents them from having a child.
Ritva tries to bring support for his interpretation from Sara using the
past tense: acharei baloti hayta li edna. However, as other commentators note,
biblical Hebrew sometimes uses past tense to mean future, and the simpler
reading is that Sara is incredulous about the possibility of turning young
again. Indeed, the immediately
preceding verse (18:11) states explicitly that Sara had stopped having her
period.
Meiri offers a different approach in which God
has a higher standard of truth. For
people, retelling some of a quote would not constitute a falsehood; but for God,
it does. Therefore, Gods statement
to Avraham still indicates the value of departing from the truth to not hurt
anothers feelings.
Maharsha suggests that accuracy in reporting
relates to formulation as well as content.
Sara said vaadoni zaken about Avraham and used a different
formulation to describe her own advanced age.
God transformed her statement about herself into vaani zakanti.
Even if she did say something about her own age, the change in language
represents a deviation from the truth.
Not only what is said matters, but how it is said.
Though all three proofs have difficulties, the Gemaras underlying
principle remains firm. We greatly
value truth, but do not consider it an absolute value overcoming all other
considerations. Preserving family
harmony and preventing hurt feelings sometimes demand deviating from the truth.
This website is constantly being improved. We would appreciate hearing from you. Questions and comments on the classes are welcome, as is help in tagging, categorizing, and creating brief summaries of the classes. Thank you for being part of the Torat Har Etzion community!