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Ch. 6 (10) The Plain Meaning of the Mishna and Its Interpretation in the Gemara

16.02.2023
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VI. “They Left Room for Us As Well”

The third and final type of gap between the plain meaning of a mishna and the Gemara’s ukimta corresponds to a certain extent to the third type of case with which we dealt in chapter 4 (section IV, 2), to explain the gap between the plain meaning of Scripture and the Midrash Halakha. Whereas with regard to the two previous types of cases, we noted the phenomenon of an ukimta that does not seek to present a necessary interpretation of the wording of the Tannaitic source, but rather stems from a different halakhic position or from a desire to reconcile a contradiction between Tannaitic sources in a practical manner, the third type involves cases in which the goal is to understand the Tannaitic source in itself, there being a difficulty with understanding the source in its plain sense. This interpretation is binding in the halakhic context, but as we saw above, it does not necessarily deny the legitimacy of alternative interpretations that deal differently with the plain meaning of the source.

We saw a clear example of this at the beginning of the chapter (section II), in Rabbi Saadya Gaon's interpretation of a difficult mishna in tractate Ketubot regarding the distribution of the ketuba in the case of "a man who was married to three wives and died." As may be recalled, the Gemara interpreted the mishna by proposing two complicated ukimtot. These ukimtot were motivated not by external considerations, but by a desire to understand a difficult Tannaitic source. Although the Gemara’s interpretations are not implicit in the Mishna’s wording, it seems the Amoraim preferred to deal with the difficulty in a logical manner. Since in any event, there is a difficulty in understanding the mishna, there are two possibilities: either the difficulty is in its logic, or the difficulty is in the peshat (plain meaning) of the mishna. The preference for understanding the logic over adherence to the plain sense is a conscious choice, and in any case, the halakhic ruling on this issue is determined according to what is stated in the Gemara.

However, as we saw earlier, Rabbi Saadya Gaon proposed a way to explain the mishna according to its plain sense, without resorting to ukimtot. He also explained the legitimacy of doing so: "they left room for us as well."[1] As may be recalled, we saw additional sources for this type of interpretation in different generations. Indeed, if Biblical commentators across the generations could interpret the verses of Scripture in accordance with their plain sense, even when their interpretations contradict the interpretations of Chazal and even with respect to halakhic issues, based on the idea of "insights into the plain meaning of Scripture that are newly thought of day by day"[2] – then there is no reason why the Tannaitic sources cannot also be interpreted in their plain sense. Of course, the binding halakha in every case is in accordance with the interpretation of Chazal.

Let us illustrate this type with another case. The Mishna defines the times for the prayers that are recited over the course of a day:

The morning prayer – until noon [chatzot]. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until the fourth hour. The afternoon prayer – until the evening. Rabbi Yehuda says: Until the middle of the afternoon [pelag ha-mincha]. The evening prayer has no fixed limit. (Berakhot 4:1)

The Gemara has difficulty understanding the words "has no fixed limit":

What is the meaning of "has no fixed limit"? If you say it means that if one wishes, he can recite the prayer any time in the night, then let it state: "The time for the evening prayer is the entire night." Rather, what is the meaning of "has no fixed limit"? As the one who says: The evening prayer is optional. (Berakhot 27b)

The Gemara rules out the possibility of understanding these words as referring to prayer times, even though that is the mishna’s topic, because were that the case, the mishna should have read: "The time for the evening prayer is the entire night." For this reason, the Gemara prefers to understand the phrase “has no fixed limit” not with regard to the time of the evening prayer, but to its very obligation – that it relates to the fact that the evening prayer is different from the other prayers, as it is defined as "optional" rather than obligatory.

The Vilna Gaon, however, clings to the possibility that the entire mishna deals with the times of prayer; therefore, he explains the words "has no fixed limit" differently:

This means: it has no time on its own part, but rather its time is when one cannot recite the other prayers; that is, between the afternoon prayer and the morning prayer. According to Rabbi Yehuda, one recites the afternoon prayer until pelag ha-mincha, and the time for the evening prayer starts from pelag ha-mincha; according to the Rabbis, who say that the time for the afternoon prayer is until the evening, the time for the evening prayer starts from the evening. (Shenot Eliyahu, ad loc.)

According to the Vilna Gaon, the phrase "has no fixed limit" means that the evening prayer has no positive time frame on its own part; rather, its time is defined as the time when the other prayers cannot be recited. Thus, there is a direct connection between the disagreement between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages regarding the time of the afternoon prayer, and the time of the evening prayer.[3]

In any case, the Vilna Gaon offers an original interpretation of the mishna, different from that of the Gemara. In this case, his interpretation has no halakhic ramifications, and therefore it is likely that even the Tosafot Yom Tov would not rule it out. It is reasonable to assume that according to the Vilna Gaon, the Gemara's interpretation does not constitute a reason for barring additional proposals for interpreting the mishna according to its plain sense.[4] This is how the Vilna Gaon's disciple, Rabbi Menashe of Ilya,[5] briefly summarized his teacher’s approach: "And he added further valor, that even in the Mishna, there is the plain sense and the exposition" (introduction to Binat Mikra).

(Translated by David Strauss)

 

[1] See shiur 37, note 8.

[2] See shiur 24 (chapter 4, sec. II).

[3] The Vilna Gaon brings a proof for his position from what the Gemara states there (Berakhot 27a): "Rav Chisda said: Let us see. Seeing that Rav recites the Shabbat prayer on the eve of Shabbat while it is still day, we conclude that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda." Rav Chisda's argument is puzzling: How can we prove, from the fact that Rav recited the evening prayer on the eve of Shabbat from the time of pelag ha-mincha, that the law is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, whose dispute with the Sages was about the time of the afternoon prayer? According to the Vilna Gaon, this is quite understandable, for the dispute regarding the time of the afternoon service is also a dispute regarding the time of the evening service.

[4] It should be noted that there are those who argue that the Vilna Gaon did not propose a new interpretation of the mishna; see Ch. Gafni, Peshuta shel Mishna, Tel Aviv 5751, p. 72.

[5] Regarding Rabbi Menashe of Ilya, see shiur 25, note 6. Rabbi Menashe of Ilya himself explained certain mishnayot in accordance with their plain meanings. The most famous example relates to the first mishna in tractate Bava Metzia, which opens with what appears to be a redundant formulation: "Two [persons, appearing before a court] hold a garment. One of them says: "I found it," and the other says: "I found it"; one of them says, "It is all mine," and the other says, "It is all mine" – then the one shall swear that his share in it is not less than half and the other shall swear that his share in it is not less than half, and [the value of the garment] shall be divided between them." The Gemara (Bava Metzia 2a) indeed asks about this redundancy: "What need is there to state: One of them says, 'I found it,' and the other says, 'I found it'; one of them says, 'It is all mine,' and the other says, 'It is all mine'? Surely one plea would have been sufficient!" And it answers: "Rav Pappa said, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Asher, and some say it was an unknown authority: The first plea applies to a case of finding, whereas the second plea applies to a case of buying and selling." However, the Tiferet Israel commentary (Rabbi Israel Lifschitz, 1782-1860, Germany) cites a different explanation in the name of Rabbi Menashe. (To understand what he says, we must first cite the continuation of the mishna there: "If one says, 'It is all mine,' and the other says, 'Half of it is mine,' he who says, 'It is all mine' shall swear that his share in it is not less than three quarters, and he who says, 'Half of it is mine' shall swear that his share in it is not less than a quarter. The former then receives three quarters [of the value of the garment] and the latter receives one quarter.") "And the Gaon Rabbi Menashe Ilya said that the entire mishna refers to one case, for it deals only with a case of finding. And this is what it means: If one of them says, 'I found it,' etc., then the law is as follows: If the one says, 'It is all mine,' and the other says, 'It is all mine,' then the one shall swear, etc. And if one of them says, 'It is all mine,' and the other says, 'Half of it is mine,' then the one shall swear, etc. And ‘the words issuing from the mouth of the Sage are elegant’ [Kohelet 10:12], but this is not in accordance with the Gemara, for in the Gemara it is stated that the plea of 'It is all mine' refers to a case of buying and selling [see Tosafot Yom Tov, Nazir 5:4]." The Tiferet Israel saw fit to refer to the words of the Tosafot Yom Tov, which legitimize interpreting the plain meaning of a mishna differently from the Gemara as long as it has no halakhic ramifications.

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