SALT - Parashat Naso 5781 - 2021

Motzaei Shabbat

            The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (68b) famously brings a debate among the Tannaim regarding the proper way to celebrate Yom Tov.  Rabbi Eliezer maintained that one has the option of devoting the holidays “kulo le-Hashem” – entirely to God, through prayer and study, or “kulo lakhem” – “entirely for yourselves,” enjoying fine food and drink.  Rabbi Yehoshua disagreed, and ruled that on Yom Tov we must combine physical enjoyment with spiritual engagement.  The Gemara then comments that when it comes to the holiday of Shavuot, even Rabbi Eliezer agrees that one must devote part of the day to enjoying festive meals.  As Shavuot celebrates our having received the Torah, festivity is obligatory according to all opinions.

            Many have raised the question as to why the celebration of Matan Torah demands festive eating more than the celebrations of the other holidays.  If anything, as Matan Torah was the event that allows us to achieve great spiritual heights through Torah devotion, it would seem more intuitive to encourage minimizing our physical enjoyment on this day, and devoting extra time to prayer and study.  Why is specifically Shavuot an occasion that requires physical enjoyment more so than our other holidays?

            The Beit Ha-levi (Parashat Yitro) answers this question based on the Gemara’s description in Masekhet Shabbat (88b-89a) of Moshe’s confrontation with the angels when he ascended Mount Sinai to receive the Torah.  The angels demanded that something as sacred as the Torah must remain in the heavens, and not be entrusted to flawed, mortal beings.  Moshe responded that the Torah’s commands are directed towards human beings, not angels.  The command to observe Shabbat, for example, is relevant to those who must work and toil during the other six days of the week.  The prohibition against murder is relevant to those who experience anger and rage that could cause them to want to kill.  The prohibition against theft is relevant to those who experience envy or greed.  And the prohibition against adultery is relevant to those who experience sexual desire.  None of these conditions are experienced by angels.  Following Moshe’s arguments, the angels had no choice but to concede and allow him to bring the Torah from the heavens to Benei Yisrael.

            The Beit Ha-levi writes that this story shows that we were given the Torah precisely because we are human beings, because we have mundane, physical needs and drives.  We have been given the Torah because we are not angelic beings, because we are frail and complicated.  Specifically on Shavuot, then, we are to celebrate our human qualities by indulging in food and drink.  Of course, like on all special occasions, the goal must be to elevate ourselves spiritually.  At the same time, however, we are obligated to indulge in food to emphasize that we have received the Torah not despite our human frailty, but because of our human frailty, so we can be uplifted, refined and enhanced by the Torah’s wisdom and sanctity.

Sunday

            The Torah introduces the account of Ma’amad Har Sinai (the Revelation at Sinai) by telling that Benei Yisrael “journeyed from Refidim, and encamped in the wilderness; the nation encamped there opposite the mountain” (Shemot 19:2).

            Rashi, citing the Mekhilta, finds it significant that the Torah here makes a point of mentioning the nation’s previous location – Refidim – of which we already read previously (17:1,8).  The Mekhilta explains that the Torah made mention of Refidim to compare the nation’s departure from that location to their encampment in the Sinai Desert: “Just as their arrival at Mount Sinai was in a state of repentance, so was their journey from Refidim in a state of repentance.”

            The question arises as to the significance of this comparison.  Why does it matter that Benei Yisrael repented not only at Sinai, but already previously, when they departed from Refidim?

            Rav Simcha Yissachar Ber Halberstam of Cheshinov, in Divrei Simcha, explains that Chazal here emphasize the importance of repenting and seeking to grow under all circumstances.  The Gemara (Shabbat 146a) teaches that when Benei Yisrael stood at Mount Sinai, “paseka zuhamatan” – their “filth” was cleansed; to one extent or another, they succeeded in subduing their negative impulses.  (As the Gemara proceeds to tell, this effect was reversed after the sin of the golden calf.)  At Sinai, Benei Yisrael experienced a unique form of inspiration, a powerful desire to connect to God that subdued their base desires.  At that time, they were overcome by religious passion and enthusiasm, to the point where they lost their “zuhama,” their sinful drives and instincts.  This special state of spiritual fervor contrasts sharply with the people’s condition in Refidim, where, as the Gemara (Bekhorot 5b) comments, “rifu atzmam mi-divrei Torah” – “they became lax with regard to words of Torah.”  In Refidim, the people experienced a degree of spiritual lethargy, lacking rigor and enthusiasm.  If Sinai marked the apex of spiritual fervor, the period spent in Refidim was characterized by laxity and disinterest.

            The Rebbe of Cheshinov writes that we all occasionally find ourselves in a condition of “Refidim,” when we feel unmotivated and uninspired.  Our day-to-day responsibilities make it very difficult to maintain our enthusiasm for Torah learning and mitzva observance.  The Mekhilta therefore teaches, “Just as their arrival at Mount Sinai was in a state of repentance, so was their journey from Refidim in a state of repentance.”  Teshuva, the effort to grow and improve, need not and should not wait until we arrive at “Sinai,” until we feel driven and inspired.  Even in “Refidim,” when we feel weary and fatigued, we are to try to advance and move forward, taking whatever small steps we can.  Even when we cannot experience the enthusiasm and energy of “Sinai,” we should nevertheless endeavor to “journey from Refidim,” to move beyond our state of lethargy.  We must not wait until we find ourselves at “Sinai,” overcome by zeal and excitement, to strive to improve; this can and must be done even in “Refidim,” at times when we lack inspiration.

Monday

            In the beginning of Parashat Naso, the Torah lists the parts of the Mishkan which were transported by the Gershon family of Leviyim – specifically, the various cloths used for the Mishkan itself and the area surrounding the Mishkan.  The Torah adds that the family of Gershon was also responsible for carrying the ropes and tools used with the cloths, as well as “kol asher yei’aseh lahem va-avadu” – literally, “and all that is done for them, and they do the work” (4:26).

            Onkelos, as cited by Rashi, explains this phrase to mean, “and all that is given to them to do.”  As the Ramban writes, Onkelos understood the verb “yei’aseh” (“that is done”) as referring to the work assigned to Gershon.  Meaning, the Torah indicates that there were miscellaneous items which needed to be transported along with the Mishkan, and these were also given to the members of the Gershon family.  This verse should thus be understood as saying that Gershon carried not only the items listed, but also the other miscellaneous materials which were given to them.  The Ramban explains this phrase in a slightly different manner, claiming that “asher yei’aseh lahem” refers to objects needed for the Mishkan and its furnishings.  There were many tools and utensils needed for setting up, dismantling, and maintaining the Mishkan, and these were assigned to the Gershon family.

            Deeper insight into this verse is offered by Rav Shmuel of Slonim, in Divrei Shmuel.  Just as (according to Onkelos’ reading) the Gershonites were expected to carry everything given to them, so are we all expected to serve God with whatever we are given, under whichever circumstances we find ourselves.  The Rebbe of Slonim suggests reading the phrase “kol asher yei’aseh lahem” to mean “all that is done to them.”  No matter what happens in life, we are to commit ourselves to serving God to the best of our limited ability.  The Rebbe of Slonim observes the instinct we often have to excuse ourselves from our religious obligations due to our conditions and circumstances which we find unfavorable and unconducive to religious excellence.  The responsibilities of the family of Gershon, which included “kol asher yei’aseh lahem” – anything they were given – serves as an instructive symbol for us of accepting whichever conditions we are placed in, and striving to achieve the most we can under those circumstances without making excuses.

Tuesday

            The Torah in Parashat Naso (6:22-27) introduces the mitzva of birkat kohanim, the special blessing with which kohanim are to bless the rest of the nation.  This mitzva applies both in the Beit Ha-mikdash and in synagogues, where kohanim bless the rest of the congregation during the prayer service each morning (though in Ashkenazic communities in Diaspora, this blessing is conducted only on festivals).

            Before proclaiming birkat kohanim, the kohanim recite a berakha over the performance of this mitzva – praising God who has commanded them “le-vareikh et amo Yisrael be-ahava” – “to bless His nation, Israel, with love.”  As many have noted, the text of this berakha clearly indicates that the Torah requires the kohanim not merely to bless the rest of the nation, but to do so “with love,” with genuine feelings of concern and affection.  Indeed, the Mishna Berura (128:37) writes that if a kohen harbors feelings of resentment toward the congregation, or if the congregation harbors feelings of resentment toward a kohen, he may not recite birkat kohanim, because the obligation requires blessing the people with love.  This cannot be fulfilled when tensions exist between a kohen and the congregation, and so in such a case, the kohen does not recite the blessing.

            Rav Shlomo Klein of Zenta, in Likutei Shlomo, suggests that the source of this halakha might be the formulation of God’s command to the kohanim: “So shall you bless the Israelites – say to them: ‘May the Lord bless you and protect you…’” The words “amor lahem” (“say to them”), Rav Klein writes, can perhaps be understood as connoting more than mere verbal communication.  It might imply a real and genuine interest in the people’s wellbeing.  Sometimes, when we wish somebody well, we have our own interests in mind.  When the people around us enjoy safety, health and contentment, we benefit from their wellbeing, in that we do not have to worry about them or help them.  In many instances, other people’s success and prosperity directly benefit us.  For kohanim, in particular, as Rav Klein notes, the people’s prosperity would likely result in larger portions of teruma – the share of agricultural produce given to kohanim – and other gifts which the Torah requires giving to kohanim.  Hence, when the kohanim bless the people, they might have their own interests in mind, given that they stand to benefit from the people’s success.  The Torah therefore emphasizes, “Amor lahem” – that the kohanim should pronounce the blessing for the people’s benefit, not for their own benefit.  They should be motivated by genuine love and concern for the rest of the nation, and not by their own interests.  And thus Chazal determined that the kohanim are required not merely to bless the nation, but to do so be-ahava, with love and affection, sincerely wishing joy and prosperity upon all Benei Yisrael.

Wednesday

            The Torah in Parashat Naso (5:1-8) addresses the situation of somebody who is guilty of a certain transgression and repents, and requires that the penitent sinner pay restitution along with a twenty percent penalty, and offer a special sacrifice.  As Rashi explains, Chazal understood this section as a restatement of the law presented earlier, in Parashat Vayikra (5:20-26), regarding the case of one who stole and then falsely denied his crime on oath.  After confessing his wrongdoing, the thief must repay what he stole, adding a chomesh (one-fifth), and also bring a special guilt-offering.  This law is repeated here, Chazal understood, to introduce the provision that applies in the unique case where the victim has since died and left no inheritors to whom the thief can return the stolen money or goods.  In such a case, the Torah commands (5:8), the payment is given to a kohen.  Chazal explained that as all people have some living relatives, even if they have no immediate family, this case is possible only in a situation of gezel ha-ger – where one had stolen from a convert.  When one converts and joins the Jewish Nation, he is halakhically considered “reborn,” such that he is no longer legally related to any of his biological kin.  Therefore, if a convert had not produced any children since his conversion, he has no inheritors, and so if one had stolen from this convert and confessed only after the convert’s death, he pays the money to a kohen.

            There is also another halakha which Chazal inferred from the Torah’s restatement of this law here in Parashat Naso.  The Mishna in Masekhet Shevuot (49a) establishes that the penitent thief is required to pay the twenty percent penalty and offer a sacrifice only if he comes forward on his own to confess.  The Torah here in Parashat Naso explicitly speaks of a thief who confesses, indicating that if the thief does not confess, but witnesses testify that he stole, then the special laws mentioned here do not apply.

            It emerges, then, that the restatement of the requirements of the twenty percent penalty and guilt offering introduces two new principles: 1) that in the case of a convert who has no inheritors, the payment is made to a kohen; 2) these requirements apply only if the thief comes forward on his own to confess.

            The Chatam Sofer (Torat Moshe) suggests a possible point of connection between these two principles.  If a person steals from a convert, then besides just committing a grievous crime, the thief is also guilty of chilul Hashem – defaming God.  When a gentile makes the decision to join the Jewish People and embrace Torah law, he does so because he has come to recognize the beauty and joy of Torah life.  If he then falls victim to a crime by one of his new coreligionists, and the thief falsely denies his crime on oath, the convert is terribly disillusioned, and likely regrets his decision to join Am Yisrael.  Such a crime brings infamy upon the Jewish People, the Torah, and God Himself.

            Coming forward to confess, the Chatam Sofer writes, serves to atone not only for the crime of theft, but also for the grave chilul Hashem that it caused.  Confessing one’s guilt and seeking to rectify the wrongdoing even before he is discovered is an act of nobility which invites esteem.  Even if we act in a manner that dishonors Torah, we can repair the damage by openly and sincerely admitting and apologizing for the wrongful behavior.  And thus the chilul Hashem caused by gezel ha-ger is reversed by the kiddush Hashem – glorification of God – caused by coming forward to confess and express remorse.

            Therefore, the Chatam Sofer explains, the Torah here restates the law of the penalty and guilt offering to introduce two details – the specific case of gezel ha-ger, and the rule that this law applies only if the thief confesses on his own.  The connection between these two points is that one who steals from a thief has committed a grave chilul Hashem, for which he can then atone through the kiddush Hashem of coming forward to confess his guilt and accept responsibility.

Thursday

            The Torah in Parashat Naso describes the procedure required in the case of a sota – a woman whose husband had suspected her of infidelity, and who, after having been warned by her husband not be secluded with a certain man, did so.  The couple in such a case is forbidden from engaging in marital relations until a special ceremony is performed in the Beit Ha-mikdash, whereby the woman’s innocence or guilt is miraculously determined.  The woman is given special water to drink, and if she was guilty of having an adulterous relationship, she would die; if she was innocent, she would survive, and she and her husband would resume their marital life.  This ceremony included a special offering consisting of grain.  Like all mincha (grain) offerings, the kohen took a handful of grain which he placed on the altar (5:25-26).  The rest of the offering was then eaten by the kohanim.

            A number of scholars noted that according to one view among the Tannaim, one who brings a sacrifice could invalidate it by simply having certain intentions at the time the sacrifice is offered – thus giving a sota a simple method of escaping punishment.  The law of pigul establishes that if the kohen performing the sacrifice intends to eat the sacrificial meat or place the required portions on the altar after the time allowed for these actions, then the sacrifice is invalid.  If the kohen has this intention during any of the four major stages of the sacrificial process (slaughtering, collecting the blood, bringing it to the altar, and sprinkling the blood), then the sacrifice is not valid and may not be eaten.  It is commonly assumed that the law of pigul applies only if the kohen tending to the sacrifice has in mind that the meat would be eaten, or the required portions would be placed on the altar, after the deadline by which this must be done.  However, one Tanna, Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Yossi, maintained that a sacrifice is disqualified even if the ba’alim – the person bringing it – has this intention (Zevachim 47a).  Since this is his sacrifice, his wrong intention can disqualify it.  Seemingly, according to this opinion, a knowledgeable sota who is guilty of infidelity has a fairly simple way of avoiding the consequences of drinking the water given to her to determine her innocence or guilt.  All she has to do is think in her mind during the offering of her mincha that it should be eaten beyond the prescribed time (that day and the following night), and then, according to Rabbi Elazar, the mincha is invalid.  As the “inspection” performed by the sota waters is ineffective without the offering of the mincha, any sota can, according to this opinion, escape punishment by “sabotaging” the sacrifice – by secretly having in her mind that the mincha should be eaten beyond its deadline.

            Remarkably, Rav Yosef Engel composed an entire book on this topic – entitled Gevurot Shemonim – consisting of eighty different possible answers to this question.  His first answer is to suggest limiting Rabbi Elazar’s view to a particular category of sacrifices.  Generally, the rule of “ein adam oser davar she-eino shelo” establishes that one cannot affect the halakhic status of somebody else’s property, making it forbidden, without performing a physical act with the object in question.  Thus, for example, prostrating before somebody else’s possession does not have the effect of making the object forbidden for use, even though an article of idolatrous worship is forbidden for any kind of benefit.  Therefore, if Rabbi Elazar empowers a person who brings a sacrifice to disqualify it through his thoughts, he must assume that one who brings a sacrifice is considered the legal “owner” over the sacrifice even after consecrating it.  (The kohen can disqualify the sacrifice through his thoughts even though he is not the legal owner, because he also performs an action with the sacrifice, as the Ran explains in Masekhet Nedarim (36a).)  Generally speaking, though, it is assumed that once a person consecrates an animal or flour as a sacrifice, he is no longer considered the legal owner.  The notable exception to this rule is Rabbi Yossi Ha-Gelili’s opinion, cited on several occasions throughout the Talmud, that sacrifices in the category of kodashim kalim, which have a lower level of sanctity, are considered “mammon ba’alim” – the individual’s legal property.  Thus, for example, according to Rabbi Yossi Ha-Gelili, if one consecrates his animal as a sacrifice of this type, he may use it to betroth a woman, as the animal remains his property (Bava Kama 12b).  Therefore, Rav Engel proposes that when Rabbi Elazar states that even the ba’alim can render a sacrifice pigul and invalidate it through his thoughts, this applies only to sacrifices in the category of kodashei kalim, and he presumes the view of Rabbi Yossi Ha-Gelili, that such sacrifices are regarded as the legal property of the ba’alim.  It is only because the sacrifice is still legally considered the individual’s property that, in the view of Rabbi Elazar, a person can render his sacrifice pigul through his thoughts.

            Now all mincha offerings fall under the category of kodashei kodashim – sacrifices of the higher level of sanctity.  As such, all opinions agree that when one brings a mincha offering, the offering is not considered his or her legal property.  Hence, Rav Engel suggests, even Rabbi Elazar concedes that when it comes to a mincha offering, only the officiating kohen, and not the ba’alim, can invalidate the sacrifice by having in mind that it should be eaten after the prescribed time.  Therefore, all agree that a sota does not have the ability to disqualify her mincha offering.

Friday

            Yesterday, we discussed the sota ceremony, the supernatural method the Torah established for determining the innocence or guilt of a woman whose husband has reason to suspect her of infidelity.  The woman was brought to the Beit Ha-mikdash and given special water to drink which would miraculously kill her if she were guilty, and thus if she survived, her innocence was confirmed.  As we saw, some raised the question that seemingly, according to a minority view in the Gemara, the wife had a very simple way of sabotaging the process.  The ceremony included a mincha (grain) offering which the woman was required to bring, and, according to Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi Yossi (Zevachim 49a), one who brings a sacrifice to the Beit Ha-mikdash can invalidate the sacrifice by having certain wrong intentions at any of the critical stages of the sacrifice’s offering.  All agree that if the kohen tending to the sacrifice has the intention that the meat should be eaten, or the required portions placed on the altar, after the prescribed time, the sacrifice is considered “pigul” and is invalid.  However, whereas most maintain that this law applies only if the kohen has such intentions, Rabbi Elazar was of the opinion that even the ba’alim (person who brought the sacrifice) invalidates the sacrifice if he has this intention.  Seemingly, then, every guilty sota can escape punishment by invalidating her mincha in this fashion, by having an intention that renders it pigul.

            Rav Yosef Engel, as we mentioned yesterday, composed an entire work entitled Gevurot Shemonim on this topic, presenting eighty different answers.  His second answer is to suggest that Rabbi Elazar allows for the ba’alim’s thoughts to disqualify an animal sacrifice only during the first stage of the sacrificial process – namely, the shechita (slaughtering).  Shechita differs from the subsequent stages of a sacrifice in that it does not require a kohen.  Whereas all the other actions involved in offering a sacrifice must be performed specifically by a kohen, anybody may slaughter the animal.  Rav Engel extends this rule one significant step further, positing that in truth, it is the ba’alim who bears the obligation to slaughter his sacrifice.  As the Gemara implies in Masekhet Pesachim (7b) and Masekhet Kiddushin (41b), when a kohen slaughters the sacrifice, he does so as the ba’alim’s agent, acting on his behalf.  Accordingly, Rav Engel suggests that when Rabbi Elazar stated that the ba’alim’s wrong intentions invalidate the sacrifice, he refers only to the shechita.  If at that point, as the animal is slaughtered, the individual has an intention of pigul, then the sacrifice becomes pigul and is invalid.  Since the kohen slaughters the animal as the ba’alim’s agent, the ba’alim is considered as though he himself performs the act of shechita (in light of the rule of “shelucho shel adam kemoto” – an agent’s action is attributed to the one in whose name he acts), and, as such, his intention can disqualify the sacrifice.  The subsequent stages, however, must be done only by a kohen, and thus only the kohen’s thoughts can render the sacrifice pigul.  During those stages, the kohen does not act as the ba’alim’s agent, because one cannot become a halakhic agent to do something which Halakha does not allow the individual himself to perform.  As such, even according to Rabbi Elazar, the ba’alim’s thoughts disqualify the sacrifice only during shechita, when the kohen acts as his agent, but not during the subsequent stages, when the kohen does not serve as the ba’alim’s agent.

            Returning to the sota, her sacrifice is not an animal, but rather flour, which, quite obviously, is not slaughtered.  In the case of a mincha, the shechita is replaced by kemitza – the taking of a handful of the sacrifice, which is then placed on the altar.  Unlike shechita, kemitza must be performed by a kohen.  Accordingly, Rav Engel writes, even Rabbi Elazar agrees that only a kohen can render a mincha offering pigul, and the ba’alim’s intentions are of no consequence, as the ba’alim is not permitted to perform any stage of the sacrifice.  As such, a sota does not have the ability to sabotage the process by having the wrong intentions as her mincha sacrifice is being offered.

 

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