“Gadol Ha-metzuveh” and the Proper Mindset
Bein Adam Le-chavero: Ethics of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav
Binyamin Zimmerman
Shiur #09: Gadol Ha-metzuveh and the Proper
Mindset
What Should We Be Thinking?
What is the proper mindset for one about to perform
an act of kindness for another? What
should one be thinking when giving charity or doing other kind deeds? Should the
focus be on fulfilling the divine decree, on benefitting the friend or on
elevating ones character? In more
day-to-day terms, should one say I am giving charity because God commanded me
to do so, or I am giving charity because my friend is in need, or I am
giving charity because I want to make myself a charitable person? Which one of these mindsets, if any,
is to be viewed as preferable?
Logically, to answer this question, one must seek to identify the nature
of interpersonal obligations. But
here is where it gets sticky. We
have seen that interpersonal commandments are rooted in a threefold obligation:
a divine command makes them mitzvot bein adam la-Makom; a focus on
benefiting ones fellow makes them uniquely mitzvot bein adam le-chavero;
and a transformational element directed towards the individual performing these
acts makes them mitzvot bein adam le-atzmo. However, if all three
elements co-exist, which should one be thinking of when performing acts of
kindness?
In order to grasp the proper mindset for performing
acts of kindness, it pays to take a moment to investigate the proper outlook for
performing mitzvot in general, which then may be applied to mitzvot
bein adam le-chavero in particular. This question, in fact, relates to a
more general issue regarding the proper outlook and intention for one performing
mitzvot in general and rational
mitzvot in particular: should one be actively cognizant of the command while
performing a given mitzva or not? In
order to deal with these issues, let us take a short look at the general
discussion surrounding the proper attitude for performing mitzvot, and
then relate it to our specific questions regarding logical, interpersonal
mitzvot.
Greater is the One Who Is Commanded
How should we look at Gods commands in the first
place? The Talmud teaches that
Avraham fulfilled the entire Torah without being commanded to do so (Kiddushin
82a). A priori, one would
probably view this as the most noble of behaviors; after all he followed Gods
will without being required to do so.
Nevertheless, the Talmud seems to provide us with a different outlook
regarding Gods commands. The Talmud
tells us, in a number of instances, Rabbi Chaninas ruling and philosophy
regarding mitzvot: Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh mi-mi she-eino metzuveh
ve-oseh, A person who does something being commanded is superior to one
who does it without being commanded.
In Bava Kamma 87a, the Talmud relates the story of Rav Yosef; as a blind
man, the nature of his obligation in the mitzvot he was performing was subject to a Tannaitic dispute. Therefore,
he would make a celebration when the opinion that gave greater significance to
his performance of mitzvot would be mentioned in the study hall.
Rav Yosef said: At first I used to say that if
someone told me that the Halakha accords with the view of Rav Yehuda, who said
that a blind person is exempt from observing
mitzvot, I would make a holiday for the rabbis. What is the reason? Because [it would mean that since I
am blind] I am not commanded to perform
mitzvot, and yet I do perform mitzvot.
However, now that we have heard this dictum of Rabbi Chanina, who said, A
person who does something being commanded is superior to one who does it without
being commanded, if someone tells me that the Halakha does not accord with Rav
Yehuda, I would make a holiday for the rabbis? Why?
Because [it means that] being commanded, I deserve a greater reward.
In our day and age it is easy to understand Rav
Yosefs initial inclination, that by performing mitzvot when one is under
no obligation to do so, one demonstrates a greater commitment to God; the
statement of Rabbi Chanina, which he seems to accept ultimately, is harder to
comprehend. We usually assume
that voluntary noble behavior is to be preferred above what one does, however
honorably, out of a sense of obligation.
Yet after hearing the statement of Rabbi Chanina, reflecting the opposite
approach, Rav Yosef seemingly changes his view, at least somewhat (see
commentators on Bava Kamma ibid). What is the meaning of this cryptic
statement, that one who is obligated to perform
mitzvot is deemed greater than the volunteer?
In fact there are many commentators that view this Talmudic passage as
the source of celebrating a childs becoming bar or bat mitzva (see Yam shel
Shelomo Bava Kamma 7:37). When a child reaches the age of
Jewish adulthood, he or she now becomes obligated in mitzvot. The whole celebration is dedicated to
rejoicing in the childs ability to perform mitzvot as a metzuveh,
a commanded being, rather than as an apprentice. Again, we may ask: what is so
great about being commanded?
At first glance, this might seem a little
counterintuitive, but after further analysis, it becomes quite reasonable. A number of Rishonim explain certain
advantages that are only applicable to one who performs
mitzvot as a metzuveh.
Tosafot (Kiddushin 31a) explain that one who
is obligated to perform a mitzva is more worried and anxious about failing to do
it properly, as opposed to one who volunteers and has nothing to lose. The additional pressure of the
yetzer ha-ra, the evil inclination, is magnified by one who is trying to
fulfill an obligation. This greater
difficulty in performing the mitzva is rewarded with greater divine
remuneration.
Other Rishonim (see Tosafot Ha-Rosh and Ritva ibid.) focus on the fact
that the individual who is commanded is fulfilling the word of God in performing
the mitzva, while the individual who volunteers is doing something God
appreciates, but which He has not asked him to do.
Self-Actualization or Commandment
One might take these explanations of the commentators to their logical
conclusion and explain that a command enjoins responsibility, and thus it may
even weigh down on one as overbearing.
While one may easily offer their services when no
obligation exists, a sense of requirement often causes one to reevaluate and
sometimes even sidestep the obligation.
The oft-heard line Nobody tells me what to do! is viewed by some as
applicable even to Gods word.
Rav Aharon Lichtenstein explains that the
fundamental teaching of this Talmudic maxim is in fact a statement of Judaisms
stress on being commanded as opposed to achieving self-fulfillment.
Presumably, one who is eino metzuveh ve-oseh, who is not commanded but
nevertheless performs, acts in accordance with his personal inclination and
therefore attains more self-fulfillment than one who is simply commanded, Do
this! No one asks the commanded individual whether he
likes what he is doing. Yet Chazal said, Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh,
thus placing at the center or even at the apex of our spiritual lives the sense
of being called and commanded. This is what religious existence in general is
about, and certainly applies to Judaism more than to most other religions.
(By His Light, p. 51)
Rav Lichtenstein expounds on the benefits of
experiencing the element of command in mitzvot, tracing it back to the
Garden of Eden and Va-yetzav Hashem Elokim al ha-adam, And Lord God
commanded the man (Bereishit 2:16):
A metzuveh leads a theocentric rather than an
anthropocentric life. He is guided by Gods will, not by his own likes and
preferences.... If you are commanded, you do not pick and choose among commands
that would be living an anthropocentric life, placing yourself in the center and
building everything around yourself. Va-yetzav Hashem Elokim al ha-adam
means, first and foremost, that Gods will is at the center; your will may be
factored in, but only secondarily.
Furthermore, we should seek to relate to mitzvot as
being intrinsically good; in this sense, we identify with the mitzvot on a
personal level. But at the same time, we must not lose sight of the element of
command within them. This can explain why Chazal say, Gadol
ha-metzuveh ve-oseh mi-mi she-eino metzuveh ve-oseh. If someone is a
metzuveh ve-oseh, then in addition to doing something which is good, he also
acts out of a sense of response to Gods demands. The experience of being
commanded is something which he has in addition to the fact that he does
something right and good, and this makes him greater than one who is eino
metzuveh ve-oseh. (By His Light, pp. 53-56)
This
explanation may find psychological backing in Frankls fascinating explanation
of the need for a command for true self-fulfillment.
[M]an is responsible and must actualize
the potential meaning of his life.
The more one forgets himself by giving
himself to a cause to serve or a person to love the more human he is and the
more he actualizes himself. What is called self-actualization is not an
attainable aim at all, for the simple reason that the more one would strive for
it, the more he would miss it. In other words, self-actualization is only
possible as a side effect of self-transcendence. (Victor Frankl, Mans Search
for Meaning, p.133)
When all is said and done, the idea of Gadol
ha-metzuveh is focusing on the element of command, extolling the virtue of
every mitzva as being bein adam la-Makom, stemming from a divine decree. If we would stop here, the proper
answer to our initial query would seemingly be that one should definitely focus
on the element of command when performing
mitzvot, and one should be cognizant of the fact that one is doing an
act of kindness because God commanded them to do so. However, when it comes to mitzvot
bein adam la-chavero, one might wonder if this is indeed applicable true,
the reward might be greater, but is the element of command so central?
When Does This Apply?
The Talmud applies Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh
mi-mi she-eino metzuveh ve-oseh to certain
mitzvot in particular, but it does not explicitly limit the concept to
these cases. However, some
commentators express the sentiment that it should be limited in its application. Rabbeinu Tams somewhat cryptic
opinion falls in this category.
As cited in Shitta Mekubbetzet (Bava Kamma 87a), Rabbeinu Tam
explains that the dictum Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh is only applicable
to mitzvot that would have been worth
writing, even had they not been written, such as the seven Noahide commands.
This statement of Rabbeinu Tam was originally
assumed to limit this rule to the seven Noahide commandments, and it was
therefore questioned by a number of commentators who pointed out that the Talmud
applies this principle to other commandments as well. Rav Moshe Feinstein deals with this
statement of Rabbeinu Tam and says that his intention is not to limit the
concept to the seven Noahide commandments per se; indeed, these bind
everyone, including non-Jews, and to say otherwise would be against the Talmud. Rather, Rabbenu Tams intention is
that the rule of Rabbi Chanina does not apply by all commandments.
If mitzvot
have an understandable reason, it is not clear that one is performing the mitzva
to fulfill Gods desire, for it is possible that the individual is only
performing this deed due to the logical reason e.g., tzedaka and
honoring ones parents. Regarding
these mitzvot, it is specifically the
commandment that gives divine significance to the act.
This principle applies specifically to logical
mitzvot; there, one must feel a sense
of obligation, as otherwise the fulfillment of these commands will be dictated
by logic and not by religion. (Iggerot
Moshe, YD 1:6)
Rav Moshe Feinsteins explanation seems to
underscore the difficulty at hand.
What should be the mindset of someone about to perform a command? Rav Moshe Feinstein seems to indicate
that specifically when fulfilling logical mitzvot one should be cognizant
of the command, or else they erase any divine element.
However, his comment seems not to be agreed upon by
all. In fact, other commentators
seem to take the opposite approach, preferring the natural fulfillment of
logical interpersonal mitzvot in place
of a sense of commanded responsibility.
Rav Ovadya Yosef (Yabbia Omer, YD 6:29) deals
with question of whether one can perform mitzvot in a dirty area which is unfit for making blessings. After quoting some sources, he
questions those who attempt to prove that one can do so from the fact that one
can give tzedaka in an unclean area.
He explains that the reason not to perform a mitzva in an unclean place
is that it is not proper to think about the Creator in an unfit area, so one
cannot have proper kavana (intent).
Yet regarding tzedaka, one need not think about the Commander of
the mitzva; rather, one should focus on providing benefit to his friend. He
cites the following explanation in the name of the Noda Bi-Yehuda:
The reason why one must perform [other]
mitzvot in order to fulfill Gods
word, as opposed to tzedaka, for which this is not necessary, is because
all [other] mitzvot are meaningless if
not done for to fulfill their Divine command. If
one were to shake a lulav, to wear tefillin or tzitzit,
without intending to do a mitzva, then one would provide no benefit for himself,
for it is the commandment itself which engenders significance to the act;
therefore, the mitzva must be performed with the intent to fulfill Gods word. However, regarding tzedaka,
even though there is no mitzva, there is still benefit for the poor individual
who receives it [and therefore the act is significant even without the proper
intention]
In the responsum, Rav Ovadya continues to quote
other sources which seem to express the same idea and apply it to all
interpersonal mitzvot. As we
explained in lesson #06, the uniqueness of mitzvot bein adam le-chavero
is that the aim is to benefit ones friends and neighbors; the Noda Bi-Yehuda,
therefore, claims that one need not think of the command in the process.
If kavana is required for a given
mitzva, then one would be limited in its fulfillment, restricting ones ability
to provide for the poor to a place where one could fulfill the divine command
properly. Since the mitzva is
significant even without a command, the proper intent may include benefiting the
poor even without intending to fulfill the word of God. Similar differences of opinion can be
seen regarding the discussion of why interpersonal
mitzvot do not contain a blessing; let us examine this.
Relationship between the Commandment and the Blessing
In lesson #06, we saw a number of opinions as to why
there is no blessing made on interpersonal mitzvot; some of them are
particularly pertinent to our current discussion.
Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (Seridei Esh I,
61) relates his explanation to limiting the applicability of Gadol
ha-metzuveh ve-oseh:
It is true that regarding
all the mitzvot we say, A person who
does something being commanded is superior to one who does it without being
commanded and we recite the blessing [which includes the words], "and [He]
commanded us." Nevertheless, in the case
of sending food to others on Purim, it is better that a person give of his own
free will, out of a feeling of love for his fellow Jew. If he gives only because
God has so commanded, he diminishes the measure of love. The same applies to
charity; if a person gives out of compassion or love for his fellow Jew, it is
better than one who gives because of the command and out of coercion
It may be
[also] on this account that we do not recite a blessing over honoring one's
father or mother.
The Arukh Ha-shulchan and others (see lesson #06) explain this
differently. They maintain that the
reason interpersonal mitzvot lack a blessing is not because we cannot say And
commanded us when our fulfillment does not discharge an obligation; rather, it
is because these mitzvot apply elsewhere as well, so that the commandment
is not readily recognizable. Others
explain that since the fulfillment of these mitzvot requires the
acceptance of the recipient, one can never be sure of their fulfillment until it
is too late to recite a blessing.
These opinions seem to recognize the element of command as significant regarding
interpersonal mitzvot, but they hold that the lack of a berakha is
the result of a technical limitation.
The Seridei Eish, while explaining why no berakha
is recited, explains the outlook of one who benefits his friend only because he
is commanded to do so. The question
of the proper mindset regarding interpersonal
mitzvot puts us in a catch-22. In fact, whichever direction we go on
this issue seems to bring us to a halt.
If we were to perform charity or other
mitzvot out of a sense of obligation
and coercion, we would be showing that we lack compassion, as the Seridei Eish
seems to indicate. Conversely, as
Rav Moshe Feinstein explain Rabbeinu Tams view, if we were to give charity
because we have compassion for the poor individual, with no thought to the Godly
command, are we really performing a mitzva at all? Are not we merely giving charity to
satisfy our feelings of concern for another?
The Maharal explained that this dichotomy is in fact
referenced in the Torah, when it presents the mitzva to give charitable,
interest-free loans.
If You Provide a Loan
The Torah expresses the mitzva of providing free
loans in a rather unusual language.
If you provide a loan to My people, to the poor
person who is with you, do not act toward him as a creditor; do not lay interest
upon him. (Shemot 22:24)
Rashi comments on the first word, im, which
is usually translated if. This
would seem to indicate that one has a choice.
He explains that this is one of the three cases in Scripture where the
word im is used to introduce an obligation.
The Maharal, in his Gur Aryeh supercommentary
(ad loc.), asks: why indeed does the Torah use the term im if it
is in essence placing an obligation upon us to provide loans to the needy? He explains this with a principle
relevant for our discussion:
For if a person would fulfill these dictates because
he is obligated to fulfill the decrees of a king, this would not be the desire
of God, for God wants man to fulfill the command out of his own desire to do so
Indeed, if a person would do these three acts out of
a sense of being decreed to do so by the king, unwillingly, this would not be
something for God to be proud of.
The Maharal continues and explains why these three
commandments in particular, although binding, should not be performed out of a
sense of obligation but rather a sense of desire.
Regarding providing interest-free loans, he explains:
If someone would loan money because he is commanded
to do so, it would not be a mitzva, as the mitzva of providing loans must be
done out of the desire of a good heart, as it is written (Devarim 15:10),
And your heart must not be bad.
The Maharal in general champions the approach that
all commands should be performed with an understanding of their essence. He explains that the very name of the
Torah, which literally means teaching, is significant: it is not called the
Mitzva because the essence of a mitzva is to carry out the order of the
commander. God has a completely different
intention in giving the Torah to the Jewish people, for He desired that we
understand and comprehend the essence of each mitzva (Derush al Ha-mitzvot
50a). Nevertheless, the Maharal here
seems to go one step further: although every mitzva should be performed with the
understanding of its background, the performance of these
mitzvot is predicated upon ones mindset, and for that reason the Torah
begins Im (see Gur Aryeh Ha-shalem, fn. 232).
What the Maharal expresses regarding the Torahs
formulation of giving loans may be true for all interpersonal mitzvot. The mitzva must be performed out of a
desire to provide for ones friend; otherwise, the one doing the mitzva have
missed its very point.
To Be Continued
After being faced with divergent opinions which seem to negate each other
should we should focus our fulfillment of interpersonal mitzvot on the
glorious sense of being commanded or on the inner calling of our kind nature?
we might wonder aloud: can one really assume that all mitzvot are created
equally, requiring the same mindset?
Is the generosity and love of the human heart to be
subject to the same halakhic formalization as the laws of Shabbat?
Are the dictates of law and obligation
going to reduce what should be the overflowing goodness of spirit to a matter of
fulfilling one's duty, according to the sections and subsections of the Code of
Jewish Law? Is there not a contradiction
between the very idea of chesed, of loving-kindness, and law, obligation,
and duty? Is this not an area where halakha should have retreated, so as not to
overwhelm the very virtue it is trying to promote? (Rav Ezra Bick, VBM,
Tzedaka
and Chesed)
On the other hand, we began with Avrahams
performing mitzvot without a command.
Though his behavior was a sign of nobility, it would not necessarily be
as noble in our day. Avraham knew
that the Torah represented the will of God, and he transformed his nature to
desire its fulfillment. The world
was not yet ready for the Torah because it required a nation, which was only in
its infancy then. However, in our
day, after the revelation at Mt. Sinai, when commandment is part and parcel of
our existence and identity, the element of command is essential. Can we really be kind without
relating to it?
In next weeks lesson, I hope to show how this dispute seems to have
actually begun much earlier; indeed, it can be found in a number of comments of
the Rishonim. I will attempt to
arrive at an outlook that will satisfy all approaches. We will just conclude with a story
which illustrates the dilemma.
The tale is told of a man who gave a poor man some
money and, after walking away, ran back and gave the poor man another set of
coins. When asked afterwards what
the reason for this was, he responded, When I originally gave him the money, I
did it because I could not allow myself to pass by a pauper without providing
him with something. After walking
away, I realized I had not performed the mitzva of tzedaka, as I did not
think of the command; therefore, I ran back to give him money with the proper
intent.
Did this man
do the right thing? What would you
have done?
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