Permitted and Forbidden Hatred
Bein
Adam Le-chavero: Ethics of Interpersonal Conduct
By Rav Binyamin
Zimmerman
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Dedicated in memory of
Joseph Y. Nadler, zl, Yosef ben Yechezkel Tzvi
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Shiur #15: Permitted and Forbidden Hatred
Introduction
In last week's lesson we
discussed the nature of the prohibition Do not hate (Lo tisna) your
brother in your heart. Despite the severity of Lo tisna, some sources
indicate that under specific circumstances, this prohibition may be waived. Is
there ever really permission to hate a fellow Jew, and if so, under what
circumstances and for what purpose?
An analysis of the
Torah's terminology is necessary in order to understand the scope of the
prohibition.
Reiakha
and Achikha, Love and Hate
The question of who is
included in the prohibition of hatred parallels the question regarding who is
included in the mitzva of loving one's fellow Jew. The two are found next to
each other in Vayikra 19:17-18, the former speaking of reiakha
(your fellow) and the latter of achikha (your brother). What is the
connotation of each?
The Rambam, in a number
of places, indicates that the obligation of love extends to all Jews. In
Hilkhot De'ot (6:3), he unequivocally extends the obligation to all Jews,
without limitation:
There is a mitzva
falling upon everyone to love each individual Jew as himself, as it is stated:
"You shall love your fellow as yourself."
The Talmud may provide a source to back up
this assertion. Sanhedrin 45a expounds this verse to give a criminal
sentenced to capital punishment a proper (i.e., humane) death, clearly implying
that the obligation of loving one's fellow applies to every Jew, even condemned
criminals.
Logic would dictate that
the same should apply to the inverse, the prohibition of hatred. If one must
love every Jew, then one must be enjoined from hating any Jew. However, this may
not be true. The Talmud notes that despite the prohibition of hating one's
brother, another verse in the Torah makes explicit reference to ones foe, an
individual whom one hates.
If you come across your enemy's ox or donkey going astray, you must
certainly bring it back to him. If you see your foes donkey lying under its
load and you refrain from helping him, you must certainly help him. (Shemot
23:4-5)
The Talmud (Pesachim 113b) discusses
the law applying to an individual whose unseemly behavior has been witnessed by
only one person, and it resolves the contradiction between the two verses, the
prohibition to hate another Jew and the obligation to help a hated Jew:
Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav
Yitzchak: It is permissible to hate him, as it is said. If you see your foes
donkey lying under its load.' Now which foe is meant? Shall we say a non-Jewish
foe? It was taught: The foe of whom they spoke is a Jewish foe, not a
non-Jewish foe. Hence, it obviously means a Jewish foe. But is it permitted to
hate him? Surely it is written, Do not hate your brother in your heart! Again,
if there are witnesses that any Jew transgressed, all agree that he should be
hated! Why is this particular person singled out? Hence it must surely apply to
such a case where he has seen something indecent in him. Rav Nachman bar
Yitzchak said: It is a duty to hate him, as it is written (Mishlei
8:13), God's commandment is to hate wickedness.
This Talmud implies that there are situations
in which it is permissible and perhaps even obligatory to hate a fellow Jew, if
the other Jew has violated a commandment. Even if reiakha includes all
Jews in the obligation of love, achikha may exclude certain people,
namely those who engage in blatant violations of commandments. In other words,
the implication is that one is obligated to hate an evildoer.
This Talmudic passage
requires analysis. While the Talmud does resolve the contradiction between the
two verses via its distinction between evildoers and others, the nature of this
law is unclear. Why does one who performs evil lose the status of achikha?
What is to be accomplished through this hatred? If it is in fact true that
one must love all Jews, including evildoers, how can one simultaneously love and
hate?
Even if we accept that
one can lose the status of achikha, we must define the point at which
this happens. The simple understanding of the passage is that one who performs a
sin, even once, may be hated. Is this really sufficient?
Reasons for Hate
In order to better
understand this issue, we must identify different forms of "hate". In truth, the
word "hate" is a very strong word. However, there is a logical reason why one
would want to limit ones love for an individual whose behavior is detrimental.
Sometimes, despite our love for another, we must distance ourselves from a
friend who is liable to have a harmful influence.
This might be better
understood based on the context of the Torah's directive regarding hate. The
Torah links the prohibition of hatred to the positive commandment of providing
rebuke and constructive criticism to one who has sinned. In last week's lesson,
we noted that numerous commentators understood the verse as one continuum. One
must not hate an individual who has wronged him or her internally, concealing
his true emotions; rather, one must speak constructively and positively to the
offender.
The whole gist of the
prohibition of hatred is to be productive. Instead of hating, a Jew is supposed
to react positively to a misdeed. Sometimes showing hatred, a lack of approval
of the others actions, may accomplish just that. This idea finds expression in
the comments of the Semak (17), who writes:
The Torah cautions us
regarding someone whom we are allowed to hate for example, one who has
committed a transgression. Despite this, it is prohibited to hate this
individual privately in one's heart while publicly expressing love; rather one
is obligated to display his hatred.
This also appears to be the opinion of Rashi (Arakhin
16b): the verse is referring to a transgressor; the victim is forbidden to hate
in his or her heart. Instead, the victim must rebuke and improve the others
behavior.
In truth, the terminology
used by the verse mandating love of ones fellow Jew differs from that used in
the prohibition of hatred, and this distinction between reiakha and achikha
may tell us something. A "fellow" would include a varied degree of individuals,
including acquaintances and even people who are very different. A "brother", on
the other hand, can refer to one of two types of people: either a blood brother
or someone whose closeness can be expressed in terms of a fraternal
relationship. These two meanings may combine to explain why it is more limited.
A brotherly relationship may persist despite bad behavior; however, the
metaphorical closeness requires a backdrop of shared values and actions. One
whose behavior distances himself from his metaphorical brethren would cease to
be their kith and kin.
Always a Brother?
Ostensibly one may lose
the status of achikha, but Rav S.R. Hirsch points out that, to a
certain degree, the opposite is true. Though many commentators explain the
prohibition of hatred as dealing with one who has wronged another, in which case
resentment is only natural, Rav Hirsch (ad loc.) points out that the
language of the verse is meant to remind us of the bigger picture. At its root,
achikha reminds us of the verb acha, to mend or sew.
The assumption in this
prohibition is that our brother's misbehavior toward us is liable to provoke
hatred in our hearts
Such feelings are only natural in a heart not sensitized
by the Torah, but they must not arise in our hearts. Even if our brother has
done us many wrongs
he always remains our brother. After all, we are all God's
children, and we are all sewn together, joined in brotherhood to each other
through God. We are brothers, the children of one Father, and for the sake of
this one Father, Who still calls him His son and reserves for him a place in His
house and in His heart, hatred must not arise in our hearts
Again, there is nothing
as effective for removing hate from the heart as the idea implicit in the word
achikha. Every man is a brother in God's house; in our Father's house,
there is no place for hate arising out of jealousy.
In a similar way, even when dealing with one
who hasn't wronged us personally but has wronged God, though his actions require
a response on our part, we mustn't forget the bigger picture. Jews are family,
and we must prevent a breakup.
On a homiletic level, the
proper way to treat one who has sinned in light of the status of "achikha"
may be dependent on the difference of opinion regarding whether Jews remain
children of the Almighty if they are no longer dutiful offspring. The Talmud (Kiddushin
36a) records:
You are children to
Lord your God (Devarim 14:2) when you act like children you are called
children; if you do not act like children, you are not called children these
are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: One way or the other you are
called children.
Rabbi Meir then goes on to cite many verses in
which the Jews are rebuked for their misbehavior but still referred to as Gods
children. If all Jews are brothers because we are all children of God, then
whether estranged Jews are included in the category of achikha may
depend on whether estranged Jews remain children of God. If we endorses Rabbi
Meirs view, in the same way in which they remain God's children, they would
also retain the status of brothers.
Limitations on Hatred
Despite the lifting of
the prohibition of hatred regarding certain classes of evildoers, the Torah goes
out of its way to indicate that under certain conditions, these individuals are
actually treated with preference. Let us return to the verses cited earlier.
Regarding returning lost objects the Torah states:
If you come across your
enemy's ox or donkey going astray, you must certainly bring it back to him.
Regarding an animal that collapsed under its
load, the Torah states:
If you see your foes
donkey lying under its load and you refrain from helping him, you must certainly
help him.
Even though one is allowed to hate a sinner,
the Torah also requires one to return the lost object.
In fact, some
commentators understood the verse differently, explaining that your foe
should not be understood as one whom you hate but rather one who hates you.
The Ibn Ezra explains
that your foe refers to one who is hostile to you. Likewise, Rav A. Astruc (Midreshei
Ha-Torah, cited by Nechama Leibowitz) explains:
This means that if you
see the donkey of he who hates you lying under its burden, and he will not ask
you for your help because of his hatred for you
you nevertheless must not
refrain from assisting him now that he needs you, though you do not need him.
The Torah teaches you to ignore such conduct and behave in a noble-minded and
magnanimous manner, offering him your help.
However, most commentators accept the Talmud's
explanation that the verse refers to helping an individual whom one despises,
though it is permitted to hate this individual for his or her sins. As the Semag
(Positive 80-81) writes:
It refers to a case in
which one sees his fellow behave sinfully, which allows him to hate his fellow
if he warns him but his fellow does not repent
Nevertheless the Torah cautions
to be sympathetic and help him in his need.
The Torah doesn't want a rift to develop
between Jews; distancing a sinner by refusing to help him is counterproductive.
Though there is no absolute prohibition to hate another Jew, there is a
comprehensive mandate to love, cherish and take care of ones fellow Jew, even
though the same closeness may no longer exist.
This idea is furthered by
a number of sources that clearly indicate that we should hate wickedness but not
the wicked. The passage in Berakhot 10a states:
There were once some
thugs in the neighborhood of Rabbi Meir who caused him a great deal of trouble.
Rabbi Meir therefore prayed that they should die. His wife Beruria said to him:
What do you think? Because it is written: Let sinners cease? Is it indeed
written sinners? It is written sins (Tehillim 104:35)! Further, look
at the end of the verse: And then the wicked will be no more. Once the sins
cease, then the wicked will be no more! Rather pray for them that they should
repent, and the wicked will be no more. He did pray for them, and they
repented.
Similarly, Rav Tzvi Yehuda Ha-Kohen Kook (Li-ntivot
Yisrael 2) remarks on this, expounding the High Holiday liturgy:
In every place where we
find references to hatred, we understand clearly that the intent is only to
oppose the phenomenon of evil and to fight the impurity of evil; it is not
directed against people, as we say, "All wickedness will vanish like smoke."
His father, Rav Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Kohen Kook
(Siddur, Olat Reiya II 412:56), even advises to follow the opinion of
the Vilna Gaon regarding the daily prayers, emending the twelfth blessing of the
Amida: instead of "May all of the blasphemers be instantly destroyed,"
the proper text should be "May all wickedness be instantly destroyed."
The Meshekh Chokhma
provides a penetrating insight into the permissibility of actually hating an
evildoer. He notes the variations between the descriptions in Shemot
(23:5) and Devarim (22:4) describing the mitzva to assist one who is
hauling a load on his donkey. Only in Shemot is the individual referred
to as your foe, while in Devarim, the term is your brother,
the antonym, referring to the one in need in fraternal, rather than
adversarial, terms. He explains:
This was said prior to
the Sin of the Golden Calf, when all of Israel was a kingdom of priests and a
holy nation (Shemot 19:6); at that point, it was permitted to hate a
person who had committed a blatant sin. However, this did not remain true after
Israel's repeated sinful acts. From that point onward, whenever encountering a
sinner, we must examine our own conduct, which is not free of faults; one may
fall short in this area, another in that area. It is, therefore, forbidden for
anyone whose conduct is not free of all blemishes to hate another Jew. But there
are very few individuals who fit that bill, as the Talmud states (Sukka
45b): "I have seen eminent men, but they are few."
Essentially, the Meshekh Chokhma limits the
license to hate to those of supreme perfection, which he sees in the verses
change in terminology as almost nonexistent after the Sin of the Golden Calf.
The term "achikha" essentially returns the prohibition to its original
force, as all Jews are brethren in their flawed nature.
The Parameters of Hatred
The above-cited sources
would indicate that there is a difference of opinion on whether it is actually
permitted to hate another Jew who is a sinner. However, even if hating is
permitted, its parameters must be defined. As Tosafot (Pesachim, ad
loc.) point out, evidently even when one is permitted to hate certain
individuals, the license is limited.
Tosafot (s.v. She-raa)
are bothered by the fact that the Talmud elsewhere (Bava Metzia 32b) says
that one should first help his "foe" to load his donkey before he assists his
friend to unload his donkey "in order that one limit his desire to hate." If
your foe refers to a sinner, then why must one be helpful to this
individual, if the desire to hate is positive? Tosafot answer:
Since he hates the
sinning individual, the sinner will hate him as well, as it says (Mishlei
27:19) "As a face opposite water reflects another face, so do people
reflect each other's hearts,
and this will
lead to complete hatred. Therefore, limiting one's inclination to hate is called
for.
Tosafot distinguish
between permitted, limited hatred and forbidden, absolute hatred. However, they
do not fully explain the distinction.
The Machatzit Ha-shekel (OC
156:2) explains that the fear is that one will continue to hate even after the
transgressor has repented, when it is no longer permitted. Rav Tzvi Yehuda
Ha-kohen Kook, however, explains this a little differently.
Tosafot give us a deep
psychological insight. The verse in the book of Mishlei says, As
a face opposite water reflects another face, so do people reflect each other's
hearts. If the religious fail to behave with love
toward the irreligious, the latter feel hated and rejected. They sense that
religious people only have love for other religious people and that they look
upon the irreligious with condemnation. This situation arises from reverence for
God, but the irreligious person is left dejected. This causes conflict, and the
situation continues and worsens until it reaches total hatred, may God save us.
The origin point is a valid response to spiritual failing. The initial hatred
isn't complete, but it grows until it becomes utter abhorrence, and this is
something truly awful.
Hating a sinner is a necessary evil, but at
the same time it is a terrible reality which may get out of control. The Torah
seeks to remind us that even when hating others is necessary, ones strong
negative feelings must be limited. Otherwise, these feelings may be shorn of
their constructive aim, namely not learning from the errors of others.
This is expressed by the
Rambam at the end of Hilkhot Rotzeiach (13:14), where he writes:
The foe mentioned in the Torah is not a non-Jew, but rather a Jew. One
might ask: how is it possible for one Jew to hate another? Is it not written (Vayikra
19:17): "Do not hate your brother in your heart"? Our Sages explain that this is
referring to a person who while alone sees a colleague violate a transgression
and rebukes him, but the colleague does not cease transgressing. In such an
instance, it is a mitzva to hate the person until he repents and abandons his
wickedness. Even if he has not repented yet, if one sees him in panic because of
his cargo, it is a mitzva to unload and reload with him, instead of leaving him
inclined toward death, lest he tarry because of his money and be brought to
danger. For the Torah shows concern for the lives of the Jewish people, both the
wicked and the righteous, for they are attached to God and believe in the
fundamentals of our faith.
The Torah's care about the estranged Jew is
reflected in this balance: it is permissible to hate, but the need to show care
is overwhelming.
Applicability in Our Day
The various sources
quoted above refer to a license to hate under certain circumstances. One might
wonder if in our current reality, or even in the reality of the past hundred
years, factors might not have contributed to a reevaluation based on the Torah's
description of the preconditions for permitting hatred. A number of commentators
speak of a connection between hatred and rebuke. Both the Rambam and the
Chinnukh require it. The latter (Mitzva 238) states:
Regarding hatred of
wicked people, there is no prohibition. Rather, it is a mitzva to hate them
after we have reproved them many times about their transgressions and they have
refused to desist, for it is stated, "For indeed those who hate you, God, I hate
them, and I argue with those who rise up against You" (Tehillim 139:21).
Rav Yehonatan Voliner (in Marganita Tava,
printed by the Chafetz Chayim as an addendum to Ahavat Chesed, 17)
explains the practical ramifications of the understanding that links the
permissibility of hatred to the need for proper rebuke:
Even concerning wicked
people, the Maharam of Lublin explains that we are prohibited to hate them
unless we have reproved them for their actions. However, there is no one in this
generation who knows how to reprove effectively (as the Talmud, Arakhin
16b, states), and perhaps if this sinners were to be reproved properly, they
would listen and repent. Furthermore, perhaps their natural tendency towards
evil has caused them to behave this way, as it is written, Do not judge your fellow until you have been
in a similar position (Avot 2:4). It is definitely prohibited to curse them. Rather, we should seek
compassion on their behalf that God may help him to repent.
Rav Voliner transforms the permitted behavior
of hating a sinner into an obligation of care and concern for their welfare. The
practical ramifications of this understanding would be a complete abrogation of
the right to hate those involved in sin.
In fact, this would be
the understanding of the Chazon Ish, who points out (YD 2:28) that a
precondition for being able to treat sinners as apostates is that they
receive adequate rebuke; otherwise, they are considered to be acting under
compulsion and incapable of acting differently. After quoting a number of
sources, including those we have quoted, he concludes that one cannot treat
sinners as apostates, which would preclude our hating them.
The Tzitz Eliezer offers
a more minimalistic understanding of when it is forbidden to hate a sinner, one
that opens the door for a more concrete outlook. He is bothered by the fact that
the Chafetz Chayim seems to be inconsistent: if one may not hate evildoers in
generations in which there is no effective rebuke, how can he write elsewhere of
individuals who are to be treated harshly on account of their severe
transgressions? He offers an interesting distinction as a possibility for
explaining the Chafetz Chayim's position:
It is possible that the
Chafetz Chayim differentiates between one who sins privately and one whose
wickedness also serves as a stumbling-block for others. One must hate evildoers
like the latter, even in our day and age
for they rise up against the Torah and
attempt to enact laws that will sway people away from God; they are a stumbling
block for the community and, therefore, one would be obligated to hate them
The Tzitz Eliezer provides a logical outlook
upon the whole question of hating the wicked. In truth, one who loves God's
creations all the more so one who recognizes the inherent holiness of the
Jewish people will be able to distinguish between the actions of a Jew and
that individuals inner spiritual purity. At the same time, continuing to love a
Jew who is deeply involved in sin is dangerous, as one is liable to be swayed by
this model of behavior. For this reason one may hate an individual whose actions
are sinful if one has effectively reproved this individual but the latter shows
no intent of changing. Again, this hatred serves to distance oneself from a bad
influence. However, in our times, in which rebuke can no longer be done
effectively, we must focus our energies on compassion for sinners, realizing
that we don't know how to aid them effectively.
Nonetheless, when we are
dealing with individuals who go beyond sinning against the Torah by actively
plotting against Jewish causes and spiritual necessities, the proper response
remains hatred. Here the hatred is necessary not only to prevent oneself from
learning from others actions; to effectively combat their attempts, we have to
be steadfast in our commitment to the Torah and our understanding that their
unacceptable behavior requires a swift response on our part. However, deep
inside, we realize that they cannot be held culpable for their actions, and we
continue to pray that their evil may be removed and that these individuals may
return to being our brothers.
Returning to the Status of Brother
In Devarim 25:1-3,
the Torah uses two terms to refer to an individual sentenced to corporal
punishment: first, "rasha (wicked) and then, "achikha."
The Talmud (Makkot 23a) explains:
And your brother may be
degraded initially he is called wicked, but only up until the time he is
flogged; once he has been flogged, the Torah calls him "brother."
One should not view a sinning brother as
eternally doomed; instead, one must be constantly mindful of how to help.
Despite the various sources allowing hatred in certain circumstances, it
certainly is not always permitted. There is a specific form of hatred, called
baseless hatred, which is so detrimental that the Talmud points to it as the
cause of the destruction of the Second Temple (Yoma 9b). In our next
lesson, we will try to understand this forbidden form of hatred and to arrive at
a conclusion as to how to look upon one's fellow Jew.
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