Ch. 2 (VII) Sinaitic Tradition or Theoretical Analysis

 

VII. Were the Thirteen Hermeneutical Rules Given to Moshe at Sinai?

To conclude this chapter, let us examine the question of whether the thirteen hermeneutical rules by way of which the Torah is expounded were given to Moshe at Sinai. These rules are the foundation for the derivation of laws from the Biblical verses, as we will see at length in the next chapter, but we must determine their source.

The earliest source in which these rules appear is the well-known baraita brought at the beginning of Torat Kohanim (1a) and called the Baraita of Rabbi Yishmael:

Rabbi Yishmael said: The Torah is expounded by way of thirteen hermeneutical rules: 1) kal va-chomer (a minori ad maius – an argument that denotes an inference from smaller to bigger or vice versa); 2) gezeira shava (a verbal analogy; drawing an inference from one verse to apply to another); 3) binyan av (rules deduced from a single passage of Scripture and rules deduced from two passages); 4) kelal u-perat (generalization and specification); 5) perat u-kelal (specification and generalization); 6) kelal u-perat u-kelal (generalization, specification, and generalization); 7) a generalization which requires elucidation by the specification, and a specification which requires elucidation by the generalization; 8) a specification implied in the generalization, and excepted from it for pedagogic purposes, elucidates the generalization as well as the specification; 9) a specification implied in the generalization, and excepted from it on account of a special regulation which corresponds in concept to the generalization, is thus isolated to decrease rather than to increase the rigidity of its application; 10) a specification implied in the generalization, and excepted from it on account of some special regulation which does not correspond in concept to the generalization, is thus isolated either to decrease or to increase the rigidity of its application; 11) a specification implied in the generalization, and excepted from it on account of a new and reversed decision, can be referred back to the generalization only when the passage under consideration makes an explicit reference to it; 12) deduction from context; 13) when two Biblical passages contradict each other, the contradiction must be resolved by reference to a third passage.

The Rambam writes in the introduction to his commentary on the Mishna (pp. 28-29):

And regarding that which he did not hear anything about from the prophet, peace be upon him,[1] concerning the branches,[2] he deduced by way of logical reasoning, by way of the thirteen rules which were given to him at Sinai, namely, "the thirteen rules by way of which the Torah is expounded."

The plain meaning of the Rambam's words is that the thirteen hermeneutical rules were given to Moshe at Sinai. This approach follows from the words of other Rishonim as well, including Rashi in several places. For example: "Gezeira shava is one of the thirteen hermeneutical rules that were given to Moshe at Sinai" (Rashi, Ta'anit 20a, s.v. atya); "And gezeira shava was stated at Sinai, and all the thirteen hermeneutical rules" (Rashi, Yevamot 90b, s.v. amar leh).[3]

However, there are several difficulties with accepting these statements in their plain sense. First, the hermeneutical rules are cited in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, while later in that baraita (ibid. 3a), seven rules are attributed to Hillel the Elder, who lived three generations before Rabbi Yishmael:

Hillel the Elder expounded seven hermeneutical rules before the elders of Beteira: 1) kal va-chomer; 2) gezeira shava; 3) binyan av[4] [from one Biblical passage]; 4) [binyan av from] two Biblical passages; 5) kelal u-perat; 6) ka-yotzei bo mi-makom acheir (similarity in content to another Biblical passage); 7) deduction from the context. These are the seven hermeneutical rules that Hillel the Elder expounded before the elders of Beteira.

It seems that Hillel recognized seven fundamental hermeneutical rules, and Rabbi Yishmael divided the rule of "kelal u-perat" into several additional rules.

Furthermore, we have seen over the course of this chapter that the Rambam maintains there can be no dispute about matters that were taught to Moshe at Sinai. However, there is clear disagreement between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva regarding some of the hermeneutical rules:

Rabbi Yochanan said: Rabbi Yishmael, who ministered to Rabbi Nechunya ben Hakana, who expounded the whole Torah on the principle of kelal u-perat (generalization and specification), also expounded it on the principle of kelal u-perat; Akiva, who ministered to Nachum of Gamzu, who expounded the whole Torah on the principle of riba u-mi'et (amplification and limitation), also expounded it on the principle of riba u-mi'et. (Shevu'ot 26a)[5]

          Similarly, the Rashbatz notes in his commentary to the Baraita of Rabbi Yishmael:

This baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, but there are Tannaim who disagree with him concerning some of these rules, which are not accepted by all.

          The fact that there are disputes concerning some of the rules indicates that not all of the rules were given to Moshe at Sinai.

          The Netziv,[6] in his commentary Ha'amek Davar to the verse, "You shall do My statutes, and keep My ordinances" (Vayikra 25:18), explains that the first part of this command refers to creating rules for expounding the Torah:

To come up with novel Torah insights based on the rules that had already been taught does not require as much study as creating a rule for expounding the Torah based on laws that had already been received, as the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael added thirteen hermeneutical rules, for at first there were the seven rules brought by Hillel the Elder… After the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael, more rules were added, based on renewed study in every generation… Therefore, Scripture cautions here: "You shall do My statutes," to make rules based on deep study.

According to the Netziv, there is an obligation in every generation to delve into the rules for expounding the verses and develop them. In the days of Hillel, there were only seven such rules; in the days of Rabbi Yishmael, new rules were added, which had not been stated explicitly before. Elsewhere, the Netziv writes that Hillel as well had developed the first seven rules through his own study:

When Ezra came up from Babylonia and came to the Temple, they no longer had to make as much use of this degree of reasoning… When sins took their toll in the Second Temple period, and the merits of the Temple no longer sufficed to achieve illumination… and for this reason the Torah was almost forgotten from Israel, until Hillel came up from Babylonia and re-established it… And by studying the traditions that had been received until then, he came up with the seven hermeneutical rules by way of which the Torah is expounded… And they became like flooding streams of water… And this is what stood for them to raise up the yoke of the Torah. (Ha'amek She'eila, Kidmat ha-Eimek 1, 10)

          It should be noted that nothing here indicates that Hillel innovated those seven hermeneutical rules. The first rule, kal va-chomer, appears many times in Scripture itself; there was no need to innovate it in a later generation.[7] Regarding the other rules as well, the baraita states only that Hillel "expounded" them before the elders of Beteira, but not that he innovated them on his own.[8] It stands to reason then that it was Hillel who gathered the rules together and presented them as a cohesive method of expounding the Torah. Several generations later, Rabbi Yishmael formulated more detailed rules, and presented them as the thirteen rules by way of which the Torah is expounded.[9]

          This position of the Netziv did not prevent him from writing elsewhere: "Included in 'had given him in commandment' are the traditions that Moshe received from God about how to expound the Torah, namely, the thirteen hermeneutical rules by way of which the Torah is expounded" (Ha'amek Davar, Devarim 1:3). There is, however, no contradiction between his two statements. It seems the Netziv means to say that the very possibility of expounding the Torah and drawing new conclusions from it, with the aid of hermeneutical rules, was received by Moshe at Mount Sinai – this being the foundation of the Oral Law. However, the tools of analysis and inference change in each generation. It is possible that the seemingly unambiguous formulations of the Rambam, Rashi, and others should also be understood in this spirit.

          We return here to the question of the relationship between Sinaitic tradition and intellectual understanding. If one sees mental capacity as a virtue that is in no way inferior to tradition, there is room to say that the Sages derived even the tools themselves through their own reasoning and analysis of Scripture, and that a tradition was needed only for the authority to interpret verses and derive laws from them that are not explicitly stated.[10]

VIII. Summary of Chapter Two

          In this chapter, I have attempted to clarify whether the thousands of laws that the Sages derived through the hermeneutical rules are rooted in a tradition from Sinai, or whether the Sages created them through their own intellect and reasoning. As noted, contradictory approaches appear to emerge from various midrashim: Some midrashim express the idea that the entire Torah, with all its details and minutiae, was given to Moshe at Sinai, while others imply that the Sages can introduce innovations that were not handed down by way of a tradition going back to Moshe. We then considered the possibility that there is no contradiction between the different midrashim, and that a distinction can be made between the principles that were given to Moshe at Sinai and the details that were derived by the Sages through their analysis of Scripture.

          The Rambam's position on this issue proposes a distinction between the two types of laws that were handed down "by way of the oral tradition" ("accepted interpretations received from Moshe," which have a basis in Scripture, and "laws given to Moshe at Sinai," regarding which there is no proof from Scripture) and the laws derived by the Sages "on the basis of their own reasoning" through one of the hermeneutical rules by way of which the Torah is expounded. The salient feature of all the laws that were passed down "by way of the oral tradition" is that they are undisputed, and the salient feature of "accepted interpretations received from Moshe" is that they deal with "principles." As for the laws derived by the Sages on the basis of their own reasoning, they are subject to dispute, and they deal only with "branches." Admittedly, the distinction between "principles" and "branches" remains somewhat vague.

          As opposed to the Rambam's approach, we saw the approach of the Maharshal, that the laws derived by the Sages based on their own reasoning are no less important than the laws based on an oral tradition. It seems from his remarks that the vast majority of laws appearing in Rabbinic literature were derived by the Sages based on their own reasoning, and the laws handed down by way of an oral tradition are just those exceptional laws about which the Sages explicitly testified that they fall into that category. This approach is supported by the simple fact that the many discussions found in Rabbinic literature about the source of various laws almost always conclude that they stem from an analysis of the verses, and only rarely propose that a particular law is a tradition going back to Moshe at Sinai.

      We also examined the very concept of a "law given to Moshe at Sinai," and saw that there are places where it is clear that this expression should not be taken literally, but rather as symbolizing a clear and permanent law.

Lastly, we considered the source of the thirteen hermeneutical rules. Some of the Rishonim imply that the thirteen rules were given to Moshe at Sinai, but this approach, if understood literally, raises various difficulties. The Netziv explicitly states that the hermeneutical rules crystalized over the course of generations. It is possible that there is in fact no substantive dispute between the two approaches: the authority itself of the Sages to innovate laws with the help of interpretative tools is, indeed, based on a tradition going back to Sinai, but some of these tools came into being over the course of the generations.

(Translated by David Strauss)