Talking about the Bride
TALMUDIC AGGADA
By Rav Yitzchak Blau
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In memory of our
grandparents, whose yahrzeits fall this week:
Shmuel Nachamu ben Shlomo
Moshe HaKohen Fredman (10 Tevet)
Chaya bat Yitzchak David
Fredman (15 Tevet)
Shimon ben Moshe
Rosenthal (16 Tevet)
By their grandchildren
and great-grandchildren,
Aaron and Tzipora Ross
and family
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Shiur #11: Talking about the Bride
How does one dance before the bride [i.e. what does
one say about her]? Beit Shammai
says: The bride is as she is. Beit
Hillel says: The bride is beautiful and graceful. Beit Shammai said to Beit
Hillel: If the bride is lame or blind, will we say she is beautiful and
graceful? Did the Torah not say,
Keep distant from falsehood (Shemot 23:7)? Beit Hillel said to Beit Shamai:
Even according to your position, if a person acquires a poor purchase in the
market, should you praise it in his eyes or denigrate it? You should praise it. Therefore, the Sages said: A
persons disposition should always be pleasant with people. (Ketubot 16b-17a)
Last weeks class addressed the clash between peace and truth, which is
the apparent point of contention in this passage as well. According to this interpretation,
Beit Shammai favors truth, whereas Beit HiIlel prefers peace. Indeed, Ritva explains Beit Hillel
based on the statement in the gemara in Yevamot (65b) that we
fabricate for the sake of peace. However,
it seems hard to accept that Beit Shammai requires brutal honesty. Does the school of Shammai expect the
wedding guests to publically catalogue all the brides shortcomings?
Tosafot offer a less harsh reading of Beit
Shammai in which the guests do not insult the bride. Rather, they either remain silent, or
focus on her positive qualities. In
a sense, Beit Shammai argues that we need not choose between opposing ideals. We can refrain from uttering a
falsehood, while simultaneously not insulting the bride or her family. How does
Beit Hillel respond to this argument?
They contend that some questions cannot be avoided. If someone asks: How is the bride?
and you respond with silence or by praising her bowling prowess, those listening
get the implicit negative message.
Since the clash of ideals is inescapable, we must make a choice, and Beit HIllel
prefers a lie when the truth will prove insulting.
This explanation of Beit Hillel reminds me of
a famous thesis advocated by Isaiah Berlin.
Berlin argues that humanity is tempted to believe in one grand
harmonizing theory enabling simultaneous realization of all the ideals we value. In truth, some of these ideals, such
as liberty and equality, inherently conflict with each other. Frequently, we need to determine when
to give up one ideal for the sake of another. Our theme provides one of Berlins
examples. You believe in always telling the truth, no matter what; I do not,
because I believe that it can sometimes be too painful and too destructive
(The Pursuit of the Ideal p. 12, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity). Whereas Beit Shammai attempts to
adhere fully to both truth and peace, Beit Hillel follows Berlin in arguing that
unavoidable clashes force us to make difficult choices and to establish
preferences.
Maharal offers an alternative understanding of
Beit Hillel in which their position does not involve any fabrication. This gemara is not
discussing an objective fact, such as who was the third American president or
what is the chemical makeup of water.
Rather, the gemara discusses a subjective judgment regarding the
attractiveness of the bride. In this context, the guest can confidently answer
that the bride is pretty, because he assumes that the groom finds her so. In effect, beauty is in the eye of
the beholder.
According to Maharals reading of Beit Hillel,
why does Beit Shammai differ?
Perhaps Beit Shammai thinks that looks also belong in the category of objective
evaluations. Alternatively, the
school of Shammai might contend that the convention is for the guest to state
his own opinion and not that of the groom.
Therefore, offering a positive report based on the presumed estimation of
the grooms opinion still constitutes a fabrication.
R. Yerucham Fishel Perlow raises another
potential point of contention between the rival Talmudic schools (see his
commentary on Rasags Sefer Ha-mitzvot, volume I, p. 312). Is there a formal biblical
prohibition against lying or a positive commandment to tell the truth? R. Shimon ben Tzemach Duran
enumerates such a mitzva in his Zohar Ha-rakiya (positive commandment
159). The verse, Keep distant from
falsehood, however, appears in a judicial context, and may only address the
honesty of judges. Since Beit
Shammai cites the verse in a non-judicial context, they obviously hold this
verse forbids lying in general. In
contrast, Beit Hillel limits the concrete prohibition to a judge who acts with
dishonesty. Perhaps this interpretation of the verse explains why Beit Hillel
finds it easier to recommend fabrication.
R. Perlow says that this explanation of the debate emerges clearly from
Kalla Rabbati (9:1).
Even if we assume that the prohibition applies
specifically to judges, this assumption does not imply that the Torah is
indifferent to issues of honesty and falsehood.
Questions of moral character and personality traits do not lend
themselves to rigidly defined halakhot (laws). No law specifically prohibits
becoming angry or expressing excessive pride, yet the rabbinic tradition clearly
views both as highly problematic. In
fact, the Sages compare both anger and arrogance to idolatry (Yalkut Shimoni
Mishlei 954, Lekah Tov Behaalotkha).
Why does the Torah not explicitly forbid these traits?
As mentioned, character traits do not easily
admit of precise halakhic delineation.
Let us assume that anger is usually negative, often dangerous, and
sometimes appropriate. Can we offer
exact guidelines clarifying when it is appropriate? The question depends so much on
context, on the personalities in question, and on the roles that people play
(teacher, parent, friend etc.) that we cannot make an easy rule book. In place
of a Shulchan Arukh (legal code) regarding character traits, the Sages
conveyed general attitudes to character traits through stories, ethical maxims
and the like. Regarding such
matters, Aggada often offers more helpful guidance than Halakha.
Perhaps one can make a similar argument
regarding honesty. Though we clearly
grant truthfulness great value, absolute honesty sometimes clashes with
principles such as not insulting others, humility, or privacy, and must
sometimes give way to these principles (see Yevamot 65b and Bava
Metzia 23b). Due to this
complexity and the uniqueness of each situation, God decided not to include a
specific prohibition of lying among the commandments.
However, even if the Torah does not
include a concrete prohibition against fabrication, it certainly considers
honesty a sterling character trait and looks askance on a person of falsehood.
Beit Hillel cites the case of an item bought
in the market in an attempt to disprove Beit Shammai. Why does Beit Shammai not
contest that case as well, and argue in favor of telling the truth about the
bought object? Perhaps that case
came with a clear communal custom or ruling in favor of lying. Rashash notes that the gemara
purposely describes an acquisition in the market, rather than from a known
individual or shopkeeper. If telling the truth enables the buyer to rectify the
mistake through returning the faulty item, then a friend should tell him the
truth. When an honest answer
accomplishes nothing, then we prefer preserving a friends feelings. Items bought in the market do not
lend themselves to easy return.
Readers of this gemara often wonder
about the exclusive focus on the brides appearance. We recall the words
traditionally recited on Friday night: Grace is deceitful, and beauty is vain;
but a woman that fears the Lord, she shall be praised (Mishlei 31:30). Presumably for this reason, R. Meir
Schiff explains the phrase naeh ve-chasuda (translated above as
beautiful and graceful) as referring to both beauty and piety; he relates
chasuda to chasidut. If
we do not accept R. Schiffs reading, we can explain that the gemara
responds to a certain social reality.
Guests at weddings discuss the brides appearance; this discussion has
become a standard part of a wedding.
Of course, people of worth should also care about deeper qualities, but we still
need to provide guidance for real life situations that occur frequently.
Expressing opinions about the looks of the bride is one such situation. Halakha follows Beit Hillel in
prioritizing avoiding insult and hurt feelings.
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