Is there Suffering Without Sin?
TALMUDIC AGGADA
By Rav Yitzchak Blau
Shiur #22: Is there Suffering Without Sin?
R. Ami said: There is no death without sin, and no
suffering without iniquity. There is no death without sin as it says: The
sinning soul, it shall die. The son shall not bear the sin of the father;
neither shall the father bear the sin of the son. The righteousness of the
righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him
(Yechezkel 18:20). There is no suffering without sin as it says: Then
will I visit their transgression with the rod and their iniquity with stripes (Tehillim
89:33).
An objection is raised: The ministering angels said
before the Holy One, blessed be He, Why did you decree death for Adam Ha-rishon
(Adam, the first man)? He said to them: I gave him an easy commandment and he
violated it. They said to Him: But Moshe and Aharon fulfilled the entire Torah
and still perished. He said to
them: There is one event to the
righteous and to the wicked, to the good, etc. (Kohelet 9:2). He (R.
Ami) holds according to the following Tanna (scholar during the time of the
Mishna). For it was taught: R. Shimon b. Eleazar said: Moshe and Aharon also
died due to their sin, for it is said, Because you did not believe in me (Bemidbar
20:12). It follows that had you believed in Me, your time had not yet come to
depart from the world.
An objection is raised: Four died due to the serpent's counsel: Binyamin
the son of Yaakov, Amram the father of Moshe, Yishai the father of David, and
Caleb the son of David. All are known from tradition except Yishai the father of
David [whose death due to serpents counsel] is derived from an explicit verse.
For it is written, And Avshalom set Amasa over the host instead of Yoav. Amasa
was the son of a man whose name was Yitra the Israelite that came upon Avigail,
the daughter of Nahash, sister to Zeruiah, Yoav's mother (Shmuel II
17:25). Was she the daughter of Nahash? Surely, she was the daughter of Yishai,
for it is written: and their sisters were Zeruiah and Avigail (Divrei
Ha-yamim I 2:16). Rather, it must mean the daughter of one who died due to a
serpents counsel. Who is the author of this source? Shall we say, the Tanna
[who taught] about the ministering angels? But
there were Moshe and Aharon as well! Rather, it must surely be R. Shimon b.
Eleazar, which proves that there is death without sin, and suffering without
iniquity. Thus the refutation of R. Ami is a refutation. (Shabbat 55a-b)
Two verses from Kohelet express our tension regarding this topic.
There is one event to the righteous and the wicked conveys that death comes to
all, irrespective of their behavior. On the other hand, There is no person on
the earth who does good and does not sin (Kohelet 7:20) implies that all
humans violate the Divine command and deserve punishment. R. Ami thinks that all
suffering and mortality stem from sin. Ultimately, Tanaitic sources refute R.
Ami and indicate that death need not be attributed to sin, since four
individuals perished without transgressions.
Some authorities reject the notion that God brings suffering on those
without sin, even though multiple Talmudic sources support the idea. For
example, the simplest reading of the gemara in Berakhot (5a) about
afflictions of love suggests that some suffering cannot be traced back to
transgressions. Rambam depicts the idea of afflictions of love as a minority
position which he discards (Moreh Nevukhim 3:17). In fact, Moreh
Nevukhim 3:17 and 3:24 approvingly cite R. Amis position despite our
gemaras apparent refutation of his position. Meiri, who often follows
Rambams views, also insists that suffering stems from iniquity. He deals with
the gemaras conclusion by emphasizing greater fluidity and leeway
regarding aggadic source material. Despite the conclusion of Shabbat 55b,
Meiri affirms the philosophical position that sin causes suffering.
Meiri neutralizes the implications of the verse from the ninth chapter of
Kohelet by arguing that it reflects our perspective rather the reality.
In other words, we perceive death as arbitrarily striking the righteous together
with the wicked. In truth, everyone sins and deserves the finality of their
existence.
Ramban suggests a different way of addressing the apparent conclusion in
our gemara (see page 274 of Kol Kitvei Ha-Ramban II ed. Chavel).
Although the Gemara says that both aspects of R. Amis position have been
refuted, the cited source of disproof only discusses death, not suffering.
Perhaps the gemara establishes that all death comes from iniquity, but
leaves open the question of the source of suffering. Philosophically, this works
well because it is not obvious that death presents the same theological
challenge to Divine justice as suffering. Perhaps mortality is simply part of
the human condition, whereas suffering always relates back to sin.
The eminence of Rambam and Ramban are beyond question; nonetheless, the
gemara in Shabbat clearly implies that some suffering bears no causal
relationship with sin. Berakhot 5a and other Talmudic sources support
this idea. Beyond the source material, human experience also provides validation
for this idea. When we witness very fine human beings undergoing extreme
suffering, it seems preferable to admit that not all suffering is caused by sin
than to blame the victims and add insult to injury by assuming a sinful cause
for their torments.
Tosafot raise the question that if according to Kohelet 7:20, all
mankind sins, why not trace all death and afflictions back to a sinful cause?
They answer that Kohelet speaks in generalities about most people, but
exceptions exist. For example, four individuals perished only due to the counsel
of the snake. Maharsha offers a different answer. Even if we posit that everyone
sins, it does not follow that those sins justify death or the depth of
suffering. We can acknowledge that each person sometimes religiously fails and
still argue that some suffering cannot be justified as a punishment for sin.
Maharsha uses the same strategy to explain the anonymous Tanna who says
that Moshe and Aharon did not die due to sin. Seeing as how Bemidbar 20
makes it abundantly clear that these two Jewish luminaries sinned in Kadesh,
what justifies that Tanaitic position?
Maharsha writes that Bemidbar 20 connects Moshe and Aharons
inability to enter the Land of Israel to their misdeed; it does not say their
sin brought about their death. However we understand the transgression of Mei
Meriva, it may not justify the demise of Moshe and Aharon.
The listing of individuals who died due to the snake is quite striking.
We normally do not think of Binyamin, Amram, Yishai, and Caleb as the four
greatest Jews in history. Did these four individuals never sin? Were they actually religiously
superior to Avraham Avinu and Moshe Rabbenu?
Maharsha explains that these four individuals did not sin, yet they were
not as significant as Moshe and Aharon. To develop this idea, I would note that
none of the four held leadership positions. The only way to eliminate mistakes
is to avoid challenges. Anyone who confronts the pressures and difficulties of
leadership or parallel hardships invariably stumbles at some point. Thus, Moshe
and Aharon were far greater than Yishai and Caleb, even if the former sinned and
the latter did not. The deepest religious striving takes on challenges and
attempts to positively impact the community, even though that approach
guarantees occasional failure.
I would like to end with a question that has
perplexed me for years. The four individuals are all closely reacted to more
famous fathers and sons. The list includes Moshe and David's fathers, as well as
Yaakov and David's sons. Is there some logical connection between these kinds of
relationships and the ability to avoid sin? I have no satisfactory answer and
would be happy to hear from the readers.
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